The British Comet Tank: Just how did it Impact World War Two?

The Comet tank was a British tank that was involved towards the end of World War Two. It was made due to the need to have an improved tank to battle Nazi Germany’s forces, but what was its impact on the war? Daniel Smith explains.

Comet tanks of the 2nd Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, 11th Armoured Division, crossing the Weser at Petershagen, Germany. April 7, 1945.

The Comet (or the Comet I A34) was a British tank introduced towards the end of the Second World War, which took part in the invasion of Germany. It is regarded as one of the best British tanks of the war, continuing in service until the 1950s and it played a key role in the development of the later Centurion tank[1]. The Comet is held in such high regard for its cost effectiveness, speed, and low profile compared to other models at the time. However, its most important feature was the ability to take on German Panther and Tiger tanks, which had previously been too heavily armored to be penetrated by the majority of Allied tanks.

To the reader, it probably sounds like the Comet changed the course of the war by finally giving the British tank divisions a means of standing up to the powerful German armor. But did they really make a difference on the battlefield? Or did the Comet come too late to make any impact in the war? 

Development up to the Comet

To understand the significance of the Comet, we have to look at its development based on the downfalls of its predecessors. 

During the interwar years, the British army began to separate their tanks into 2 sections; cruisers (fast tanks for swarming the enemy) and infantry support (heavily armored vehicles whose purpose is clear from the name). However, it became clear in the early years of the Second World War that British tanks were vastly outmatched by their German counterparts.[2] 

Learning from the shortcomings of British tanks in the North Africa campaign, a request for a new heavy cruiser was made in 1941, which resulted in the MKVII Cromwell entering the battlefield in 1944.[3]

Despite it being an upgrade compared to previous models, there were still issues with the Cromwell. The foremost issue was that the main armament, the main gun, was not powerful enough to take on the heavily armored Panther and Tiger. 

Attempts were made to supply the British army with a tank capable of providing the firepower needed, resulting in the unsuccessful Challenger and the more successful Sherman Firefly. The Challenger was an attempt to add a larger gun to the body of a Cromwell; this resulted in an oversized tank that was unsuitable on the battlefield. The Firefly was created by attaching a larger turret and gun on top of the hull of the iconic Sherman tank. This fulfilled the army’s need initially, where the Fireflies could provide support to Cromwell armed formations for the upcoming D-Day landings. Complications arose in France largely due to the maintenance requirements of units equipped with two different tank models needing twice the amount of parts, ammunition and supplies.[4] Once again the request was made for a new tank model. 

The benefits of the Comet

At this point, in steps the Comet. Learning the lessons from previous tank designs, the Comet used parts from the Cromwell to maximize cost and production efficiency, but also added numerous improvements. The armor was increased and the profile was lowered making it harder to hit and penetrate. It also utilized an electrical traversing turret meaning the main gun could turn more smoothly and even had a telephone headset mounted on the side enabling infantry to talk to the crew.

But the most important improvement by far was the main armament. It had heavier firepower than both the Cromwell and the Firefly as it was fitted with a 17-pounder High Velocity gun, which fired 3-inch shells. The ammunition had also been developed to pack the same punch while being smaller in size, allowing the crew to carry more rounds and load them more easily. When firing anti-tank rounds, the Comet could even outclass the German Panther in terms of penetration. With this firepower, it could even take out Tiger tanks.[5]

Production started in late 1944 after being delayed in favor of increased Cromwell production.[6] The first batch was due to be delivered to the front in December of the same year, as a replacement for the 11th Armoured Division’s Shermans. This was then delayed to January due to the German offensive in the Ardennes forest, that later became known as the Battle of the Bulge. Once the division had been refitted with their new vehicles they went on to take part in the crossing of the River Rhine into Germany. However, few Comets saw the chance to face off against their German counterparts due to the scarcity of operational German tanks on the Western front in 1945. Reportedly, a Comet faced against a Tiger in April, in which the Comet won this encounter but this may be the only such example.[7]

Impact on the war

So how big was the impact of the Comet on the battlefield during the Second World War? Was the Comet in fact too little, too late?

Too little? Around 1,200 Comets were produced by the end of the war but only the 11th Armoured Division received enough to completely replace their older models. It could be argued this was a production issue, as for the majority of the war, the British Army relied largely on American made tanks.[8] It is important to note that the 11th Armoured favored their Comets, with the tanks proving popular with the division’s crews.[9] Nevertheless, the argument can still be made that there were enough to make a difference to the war. Too late? Undoubtedly so. If the Comet had been ready to join the D-Day landing forces, it could have provided the edge needed in destroying German armor and may even have resulted in a quicker Allied offensive through France and Germany. That is not to say that the Comet was entirely wasted; soldiers who got the chance to drive them certainly enjoyed their top speeds of 32mph on the Autobahns.

Several Comets can be seen today in various places in the UK and around the world. There are examples in the Tank Museum in Bovington, UK as well as the American Heritage Museum in Massachusetts, USA to name a few.

What do you think the impact of the Comet tank was on World War Two? Let us know below.

[1] Steven Zaloga, Armoured Champion: The top tanks of World War II (Stackpole Books, 2015), 226. 

[2] David Fletcher, Sherman Firefly (Bloomsbury, 2012), 10.

[3] Benjamin Coombs, British Tank Production and the War Economy 1939-1945 (C Black, 2013), 65.

[4] Zaloga, Armoured Champion, 244.

[5] David Fletcher and Richard C. Harley, Cromwell Cruiser Tank 1942-50 (Bloomsbury, 2012), 40.

[6] Coombs, British Tank Production, 105.

[7] Zaloga, Armoured Champion, 226.

[8] John Stone, The Tank debate: Armour and the Anglo-American Military Tradition (Routledge, 2018), 67.

[9] Fletcher and Harley, Cromwell Cruiser Tank, 40.

Bibliography

Benjamin Coombs, British Tank Production and the War Economy 1939-1945, C Black, 2013.

David Fletcher, Sherman Firefly, Bloomsbury, 2012.

David Fletcher and Richard C. Harley, Cromwell Cruiser Tank 1942-50, Bloomsbury, 2012.

John Stone, The Tank debate: Armour and the Anglo-American Military Tradition, Routledge, 2018.

Steven Zaloga, Armoured Champion: The top tanks of World War II, Stackpole Books, 2015.

The 1914-23 Armenian Genocide – Why is it so Little Remembered?

Everyone has heard of the atrocities associated with the Holocaust that killed countless people of Jewish ancestry and wreaked havoc upon the populations of Europe during World War II. However few people have heard of the genocide that occurred over 1914 to 1923, the Armenian Genocide. There are multiple reasons that the Armenian Genocide is not widely studied or spoken of as its historical context continues to affect modern geopolitics. Regardless of the sensitive nature of current geopolitical relations, the truth of the countless lives lost must be examined before a larger audience to allow their memory to not be forgotten. Roy Williams explains.

Armenian people are marched to a nearby prison in Mezireh by armed Ottoman soldiers. Kharpert, Ottoman Empire, April 1915. Source: here.

The Armenian Genocide occurred from 1914 to 1923 coinciding with the events of World War I. The ethnic Armenians of the eastern regions of the Turkish Ottoman Empire had long been treated as a scapegoat for issues that plagued the Ottoman Empire. With the rapid decline of Ottoman Turkish authority, power was consolidated in the Triumvirate of power that included a man known as Talat Pasha who had disdain for the Armenian people. To stop the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey began implementing nationalist measures to ensure that Turkey and all its lands were for the Turkish rather than ethnic or religious minorities. The Christian Armenians became the target of intense scorn and soon would be cleansed from the Ottoman territory to ensure Turkish dominance. From 1914 to 1923, over 1.5 million Armenians were systematically slaughtered in the first modern genocide of the 20th century. Methods of genocide included marching people through the desert without food and water to await their deaths, as well as firing squad executions and burying the dead in mass graves. These mass graves can still be seen throughout this region of Anatolia as a grim reminder to the dark past that the Turkish authorities refuse to acknowledge. Many people in Europe and the United States condemned these atrocities and asked for the governments of the free world to assist in stopping them. Sadly, no unified effort presented itself in stopping the atrocities of the Armenian Genocide. Later with the rise of the Nazis in Germany, Hitler infamously mentioned in his Obersalzberg Speech, speaking proudly of his plans to cleanse Poland, ”Who, after all, speaks of the annihilation of the Armenians?” (Adolf Hitler, 1939) This leads to the direct conclusion that Hitler and the Nazi party of Germany realized they could theoretically commit genocide without any repercussions. 20

Multiple primary source accounts exist from individuals who witnessed the massacre or saw the Turkish government plans to exterminate the Armenians. These accounts range from Armenian victims to government officials who admitted to the slaughter in one form or another. The Ambassador for England, Henry Morgenthau, recorded his encounters with Talat and his dealings with the Armenian people, describing the obvious and overbearing nature of the Turkish animosity towards the Armenian people. On July 16, 1915, Henry Morgenthau in his ‘Report That Ottoman Turkey Is Seeking to Exterminate the Armenian Nation’ detailed the mass deportations and the use of racial extermination. “Have you received my 841? Deportation of and excesses against peaceful Armenians is increasing and from harrowing reports of eyewitness it appears that a campaign of race extermination is in progress under a pretext of reprisal against rebellion.”

Little remembered

The question remains, why is the Armenian Genocide a forgotten part of the history of the West? Why would something so traumatic and historically significant be brushed to the side as an insignificant part of the tragedy of World War I? The reasons for this forgotten part of history are largely intentional. The current government of Turkey outwardly denies the atrocity that occurred in the Armenian Genocide. Turkey holds that the casualties of the Armenian Genocide were not an act of intentional genocide but casualties of World War I that were largely the fault of Armenians who allied themselves with Russia. The geopolitical balance of the Middle East currently relies heavily upon the countries of Turkey and Israel as two of the nations who largely have favorable relations with Europe and the United States. Turkey refuses to accept responsibility for the events of the Armenian Genocide and in this regard does not like the United States from criticizing them for their historical atrocity. Many nations do not recognize the Armenian Genocide as genocide. The US only recognized the Armenian Genocide in late 2019, while Israel still does not recognize it. Israel’s refusal to acknowledge the mass suffering of the Armenian genocide is perplexing as the Armenian Genocide parallels the Holocaust in many significant ways. The United States’ only very recent of the Armenian Genocide stems from a careful balance of keeping Turkey as a tentative ally. 

The Armenian Genocide was one of the darkest moments of the 20th century. Countless lives were lost in the Turkish purge that was based on keeping Turkey Turkish. In some ways, the genocide may have also influenced the way that Adolf Hitler went about orchestrating the Holocaust. Though the modern day government of Turkey does not wish to accept responsibility for this heinous atrocity, it is the responsibility for the free people of the world to recognize genocide and condemn anyone who attempts to deny the memory of the countless souls that were lost. As the adage goes, “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing” (commonly attributed to Edmund Burke, see here).

Editor’s note: The quote from Hitler referenced in the article is disputed – see here. In addition, the exact number of deaths in the genocide remains disputed – see here.

Why do you think the Armenian Genocide is not better remembered? Let us know below.

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 1928 New York Gubernatorial Campaign – Part 4 – Victory

Nearly exhaustive research has been done on Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR’s) four national campaigns, his controversial Presidency, and his leadership in WWII. Surprisingly little, however, has focused on his New York State gubernatorial campaign in 1928. This was the campaign and position in which FDR would prove his fitness for the presidency of the Unites States, a position he held from 1933 to 1945.

In part 4, K.R.T. Quirion explains how Roosevelt closed his campaign with a focus on the justice system, the close election results, and the longer-term consequences of Roosevelt’s victory.

You can read part 1 on how Roosevelt overcame a serious illness, polio, to be able to take part in the 1928 campaign here, part 2 on how Roosevelt accepted the nominarion here, and part 3 on Roosevelt’s opponent and how Roosevelt performed on the campaign trail here.

Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1930, while Governor of New York.

Back to New York City

After completing his up-State tour, FDR returned to the Democratic bastion in New York City and its boroughs for the final week of the campaign. There, he continued to develop and expand his platform of populist programs aimed at winning the support of the common man. In Queens, he addressed the problem of urban congestion. According to Roosevelt, a major contributor to overcrowding was the abandonment of farmland by rural populations. To combat this, he promised to actively pursue ways of retaining rural populations.[1] It was in the interest of urban and rural citizens alike that farms be adequately maintained. 

However, as rural populations moved to town, city people moved out. Roosevelt believed that two factors were contributing to suburbanization, the growth of popular sports and the democratization of the automobile.[2] New York’s highway program had aided the latter. As to the former, Roosevelt told the audience of Governor Smith’s long legal struggle to acquire for the “great rank file” of New York’s citizenry, adequate parks facilities.[3] He explained how entrenched interests attempted to subject the former Governor to “political embarrassment,” but that Smith fought for what “was approved by the people of the State” and won.[4] In closing, Roosevelt assured the assembled voters that the Democratic Party “will keep on winning as long as it goes ahead with a program of progress.”[5]

The justice system

During the campaign, FDR developed three of the four issues he had outlined in his acceptance speech. On October 30th in the Bronx, he finally addressed the fourth; a Roosevelt administration would be committed to the reforming of New York’s justice system. He considered the administration of justice to be foundational to effective governance.[6] On that account, New Yorkers had much to be proud of in their jurisprudential tradition. However, he believed that reform was necessary to ensure that the State could “keep pace with the fundamental changes in…social conditions.”[7] He warned that a number of factors—such as an increase in population, the growth of cities, and the growth of business—were coalescing resulting in dramatic consequences to the justice system. Specifically, he stated that “these increased complexities of our social relations have added to the difficulties of assuring fundamental justice to the individual man and women.”[8]

First and foremost, Roosevelt advocated for the use of targeted efforts to provide “more modern, more American methods” to address the causes of crime.[9] He hoped to reduce not only the slowness and costliness of litigation but also the volume. Regarding the recent proliferation of civil suits, Roosevelt retorted, “You know, we Americans just love to go to court.”[10]Affirmative steps were needed to reigning in the number of cases being brought to trial. As governor he intended to launch a fact-finding mission to determine “what cases cause the delay and the expense; what kinds of cases take up the time of the courts; what courts are most crowded; and, finally, what cases ought never have come to court at all.”[11]

He discussed other reforms that he would pursue if elected as well. On the civil side, he promised to work for a reduction in the number of jury trials, eliminate perjury, hold members of the bar to a stricter ethical standard, eliminate ambulance chasing and dilatory motions, and finally, to devise new administrative tribunals tasked with freeing the court system of certain kinds of cases. 

