Nazi Germany’s ‘Wonder Weapons’ – And Their Many Flaws

In their attempt to win World War II, Nazi Germany produced a range of ‘Wonder Weapons’. While initially seemingly impressive, in reality they all had their flaws. Here Daniel Boustead returns and tells us about the V-1 flying bomb, the v-3 artillery gun, the XXI submarine, and the Fritz X guided bomb.

A German crew rolling out a V-1 flying bomb. Source: Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1973-029A-24A / Lysiak / CC-BY-SA 3.0, available here.

In World War II, Nazi Germany built and designed various “Wonder Weapons”. Some of these weapons were of the “Vengeance Weapons” series. The “V- Weapons” had some important success but did have some fatal flaws. Another group of these weapons were not of the “V-Weapons” designation. Although these other weapons achieved some successes, they had defects. This analysis will prove that these weapons were truly not “Wonder Weapons”.

V-1 Flying Bomb

The first of these  “Wonder Weapons” is the  “V-1 Flying Bomb” which many military historians call the world’s first cruise missile. The V-1 Flying Bomb’s official technical designation was the FI 103 A-1 and it was equipped with a 1,832 pounds warhead ([1]). The weapon had a cruising speed of up to 400 miles per hour (2). The guidance system was controlled by gyroscopic auto pilot, Askania, anemometer, air log device measurer, gyroscopic compass, and tails controlled by two compressed air bottles and a 30 Volt Battery (1). The weapon also had a small windmill in the nose of the V-1, which powered an air log. This air log measured the distance travelled, and at a predetermined distance, cut off fuel to the engine. The air log also commanded the weapon to dive and gave erratic and imprecise measurements - it was accurate enough to hit a target the size of London (2). The V-1 Flying bomb was often launched from a catapult wall that was pointed towards London and that was adjacent to “ski” type buildings (3).

The V-1 “Flying Bomb” had achieved some important success during its operation. From June 12, 1944 to September 1, 1944 more than 8,500 V-1 “Buzz Bombs” were launched from their sites in France (6). The V-1 Flying Bomb would continue to be used even after September 1944.  The V-1 launch sites were moved to the Netherlands and Germany from autumn to winter 1944 after V-1 bases in France were captured by the Allies (8). The last V-1 “Flying Bomb” to hit London was on March 28, 1945 (7). The total number of V-1 “Flying Bombs” launched during the war was 23,172 (11). In total, the V-1 attacks had killed about 5,000 people and wounded 16,000 people in England, as well as causing substantial damage (7).  However, despite the numerous success of the V-1 “Flying Bomb” the weapon began to show its terrible faults. 

The V-1 Flying Bomb’s speed of 400 miles per hour made it vulnerable to late model Spitfires, Mustangs, Tempests, and the new Meteor Jet Fighters. These weapons shot down 1,847 V-1 Flying Bombs (2). Also, the V-1 was frequently destroyed by barrage balloons, and anti-aircraft guns (6). In addition, just under half of the V-1s crossing the English coast were destroyed by aircraft and anti-aircraft fire, and many went astray, exploding in open country (9). Some V-1’s were destroyed by Allied Fighter planes flying up to the weapon and tipping it off its course and equilibrium, causing the weapon to fall to the ground (10).

V-3 Artillery Gun

The next “Wonder Weapon” was the V-3 Artillery Gun which was located in Mimoyecques, France (4). The V-3 Artillery gun had 50 barrels (4). This gave it a potential range of 100 miles, which was achieved by sending the 300-pound projectile through a series of ignitions of explosive charges along the intervals of each barrel (4). The V-3 Artillery Gun was a 150 centimeters/5-feet caliber gun - it was 127 meters or 415 feet long (5). 

The fact that the V-3 Artillery Gun was stationary at Mimoyecques France proved itself very vulnerable to air attack. This was brutally demonstrated on July 6, 1944 when Royal Air Force bombers carrying the 6-ton “Tall Boy” bomb attacked the site (12). One “Tallboy” directly impacted the concrete slab on top of the complex, collapsing Drift IV of the weapons site. The other “Tallboy” bombs penetrated the tunnel system below, creating extensive damage The Germans tried to clean up the debris from the raid but they realized that all hope was lost. The Mimoyecques V-3 site was officially overrun and captured by the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division on September 5, 1944 (12). The surviving V-3 gun weapon was moved to Lampaden, Germany where from December 30,1944 to February 22, 1945 it shelled Luxembourg City, Luxembourg killing 10 people (13).

XXI U-Boat

The German XXI U-Boat or submarine was another one of the Nazi “Wonder Weapons”. The Type XXI Submarine had a revolutionary cross section that was a “figure of eight’ that made a smaller target for sonar (14). It also had increased battery capacity, which allowed it to remain submerged longer. The Type XXI Submarine was also equipped with a schnorchl which allowed it to recharge it batteries underwater and thus avoid being attacked by Allied aircraft. Furthermore the XXI Submarine had a rapid reloading system, which allowed it to fire three six-torpedo salvos in 20 minutes, thus increasing the number of targets it could attack per convoy (14). The Type XXI Submarine had a top underwater speed of 17.2 knots, while its surface speed was only 15.65 knots thus allowing it to avoid Allied anti-submarine units (15). This combination allowed the Type XXI Submarine to run fast underwater attack against Allied convoys and go away virtually undetected (20).