According to Roosevelt, the criminal justice system needed reform as well. If elected, he proposed twelve steps for study in the coming years. These included a complete overhaul of New York’s prison labor system, the establishment of state detectives to assist District Attorney’s and a revision of the Penal Code.[12] He also suggested the creation of a court system focused on minor crimes. Finally, he declared his intention to revise the firearms law. 

Roosevelt lamented that there was often “talk of one law for the rich and another law for the poor.”[13] Looking at the States justice system as a whole, he believed that reform was necessary, and that the people of New York did as well. In closing, he told the voters that “what we need is action, and I propose to do all in my power to see that it is brought about.”[14]

Roosevelt’s whirlwind campaign ended on the 5th of November in Poughkeepsie. There he was greeted by tens of thousands of supporters parading in his honor. Over the course of nineteen days, he had traveled 1,300 miles and had given almost 50 separate speeches. The next morning, he cast his vote at the Hyde Park Town Hall and then retired to his campaign headquarters in the Biltmore Hotel to await the returns.      

VICTORY

Up-State Republican leaders had early on declared that they were “nevermore confident in victory” and prophesied a “big increase in the vote” from their districts.[15] At first, the election returns seemed to verify their confidence. Nationally, Hoover had defeated Smith in a landslide that seemed to be taking Roosevelt down with it. By midnight Election Day, votes for Ottinger coming in from up-State had more than offset the Democratic powerhouse of NYC. The papers began calling the race for Ottinger on the morning of the 7th. For Roosevelt, however, it was still too close to concede. 

Late night on the 7th, Roosevelt, Flynn, and others in the campaign took notice of the “slowness of the returns from certain upstate counties” where they were confident that Roosevelt had strong support.[16] They suspected that entrenched officials in those districts were up to something. Flynn then issued a statement indicating that key figures of the Democratic State Committee—accompanied by a staff of 100 lawyers—would be heading up-State to investigate suspected voter fraud. Soon thereafter, “many thousands of normally Republican votes” that Roosevelt won began trickling out of the up-State precincts.[17]

As the race began to shift in Roosevelt’s favor, Ottinger released a statement saying that he was ready to “concede nothing.”[18] Republicans were holding out for a few favorable up-State districts as well as about 20,000 absentee ballots. By this time, Roosevelt had returned to his beloved Warm Springs where he was recuperating from the campaign and awaiting its final verdict. On the 18th of November, Ottinger telegrammed Roosevelt his concession stating that “Undoubtedly the final count…will declare your election…You have my heartiest good wishes for a successful administration.”[19]

The election ended with 2,142,975 votes going to Roosevelt and 2,117,411 to Ottinger. Roosevelt was victorious by a razor-thin margin of a mere 25,564 votes. [20] New York State Democrat’s had paid dearly for these votes with campaign funds listed at $5,028,706.02 and expenses of $4,845,774.78. The Republicans, on the other hand, reported astonishingly small receipts of $867,874.25 and expenditures of $832,225.62.[21] Each vote cost the Democratic State Committee $2.26. This was astoundingly expensive when compared to the $0.39 per vote spent by Republicans. [22] In economic terms, the Roosevelt campaign was a disaster. Even in the overall vote, Roosevelt was not very successful, winning only by a plurality of 0.6 percent.[23] Nor had he delivered New York to Smith in the national election as originally hoped. Nonetheless, Roosevelt had fought hard and won.

A personal success

Despite his bitter-sweet victory, the gubernatorial campaign was a fantastic personal success for Roosevelt on several fronts. Given that his previous eight years had been spent living on the periphery of New York politics, his ability to carry the state despite only three weeks of campaigning was a testament to his continued political renown. It was a testament to Howe and Eleanor’s feverish work behind the scenes over those eight years as Roosevelt’s eyes and ears. And, it was a testament to the lasting impact of his “Happy Warrior” speech in 1924. 

This combination of factors boosted Roosevelt’s campaign on to an equal footing with Ottinger’s from the start. If he had dropped out of the public eye after contracting polio in 1921, he would have been unlikely to have been considered for the Governorship at all. Assuming he was considered, he would have been at a great disadvantage compared to his highly prominent and active political opponent. 

Even though challenges to his health would re-surface, the 1928 gubernatorial race presented Roosevelt with an opportunity to implement strategies to deal with this critical issue. He presented himself as a physically strong candidate that appeared in excellent condition. By appearing indefatigable, despite the breakneck speed of his campaign, voter concerns about his health were assuaged. In face-to-face meetings, New Yorkers were continually surprised “by his vigor.”[24] In the eyes of the electorate, Roosevelt appeared more than capable of handling matters of State despite his physical ailment. In future campaigns, he would repeat these strategies with great success. 

The gubernatorial campaign also affirmed Roosevelt’s new Democratic coalition strategy. The pattern of Democratic voter distribution in the 1928 result among cities, towns, and villages as well as between industrial and agricultural areas “indicated a trend” that confirmed the validity of forging a new coalition between labor, agriculture, minority, and urban voters.[25]During the next four years he would cultivate and mold this coalition into the base of the new Democratic Party. He accomplished this in part by working to establish a “permanent national organization, which would ‘extend its…help to…campaigns in between elections and…serve to constantly educate the public.”[26]    

Finally, the 1928 campaign elevated Roosevelt as the “heir apparent to the leadership of the Democratic Party.”[27] Following the election, he commissioned a national survey of the Democratic leadership designed to look at several important party matters. Out of the 979 responses from forty-five states “approximately 40% said that they were for Roosevelt or were leaning in his direction…” and “…15 percent specifically declared that he should be the party's next presidential nominee.”[28] From his position as the de facto leader of the Party, Roosevelt was able to further strengthen his new Democratic coalition. 

The leadership Roosevelt displayed during the campaign and his first term in office not only secured him a second term as governor but also secured his place at the helm of the Democratic Party. Over the next four years as governor, he developed the policies and strategies that he would later employ as the nation’s chief executive. His response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the following years of economic depression highlighted his ability to cope with a crisis. By 1932, he was once again poised to rendezvous with destiny.

Now, you can read K.R.T Quirion’s recently published series on telegraphy in the US Civil War here, or the secret US Cold War facility in Greenland here.

[1] Roosevelt, “Campaign Address (Excerpts), Queens, N.Y. October 29, 1928,” 55.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., 56.

[4] Ibid. 

[5] Ibid., 59.

[6] Roosevelt, “Campaign Address (Excerpts), Bronx, N.Y. October 30, 1928,” 62

[7] Ibid., 63.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., 63-4.

[10] Ibid,64.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., 66.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times, (Oct 18, 1928), “Roosevelt Assails Campaign Bigotry,” New York Times (1923-Current file), 1.

[16] Davis, FDR: The New York Years 1928-1932, 45.

[17] Ibid.

[18] “Ottinger Refuses to Concede Defeat,” (Nov 08, 1928), New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[19] “Ottinger Concedes Roosevelt Victory,” 1.

[20] Davis, FDR: The New York Years 1938-1932, 47.

[21] Special to The New York Times, (Nov 27, 1928), “Democrats List Funds at Albany,” New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[22] See Table 1. 

[23] Davis, FDR: The New York Years 1938-1932, 47.

[24] From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times, (Oct 22, 1928), “Roosevelt Stands Campaigning Well,” New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[25] Davis, FDR: The New York Years 1928-1932, 47.

[26] Earland I. Carlson, “Franklin D. Roosevelt's Post-Mortem of the 1928 Election,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Aug., 1964), 300.

[27] From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times, (Nov 11, 1928), “Roosevelt Hailed by South as Hope of Party in 1932,” New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[28] Carlson, “Franklin D. Roosevelt's Post-Mortem of the 1928 Election,” 307.

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__________. FDR: The New York Years 1928-1933. New York, NY: Random House. 1985.

Goldberg, Richard Thayer. The Making of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Triumph Over Disability. Cambridge, MA: Abt Books. 1971.

Gunther, John. Roosevelt in Retrospect, A Profile in History. New York, NY: Harper. 1950.

Troy, Gil, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., and Fred L. Israel. History of American Presidential Elections: 1789-2008, Vol. II, 1872-1940. New York, NY: Facts on File, 2012.

Journal Articles           

Carlson, Earland I. “Franklin D. Roosevelt's Post-Mortem of the 1928 Election.” Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Aug., 1964): pp. 298-308.

Goldman, Armond S., Elisabeth J. Schmalstieg, Daniel H. Freeman, Jr, Daniel A. Goldman and Frank C. Schmalstieg, Jr. “What was the cause of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s paralytic illness?” Journal of Medical Biography. (11, 2003): pp. 232–240.

 Kiewe, Amos. “A Dress Rehearsal for a Presidential Campaign: FDR's Embodied "Run" for the 1928 Governorship.” The Southern Communication Journal. (Winter, 1999): pp. 154-167.

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 1928 New York Gubernatorial Campaign – Part 3 – The Campaign

Nearly exhaustive research has been done on Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR’s) four national campaigns, his controversial Presidency, and his leadership in WWII. Surprisingly little, however, has focused on his New York State gubernatorial campaign in 1928. This was the campaign and position in which FDR would prove his fitness for the presidency of the Unites States, a position he held from 1933 to 1945.

In part 3, K.R.T. Quirion tells us about Roosevelt’s opponent, Albert Ottinger, and then how Roosevelt performed on the campaign trail.

You can read part 1 on how Roosevelt overcame a serious illness, polio, to be able to take part in the 1928 campaign here, and part 2 on how Roosevelt accepted the nominarion here.

Franklin D. Roosevelt in Hyde Park, New York in 1928.

THE OPPOSITION

Like Roosevelt, Albert Ottinger had an impressive resume. A graduate of New York University School of Law, Ottinger was elected to the State Senate of New York in 1917 and 1918. In 1921 he was appointed Assistant Attorney General of the United States. Three years later he resigned from this position and was elected Attorney General of New York. He was re-elected in 1926 as the sole survivor of a Democratic landslide. That year every other member of the Republican ticket went down in defeat.[1] Roosevelt knew that Ottinger was a “very promising gentleman” as well as a serious political opponent.[2]

In an early interview with S.J. Woolf of the New York Times, Ottinger said that, “[t]he inhibitions, ‘thou shalt not lie’ and ‘thou shalt not steal,’ would perfectly describe the work upon which I have been employed throughout my term of office as Attorney General, and I shall continue to employ them in my future work.”[3] He also took the opportunity to tout his record of fighting for the common man. Ottinger recalled how, when a statute requiring voting machines to be installed throughout New York City was being debated, he had fought for the enforcement and protection of each citizen’s right to vote, and for that vote to “be honestly counted.”[4]

He claimed that he was for the honest enforcement of all State laws, including those deemed harsh, archaic or repressive. Tempering these remarks, he said that there is a humane manner to accomplish the execution of a law. Where a law is humane it must be “humanely interpreted and applied.”[5] As an example, he pointed to his work with the Workmen’s Compensation act.[6] By clearing out backlogged cases as Attorney General, Ottinger claimed to have granted quick relief to the maimed. Furthermore, his fight against loan sharks, grafters, and other types of criminal fraud enabled him to campaign as a “champion of ‘little people.’”[7]

Besides accepting Roosevelt’s challenge to make the water-power policy a primary issue of the race, Ottinger used his nomination speech to reveal other parts of his platform. He focused on minimizing the “extravagant expenditures of Smith’s administration. In its place, he pledged to focus on the economy, revise the taxation system and “abolish the State income tax.”[8] He also announced his intent to establish a state bureau of investigation to “detect crime and discover the criminal.”[9]Finally, he vowed to stamp out corruption in state and local governments.[10] On the prohibition question Ottinger—unlike Roosevelt—decided to stay silent.

Ottinger waged an active campaign throughout the State. Beginning with his acceptance speech in NYC on October 16, Ottinger spoke sixteen times in fourteen up-state cities before returning to Manhattan on the 24th.[11] Early on he associated himself with Herbert Hoover and the wider national election. At his first stop in Elmira, NY, Ottinger told the crowd that he believed the people of New York would “Hooverize [the] election…and…draft the brains of that gigantic genius of organization for…the benefit of all the American people.”[12] Political leaders up-State had assured  him that “all those supporting Hoover would support [him].”[13] According to Oliver James, the Chairman of Ottinger’s campaign committee, the plurality of 600,000 up-State votes would decide the election.[14]

FROM BINGHAMTON TO POUGHKEEPSIE

Ottinger’s campaign men could make predictions of a massive up-State vote for their candidate because it was a historically Republican voting bloc. For that very reason, FDR chose to run a hard campaign in the up-State counties; whereas his Democratic predecessors had chosen to rely on their traditional bastions in the major cities. Instead, he had a theory for a new Democratic coalition of labor, agriculture, minorities, and urban voters. Seeking to forge this coalition, Roosevelt carefully crafted his platform with their interests in mind.

In Jamestown—a minor New York city but the heart of one of the States' most prominent agricultural centers, Chautauqua County—Roosevelt delivered his first message to the agricultural interests of the up-Staters’. After affirming the Democratic platform on agriculture, Roosevelt declared that he “aimed to go even further.”[15] He said that he wanted to see “the farmer and his family…put on the same level of earning capacity as their fellow Americans.”[16] Acutely aware that he was speaking in a primarily Republican district, he told the assembled crowd that his fight was “not with the Republican rank and file” but with the leadership.[17] Roosevelt had given a similar speech in Elmira—“the heart of dairy country”—the day before and was greeted by an audience that showed enthusiastically that they “appreciated his effort to deal constructively with their specific problems.”[18]

Roosevelt decided to roll out his labor plank in Buffalo on the 20th. He had originally planned to speak on a different subject but changed his plans when Ottinger “had the nerve to talk about what the Republican Party has done for labor.”[19] In Buffalo, Roosevelt delivered one of his most memorable lines from the campaign. “Somewhere in a pigeon-hole in a desk of the Republican leaders of New York State is a large envelope, soiled, worn, bearing a date that goes back twenty-five or thirty years.”[20] This envelope, he continued, has “Promises to labor” written on the front and is filled with identical sheets of paper dated two years apart.[21] “But nowhere is a single page bearing the title ‘Promises kept.’”[22] He closed by indicting “half-way measure[s]” proposed by a Republican “smoke-screen commission,” and challenged the crowd to compare the two party’s programs.[23]

Roosevelt then listed the Democrats’ promises to labor. First, he pledged to “complete Governor Smith’s labor and welfare program.”[24] Second, he promised to give old-age pensions a fair consideration.[25] He also guaranteed to establish an advisory board on minimum wage for women and children, extend the Workmen’s Compensation Act and liberalize “laws relating to the welfare of mothers and children.” [26] The Roosevelt administration would be committed to the principle that the “labor of human beings is not a commodity.” [27]

Social Programs

The next evening in Rochester, Roosevelt addressed the social programs that were central to the liberal platform of the New York Democratic Party. He began his discussion of these “human function[s]” of government by reminding voters of the great strides in education achieved by Governor Smith.[28] Despite the progress already made, FDR admitted that additional State aid would be needed to continue raising the minimum educational standards throughout the State. 

Drawing a parallel between education and healthcare, he said that an expansion of medical service was needed statewide.[29]He lauded the Democratic Senate for passing bills increasing social welfare and government assistance but denouncing the Republican House for ignoring these “pleas” which they had “strangled to death in committee.”[30] If elected, he planned to accelerate the momentum already gained and ask for the money to expand healthcare assistance throughout the State.[31]

Finally, he addressed the issue of old-age pensions. New York’s great need for an old-age pension law was nowhere more apparent than when examining the State’s Poor Laws. In Rochester, he exclaimed that “[I]t just tears my heart to see those old men and women,” going into the County Poorhouse. [32] He concluded that if an adequate old-age law was passed there would be no need to reform the Poor Laws. Instead, they would be repealed “forever and ever.”[33] Roosevelt summarized all that he was trying to accomplish with his campaign by the motto, “Look outward and not in; look forward and not back; look upward and not down, and lend a hand.”[34]

From Water-power to Prohibition

The water-power issue was front and center in Syracuse. On the 23rd, he regaled the audience with the twenty-one-year long struggle between public and private power interests in the use and administration of water resources throughout the State. He weaved a complex narrative which portrayed the Republican Legislature as putting special interests above the good of the public, while the Democrats—and particularly Governor Smith—fought for the people of New York. He claimed that Ottinger’s election would mean the abandonment of the policy supported by the electorate.”[35] Worse still, it would mean the immediate abdication of power resources to “development by private corporations.”[36]

Syracuse turned out to be the most effective speech of the campaign.[37] This intense barrage forced Ottinger to address the issue on a battlefield of Roosevelt’s choosing. Ottinger explained his actions in terms designed to convince the electorate of his “profound devotion to the public interest.”[38] Even while Ottinger scrambled to cover his tracks on the power issue, FDR declared that the people had already made up their minds.     

Later that same day in Utica, Roosevelt reiterated his stance against the re-enactment of State Prohibition Laws. Citing his tenure on the National Crime Commission, Roosevelt explained that all across the nation there was an “undoubted increase in crime.”[39] One factor contributing to this drastic crime surge was the bootlegging of liquor.[40] He expressed concern that Prohibition had caused a proliferation of criminal activity and was leading to a general disrespect for the law. In light of this, he appealed to the voters, urging them to fight the enactment of additional prohibition laws at the state level. He believed that state dry laws added to the confusion rather than streamlining enforcement. Instead, he believed that the Federal Volstead Act was sufficient—when properly enforced—to fulfill the needs of New York.

By the 26th, the campaign was seeing massive support from the up-State counties. Recounting his travels to a gathering in Troy, Roosevelt told how his motorcade was “kidnapped” in Fonda by a group of people in forty or fifty cars.[41] His abductors directed the campaign to the town of Gloversville. In past elections, “two Democrats, and sometimes three” went to the Gloversville polls on Election Day.[42] When Roosevelt arrived in the town, he was greeted by some two thousand people who had gathered to hear him speak. Later that same day the campaign made another impromptu stop in Amsterdam to speak before a group of sixteen hundred. “Too bad about this unfortunate sick man isn’t it,” he quipped.[43]

With the up-State tour complete, FDR returned to New York City with one week left of this fateful election.

Now, read the final part in the series, ‘Victory’, here.

What do you think of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s activity on the campaign trail? Let us know below. 

[1] S.J Woolf, (1928, Oct 07), “The Two Candidates for the Governorship,” New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[2] “Roosevelt Demands State Keep Power,” 2.

[3] Woolf, “The Two Candidates for the Governorship,” 1.

[4] Ibid., 1.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ottinger explained that the Workmen’s Compensation act was a “beneficial statute passed in the interest of the injured workman.” Ibid. 

[7] Davis, FDR: The New York Years 1928-1932, 31.

[8] “Ottinger Accepts Power as Big Issue,” (Oct 16, 1928), New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[9] Ibid, 2.

[10] Ibid.

[11] “Ottinger to Visit 14 Up-State Cites,” (Oct 13, 1928), New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[12] From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times, (Oct 3, 1928), “Ottinger Advances Queens Sewer Issue in Opening Campaign,” New York Times (1923-Current file), 1.

[13] “Big Ottinger Vote Predicted Up-State,” (Oct 12, 1928), New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[14] “Ottinger to Visit 14 Up-State Cites,” 1.

[15] The platform included a “pledge for a careful study” of the farming economy and a pledge for an investigation into the “farm tax situation.” Roosevelt, “Extemporaneous Campaign Address (Excerpts), Jamestown, N.Y., October 19, 1928,” 27.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid., 29.

[18] From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times, (Oct 19 1928), “Roosevelt Scouts Tariff Prosperity” New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[19] Roosevelt, “Campaign Address (Excerpts), Buffalo, N.Y. October 20, 1928,” 30.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., 30-31

[22] Ibid., 31.

[23] Ibid., 32.

[24] Ibid., 34-35.

[25] Ibid., 35.

[26] Ibid., 36.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Roosevelt, “Campaign Address (Excerpts), Rochester, N.Y. October 22, 1928,” 38.

[29] Ibid., 41.

[30] Ibid., 42.

[31] Ibid., 41.

[32] Ibid., 43.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., 44.

[35] Ibid., 50.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Davis, FDR: The New York Years, 42.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Roosevelt, “Campaign Address (Excerpts), Utica, N.Y. October 25, 1928,” 51.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Roosevelt, “Campaign Address (Excerpts), Troy, N.Y. October 26, 1928,” 54.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

“Big Ottinger Vote Predicted Up-State.” (Oct 12, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104441542?accountid=12085.

“F.D. Roosevelt Back; Sees Leaders Today.” (Oct 08, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104448848?accountid=12085.

F.D. Roosevelt Drive Will Start at Once; To Centre Up-State. (Oct 04, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104470038?accountid=12085.

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 03, 1928). “Choice of Roosevelt Elates Gov. Smith.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104308830?accountid=12085.

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 3, 1928). “Ottinger Advances Queens Sewer Issue in Opening Campaign.” New York Times (1923-Current file). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104425583?accountid=12085

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 18, 1928). “Roosevelt Assails Campaign Bigotry.” New York Times (1923-Current file). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104438214?accountid=12085

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Nov 20, 1928). “Roosevelt Begins Work on Message.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104443997?accountid=12085. 

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Nov 24, 1928). “Roosevelt Confers on Labor Program.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104398916?accountid=12085. 

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Nov 11, 1928). “Roosevelt Hailed by South as Hope of Party in 1932.”New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104416279?accountid=12085. 

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 19, 1928). “Roosevelt Scouts Tariff Prosperity” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104437219?accountid=12085.

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 22, 1928). “Roosevelt Stands Campaigning Well.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104310663?accountid=12085. 

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times, (Oct 3, 1928), “Roosevelt Yields to Smith and Heads State Ticket; Choice Cheers Democrats,” New York Times (1923-Current file). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104308778?accountid=12085.

“Ottinger Accepts Power as Big Issue.” (Oct 16, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File).  Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104430730?accountid=12085.

“Ottinger Concedes Roosevelt Victory.” (Nov 19, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104439338?accountid=12085. 

“Ottinger Refuses to Concede Defeat.” (Nov 08, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104415539?accountid=12085.

“Ottinger to Visit 14 Up-State Cites.” (Oct 13, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104460248?accountid=12085.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. “Acceptance Speech for the Renomination for the Presidency, Philadelphia, Pa.” June 27, 1936. The American Presidency Project. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15314.

“Roosevelt Attacks Theories of Hoover.” (Nov 02, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104414619?accountid=12085.

“Roosevelt Confers with Smith to Map Campaign in State.” (Oct 10, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104321497?accountid=12085. 

“Roosevelt Demands State Keep Power.” (Oct 17, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104423627?accountid=12085.

“Roosevelt Opposes Any Move to Revive New York Dry Law.” (Oct 09, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104367563?accountid=12085. 

Roosevelt, Franklin D. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 1, The Genesis of the New Deal 1928-1932. New York, NY: Random House. 1938.

“Roosevelt to Make Wide Tour of State.” (Oct 13, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104433007?accountid=12085.

Special to The New York Times. (1928, Oct 07). “Bigotry is Receding, Says F.D. Roosevelt.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/104469322?accountid=12085.

Special to The New York Times. (Nov 27, 1928). “Democrats List Funds at Albany.” New York Times (1923-Current File).Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104304172?accountid=12085.

Special to The New York Times. (Oct 03, 1928). “Roosevelt Held Out to the Last Minute.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104326803?accountid=12085. 

Special to The New York Times. (Oct 03, 1928). “Roosevelt Lauded by Mayor Walker.” New York Times (1923-Current File).Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104326338?accountid=12085. 

Woolf., S.J. (1928, Oct 07). “The Two Candidates for the Governorship.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/104433929?accountid=12085.

Secondary Sources

Davis, Kenneth S. FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny 1882-1928. New York, NY: Random House. 1972.

__________. FDR: The New York Years 1928-1933. New York, NY: Random House. 1985.

Goldberg, Richard Thayer. The Making of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Triumph Over Disability. Cambridge, MA: Abt Books. 1971.

Gunther, John. Roosevelt in Retrospect, A Profile in History. New York, NY: Harper. 1950.

Troy, Gil, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., and Fred L. Israel. History of American Presidential Elections: 1789-2008, Vol. II, 1872-1940. New York, NY: Facts on File, 2012.

Journal Articles           

Carlson, Earland I. “Franklin D. Roosevelt's Post-Mortem of the 1928 Election.” Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Aug., 1964): pp. 298-308.

Goldman, Armond S., Elisabeth J. Schmalstieg, Daniel H. Freeman, Jr, Daniel A. Goldman and Frank C. Schmalstieg, Jr. “What was the cause of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s paralytic illness?” Journal of Medical Biography. (11, 2003): pp. 232–240.

Kiewe, Amos. “A Dress Rehearsal for a Presidential Campaign: FDR's Embodied "Run" for the 1928 Governorship.” The Southern Communication Journal. (Winter, 1999): pp. 154-167.

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 1928 New York Gubernatorial Campaign – Part 2 – Accepting the Nomination

Nearly exhaustive research has been done on Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR’s) four national campaigns, his controversial Presidency, and his leadership in WWII. Surprisingly little, however, has focused on his New York State gubernatorial campaign in 1928. This was the campaign and position in which FDR would prove his fitness for the presidency of the Unites States, a position he held from 1933 to 1945.

In part 2, K.R.T. Quirion explains how a not-so-healthy Roosevelt ended up accepting the 1928 nomination, how he set up his campaign team, and the very start of his campaign in October 1928.

You can read part 1 on how Roosevelt overcame a serious illness, polio, to be able to take part in the 1928 campaign here.

Franklin D. Roosevelt in Olean, New York. October 19, 1928.

DETERMINATION

When Al Smith was nominated by the Democratic National Committee (DNC) for a second presidential run in 1928, Roosevelt was again approached about running in the New York gubernatorial campaign. Committed to his full recovery—and even more dubious about the Democrat’s chances of success in 1928 then he was in 1924—Roosevelt was determined to stay out of the political race, or so he thought. 