There were significant flaws with the Type XXI Submarine, which delayed its introduction. In production and development the Type XXI submarine had problems with batteries, which led to minor explosions (16). A particular problem arose when it was discovered that the main electrical lead supplying the DC current from the battery to the electrical motors ran down one side of the boat and returned along the other. This was a neat solution from a production point of view, but was potentially disastrous at sea, since it set up a magnetic field, which could easily trigger a mine. Again, boats had to be returned to the yards for the cabling to be rerouted (16). These wasted needless hours of work thus delayed the weapon’s introduction into combat. Also the standard torpedo the Type XXI Submarine carried was the G7a and G7e, which had warheads of either 617 pounds or 604 pounds respectively (17). In contrast the Japanese Kaiten Type 1 Suicide Torpedo had a 3,400-pound warhead and was powered by a fuel mixture of kerosene and oxygen (18). The fact oxygen was used in the Kaiten Type 1 Suicide Torpedo, and the Type Model 93 “Long Lance” torpedo produced the result that it left no telltale wake of water behind it (19).  In the end only two of the Type XXI U-Boats saw service (U-2511 and U-3008) and neither fired a shot in anger (20). 

Fritz X Guided Bomb

A further Nazi “Wonder Weapon” was the Fritz X Guided Bomb. The Fritz X Guided bomb had a warhead which weighed 3,085 pounds (21). The Fritz X was launched from a bomber aircraft and was guided to its target by the bombardier who used a joystick inside the bomber aircraft (22). The radio command system of the Fritz X was codenamed E30 Kelhl- Strasbourg (22). 

On September 9, 1943 the Fritz X Guided bomb successfully attacked the surrendering Italian Battleship RM Roma. The attack also killed most of the crew (21). This led to RM Roma to be sunk, scuttled and written off (23). This was the most successful of any German anti-ship missile attack of World War II. 

In spite of this great success the Fritz X and the HS-293 would suffer a fatal setback later in 1943. The Allies found an intact HS-293 guided missile on an Anzio beach with an undamaged Kehl-Strasbourg radio receiver (24). The Fritz X used the same radio receiver equipment as the HS-293. This allowed the Allies to not only to determine the operating bands but also how the signals actually guided the missile. This meant that in the future, the Allies could not only jam the frequencies, but also spoof the guidance channel with false commands (24). The net result of the jammer counter-measures was that through January 1944, German successful anti-ship missile launch claims averaged 20% to 30% of missiles that did not malfunction (25).  By February 1944, when a greater number of jammers were available to the fleet off Anzio, the successful Anti-ship missile launch claims that did not malfunction fell to about 10 percent. Further Allied progress resulted in the number of successful anti-ship missiles that did not malfunction to fall to less than 5 percent by the summer of 1944. The combination of deteriorating Luftwaffe crew experience, Allied fighter defense, and the greater presence of sophisticated shipboard jammers spelled the end of the German anti-ship missile threat (25).

Conclusion

The Nazis produced many advanced weapons during WW II. These weapons had success during their time in combat. However, these weapons had fatal flaws. The “Wonder Weapons” were not only “too little and too late”, but also superfluous, wasteful, and technologically ineffective during the course of the war. 

What do you think of these Nazi weapons? Let us know below.

Now, you can read more World War II history from Daniel: “Did World War Two Japanese Kamikaze Attacks have more Impact than Nazi V-2 Rockets?” here, “Japanese attacks on the USA in World War II” here, and “Was the Italian Military in World War 2 Really that Bad?” here.

[1] Mercado, P. and Miranda, J. Secret Weapons of the Third Reich: German Missiles 1934-1945. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 1996. 36. 

2 Bishop  Chris  and Warner , Adam, eds. German Weapons of World War II. Edison, New Jersey: Chartwell Books, Inc. 2001. 114.

3 Zaloga, Steven J. German V-Weapon Sites 1943-45. Long Island City: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2008. 27 to 28. 

6 Bishop, Chris and Warner, Adam, eds. German Weapons of World War II. Edison, New Jersey: Chartwell Books, Inc. 2001. 113. 

8 Zaloga, Steven J. German V-Weapons Sites 1943-45. Long Island City:  New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2008. 49. 

7 Zaloga, Steven J. German V-Weapons Sites 1943-45. Long Island City: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2008. 51. 

11 Zaloga, Steven J. German V-Weapons Sites 1943-45. Long Island City: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2008. 58. 

9 Bishop, Chris and Warner, Adam, eds. German Weapons of World War II. Edison, New Jersey: Chartwell Books, Inc. 2001. 113 to 114. 

10 Engelmann, Joachim. V1: The Flying Bomb.  Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing Ltd. 1992. 35. 

4 Bailey, Ronald H. The Air War in Europe. Alexandria: Virginia: Time Life Books Inc. 1979. 179 to 180. 

5 Zaloga, Steven J. German V- Weapon Sites 1943-45. Long Island City: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2008. 14. 

12 Zaloga, Steven J. German V-Weapons Sites 1943-45. Long Island City: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2008. 14. 