Roosevelt returned to his beloved Warm Springs after delivering Smith’s nomination speech in Houston. He was barely settled into his routine at the Georgia hideaway before he was summoned to New York City by the DNC. For the next three months, FDR remained on the periphery of the Smith campaign. Finally, in late September, Roosevelt escaped back to Warm Springs. He needed to get away, as much for his health as to avoid the importuning politicians who were already harassing and cajoling him to run for governor of New York.[1]

Howe agreed with Roosevelt’s decision not to run for three important reasons. First, he concurred with Roosevelt’s concern for his health. The second reason was their mutual awareness that FDR might be defeated. Third, they “felt that 1928 was too early for [Roosevelt] to run again for office.”[2] Smith implored Roosevelt on multiple occasions to reconsider his candidacy and each time Roosevelt remained unwavering in his opposition.

Once situated in Warm Springs, Roosevelt began taking increasing steps to “deliberately cut himself off from communication with” the Democrat delegates in New York that were pushing him to accept the nomination.[3] Eleanor, who had remained in New York was under pressure from the delegates to convince him to run. She held out until October 1, when she finally agreed to help Smith get in contact with her husband.[4] In the conversation that followed, Smith brought all the force he could bear against the reluctant Roosevelt. Finally, the combination of Eleanor’s tacit endorsement of his nomination, John Raskob’s promise to financially maintain the Warm Springs Foundation, and Smith’s decision to frame his plea on a personal basis, Roosevelt, at last, began to buckle.[5]

Smith and the DNC believed that without Roosevelt, he had no chance of carrying New York in the general election, and if he did not carry New York, then he had no chance of securing the electoral votes needed to win. Roosevelt argued against this line of reasoning, but once Smith had made the matter personal, Roosevelt knew that if he refused, he would likely lose the support of Smith and his political machinery in all future endeavors. As the conversation came to its conclusion, the exasperated Smith was nearly shouting into the phone. He asked whether Roosevelt would “actually decline to run if nominated.”[6] At this FDR waivered. He told Smith that if the convention, in full knowledge of his wishes, chose to nominate him, then he was unsure what he would decide. Roosevelt might as well have announced that he wanted to be drafted. For Smith, the effect was the same. 

The very next day, FDR was nominated by the convention in Rochester, New York. Mayor Walker of New York City announced FDR’s nomination to the crowded convention. He lauded the choice of such a “distinguished, honorable American” assuring the crowd that Roosevelt would “maintain the same high degree of efficiency, the same genius, in fact, in government, the same sterling honesty that has characterized the present Governor of this State.”[7] At 1:10 P.M. that afternoon, Roosevelt sent a message to the convention acknowledging his intent to accept the nomination.[8] The nomination of Roosevelt inspired Democratic party leaders.[9] Even the heavily Republican press was pleased with the nomination. Two New York papers, The Sunand The New York Telegram, which had both supported Herbert Hoover in the national election, immediately came out in support of Roosevelt.  

GETTING A “RUNNING” START

At once, Roosevelt set himself to the task before him. He plunged into the campaign with the same force of determination with which he had initially refused, though his past reluctance haunted his initial steps. As Kiewe explains, “the campaign ahead was largely defined by Roosevelt’s refusal to run due to the health issue.”[10] The disease that had paralyzed him was once again a hurdle to his ambitions. The New York Herald Tribune threw the first stone on October 3, one day after Roosevelt’s nomination. It complained that his nomination was “unfair to the people of the State who, under other conditions, would welcome Mr. Roosevelt’s candidacy for any office.”[11] Smith backed up his candidate by returning fire through the New York Times:

‘The real fact is this,’ the Governor said. ‘Franklin Roosevelt today is mentally as good as he ever was in his life. Physically he is as good as he ever was in his life….a Governor does not have to be an acrobat. We do not elect him for his ability to do a double back flip or a handspring. The work of the governorship is brain work. Ninety-five per cent of it is accomplished sitting at a desk. There is no doubt about his ability to do it.’[12]  

Despite Smith’s vigorous advocacy, Roosevelt would still have to prove to the electorate the truth of those assertions. The key to putting the questions regarding his disability to rest was to cultivate the image of an active and mobile campaigner.[13] He further defused the health question by making light of his disability. In an interview with the New York Herald Tribune, Roosevelt stated that “most people who are nominated for the Governorship have to run, but obviously I am not in any condition to run, and therefore I am counting on my friends all over the state to make it possible for me to walk in.”[14]

Even before returning to New York, FDR had begun planning his campaign. In a telegraph to some of his political allies in the City, Roosevelt indicated that he would run an aggressive campaign for himself as well as other Democratic candidates at the State and national level.[15] Instead of confining his race to the Democrat-controlled cities, plans were put into place to carry the campaign “into the ‘enemy’s country.’”[16]  These were the rural districts where Democratic voters had been rare in past elections.[17]

Roosevelt arrived in New York City six days after accepting the nomination via telegraph. He used his travel as an opportunity to campaign for Smith. In one speech on October 6, in Cleveland, Roosevelt revealed some of his up-coming platform for the New York race. Following a denunciation of religious bigotry, Roosevelt stated that he accepted the nomination because he was “so anxious to see Governor Smith’s policies continued that he was willing to make the effort.”[18] He also stated his belief that prohibition was a “cloak for something else” but in his view, the tactic’s effect was receding.[19]

Campaign team

His first stop in New York was Hyde Park where he was greeted by “200 of his neighbors in an impromptu celebration.”[20] On October 8th, FDR met with the candidate for Lieutenant Governor, Colonel Herbert Lehman, and other party leaders at the campaign headquarters in the Biltmore Hotel. The next day, Roosevelt met with Smith to finalize his campaign plans. Among the strategies adopted was the creation of a Citizens’ Campaign Committee designed to register voters and encourage people to go to the polls in November. When Smith last ran for Governor, the Democrats had instituted a similar Committee with success. This time, James Farley and the Chairman of the Democratic Committee, William Bray, were responsible for the up-State campaign, while the infamous Tammany Hall handled New York City and the boroughs. 

Apart from Howe and Farley, there were several other indispensable figures in Roosevelt’s campaign. The Bronx Democratic Boss, Edward J. Flynn, was among the first to join Roosevelt’s team. Flynn had been active in Smith’s presidential election but, because of New York’s importance in the national election, he detached himself from the Smith campaign to aid Roosevelt and secure the State’s desperately needed electoral votes. Raymond A. Moley, a professor at Columbia University was summoned to aid the campaign as speech draftsman and as a consultant on issues of crime prevention and criminal justice.[21]

Then there was William H. Woodin. A life-long Republican and the President of the American Car and Foundry Corporation, Woodin had endorsed the Smith campaign in July. He personally contributed $25,000 to the Democratic national campaign fund. Woodin was enlisted as Roosevelt’s “financial dictator.”[22] Henry Morgenthau, Jr. was personally recruited to direct the campaign’s agricultural platform. One of the most important aids brought into was Samuel I. Rosenman who joined after Roosevelt requested an advisor that could supplement his deficiencies concerning the legislative history of the parties in New York.[23]

After conferring with Smith and his team at the Democratic campaign headquarters in the Biltmore, Roosevelt made his first formal interview with the press concerning the gubernatorial race. There, he announced that he did not favor re-enacting the Mullan-Gage State Prohibition Enforcement act. He further added that while traveling throughout the country he had found the Prohibition acts of other States no more effective than those of New York, which relied exclusively on Federal laws.[24] When asked if, as Governor, he would veto a Legislative bill for the enforcement of Prohibition, he replied in the affirmative.[25] He closed his remarks by promising to run an active campaign “with a lot of handshaking and close contact with the voters.”[26]

Campaign starts

By Friday, October 12, the campaign itinerary was released. It listed Roosevelt speaking at nineteen events over nineteen days beginning on the 17th in Binghamton. His final speech would be made on the last night of the election, November 5, in Poughkeepsie at a neighborhood rally.[27] The campaign was officially kicked off when Roosevelt officially accepted the nomination at the National Democratic Club on the 16th. He opened his speech saying, “I accept the nomination for Governor because I am a disciple in a great cause.”[28] The cause he was referring to was the continuation of Governor Smith’s reforms. Continuing, consolidating and making permanent these reforms was the first great issue of the campaign. The second great issue, Roosevelt declared, was whether New York would “undertake new improvements” in government to “keep pace with changing times.”[29]

“Progress means change,” he said, and there were four areas he had in mind. [30] The first was the passage of law mandating the public retention of State-owned water-power resources. Second, he called for a reform of the Judicial System. He asserted that the judiciary “failed to keep pace with the advancement[s] of a practical age.”[31] The final two points focused on New York’s rural districts. He believed that measures were needed to improve the economic conditions of agricultural communities. Finally, he called for governmental reorganization policies at the State level to extend to county and town administrations as well.[32]

With these points Roosevelt launched his campaign. His opponent for the governorship, Albert Ottinger, had already accepted his party’s nomination and begun campaigning. During his acceptance speech, Ottinger indicated his stance on the opposite side of the water-power issue. The Republican Party in New York had long stood against the policy advocated by Roosevelt. Ottinger, in lockstep with his party, was a consistent advocate of private waterpower. If elected, he promised to create a commission of experts to investigate the subject and recommend policy.[33]     

Now, read part 3 in the series on what happened during the short 1928 New York Gubernatorial campaign here.

What do you think of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision to accept the nomination in 1928? Let us know below.

[1] Davis, FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny 1882-1928, 838.

[2] Ibid., 839-840. 

[3] Ibid., 848.

[4] On October 1, Roosevelt had deliberately planned to spend “a long afternoon of picnicking at the Knob, miles from the nearest phone, planning to return to his phoneless cottage barley in time to dress for the political speech he was to make that evening in Manchester, ten miles from Warm Springs.” Thus, he had hoped to “double lock the door of unwanted opportunity.” However, Eleanor knew, as did the Smith, that Roosevelt would not refuse a “person-to-person” phone call from his wife. With this backdrop, Eleanor knew that her assent to Smith’s plea was “no neutral, noncommittal gesture.” Rather, she knew that it would be interpreted by her husband as a silent conclusion that he should accept the nomination. Ibid., 846, 848.

[5] Ibid., 851.

[6] Gunther, 253.

[7] Special to The New York Times, (Oct 03, 1928), “Roosevelt Lauded by Mayor Walker,” New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[8] From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times, (Oct 3, 1928), “Roosevelt Yields to Smith and Heads State Ticket; Choice Cheers Democrats,” New York Times (1923-Current file), 2.

[9] “F.D. Roosevelt Drive Will Start at Once; To Centre Up-State,” (Oct 04, 1928), New York Times (1923-Current File, 1.

[10] Kiewe, 158.

[11] Goldberg, 108. 

[12] From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times, (Oct 03, 1928), “Choice of Roosevelt Elates Gov. Smith,” New York Times (1923-Current File), 1-2.

[13] Kiewe, 159. 

[14] Davis, FDR: The New York Years 1928-1932, 31. 

[15] “F.D. Roosevelt Drive Will Start at Once,” 2.

[16] Ibid., 1.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Special to The New York Times, (1928, Oct 07), “Bigotry is Receding, Says F.D. Roosevelt,” New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[19] Ibid.

[20] “F.D. Roosevelt Back; Sees Leaders Today,” (Oct 08, 1928), New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[21] Davis, FDR: The New York Years 1928-1932, 33.

[22] “Roosevelt Confers with Smith to Map Campaign in State,” (Oct 10, 1928), New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[23] Davis, FDR: The New York Years 1928-1932, 35.

[24] “Roosevelt Opposes Any Move to Revive New York Dry Law,” (Oct 09, 1928), New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[25] Ibid

[26] Ibid., 2.

[27] “Roosevelt to Make Wide Tour of State,” (Oct 13, 1928), New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[28] Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The Candidate Accepts the Nomination for the Governorship, October 16, 1928,” The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 1, The Genesis of the New Deal 1928-1932, (New York, NY: Random House, 1938), 13.

[29] Ibid., 16.

[30] Ibid., 14.

[31] Ibid., 15.

[32] Ibid., 16.

[33] “Roosevelt Demands State Keep Power,” (Oct 17, 1928), New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

“Big Ottinger Vote Predicted Up-State.” (Oct 12, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104441542?accountid=12085.

“F.D. Roosevelt Back; Sees Leaders Today.” (Oct 08, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104448848?accountid=12085.

F.D. Roosevelt Drive Will Start at Once; To Centre Up-State. (Oct 04, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104470038?accountid=12085.

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 03, 1928). “Choice of Roosevelt Elates Gov. Smith.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104308830?accountid=12085.

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 3, 1928). “Ottinger Advances Queens Sewer Issue in Opening Campaign.” New York Times (1923-Current file). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104425583?accountid=12085

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 18, 1928). “Roosevelt Assails Campaign Bigotry.” New York Times (1923-Current file). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104438214?accountid=12085

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Nov 20, 1928). “Roosevelt Begins Work on Message.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104443997?accountid=12085. 

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Nov 24, 1928). “Roosevelt Confers on Labor Program.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104398916?accountid=12085. 

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Nov 11, 1928). “Roosevelt Hailed by South as Hope of Party in 1932.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104416279?accountid=12085.

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 19, 1928). “Roosevelt Scouts Tariff Prosperity” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104437219?accountid=12085.

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 22, 1928). “Roosevelt Stands Campaigning Well.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104310663?accountid=12085. 

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times, (Oct 3, 1928), “Roosevelt Yields to Smith and Heads State Ticket; Choice Cheers Democrats,” New York Times (1923-Current file). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104308778?accountid=12085.

“Ottinger Accepts Power as Big Issue.” (Oct 16, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File).  Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104430730?accountid=12085.

“Ottinger Concedes Roosevelt Victory.” (Nov 19, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104439338?accountid=12085. 

“Ottinger Refuses to Concede Defeat.” (Nov 08, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104415539?accountid=12085.

“Ottinger to Visit 14 Up-State Cites.” (Oct 13, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104460248?accountid=12085.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. “Acceptance Speech for the Renomination for the Presidency, Philadelphia, Pa.” June 27, 1936. The American Presidency Project. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15314.

“Roosevelt Attacks Theories of Hoover.” (Nov 02, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104414619?accountid=12085.

“Roosevelt Confers with Smith to Map Campaign in State.” (Oct 10, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104321497?accountid=12085. 

“Roosevelt Demands State Keep Power.” (Oct 17, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104423627?accountid=12085. 

“Roosevelt Opposes Any Move to Revive New York Dry Law.” (Oct 09, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104367563?accountid=12085. 

Roosevelt, Franklin D. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 1, The Genesis of the New Deal 1928-1932. New York, NY: Random House. 1938.

“Roosevelt to Make Wide Tour of State.” (Oct 13, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104433007?accountid=12085.

Special to The New York Times. (1928, Oct 07). “Bigotry is Receding, Says F.D. Roosevelt.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/104469322?accountid=12085.

Special to The New York Times. (Nov 27, 1928). “Democrats List Funds at Albany.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104304172?accountid=12085.

Special to The New York Times. (Oct 03, 1928). “Roosevelt Held Out to the Last Minute.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104326803?accountid=12085. 

Special to The New York Times. (Oct 03, 1928). “Roosevelt Lauded by Mayor Walker.” New York Times (1923-Current File).Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104326338?accountid=12085. 

Woolf., S.J. (1928, Oct 07). “The Two Candidates for the Governorship.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/104433929?accountid=12085.

Secondary Sources

Davis, Kenneth S. FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny 1882-1928. New York, NY: Random House. 1972.

__________. FDR: The New York Years 1928-1933. New York, NY: Random House. 1985.

Goldberg, Richard Thayer. The Making of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Triumph Over Disability. Cambridge, MA: Abt Books. 1971.

Gunther, John. Roosevelt in Retrospect, A Profile in History. New York, NY: Harper. 1950.

Troy, Gil, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., and Fred L. Israel. History of American Presidential Elections: 1789-2008, Vol. II, 1872-1940. New York, NY: Facts on File, 2012.

Journal Articles           

Carlson, Earland I. “Franklin D. Roosevelt's Post-Mortem of the 1928 Election.” Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Aug., 1964): pp. 298-308.

Goldman, Armond S., Elisabeth J. Schmalstieg, Daniel H. Freeman, Jr, Daniel A. Goldman and Frank C. Schmalstieg, Jr. “What was the cause of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s paralytic illness?” Journal of Medical Biography. (11, 2003): pp. 232–240.

 Kiewe, Amos. “A Dress Rehearsal for a Presidential Campaign: FDR's Embodied "Run" for the 1928 Governorship.” The Southern Communication Journal. (Winter, 1999): pp. 154-167.

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 1928 New York Gubernatorial Campaign – Part 1 – Overcoming Illness

Nearly exhaustive research has been done on Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR’s) four national campaigns, his controversial Presidency, and his leadership in WWII. Surprisingly little, however, has focused on his New York State gubernatorial campaign in 1928. This was the campaign and position in which FDR would prove his fitness for the presidency of the Unites States, a position he held from 1933 to 1945.

In part 1, K.R.T. Quirion explains the background to the campaign, the struggles that FDR had after he contracted Polio, and an amazing comeback appearance in 1924.

Franklin D. Roosevelt on crutches in August 1924, several years after his illness. Here with Lieutenant Governor George Lunn, FDR, John W. Davis, and Al Smith at Roosevelt's family home in Hyde Park, New York. Source: FDR Presidential Library & Museum, available here.

INTRODUCTION

While there has been little focus on Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s campaign for governor of New York State in 1928, it is known that prior to the campaign he had taken “steps in the presidential direction.”[1] Amos Kiewe outlines FDR’s climb up the political ladder starting his election to the New York State Senate, his appointment to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and finally, his nomination as Vice-President on the 1920 Democratic ticket. Ultimately, however, New York was the crucible in which FDR demonstrated his fitness for a shot at the nation’s highest office.

Unfortunately, Roosevelt’s vision of political grandeur was cut abruptly short when he contracted poliomyelitis—commonly known as polio—during a vacation to Campobello Island in the summer of 1921.[2] Despite his affliction, FDR would return to the public arena within three years and re-enter political office in seven. In hindsight, this short withdrawal from public life was a relatively small detour in FDR’s long political career. During the “nearly fatal initial phase of the [polio] attack” he might well have abandoned his political aspirations and retired to Hyde Park for good.[3] Instead, thanks to the support of his wife Eleanor and his life-long friend Louis Howe, Roosevelt overcame his affliction and began the long road of recovery.  

Over the next seven years, FDR strengthened his body, his mind, and his belief that there was a providential plan for his life. Davis explains how, in retrospect, FDR “knew absolutely that what had happened to him…was integral to God’s design.”[4] His wife Eleanor believed that her husband’s trial by fire was preparing him for the “great historic tasks he must ultimately undertake.”[5] Despite the great personal difficulty of this period, Eleanor and Howe were successful in keeping Roosevelt plugged into the political arena.

The 1928 chance

His moment came in 1928. New York governor and presidential hopeful, Al Smith, indicated his desire to have FDR continue his legacy in the Empire State. More importantly, Smith knew that the “margin between victory and defeat…in the national race might well be provided by a victorious Democratic gubernatorial candidate in New York, and it was a margin that Roosevelt and Roosevelt alone could assure.”[6] At first, FDR was staunchly opposed to entering the race. He refused Smith’s initial invocation to run, citing concerns about his health.[7] Privately, Roosevelt believed that 1928 would be a bad year for Democrats and preferred to wait until the 1932 election. He finally yielded to Smith on October 2, on the condition that the delegates chose to nominate him with “full knowledge of his personal situation and wishes.”[8] The very next day, the Democratic convention in Rochester, NY nominated Roosevelt by acclamation. 

Over the next month, Roosevelt crisscrossed New York State, stumping in every city where he could make time for a speech. This important race attracted individuals, like Judge Samuel Rosenman, that would become intertwined in FDR’s political career for the next 17 years. The race was so invigorating that he once exclaimed if “I could keep on campaigning twelve months longer, I’d throw away my canes.”[9] As the New York polls closed on November 7, 1928, the votes appeared to favor the Republican candidate, Albert Ottinger. But, by the 19th, Roosevelt had won by a razor-thin margin of less than half of 1% of the total vote.[10]

What allowed a candidate who had spent the last eight years living on the periphery of New York politics, to win a heavily contested race with a mere three weeks of active campaigning? This article examines the challenges that FDR faced in convincing the New York electorate that he was fit for the Governor’s Mansion. The article explores how he overcame concerns about his physical health by presenting himself as an active campaigner. It also looks at Roosevelt’s experimental coalition of labor, agriculture, minority, and urban voters and the platform he used to convince these widely differing constituencies to give him their vote. Finally, this article argues that the 1928 campaign boosted FDR to the forefront of national politics and laid the groundwork for convincing the national electorate that he was ready for the White House in 1932. 

Though initially reluctant to his candidacy, once nominated, FDR boldly met the challenges of the race. His 1928 platform and his tenure as Governor of New York laid the foundation for his national policies in the White House. Eight years after his gubernatorial race, President Roosevelt would tell supporters at the 1936 Democratic National Convention (DNC) that their generation of Americans had a “rendezvous with destiny.”[11] For Roosevelt, when destiny came knocking, he confidently answered. 

POLITICS, POLIO, POLITICS AGAIN

Despite his nearly miraculous victory in the gubernatorial campaign, the 1928 race was not run in a vacuum. Roosevelt had been on a political trajectory long before contracting polio. After his outstanding record as assistant secretary of the Navy, FDR sought to establish himself as the “heir to Wilsonian Progressivism.”[12] A platform to project that image presented itself in 1920 when the DNC named Roosevelt the running mate of their Presidential nominee, James M. Cox. Though the election did not favor the Democratic ticket, it did allow FDR to build a national network within the Party.[13] Another important side-effect of the election was that FDR was able to build up his permanent secretariat.[14] He would rely heavily on his so-called “Cuff-Links Club” in future campaigns and in office.

Following the landslide loss of 1920, Roosevelt and his family retired to Campobello Island for some much-needed respite. However, the fatigue that he was hoping to recuperate from “did not go away.”[15] Instead, disaster struck a few days into the vacation. The young political maverick had his aspirations of future office dashed when he contracted polio which left him permanently disabled. As Amos explains, “the disease was a devastating shock to the energetic Roosevelt.” Not only did he have to re-learn basic skills and face the “mental anguish of a life-long disability”, but he also had to cope with the stigma of polio.[16] In the early 1900s, polio was viewed as the “disease of the unclean and unhygienic” and the “poor and low class.”[17] This aura clung even to Roosevelt. Despite his upper-class upbringing, even he struggled to shake this humiliating stigma.

The physical and psychological struggle that FDR endured during the initial stages of his recovery was then multiplied by the fear that his political aspirations had been dashed in one cruel blow. The disease engulfed his body and swallowed all hope of political grandeur in its wake. Instead of sinking into the depths of history as the tragic shadow of his cousin Theodore, FDR was carried through the storm by his wife Eleanor and the political acumen of his close friend and advisor Louis Howe. Roosevelt managed to stay politically active from the sidelines.  He never dropped out of public life. With the help of Eleanor and Howe, he continued his extensive political correspondence “virtually without interruption.”[18]  

Politics after Polio

Roosevelt’s first major political action following his disability was his endorsement of Al Smith for Governor of New York in 1922. This wise investment would pay dividends for FDR within the decade. Following a successful term as Governor, Smith was impeccably positioned for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1924. Early that year, Roosevelt formally endorsed Smith’s candidacy. Though harboring doubts about the election, Roosevelt “calculated that the Smith campaign would keep his name before the public.”[19]

His strategy paid off amidst the chaos of the 1924 Democratic Convention. When he took the lectern to deliver Smith’s nominating speech at Madison Square Gardens in New York City, onlookers waited with bated breath as he moved slowly and carefully to the podium. He proceeded across the stage alone “swinging his weight from his hips.”[20] Even this physical stunt was a calculated political decision. In June of 1922, Roosevelt had begun training himself to exercise some amount of independent movement.[21] He believed that the appearance of health and independent movement was a necessity if he ever wished to hold political office again. This had been the reason for his physical training. Roosevelt knew that no modern leader had reached the highest rungs of political office without the public perception of good health and physical command. His performance at the Convention went a long way in proving that he was ready to return to politics.

In addition to demonstrating his physical recovery, the remarks at the DNC earned him even greater political points. His “Happy Warrior” speech resounded with millions of people from all across the nation who listened over the radio.[22] Davis writes that Roosevelt “was the central figure of the only scene that would brightly shine…out of the Garden’s prolonged and gloomy turmoil.”[23] The publicity that Roosevelt reaped from this speech was as significant for his political future as it was proliferous.[24] Following the Convention, a columnist for the Herald Tribune wrote that, “[f]rom the time Roosevelt made his speech…he has been easily the foremost figure on the floor or platform…” and “...has done for himself what he could not do for his candidate.”[25]

The momentum Roosevelt created at the Convention translated into an invitation to run for Governor of New York that very year. He declined, however, explaining that he would “not run for public office until he could walk without crutches.”[26]Despite this commitment, which he would cite again in 1928, FDR would soon concede to the pressure of politics. 

Now, read part 2 on how Roosevelt accepted the nomination here.

What do you think of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s response to getting Polio? Let us know below. 

[1] Amos Kiewe, “A Dress Rehearsal for a Presidential Campaign: FDR's Embodied "Run" for the 1928 Governorship,” The Southern Communication Journal, (Winter, 1999), 154.

[2] A 2003 study published in the Journal of Medical Biography has placed the actual nature of FDR’s disease in question. The accepted diagnoses has been polio. However, a team of medical research led by Dr. Armond S. Goldman, Emeritus Professor of Pediatrics at the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, Texas has shed new light on this once solidly held fact. Their research suggests that FDR actually suffered from Guillain–Barre´ syndrome, a disorder in which the body's immune system attacks part of the peripheral nervous system. Despite the probability of this assertion, for the purposes of my research, I will maintain the widely accepted diagnosis as it neither adds nor detracts from the content of this article, whereas “rocking the boat” so to speak, by replacing the commonly accepted diagnosis with a rare and difficult to pronounce disorder is distracting at best and confusing at worst. Armond S. Goldman, Elisabeth J. Schmalstieg, Daniel H. Freeman, Jr, Daniel A. Goldman and Frank C. Schmalstieg, Jr, “What was the cause of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s paralytic illness?,” Journal of Medical Biography, (11, 2003): 1. 

[3] Kenneth S. Davis, FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny 1882-1928, (New York, NY: Random House, 1972), 10-11.

[4] Ibid., 11.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Davis, FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny 1882-1928, (New York, NY: Random House, 1972), 851.

[7] Special to The New York Times. (Oct 03, 1928). “Roosevelt Held Out to the Last Minute.” New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[8] Davis, FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny 1882-1928, 852.

[9] “Roosevelt Attacks Theories of Hoover,” (Nov 02, 1928), New York Times (1923-Current File), 1.

[10] “Ottinger Concedes Roosevelt Victory,” (Nov 19, 1928), New York Times (1923-Current File), 6.

[11] Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Acceptance Speech for the Renomination for the Presidency, Philadelphia, Pa.,” June 27, 1936, The American Presidency Project, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley.

[12] Gil Troy, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., and Fred L. Israel, History of American Presidential Elections: 1789-2008, Vol. II, 1872-1940, (New York, NY: Facts on File, 2012), 1037.