13 Zaloga, Steven J. German V-Weapons Sties 1943-45. Long Island City: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2008. 57 to 58. 

14 Miller, David. U-Boats: The Illustrated History of the Raiders of the Deep. Washington: District of Columbia. Brassey’s. 2000. 61. 

15 Miller, David. U-Boats: The Illustrated History of the Raiders of the Deep. Washington: District of Columbia. Brassey’s. 2000. 60-61. 

16 Miller, David. U-Boats: The Illustrated History of Raiders of the Deep.  Washington: District of Columbia. Brassey’s. 2000. 68. 

17 Miller, David. U-Boats: The Illustrated History of the Raiders of the Deep. Washington: District of Columbia. Brassey’s. 2000. 68. 

18 Boyd, Carl and Yoshida, Akihiko. The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II. Annapolis: Maryland. Bluejacket Books: Naval Institute Press. 1995 and 2002. 39. 

19 Wheeler, Keith. War Under the Pacific. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books Inc. 1980. 98. 

20 Miller, David. U-Boats: The Illustrated History of the Raiders of the Deep. Washington; District of Columbia. Brassey’s. 2000.68 to 69. 

21 Zaloga, Steven J. German Guided Missiles of World War II: Fritz-X to Wasserfall and X-4. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2019. 12. 

22 Zaloga, Steven J. German Guided Missiles of World War II: Fritz-X to Wasserfall and X-4. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2019. 6. 

23 Zaloga, Steven J. German Guided Missiles of World War II: Fritz X to Wasserfall and X-4. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2019. 19. 

24 Zaloga, Steven J. German Guided Missiles of World War II: Fritz X to Wasserfall and X-4. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2019. 16. 

25Zaloga, Steven J. German Guided Missiles of World War II: Fritz X to Wasserfall and X-4. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2019. 18. 

Bibliography

Bailey, Ronald H.  The Air War in Europe. Alexandria: Virginia; Time Life Books Inc. 1979. 

Bishop, Chris and Warner, Adam, eds. German Weapons of World War II. Edison., New Jersey: Chartwell Books, Inc. 2001.

Boyd, Carl and Yoshida, Akihiko. The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II. Annapolis: Maryland. Bluejacket Books: Naval Institute Press. 1995 and 2002.

Engelmann, Joachim. V1: The Flying Bomb. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing Ltd. 1992.

Mercado, P. and Miranda, J. Secret Weapons of the Third Reich: German Missiles  1934-1945. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 1996.

Miller, David. U-Boats: The Illustrated History of the Raiders of the Deep. Washington: District of Columbia. Brasey’s. 2000.

Wheeler, Keith. War Under the Pacific. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books Inc. 1980.

Zaloga, Steven J. German Guided Missiles of World War II: Fritz X to Wasserfall and X-4. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2019.

Zaloga, Steven J.  German V-Weapons Sites 1943-45. Long Island City: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2008.

Disastrous Preparation for World War 2’s D-Day: Exercise Tiger

Exercise Tiger was an Allied training exercise in preparation for World War Two’s D-Day that took place in southern England in April 1944; however, it went very wrong. Here, Peter Baugher tells the story of the largely unknown exercise – and how even Nazi Germany became involved.

American troops landing in Slapton Sands, southern England as part of Exercise Tiger. April 1944.

"It was a different world then. It was a world that required young men like myself to be prepared to die for a civilization that was worth living in” (Murphy 2019), says Harry Read, a British D-Day veteran, in a powerful statement. Operation Overlord freed northwestern France, generating shockwaves that eventually toppled Adolf Hitler. The invasion constitutes one of the most tactical military campaigns in history, the largest amphibious operation to date. But how did the Allies prepare? What blood was spilled in secret, and how long will it remain in the shadows? The forgotten dead of one fateful April night must now be remembered and honored. Although the story of Exercise Tiger is widely unknown, the operation was the deadliest training operation of the War.

The Curtain Opened

In September of 1943, around three thousand British villagers evacuated from Devon near Slapton Sands by order of the Allied Forces. (Small 1988) The exiles deserted homes, farms, and, as a result, their livelihoods. Although the officers delivering the order disclosed scarce information, the Allies decided the Beaches of Slapton Sands granted an ideal practice ground for the American troops to prepare for the invasion into Normandy. According to Naval History and Heritage Command, “Slapton was an unspoiled beach of coarse gravel, fronting a shallow lagoon that was backed by bluffs that resembled Omaha Beach. After the people in the nearby village were evacuated, it was an almost perfect place to simulate the Normandy landings. (Command 2015).” The Supreme Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower realized that the American troops were not prepared to stage the enormous invasion. Ironically, the future President failed to avoid spoiling that beach of gravel during a training exercise to prepare for success.

Evil Entered the Stage

The horrors of the morning of April twenty-seventh foreshadowed the disaster. In the early morning hours, British personnel bunkered on the beaches at Slapton Sands.  In the interest of preparing the men for the chaos of battle, Commander Eisenhower commanded the British Army to fire live rounds aloft the American troops. Originally, Convoys planned to stage the mock invasion at seven-thirty. After logistical delays, the appointed time was moved to eight thirty. One convoy did not receive the order and arrived at the beach at the original scheduled time. The first wave stormed the beach while the British initiated live fire over the heads of the Americans. As the next wave arrived abaft, rogue lead found the bodies of American troops. Although the army avoided creating an official count, an estimated four hundred were killed during the incident. 

The following midnight, a convoy known as T-4, consisting of American Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs), lumbered through the murky waters of the English Channel. After leaving port, British scanners detected the presence of German submarines, and attempted to alert the Americans. The American Convoy was not set to the proper frequency. Consequently, the American soldiers and sailors floated oblivious to potent danger (although some officers later reported ignorance that the mission was a training exercise at all). Years later, American and British historians learned that the German aerial reconnaissance missions found evidence of American and British Naval presence in the English Channel. German submarines were consequently ordered to patrol the surrounding waters. At 2:30 AM, the German S-Boat Flotilla found the convoy and fired missiles at the LST-515, resulting in critical damage to the hull. The survivors went overboard, thus initiating the Battle of Lyme Bay. 

Naval policy forbade a functional ship to attempt a rescue in the middle of an operation without explicit order. However, the men of the LST-515, with unanimous consent, risked death or court martial, turned back to the burning wreckage of the 507, and saved half the crew. The rest of the men died in the fire, succumbed to frostbite, and drowned, or burned to death from the gasoline and oil spilled onto the water. Meanwhile, other submarines joined the attack, sinking the LST-531 and killing four hundred twenty-four men on board. A report from military archives states, “Most of the casualties were from LST 531. There were only 290 survivors of 744 soldiers and 282 sailors.” (Military History) In an attempt to retaliate against the aggressors, the LST-496 fired at the submarines, but caught the LST-515 in the crossfire. Although the endeavor sent the Germans back to port, the accident killed eighteen naval service members. At the end of the catastrophe, over seven hundred Americans were dead. The bodies that were recovered were reportedly never buried. According to an eyewitness, “They were driven round the top of the island and stored in Castletown dockyard.... they were packed in the tunnels, which were collapsed by explosions in 1994 before the dockyard closed.” (Dorset 2009) The failure had wider implications for Eisenhower and the other Allied leaders. 

The Heroes Foregathered and the Warriors Sequestered  

Eisenhower prepared to reconsider all Operations in the European Theater. Ten officers with detailed knowledge of Operation Overlord remained missing in action for several days. Additionally, the cataclysm provided evidence that German intelligence was successfully monitoring American and British movement.  The men were given strict orders to remain in friendly territory. According to a researcher Rodney Ley, “General Dwight D Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, had given strict instructions that no BIGOT-classified (A classification referencing personnel with knowledge of specific details of the invasion, standing for “British Invasion of German Occupied Territory”) personnel should go on any journey or operation before D-Day which carried a risk of being captured by the Germans.” (Dorset 2009) Eisenhower carefully considered canceling or postponing the invasion into Normandy. However, after in-depth deliberation and discussion, as history shows, the invasion date remained June Sixth. 

Despite the operation producing the deadliest training exercise of the war, the operation is unknown to most Americans and Brits. To date, no significant memorial appears to exist that honors the American lives lost. Although a private endeavor led by Devon native Kenn Small pulled a Sherman tank out of the water, and dedicated a plaque in honor of the fallen, neither the United States nor the British governments participated or recognized the ceremonies. At the time of writing, nothing of the sort exists on American soil. Both Navy and Army personnel were lost that day, but seventy years later, neither branch has erected a cenotaph to those bodies dwelling the wreckage of their old vessels. An acquaintance of mine, with a master’s in military history, was fascinated by my knowledge of the occurrence. Though you, reader, missed an opportunity this April, let the deaths of the men of Exercise Tiger infuse you with thanksgiving and respect for those who died to provide you with the freedom you live every day. 

What do you think of Exercise Tiger? Let us know below.

References

Business Insider. “D-Day by the Numbers: Pulling Off the Biggest Amphibious Invasion in History.” Military.Com, 5 June 2019, www.military.com/off-duty/2019/06/05/d-day-numbers-pulling-biggest-amphibious-invasion-history.html

“Massacre at Slapton Sands — the Great Portland Cover-up | Dorset Life - The Dorset Magazine.” Dorset Life, May 2008, www.dorsetlife.co.uk/2009/05/massacre-at-slapton-sands-the-great-portland-cover-up.

Murphy, Bill, Jr. “17 Inspiring Quotes to Remember the 75th Anniversary of D-Day.” Inc.Com, 6 June 2020, www.inc.com/bill-murphy-jr/17-inspiring-d-day-quotes-to-remember-75th-anniversary-of-d-day.html.

Naval History and Heritage Command. “Exercise Tiger.” Naval History and Heritage Command, 26 Aug. 2015, www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/e/operation-tiger.html.

Small, Ken. The Forgotten Dead: The True Story of Exercise Tiger, the Disastrous Rehearsal for D-Day. Reprint, Osprey Publishing, 1988.

The Cold War-era Guatemalan Genocide – And America’s Role in it

The Guatemalan Genocide, coined the Silent Holocaust, had a great impact upon the indigenous Mayan people of the mountainous regions of Guatemala; however, few have heard of it. Between 1981 and 1983 the CIA backed military dictatorship of Guatemala persecuted indigenous Mayans as a proxy in the war against socialist guerillas. Roy Williams explains.