[13] Ibid.

[14] John Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect, A Profile in History, (New York, NY: Harper, 1950), 217.

[15] Richard T. Goldberg, The Making of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Triumph Over Disability, (Cambridge, MA: Abt Books, 1971), 28.

[16] Kiewe, 155.  

[17] Ibid.

[18] Davis, FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny 1882-1928, 673.

[19] Goldberg, The Making of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Triumph Over Disability, 70. 

[20] Ibid., 71.

[21] Roosevelt in fact could not walk. Instead, he used the muscles in his upper body and torso and swung his legs—which were re-enforced with heavy steel braces—so that he could give the appearance of walking. 

[22] Davis, FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny 1882-1928, 756.

[23] Ibid., 755.

[24] “[T]he New York World proclaimed that ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt stands out as the real hero of the Democratic Convention of 1924.’ Said the World: ‘Adversity has lifted him above the bickering, the religious bigotry, conflicting personal ambitions and petty sectional prejudices…It has made him the one leader commanding the respect and admiration of delegates from all sections of the land.’” Ibid., 757.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect, 247.

Bibliography

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“Big Ottinger Vote Predicted Up-State.” (Oct 12, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104441542?accountid=12085.

“F.D. Roosevelt Back; Sees Leaders Today.” (Oct 08, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104448848?accountid=12085.

F.D. Roosevelt Drive Will Start at Once; To Centre Up-State. (Oct 04, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104470038?accountid=12085.

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 03, 1928). “Choice of Roosevelt Elates Gov. Smith.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104308830?accountid=12085.

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 3, 1928). “Ottinger Advances Queens Sewer Issue in Opening Campaign.” New York Times (1923-Current file). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104425583?accountid=12085

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 18, 1928). “Roosevelt Assails Campaign Bigotry.” New York Times (1923-Current file). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104438214?accountid=12085

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Nov 20, 1928). “Roosevelt Begins Work on Message.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104443997?accountid=12085. 

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Nov 24, 1928). “Roosevelt Confers on Labor Program.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104398916?accountid=12085. 

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Nov 11, 1928). “Roosevelt Hailed by South as Hope of Party in 1932.”New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104416279?accountid=12085. 

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 19, 1928). “Roosevelt Scouts Tariff Prosperity” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104437219?accountid=12085.

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times. (Oct 22, 1928). “Roosevelt Stands Campaigning Well.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104310663?accountid=12085. 

From a Staff Correspondent of The New York Times, (Oct 3, 1928), “Roosevelt Yields to Smith and Heads State Ticket; Choice Cheers Democrats,” New York Times (1923-Current file). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104308778?accountid=12085.

“Ottinger Accepts Power as Big Issue.” (Oct 16, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File).  Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104430730?accountid=12085.

“Ottinger Concedes Roosevelt Victory.” (Nov 19, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104439338?accountid=12085. 

“Ottinger Refuses to Concede Defeat.” (Nov 08, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104415539?accountid=12085.

“Ottinger to Visit 14 Up-State Cites.” (Oct 13, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104460248?accountid=12085.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. “Acceptance Speech for the Renomination for the Presidency, Philadelphia, Pa.” June 27, 1936. The American Presidency Project. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15314.

“Roosevelt Attacks Theories of Hoover.” (Nov 02, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104414619?accountid=12085.

“Roosevelt Confers with Smith to Map Campaign in State.” (Oct 10, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104321497?accountid=12085. 

“Roosevelt Demands State Keep Power.” (Oct 17, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104423627?accountid=12085. 

“Roosevelt Opposes Any Move to Revive New York Dry Law.” (Oct 09, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104367563?accountid=12085. 

Roosevelt, Franklin D. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 1, The Genesis of the New Deal 1928-1932. New York, NY: Random House. 1938.

“Roosevelt to Make Wide Tour of State.” (Oct 13, 1928). New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104433007?accountid=12085.

Special to The New York Times. (1928, Oct 07). “Bigotry is Receding, Says F.D. Roosevelt.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/104469322?accountid=12085.

Special to The New York Times. (Nov 27, 1928). “Democrats List Funds at Albany.” New York Times (1923-Current File).Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104304172?accountid=12085.

Special to The New York Times. (Oct 03, 1928). “Roosevelt Held Out to the Last Minute.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104326803?accountid=12085. 

Special to The New York Times. (Oct 03, 1928). “Roosevelt Lauded by Mayor Walker.” New York Times (1923-Current File).Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/104326338?accountid=12085. 

Woolf., S.J. (1928, Oct 07). “The Two Candidates for the Governorship.” New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from http://ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/104433929?accountid=12085.

Secondary Sources

Davis, Kenneth S. FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny 1882-1928. New York, NY: Random House. 1972.

__________. FDR: The New York Years 1928-1933. New York, NY: Random House. 1985.

Goldberg, Richard Thayer. The Making of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Triumph Over Disability. Cambridge, MA: Abt Books. 1971.

Gunther, John. Roosevelt in Retrospect, A Profile in History. New York, NY: Harper. 1950.

Troy, Gil, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., and Fred L. Israel. History of American Presidential Elections: 1789-2008, Vol. II, 1872-1940. New York, NY: Facts on File, 2012.

Journal Articles           

Carlson, Earland I. “Franklin D. Roosevelt's Post-Mortem of the 1928 Election.” Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Aug., 1964): pp. 298-308.

Goldman, Armond S., Elisabeth J. Schmalstieg, Daniel H. Freeman, Jr, Daniel A. Goldman and Frank C. Schmalstieg, Jr. “What was the cause of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s paralytic illness?” Journal of Medical Biography. (11, 2003): pp. 232–240.

 Kiewe, Amos. “A Dress Rehearsal for a Presidential Campaign: FDR's Embodied "Run" for the 1928 Governorship.” The Southern Communication Journal. (Winter, 1999): pp. 154-167.

The Takeover of the Bureau of Indian Affairs Headquarters in 1972

The Bureau of Indian Affairs in Washington, D.C. was taken over from November 3 to 9, 1972 by the American Indian Movement. Here, Daniel L. Smith returns to the site and tells us about this event.

Daniel’s book on mid-19th century northern California is now available. Find our more here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Tipi with the sign "American Indian Movement" on the grounds of the Washington Monument, Washington, D.C. in 1978. Source: Warren K. Leffler, available here.

The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) headquarters building was raided, ransacked, vandalized, and ultimately occupied for almost a week from November 3 to 9, 1972. 

Nearly 500 Native Americans marching with the American Indian Movement (AIM – a progressive grassroots movement) ended their attention grabbing parade called the Trail of Broken Treaties, in front of the BIA building in Washington D.C. This cross-country political parade was intended to highlight Native Americans’ social issues, such as their standard of living and obligated treaty rights as legally sovereign nations.

Activist and news contributor Bob Simpson would point out that “leaders of the Trail of Broken Treaties were negotiating with the Interior Department over the question of housing. Suddenly fighting broke out between several GSA security guards and a group of young Indians.” He goes on to say that “apparently the guards misunderstood that the BIA had given the Indians permission to stay in the building past closing time. The guards were quickly overpowered and escorted from the building. Indians ran through the BIA building at 19th and Constitution, breaking up furniture to barricade entrances and manufacture makeshift weapons. The occupation was on.”[1]

Once inside the BIA’s building, protesters displayed their frustration towards the interior of the building. They threw furniture against windows and doors barricading themselves against potential police interference. Other members of the group set multiple fires in different interior offices and vandalized the polished marble lobbies. Unfortunately many historic documents were destroyed in the vandalism.[2]

The following day on November 4, John Chancellor, reporting desk anchor for NBC News said: “Several hundred American Indians remained in the Bureau of Indian Affairs building in Washington today. They took it over late yesterday after scuffles with police.” Moments later, news field-anchor John Cochran reported live stating: “It was peaceful if not quiet at the Indian Affairs Bureau, but nothing was settled today. The Indians are waiting for the Administration to respond to their demands for reforms in the way the government deals with Indians. And they’re asking for a decent place to eat and sleep while in Washington. Until they get it, they vow to stay in what they call their embassy.”[3]

Altercations and Theft

After a few days of altercation, the protesters began to run out of supplies. There was quickly little food and provisions to sustain their opportunistic operation. The AIM protesters would not allow police or government representatives to cross into the Bureau of Indian Affairs building. Because of this, two children of BIA employees were recruited to bring in supplies and rations to the protesters.

It was reported that the AIM’s actions created the loss, destruction, and theft of many historical records—mainly critical treaties, property deeds, and water rights documentation.[4] Even Native American officials stated that the consequences of the AIM’s actions could set Native American culture back 50 to 100 years—with a final estimated loss of nearly $2.28 million dollars in damages and theft by the hostile takeover of the BIA to the American taxpayer.[5]

In the end, it was the Nixon Administration who would secretly sign the “Menominee Restoration Act” on December 22, 1973. This policy would ultimately give the Menominee fully-recognized tribal status by the U.S. government, and return their land assets to trust status. Although only one tribe benefitted from this policy, it was a direct message sent to those who understood Nixon’s political interests - especially when it could be seen that his administration quite quickly agreed to these demands.

Corruption Through Proxy

More broadly, Nixon did have some sympathy with the Native American rights movement. Prior to the BIA takeover in Washington D.C, President Nixon stated in his 1970 address to Congress: 

“The special relationship between Indians and the Federal government is the result instead of solemn obligations which have been entered into by the United States Government. Down through the years, through written treaties and through formal and informal agreements, our government has made specific commitments to the Indian people. 

For their part, the Indians have often surrendered claims to vast tracts of land and have accepted life on government reservations. In exchange, the government has agreed to provide community services such as health, education and public safety, services which would presumably allow Indian communities to enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of other Americans. 

This goal, of course has never been achieved…”[6]

Younger Native Americans and First Nations peoples would give the most support to the American Indian Movement’s radical cause. The groups and entities found sympathetic to the BIA takeover of 1972 were:

·       The National Indian Brotherhood of Canada

·       Native American Civil Rights Fund

·       Native Indian Youth Council

·       National American Indian Council

·       National Council on Indian Work

·       National Indian Leadership Training

·       American Indian Committee on Alcohol and Drug Abuse

Other entities that endorsed and supported the takeover were:

·       The Native American Women’s Action Council

·       United Native Americans

·       National Indian Lutheran Board

·       Coalition of Indian-Controlled School Boards

·       Black Panther Party for Self Defense

To Conclude

There is almost always a political motive behind current events. Occupations, building takeovers, and progressive grassroots movements are all just a part of radical American history. It takes a certain rebellious ideology to undertake this type of insubordinate behavior and defiant action.

This is also the same type of ideology and behavior that commits citizens to the destruction of their own history. 

Isaiah 5:20 says, “Woe to those who call evil good and good evil, who put darkness for light and light for darkness, who put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter.”

You can read a selection of Daniel’s past articles on: California in the US Civil War (here), Spanish Colonial Influence on Native Americans in Northern California (here), Christian ideology in history (here), the collapse of the Spanish Armada in 1588 (here), early Christianity in Britain (here), the First Anglo-Dutch War (here), and the 1918 Spanish Influenza outbreak (here).

Finally, Daniel Smith writes at complexamerica.org.

[1] Simpson, Robert. "Native Americans Take Over Bureau of Indian Affairs: 1972." Washington Area Spark. Last modified May 10, 2013. https://washingtonareaspark.com/2013/03/26/native-americans-take-over-bureau-of-indian-affairs-1972/. 

[2] The Washington Post (Washington D.C.). "Amnesty Denied To Indians." November 10, 1972. https://www.maquah.net/Historical/1972/images/72-11-10_amnesty_denied.jpg. Note: An initial first estimate was officialized at about $250,000 in damages within the building.

[3] "Occupation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs" NBC News, New York, NY: NBC Universal, 11/03/1972. Accessed Sat Jan 11 2020 from NBC Learn: https://highered.nbclearn.com/portal/site/HigherEd/browse/?cuecard=5170  

[4] The Washington Post (Washington D.C.). " Justice Eyes Way to Charge Indians.” November 10, 1972. https://www.maquah.net/Historical/1972/images/72-11-1_justice_charge_indians.jpg. 

[5] The Washington Post (Washington D.C.). " Damage to BIA Third Heaviest Ever in U.S..” November 11, 1972. https://www.maquah.net/Historical/1972/images/72-11-11_damage_to_BIA.jpg. 

[6] Nixon, Richard. "Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs." The American Presidency Project. Last modified July 8, 1970. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-indian-affairs. 

The 1916 Proclamation that Helped to Create an Independent Ireland

In 1916, Irish republicans led the Easter Rising that sought to end British rule and create an independent Ireland. As part of this they read the 1916 Proclamation or Easter Proclamation, a document that proclaimed Irish independence. Here, Jenny Snook explains the events and their lasting importance.

Birth of the Irish Republic by Walter Paget.

In 1949, Ireland was officially declared a republic. In 2008, an auction of independence memorabilia took place in Dublin, with sales reaching over €2 million (around $2.3 million). One of the pieces sold was an original copy of the 1916 Proclamation of the Irish Republic, selling for €360,000 (c. $410,000).[1] This was a declaration read out over a century ago by a member of the Irish Volunteer Force. Although not an official declaration, it is now seen as a symbolic gesture which motivated the Irish people to stand up for their right to obtain independence and is still celebrated today.

The country was first captured by the British in 1169 and Republican ideas immerged centuries ago from people willing to use force to free Ireland from the British Empire. The 1798 Rebellion is known as one of the most disturbing, violent events in Irish history, significantly inspired by French republicanism. The Easter 1916 Rising is commonly recognized as the turning point in the development of modern Ireland.