Queqchí people carrying their loved one's remains after an exhumation in Cambayal in Alta Verapaz department, Guatemala. Source: Trocaire / CAFCA archive, available here.

Amid the backdrop of the Cold War and the Reagan administration’s newfound vigor in combatting Soviet style socialism in the western hemisphere, the United States funded the military dictatorship of Efrain Rios Mott. The rise of the Guatemalan dictatorship stemmed from the Guatemalan Civil War and the United States backed coup, which overthrew a democratically elected government in favor of a more easily controlled military dictatorship. From 1960 until 1996, the Guatemalan civil war raged as the military and the government sought to defeat leftist rebels. Amid this conflict, the Guatemalan military carried out cruel acts of genocide upon the indigenous Mayan population who were blamed for rebel activity regardless of their actual involvement. 

To understand the reasons behind the Guatemalan genocide, the history of Guatemala’s civil war remains tantamount. In 1944 Juan Jose Arevalo was democratically elected to the presidency and began instituting multiple reforms. These reforms included increased funding for education, a national minimum wage, and a maximum work week. While these reforms were ultimately beneficial for the Guatemalan people, they failed to recognize one of the most consequential determinants of Guatemalan poverty, land ownership.

The United Fruit Company

In 1951, Jacobo Arbenz was elected president of Guatemala and continued in the spirit of reform as his predecessor. Arbenz stood as a unique leader in the Latin American world as a proponent of freedom of expression and freedom of the press. At the time of Arbenz’s presidency, Guatemala stood as an ideological leader of the Latin American world in its quest for reform and modernization. On June 17, 1952, the Agrarian Reform Law was passed as a monumental move towards granting Guatemala’s people a chance at land ownership. At the time of passage, 40% of the Guatemalan economy was run by the American company, the United Fruit Company. The United Fruit Company owned large swaths of land and controlled all the country’s railways as well as the electrical infrastructure. Arbenz attempted to pay the United Fruit Company for their large swaths of land but they ultimately refused. Unbeknownst to president Arbenz, the current secretary of state of the United States during the Eisenhower Administration, John Foster Dulles, was a corporate board member of the United Fruit Company. John Foster Dulles’ brother, Allen Dulles, was also the head of the CIA at the time. 

Upon the conflict between the Guatemalan government and the United Fruit Company, a concerted effort began to paint president Arbenz as a communist for his reformist attitude. Slowly but surely public opinion in the United States began to go against president Arbenz and his attempted reforms. In June 1954, the CIA staged a coup of the Guatemalan government led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, which sought to regain the lands of the United Fruit Company. Ultimately the CIA were successful and on June 27, 1954, Armas overthrew Arbenz and became president of Guatemala, marking the end of the 10 years of spring, the only time in Guatemalan history that any leaders were elected democratically without foreign interference.

War begins

Immediately after the coup, Armas began suspending civil liberties and accusing peasants of having communist sympathies. This cycle of military dictatorships continued until 1960 when the Guatemalan civil war began. Initially guerilla resistance began in the cities of Guatemala, but it soon became evident that the mountainous regions of Guatemala would be more effective as a base of operations in resisting the government. The sad coincidence of the movement of guerillas to mountainous regions such as El Quiche is that the indigenous Mayan populations lived there largely uninvolved with the revolutionary politics of Guatemala.

In March 1982, military leader Efrain Rios Montt assumed power - with the help of the military. Montt had strong ties with the Reagan administration in the United States and ultimately received foreign aid in the conflict with the Guatemalan people. Montt claimed that God had put him in power and began his reign by bringing law and order to the major cities of Guatemala. Every Sunday Montt conducted erratic sermons aimed at reducing crime in the cities. Ultimately Montt’s goals succeeded in reducing crime and gained him wild popularity in the cities. Montt then turned his mission towards wiping out all resistance in the rural areas of Guatemala. On May 28, 1982, the government announced a 30-day amnesty plan allowing any guerilla fighters to turn themselves in. The 30-day amnesty plan ultimately failed resulting in the mobilization of the Guatemalan Army against the countryside. Montt instituted the Frijoles y Fusiles program, which would be used to legally justify attacking indigenous populations.  During this period, the government and army systematically massacred the indigenous Mayan populations of mountainous regions such as El Quiche. The government of Guatemala made the horrendous decision that all indigenous populations were considered guerilla sympathizers and treated them as enemies. During this phase of the Guatemalan civil war, 200,000 native Mayans were massacred with 400 villages destroyed. Many of the massacres were committed in rudimentary ambush formats. When Mayan villagers would journey to the marketplace, the army would force as many people into large buildings, bar the door and burn them alive with the aide of gasoline. Other forms of genocide included forced disappearances, torture of suspected guerillas, and indiscriminate massacres.

War ends

The Guatemalan Civil War finally ended on December 29, 1996 when guerilla fighters signed a peace treaty with the government. Efrain Rios Montt was eventually found guilty of genocide in 2013 and sentenced to 80 years in prison. The sentence did not hold, as the Guatemalan constitutional court demanded a retrial and Montt died in 2018 without ever facing justice. Many officials in both the Guatemalan and American governments continue to deny the massacres as genocide, defending their actions as appropriate. The Guatemalan Civil War claimed the lives of some 200,000 people – including over 40,000 killed and disappeared as identified by the Commission for Historical Clarification (although the true figure is higher). Countless mass burial sites dot the landscape of the mountainous regions of Guatemala for which researchers continue to uncover the bodies of those murdered by their own government. 

While the genocidal killings have ended and dictator Efrain Rios Mott is dead, the United States has not atoned for its heinous actions in supporting the killings. The CIA is widely known to have understood its role in funding genocidal persecution whether intentionally or unintentionally. Regardless of the overarching goals of United States’ Cold War foreign policy in containing the spread of socialism throughout the world, the United States still bears responsibility in perpetuating genocide against the Mayan people of Guatemala. In combatting the denial of the Guatemalan genocide, citizens of both Guatemala and the United States must continue to stand up for the truth in remembering the atrocities of the past committed by both governments. By telling the stories of the Guatemalan Genocide and condemning the crimes against humanity perpetuated upon the Mayan people of Guatemala, further acts of genocide may be prevented in the battle against the violence of the state. 

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

Now, read Roy’s article on the Armenian Genocide here.

Politics in the Kitchen during the Cold War

The kitchen is the heart of domesticity; the home of the home where food and warmth are enjoyed by family members. But even the kitchen—this private realm in our life—can be part of everyday politics. Here, Liza Hadiz considers the role of the kitchen in the Cold War, including the famous ‘kitchen debate’.

US Vice-President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev taking part in the ‘kitchen debate’ at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959.

The Chamber

Before modern technologies were developed for the household, the kitchen was the drudgery of domestic labor; labor which was generally associated with women’s role. Not surprisingly, the Soviets once viewed the kitchen as a terrible chamber for women. After the Russian Revolution in 1917, the kitchen was part of the house that must be rid of for the full emancipation of women. Public dining spaces replaced the kitchen to free women from the derogatory labor and toil of the kitchen, to give women time for self-growth and development—more time to read as well as explore literature and the arts. 

When these public dining places didn’t take off too well and the growing industry brought more people to the cities, the government set up communal apartments for several families to live in. Called kommunalka, these living spaces had a shared kitchen. The kitchens in these homes were public space, where each family sharing the apartment cooked their meals in. 

Among the pots and pans and laundry of all the families living in the apartment, the kitchen was not the best place to be sitting down to enjoy your coffee. Not just because it was a potential hotbed for occupants to engage in conflict, perhaps over a missing kettle, but it was also a dangerous place to carry out the wrong conversation. In the communal kitchen, you would have to watch what you say, as information can be passed on to the government.

A Kitchen of One’s Own

From the 1950s, in the rush to provide housing for the increasing population, low ceiling two-bedroom apartments were developed for the masses—dubbed the Khrushchyovka, after the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. This time, they were built for individual families, with their very own bathroom and kitchen too. As extended families of three generations cramped into these small apartments, there was barely space for family members to eat together. But at least they had their very own kitchen.

With families having their own privacy, the kitchen did not become any safer. Being a private space, the government needed to take an even closer look at the kitchen. Agents were watching and tapping kitchens. 

However threatening, families welcomed guests into their small kitchens, and they were the place where conversations about politics and the arts took place. Between the walls of the kitchen, underground self-published literature (samizdat) was shared and read. It was also a place for family and friends to listen to banned music, such as jazz and rock and roll. When a group of people hung out in the kitchen like this, it was considered a form of dissident activity.

Ironically, while freedom of art and freedom of expression were topics discussed at the kitchen table, the discrimination that Soviet women were facing was left out of the discussion.

While after the revolution, Russian women obtained legal, political, and economic rights, it was not long after Stalin came into power that he brought back the traditional gender division of labor. Women were defined as mother, wife, and communist. Women’s condition eroded. Between the neighboring walls of communal apartments, it was no secret that women were victims of abuse.

In 1979, a group of women (Tatiana Mamonova, Tatiana Goricheva, Natalia Malakhovskaya, and Yuliya Vesnesenskaya) self-published the controversial almanac Woman and Russia that revealed what women really faced in the Soviet Union: the double standard as proletariats and as wives and mothers, unequal pay, domestic violence, poor conditions of maternity clinics, and the state’s poor childcare quality. However, the dissident circles did not care to discuss these issues at their kitchen tables and it was not long after the almanac’s circulation that the KGB were after the authors, forcing them to flee the Soviet Union.

The Dishwasher

Twenty years before Woman and Russia was written, in 1959, during an American exhibition at Sokolniki Park in Moscow, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had a heated debate with US Vice President Richard Nixon about women and kitchen design—one which would be remembered years on as part of Cold War history. Nixon proudly introduced the kitchen model of the “typical American house” and then particularly took the dishwasher as an example which he might have thought would represent women’s liberation in the US.  

While pointing at a dishwasher Nixon goes on to say:

“This is our newest model. This is the kind which is built in thousands of units for direct installations in the houses. In America, we like to make life easier for women.” 

In response, Khrushchev said, “Your capitalistic attitude toward women does not occur under communism.” 