The Irish Volunteer Force (IVF)

The Irish Volunteer Force (IVF) was a military republican organization first founded in 1913 and was the group most significantly involved in the Rising. They were formed as a direct response to the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), established in 1912. The UVF opposed any republican ideas and wanted to remain part of the British Empire. The Irish Citizen Army (ICA) were a smaller force that took part in the Rising, set up as the armed wing of workers on strike during a labor dispute known as the “Dublin Lock Out”.

The Easter 1916 Rising displayed a willingness to resort to violence to make Ireland a republic. While the British were more concerned with the problems of World War One, a popular slogan that became linked with the IVF was:

England’s difficulty is Ireland’s opportunity.

Conscription was never implemented in Ireland, but over 200,000 Irishmen still chose to enlist in the British army during the war. Members of the UVF were willing to stand up for their country but many members of the IVF had no desire to support a country that they did not want to be a part of.

It was their plan to take control of the General Post Office (GPO) on O’Connell Street in Dublin City Center, while taking over some other sites to block the main routes into the city. It was outside the GPO that Padraig Pearse would stand up and read the Proclamation of the Irish Republic.

Most of the actions taken involved rebels taking possession of buildings along these routes and then defending themselves from the British soldiers. It does not appear as though they expected victory but it seems more of a symbolic action that people still admire today. A famous statement made by Padraig Pearse, on 25th April was:  

Victory will be ours, even though victory will be found in death.[2]

Problems from the Beginning

Although members of the IVF all had the same goal of turning Ireland into a republic, they held vastly different views over whether the Rising was a good idea. Some thought that more time was needed to assemble followers and plan mass resistance. There were others who believed the best thing to do was strike, there and then, without worrying about the risks. Sean MacDermott was one of the leaders of the Rising who supported this view.

Opposing MacDermott, Eoin MacNeill felt this was a reckless and counter-productive idea that held no real benefits. One of the reasons MacNeill finally agreed to support the Rising was the reassurance that Germany would be sending over a shipment of weapons. The Aud carried 20,000 rifles, 3 machine guns, and ammunition over to Co. Kerry in southwest Ireland. Unfortunately, this ship was intercepted by the Royal Navy and the captain decided to scuttle the ship, rather than letting it be seized by the enemy. When MacNeill found out what had happened but realized that the Rising was still going ahead, he issued a ‘countermanding order’ to cancel their plans.

While he sent an order to cancel the rebellion beginning on Sunday, the Military Council met, agreeing to change the day until Monday, causing confusion. This disagreement was one of the main reasons why a lot of the people who had planned to attend on Sunday did not even turn up the next day.

None of the leaders were professional officers and they did not have enough support or sufficient artillery to seize power. There were about 1,300 members of the IVF involved and 219 from the ICA,[3] with a central meeting point outside the headquarters of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union at Beresford Place. Under Padraig Pearse and James Connolly (founder of the ICA), a force was sent out to take control of the GPO on O’Connell Street.

Four battalions were set up to occupy different parts of the city. The first of these battalions was led by Ned Daly and took possession the Four Courts, home of the country’s law courts. Under Thomas MacDonagh, the second battalion met at St. Stephen’s Green, before taking control of the Jacob’s Biscuit Factory. Eamon de Valera oversaw the third battalion, occupying Boland’s Bakery and under Eamonn Ceannt, the fourth battalion focused on a workhouse, ‘the South Dublin Union.’

Although their defensive locations were strong, these groups were positioned too far apart and there were not enough people involved to offer support if another was attacked. Although the initial British reaction was shock, martial law was quickly declared, leading to the gradual isolation and surrender of these rebel positions.

The Reading of the Proclamation

After taking control of the GPO, it was here that Padraig Pearse read out the Proclamation of the Irish Republic on April 24th, 1916. This was signed by James Connolly and 6 members of the IVF: Thomas J. Clarke, Eamonn Ceannt, Thomas MacDonagh, Joseph Plunkett, Padraig Pearse, and Sean MacDermott, written primarily by Pearse and Connolly.

A supporter of the Gaelic League (dedicated to protecting Irish language and culture), Pearse was also an educational reformer. He described the national school system as a ‘murder machine’ set out to destroy the Irish language.[4] Responsible for setting up several experimental, Irish speaking schools, he stated:

A country without language is a country without soul.[5]

There was only a small crowd present to listen to the reading of the proclamation. They did not show much enthusiasm when he tried to justify what the rebels were doing and what they hoped to achieve from it. The opening sentence read:

In the name of God and the dead generations from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom.

He tried to assure the crowd that becoming a republic:

Guarantees equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally.[6]

Pearse may not have succeeded in motivating the crowd at the time, but was correct when he said later that week that:

When we are all wiped out, people will blame us. In a few years they will see the meaning of what we tried to do.[7]

Lasting Effects of the 1916 Rising

By Friday, it was clear they could not last much longer at the GPO. Pearse ordered female volunteers to leave and by 7pm was forced to evacuate himself. At 8pm, the remaining rebels gathered to sing Ireland’s national anthem: “The Soldier’s Song”. After their surrender, 3,430 men and 79 women were arrested and while about 2,700 prisoners had been released by August 1916, there was no escape for the leaders.  [8]

Between May 3 and May 12 all of the 14 leaders were shot dead, except for Eamon de Valera, who was officially a US citizen, moving over to Ireland at the age of two. The British might have sentenced these men to death to try and restore law and order, but all they really succeeded in doing was to turn most of the Irish public against them. Even though the majority of those arrested were released within a few months, there was still much resentment shown by those believing these people should not have been locked up in the first place. In 1917, support for Sinn Féin (Ourselves), a political party dedicated to Irish independence, grew rapidally.  After his release, De Valera became a national icon. Serving as Taoiseach from 1937-1948, 1951-1954, and 1957-1959, he went on to serve as president of Ireland between 1959 and 1973.

Unlike the small crowd that first listened to Padraig Pearse read out the proclamation in 1916, on March 27, 2016, hundreds of thousands listened to it being read out again outside the GPO by Captain Peter Kelleher, to mark the 100-year anniversary of the 1916 Rising. This is probably the most celebrated scene in Irish history which Irish people today are proud to celebrate. Well-known and passionate supporters of the Rising include Irish poet W. B. Yeats, named one of the greatest poets of the 20th century. The last lines of his poem ‘Easter 1916’ (1921) read:

MacDonagh and MacBride   

And Connolly and Pearse

Now and in time to be,

Wherever green is worn,

Are changed, changed utterly:   

A terrible beauty is born.[9]

How important do you think the 1916 Proclamation was to achieving Irish independence? Let us know below.

[1] https://www.irishtimes.com/news/proclamation-copy-sells-for-360-000-1.913576

[2] Pritchard, p42

[3] https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/profiles/po14.shtml

[4] Townshend, p71

[5] Pritchard, p8

[6] https://irishrepublican.weebly.com/proclamation.html

[7] https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/profiles/po11.shtml

[8] https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/aftermath/af01.shtml

[9] https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/43289/easter-1916

Bibliography

·       Kenny, Michael: The 1798 Rebellion (1996). Town House and Country House. Dublin.

·       Killeen, Richard: A Short History of the 1916 Rising (2009). Gill & Macmillan Ltd. Dublin

·       Pritchard, David: A Pictorial Guide to the 1916 Easter Rising (2015). Real Ireland Design. County Wicklow, Ireland.

·       Townshend, Charles: Ireland: The 20th Century (1999). Hodder Arnold. London.

·       https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/43289/easter-1916 Easter 1916, by William Butler Yeats.

·       https://irishrepublican.weebly.com/proclamation.html Copy of Proclamation.

·       https://www.irishtimes.com/news/proclamation-copy-sells-for-360-000-1.913576 Proclamation Copy Sells for €360,000. (Apr 16th, 2008).

·       https://www.rte.ie/news/ireland/2016/0327/777698-easter-rising/ Massive Crowds Line the Streets of Dublin for 1916 Parade (March 28th, 2016).

·       https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/profiles/po11.shtml 1916 Easter Rising Profiles: Patrick Pearse: 1879-1916.

·       https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/profiles/po14.shtml  The Irish Citizens Army

·       https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/aftermath/af01.shtml The Executions

The Man who Risked his Life to Save Thousands of Works of Art in World War II

World War Two led to the destruction of too many monuments or artifacts of great historical interest; however, some people played important roles in keeping many such artifacts safe. Here, Charlotte Davies explains how Kurt Seeleke (1912-2000) helped to keep thousands of pieces of art safe in the north German city of Braunschweig in World War Two.

The devastation from World War Two: Braunschweig on May 12, 1945.

The other day I was sitting on a bench in a little square in Braunschweig, Germany, where I live, attempting to do a watercolor painting of a romantically ruined old building. A well-turned-out older lady walked past and I smiled at her, and then immediately thought better of it, since smiling at strangers isn’t really the done thing here. But the next thing I knew, she had stopped and said “Braunschweig hat schöne Ecken”, nodding towards the scene – Braunschweig has its nice little corners. I agreed and pointed out the ruined building. This prompted the lady to begin recounting her wartime memories: she told of how her family’s house in the city center had been destroyed by a bomb, an incident which she could remember despite being only three years old at the time. I was all ears, particularly because I had been doing the research for this article and had wartime Braunschweig on the brain. Now here was someone in front of me who had actually experienced those times. We chatted for about 15 minutes, and when I thanked her for sharing her memories with me, she said in rather heartfelt tones that no one had ever asked them, meaning her generation, about their experiences. I was glad to have been an interested audience for her story.

Wartime destruction and post-war rebuilding

Braunschweig was once the largest half-timbered town in Germany, but lost 90% of its city center to bombing raids in 1944. A list of the German cities that were bombed shows that destruction of this magnitude was fairly common, with many town centers being all but wiped out. This obviously had long-term consequences for the appearance of German townscapes. If I go down the hill into the town center from where I live, I come to a Bohlweg, where the unfortunate aesthetic choices of post-war architects are all too apparent – what used to be a street of timber-framed buildings is now lined with drab blocks, including some real eyesores. Thankfully, however, not all of the city center looks like this. There are several squares surrounded by pretty buildings that evoke times of yore, including the Burgplatz with its medieval-style castle, or the cobbled expanse of the Altstadtmarkt bordered by the atmospheric arches and turrets of the gothic town hall.

Whether or not they are aware of it, all Braunschweigers owe a debt of gratitude to the subject of this article, Kurt Seeleke, for the fact that their city contains these pockets of quaintness. In his position as Head of Conservation for the region and together with the architect Friedrich Wilhelm Kraemer, he developed a plan to preserve and restore buildings after the Second World War. The aim was to create five heritage areas, each centered around one of the city’s churches. He called these areas the Traditionsinsel. In some cases, buildings were moved from other locations to fill gaps and thus create a unified whole.

Seeleke’s vital influence on shaping the post-war cityscape was something I had been aware of for a while. But when I started looking into him a bit more, I discovered that, prior to this, he had achieved other great feats of preservation, getting into some dramatic situations in the process: whether that was watching bombing raids from the top of a church tower, or pleading with a Wehrmacht general who apparently threatened to have him shot. I soon realized I had to dedicate an article to this remarkable man.

Saving art and cultural heritage from the firestorms

Kurt Seeleke came from a Braunschweig family who ran a long-established business producing gingerbread and honey cake. The young Kurt showed an aptitude for cultural conservation work, possessing a combination of practical skill and an artistic sensibility, and went on to study art history in Berlin and Munich, before being put in charge of monument preservation in Braunschweig. However, he had only been in the role a short time when the Second World War broke out. By the end of 1939, the museums had been closed and the collections moved to the cellars for safety. These included the renowned collection of the Herzog Anton Ulrich Museum which included works by many big names including Cranach, Rembrandt, van Dyke, Rubens, and Vermeer.

Seeleke was called up in early summer 1940 and sent to France, only to be discharged due to illness in 1941 and sent to Italy to teach at German academies there. He was ordered to return to Braunschweig in August 1943 amidst growing concern for the safety of Germany’s cultural heritage following the bombing of Lübeck in March of that year. It was the first German city to be heavily bombed by the RAF, with the resulting firestorms wiping out large parts of the town’s historic center. Back in his home city, he returned to the task of getting as many movable art treasures as possible out of the city center and into underground storage, in case a similar fate awaited Braunschweig.

On February 10, 1944, heavy bombing raids did indeed reach Braunschweig. When Seeleke came out of the bunker he had been sheltering in, he discovered that one of the city’s historic buildings was burning to the ground. He decided that on future occasions, he could not wait around in an air-raid shelter whilst irreplaceable cultural heritage was destroyed. Instead, he would climb up to the top of the spire of the St. Martinikirche, which gave him the best vantage point to watch for fires. When he saw flames, he would race down to get in his car or on his bike so that he could reach the scene and support the small voluntary fire service in trying to put out the fire. In order to be better prepared for this role, he got himself trained up as a fireman. Poignantly, it was from his high vantage point that he saw the timber-frame headquarters of his family’s honey cake business be blown to pieces.

The moving of paintings and other works of art continued in this period when possible. But the bombs were falling more and more frequently. The worst night came on October 15, 1944. Seeleke wrote simply “destruction of Old Braunschweig at 2:30 by English planes” (1). The firestorm lasted two and a half days, and afterwards, the city was a wasteland, with church towers rising up out of the smoldering ruins.

Devastating as this must have been for him, Seeleke at least had the comfort of knowing that the city’s most valuable paintings were still safely in the bunker where they had been stowed at the start of the war. But then came the order from the local chief of police to remove these artworks in order to free up the space for civilians. Appalled at the thought of exposing the paintings to danger, he initially ignored the order, which was of course a dangerous business in Nazi Germany. Finally, he arranged to have the bunker emptied, and the paintings transported to the cellars of Blankenburg Palace in the Harz mountains – although due to the risky nature of these trips and a lack of transport vehicles, Seeleke secretly left the most valuable paintings in the bunker.