Nixon replied, “I think that this attitude towards women is universal. What we want to do, is make life easier for our housewives.”[i]

The dishwasher conversation between the two leaders—dubbed “the kitchen debate”—is quite telling. Women’s wellbeing was some sort of a benchmark for assessing a political system. 

So if the Soviet Union had wanted to liberate women by getting rid of the kitchen, the US had opted for revolutionizing the kitchen. After World War II, women in America were encouraged to stay at home to make way for the employment of men returning from war. During this time, the old-fashioned American kitchen began experiencing a dramatic change. Listening to what housewives felt about their kitchen, in the late 1940s, architects, engineers, and home economics specialists began building modern kitchens. Using new technology, kitchens were turned into workshops to make cooking and washing convenient, less time consuming, and to give women freedom from drudgery. The architect of the successful suburban houses of the 1950s, Alfred Levitt, was quoted as saying: “Thanks to the number of appliances in our house, the girls will have three hours to kill every afternoon.”[ii]

With the new technologies aimed to boost efficiency and reduce domestic labor time, especially for women, couples could operate independently of extended family members. This was the time of the rise of the postwar nuclear family with the male breadwinner/housewife gender roles, from what advertisers and women’s magazines created the image of the postwar middle-class housewife. 

Although as a housewife a woman toils with unpaid labor daily, in the capitalist system Nixon was promoting, this was not considered demeaning. Her devotion to her family was what makes up the American family values of the time. US Cold War propaganda heavily focused on the family where the values of the ideal Western family were expected to sell democracy and capitalism abroad through the image of prosperity that the ideal family suggested.

Beyond the Kitchen

Interestingly, just four years after the kitchen talk with the Soviet leader—where Nixon attempted to use the domestic sphere to indicate the improvement of women’s life in the US—Betty Friedan’s research revealed the contrary. Her book The Feminine Mystique (1963) exposed what was not communicated over the kitchen table: the unhappy white middle-class housewife’s discontent with domestic life. 

Likewise, in contrast to what Khrushchev may have thought about communism’s attitude towards women, Soviet women faced discrimination in the private and public sphere and this fact was even overlooked by dissident circles. Banned over 40 years ago, the self-published Woman and Russia was in last year’s Leningrad Feminism 1979 exhibition. The exhibition allowed us to hear the once silenced voices of women who criticized the Soviet Union. These were the voices denied at the kitchen table.

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

Liza Hadiz is an editor and writer who lives in Jakarta. She writes on topics related to gender and history. Her blog is Some Thoughts from the Cappuccino Girl https://feministpassion.blogspot.com.

[i] Taken from The Kitchen Debate-transcript 24 July 959 Vice President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev U.S. Embassy, Moscow, Soviet Union.

[ii] Levittown Pa. (2003) Building the Suburban Dream.

Sources

Friedan, Betty (1973) ‘Up from the Kitchen Floor.’ NY Times. https://www.nytimes.com/1973/03/04/archives/up-from-the-kitchen-floor-kitchen-floor.html [Accessed August 22, 2020].

GeoHistory (2015) The Evolution and Dissolution of the Soviet Kitchen. https://geohistory.today/soviet-kitchen/ [Accessed July 5, 2020].

Iber, Patrick (2017) ‘Cold War World.’ The New Republic [online] <https://newrepublic.com/article/144998/cold-war-world-new-history-redefines-conflict-true-extent-enduring-costs> [Accessed December 21, 2019].

Krasner, Barbara (2014) ‘The Nuclear Family and Cold War Culture of the 1950s.’ Academia. https://www.academia.edu/9926751/The_Nuclear_Family_and_Cold_War_Culture_of_the_1950s [Accessed December 21, 2019].

Levittown Pa. (2003) Building the Suburban Dream. http://statemuseumpa.org/levittown/three/kitchen.html [Accessed August 22, 2020].

NPR (2014) ‘How Soviet Kitchens Became Hotbeds of Dissent and Culture.’ The Salt. https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/05/27/314961287/how-soviet-kitchens-became-hotbeds-of-dissent-and-culture [Accessed July 5, 2020].

Roache, Madeline (2019) ‘Is Capitalism or Communism Better for Women? How the Kitchen Debate Gave a New Meaning to the Cold War “Home Front”.’ Time. https://time.com/5630567/kitchen-debate-women [Accessed August 16, 2020].

The Calvert Journal (2020) The Story Behind the 70s Samizdat that Launched Late Soviet Feminism. https://www.calvertjournal.com/articles/show/11906/woman-and-russia-feminist-zine-samizdat [Accessed August 16, 2020].

The Kitchen Debate-transcript 24 July 959 Vice President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev U.S. Embassy, Moscow, Soviet Union. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1959-07-24.pdf [Accessed August 16, 2020].

The Kitchen Sisters (2020) Communal Kitchens. http://www.kitchensisters.org/hidden-kitchens/communal-kitchens/ [Accessed July 5, 2020]. 

United States Department of Agriculture National Agricultural Library (n.d.) Step-Saving Kitchens. https://nalgc.nal.usda.gov/step-saving-kitchens [Accessed August 22, 2020].

How the Nazi Soldiers Used Drugs During Fighting in World War 2

During World War II, the Nazi war machine stormed through much of Europe. But did you know that some Nazi troops were taking the drug methamphetamine during the fighting? Jefrey Ramos explains.