A visit to the Wehrmacht general

Shortly afterwards, it emerged that he could not have picked a worse place to move the artworks to. In early April 1945, Heinrich Himmler declared Blankenburg to be the center of the "Harz Fortress", which would be defended to the last man against advancing Allied forces. The artworks would surely not survive. Seeleke was almost in despair. But he wasn't prepared to give up yet. A delegation including Seeleke went to the local mayor to plead for a change of plan. Seeleke then proposed that they go directly to the general in charge to plead their case. But the others in the delegation were aware that any attempt to persuade a military commander to be “unfaithful to his duty” could be punishable by death. The next morning, Seeleke set off accompanied only by Prince Welf Heinrich, son of the former Duke of Braunschweig, apparently encouraged by the latter’s “youthful foolhardiness” (2). Both men took leave of their families in case the worst happened.

When the two men entered the general’s office, Seeleke was carrying a curious object. It was an onyx vase from the museum collections. Ingeniously, he had invented a history for it that was designed to target the pompous nationalistic pretensions of a Nazi general: he claimed that for a thousand years, it had held a balm used to anoint the German emperors. It is said that he challenged the general to “hold it, hurl it against the wall! If you’re certain of winning this war, then everything must be sacrificed. But if you aren’t…” (3), at which point he trailed off, and there was an oppressive silence. The general is supposed to have told them during this meeting that he “could have them shot on the spot” (4). But he didn’t carry out his threat. The men were told to leave, and that they would get an answer the following day.

Whether it was the onyx vase that tipped the balance, we will never know, but on April 13, 1945, the German troops did indeed move out of Blankenburg and form a new front deeper in the Harz mountains. The thousands of paintings and objets d’art were safe. Seeleke must have breathed an almighty sigh of relief. But that still wasn’t the end of the story. After the war was over, Blankenburg was made part of the Soviet occupation zone, and once again, the paintings had to be saved, this time from the clutches of the advancing Red Army; British troops provided assistance.

The Braunschweig lion. Source: Heribert Bechen/HerryB, available here.

The Braunschweig lion

There is another of Kurt Seeleke’s daring feats that should be mentioned, and that concerns the Braunschweig lion, symbol of the city since Henry the Lion’s time. In 1943, in the midst of the war, the bronze statue from 1166 was still standing unprotected at the center of the Burgplatz. Seeleke then received orders to have it sent away to safety. But there was no way he was allowing this iconic creature to be transported to far away Silesia, perhaps never to return. So he mounted a top-secret operation to have the original statue replaced by a copy that had been created a few years earlier. He successfully hoodwinked his Nazi superiors – the original lion was spirited away to a mine tunnel in the region.

Following the end of the war, Braunschweig became part of the British occupation zone and a British army captain was installed in the city to assist in the task of retrieving and restoring artworks. Robert „Rollo“ Lonsdale Charles was one of the “Monuments Men”, a group of volunteers (both men and women) who took on the mission of “saving cultural treasures from the destructiveness of war, and theft by Adolf Hitler and the Nazis” (4).  Rollo and Seeleke got on well and formed a close working relationship. In the diary he kept at the time, Rollo recorded the retrieval of the lion as follows (not his exact words as I only had access to a German translation):

Tuesday, 23. October 1945. Went to Goslar with Seeleke and Kump to get the lion… the workers in the fields uncovered their faces as we drove past, and I could see their lips moving as they pointed towards us, laughed and cried “Der Braunschweiger Löwe!”. Around five o’clock, we arrived in Braunschweig… a crowd of people gathered around him and stroked him, mothers held up their children so that they could see… it was all very touching … an excellent animal. One feels like he might wag his tale at any moment!” (5)

Seeleke had many successes, but there was one thing he didn’t manage to save, despite his best efforts, and that was the Braunschweiger Schloss. The former ducal palace was demolished in the summer of 1960, following which Seeleke left Braunschweig in disgust and took up a post in Berlin. He didn’t return until his retirement in 1990, and was awarded a Citizen’s Medal for his services to conservation and historical restoration. Kurt Seeleke lived to be a ripe old age, dying in 2000.

The next time I go into a museum and look at paintings, I will try to bear in mind that their survival over the centuries is by no means a given. It requires the knowledge and dedication of experts who conserve and restore, it requires societies that deem their cultural heritage to be important and worthy of preserving, and governments that allocate funding accordingly. And sometimes, in the worst times when war is raging and reeking destruction on all sides, it requires great ingenuity, resourcefulness and astounding acts of bravery.

Charlotte Davies writes the blog https://braunschweigportraits.blogspot.com/ which takes a light-hearted look at various characters from German history.

Now, what do you think of the article? Let us know below.

1) Quoted in Friemuth, Cay, Die geraubte Kunst. Der dramatische Wettlauf um die Rettung der Kulturschätze nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, 171

2) Quoted in ibid., 174

3) Quoted in ibid.

4) https://www.ndr.de/geschichte/chronologie/kriegsende/Kunstretter-mit-Loewenherz-trotzt-selbst-Bombenhagel,seeleke100.html

5) https://www.monumentsmenfoundation.org/

6) Quoted in Friemuth, Cay, Die geraubte Kunst. Der dramatische Wettlauf um die Rettung der Kulturschätze nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, 279–281

Sources:

https://www.ndr.de/geschichte/chronologie/kriegsende/Kunstretter-mit-Loewenherz-trotzt-selbst-Bombenhagel,seeleke100.html

Friemuth, Cay. Die geraubte Kunst. Der dramatische Wettlauf um die Rettung der Kulturschätze nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Georg Westermann Verlag GmbH, 1989)

Modern Greece and the Idea of Regaining Istanbul/Constantinople: Dreaming of Byzantium

When Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul, or Byzantium prior to Constantinople), the queen of cities, fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453, the millennia-old Roman Empire, in the form of the Byzantine Empire, was lost to the world. But the memory of Byzantium did not die, and the Romaioi (Romans), the Greek-speaking population of the former Byzantine Empire, yearned for freedom and the restoration of their long-lost empire. When Greece officially became independent in 1832, this dream of restoring Byzantium became Greek national policy, and was aggressively pursued for the next nine decades, shaping the development of the modern Greek state. This is known as the Megali Idea.

Michael Goodyear explains.

Eleftherios Venizelos, who became Greek Prime Minister in 1910.

400 Years of Ottoman Rule

Following the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman Empire quickly conquered the remaining independent Greek-Byzantine territories. These new Ottoman subjects were subjected to restrictions and obligations based on their religion, including being subject to a poll tax in lieu of military service and the devşirme levy on Christian boys for imperial service.[1]On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire practiced much greater religious tolerance than European nations at that time.[2] The Ottomans categorized their subjects based on religion, and this kept ethnic Greeks looking to Constantinople and its Patriarch, as their identity as Orthodox Christians was of preeminence under the Ottoman Empire. This in turn maintained the Greek memory of Constantinople as their great city, and Greeks continued to think of themselves as Romans. For example, when the Greek political thinker Rigas Feraios thought of a Pan-Balkan federation in the late eighteenth century, he was thinking of the Byzantine Empire as a model.[3]

When Greeks started agitating for independence, they looked to the greater Greek community living in the Ottoman Empire. The Byzantine Empire served as a model of independence. Revolution broke out in 1821, and through eight years of bloody struggles, and the assistance of Great Britain, France, and Russia, a newly independent Greek state emerged. Constituting little more than southern Greece and a few islands, the nascent modern Greece would quickly develop ambitions to recover all territory that had been Greek.

Once More They Shall Be Ours

Due to its small size, from its inception, modern Greece wanted to grow and recover more territory where ethnic Greeks resided. This irredentist mission to rescue the Greeks remaining under Ottoman rule ultimately took form as the policy of the Megali Idea (the Great Idea). In 1844, Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Kolettis first used the term in a political context to advocate for the recovery of “any land associated with Greek history or the Greek race.”[4] The contemporary Greek historian Constantine Paparrigopoulos connected Kolettis’ vision with Byzantium, fleshing out the Megali Idea as the dream to restore the Byzantine Empire, the last “Greek” polity prior to Ottoman rule.[5] While the goal was to recover all historically Greek lands, there was a clear goal: Constantinople. As Kolettis had put it, “Constantinople is the great capital, the dream and hope of all Greeks.”[6]

Throughout the nineteenth century, Greece embarked on a slow but steady expansion. In 1864, Greece acquired the Ionian Islands from Great Britain as a present for the new Greek king, George I. When George was crowned, his title was King of the Hellenes, rather than just Greece, and thus a direct claim to the mantle of the Megali Idea. In 1881, Greece acquired Thessaly from the Ottoman Empire. But Greek expansion was stalled in 1897; the Greek army attempted to assist the island of Crete, which was rebelling against Ottoman rule, but the Ottoman army crushed the Greeks. Yet even in military defeat, the Megali Idea was preserved. The Great Powers intervened and forced the Ottomans to make Crete an autonomous province inside the Ottoman Empire, with George I appointed as the High Commissioner of the Cretan State.

Zenith and Fall

The height of the Megali Idea, however, was at the start of the twentieth century. As the new century dawned, the Ottoman Empire was the Sick Man of Europe. The nations of Europe waited for its imminent demise, and the newly independent countries of the Balkans hungrily eyed the decaying corpse. One of the leading proponents of the Megali Idea, Eleftherios Venizelos, became the Greek prime minister in 1910. Venizelos was a native Cretan, and as an ethnic Greek born outside of Greece, he actively wanted to recover former Greek territory from the Ottomans. Venizelos allied with the other Balkan states against the Ottoman Empire. In 1912-1913, this Balkan League quickly obliterated the Ottoman military and occupied practically all of Ottoman Europe, even advancing on Constantinople itself. Greece occupied former core territories of the Byzantine Empire: Epirus and the Aegean islands, including Crete, were taken. The greatest prize was the taking of Macedonia, and its provincial capital of Thessaloniki, the former second city of the Byzantine Empire.

George I was assassinated upon entering Thessaloniki as the victor, but this hardly slowed the advance of the Megali Idea. George I’s successor, Constantine I, was even named in honor of the Megali Idea; the last emperor of Byzantium was Constantine XI, so Constantine I was also known as Constantine XII. The start of World War I in 1914 was a potential problem, as Constantine supported the Central Powers while Venizelos supported the Entente, and although a national schism ensued between the two, Venizelos prevailed and authorized the Entente to use Thessaloniki as a forward base against the Central Powers. Venizelos’ gamble paid off: when the Ottoman Empire capitulated in the Treaty of Sevres, Greece was given Thrace and the area around the major Anatolian port city of Smyrna. Greek territory now surrounded the Aegean and approached the very gates of Constantinople.

Greece, seeing an opportunity, landed troops in Smyrna and conducted operations to occupy more Ottoman land to the east and northeast. The timing seemed ideal: the Ottoman Empire had effectively disintegrated and Constantinople was occupied by Allied forces. But the future president of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, was rallying Turkish forces in the east, and in late 1920, the briefly deposed Constantine I returned and Venizelos fell from power. The purge of Venizelists from the army substantially weakened its effectiveness and the Greek Army, which was numerically small, was stretched thin across western Anatolia. Kemal’s forces halted the Greek advance at the Battle of Sakarya in 1921, and the next year Turkish forces began the counter attack. The Greek army had never properly reorganized after Sakarya and their withered forces were decimated by the Turks at the Battle of Dumlupınar. The remnants of the Greek army fled to Smyrna. Greek soldiers, citizens, and local Christians crowded the docks of Smyrna as Turkish soldiers started to burn the city behind them. The dreams of a restored Byzantium perished in those flames.

Lingering Memory

In 1923, a new treaty was signed between Greece and Turkey, the Treaty of Lausanne, which returned all Anatolian land and Eastern Thrace to Turkey. In addition, Greece and Turkey exchanged their local populations of Greeks and Turks: over a million ethnic Greeks moved from Turkey to Greece and 400,000 Turks moved from Greece to Turkey. Irredentism was effectively dead, as almost all of the Greeks in Turkey had now moved to Greece. This massive influx of people would significantly affect the Greek economy and society, with neighborhoods such as Nea Smyrni (New Smyrna in Athens) and the distinctive rebetiko music serving as lingering examples of the Megali Idea in Greece. But the idea has not completely died; Ioannis Metaxas invoked it during his dictatorship from 1936-1941 and similar ideas emerged over the issue of Cyprus in the mid-twentieth century. Even today, the ultranationalist far right Greek political party Golden Dawn has claimed Constantinople.[7] These lingering memories leave little doubt of how irredentist dreams of restoring a lost medieval empire shaped the course of modern Greek history.

How important do you think regaining Byzantium/Constantinople/Istanbul has been to modern Greece? Let us know below.

[1] David Brewer, Greece, the Hidden Centuries: Turkish Rule from the Fall of Constantinople to Greek Independence 51, 115 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010).

[2] Id. at 35-36.

[3] See Peter Mackridge, Language and National Identity in Greece, 1766-1976 45-46 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[4] See Yannis Hamilakis, The Nation and Its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece 107, 114-115 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 

[5] Id. at 115; see also Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea,” in Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity (David Ricks & Paul Magdalino, eds.) (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 1998). 

[6] Hamilakis, supra note 4, at 114-115.

[7] “Neo-Nazi Golden Dawn Says Istanbul Will Be Greek,” Hurriyet Daily News (June 1, 2012), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/neo-nazi-golden-dawn-says-istanbul-will-be-greek.aspx?pageID=238&nID=22118&NewsCatID=351.