An advert for Pervitin, now more commonly known as methamphetamine. Source: Onkel Dittmeyer, available here.

Methamphetamine: An Unlikely Factor in Hitler’s Destructive Blitzkrieg

Most history fanatics have heard the WWII stories. How Germany overwhelmingly invaded its European neighbors - they quickly took over countries using the Blitzkrieg strategy. We know they were ruthless, cruel, and unforgiving. Yes, they were taking orders from a maniac dictator, but they were not super humans. Sure, they were well trained, they had deadly war machines, but what further aided the Third Reich to stomp out its adversaries? You ever been to Hollywood past 10pm? That's right. Speed, or methamphetamine, better known during World War II as Pervitin, was a substance that was issued and used as an enhancer by Hitler’s Nazi regime.

The Commercialization of Meth In Germany and How it was Popularized

After World War I, drug use in Germany boomed. It is not hard to imagine such a thing would happen in a society that was ravaged by war. After all, Germany had lost World War I, and they were severely penalized for it. Many veterans and people felt defeated, punished, and humiliated. Drugs tend to be something that certain groups of people turn to when they experience these sorts of agonies. Germany was defeated, and many veterans began to indulge in drug use. Major pharmaceutical companies in Germany mass-produced various types of drugs such as methamphetamines. Temmler-Werke produced and sold methamphetamine under the brand of Pervitin in the 1930s. Pervitin became prevalent during this time thanks to a massive marketing campaign. People could access it without a prescription, even in the form of chocolates. It was a methamphetamine-based stimulant. German society began to use these drugs more openly. The campaigns even targeted housewives - they would promote the drug as an anti-exhaustion wonder drug, so Germans were no strangers to drugs and their effects.

Human Capabilities were not enough for Hitler’s Plans

Fast forward to World War II. Here we have Hitler trying to invade territory after territory. He’s ruthless and he wants the operations to be done and executed expeditiously. The obstacle that stood in front of Hitler’s conquest was simply human nature - and the limitations that came with it. For a rapid approach, Hitler needed continuous momentum and strength for his lightning war. However, soldiers were human, and they absolutely needed rest and time to heal. This is where meth came in. Pervitin made soldiers awake and in need of less rest. Thus, Germany began to issue Pervitin to its forces. The logic behind it was that it helped troops and personnel stay awake for long periods of time, but most importantly, not feel exhaustion. This would make the soldiers better - until the drugs came down. That's right. We don’t actually believe they became the Red Skull, Captain America’s super-powered nemesis, himself do we? Like any drug of such a nature, it was only logical and natural that meth was going to have catastrophic effects on the troops. 

The Consequences of Pervitin use on the Third Reich

Nazi soldiers did in fact experience withdrawals when there were shortages of the drug. Others suffered accidental overdoses. There was an incident where a group of soldiers surrendered to Allied forces without a fight. They were likely in a meth-influenced state the night before, and their paranoia caused them to exhaust their ammunition. When the real Allied forces came into contact, they turned themselves in. The chain of command became aware – such incidents combined with less funds eventually led to Germany cutting the distribution of Pervitin.

It is now known that Hitler was an avid drug user. His personal physician would administer various types of drugs throughout his life. It is only logical that someone who used drugs for so long would see it as acceptable for his armed forces to use them too.

Pervitin and Hitler’s Policies

It is important to note that Germany was not the only world power in World War II to administer drug stimulants to their forces. The Allies also used amphetamines to stand combat fatigue. It is a practice that was not unknown to other countries.

The reader should also remember that while the effects of Pervitin may have made some Nazi activities worse, it was not the underlying reason why the Nazis committed so many atrocities. Hitler’s ideology came about much earlier than Pervitin’s distribution in the 1930s. Hitler expressed his political and racist views in his book Mein Kampf. While the book was published in 1925, Hitler’s military drug distribution effort unfolded at scale during the fighting in the war.

What do you think of the use of Methamphetamine during World War II?

Finally, Jefrey writes on his personal site here.

A Brief History of the Growth of UFO Mythology Since World War 2

UFOs, or unidentified flying objects, have been seen in the sky for millennia. However, in more recent times there has been a growing interest in UFO sightings – and what exactly UFOs are. Nigel Watson looks at the growing interest in ‘flying saucers’ and UFOs since World War II.

Nigel has published several books, most recently 'Captured by Aliens? A History and Analysis of American Abduction Claims' (Amazon US | Amazon UK).

A Swediah officer searches for a "ghost rocket" in Lake Kölmjärv, Sweden, 1946.

Since ancient times, strange lights, objects and celestial wonders in the sky have warned of impending doom or the dawn of a new era of revelation.

In the early 20th century mystery lights over Great Britain were interpreted as being caused by German Zeppelins spying out the land in preparation for invasion. During WWI any unusual thing in the sky was regarded as an enemy aircraft and as a consequence they produced scares in South Africa, Canada, the USA, and Britain.

In the 1930s, ‘mystery aircraft’ were often reported, but with the coming of WWII strange objects viewed by Allied pilots, which followed their aircraft, were dubbed ‘foo fighters’. After the war there was a huge spate of ghost rocket sightings over Scandinavia, but sightings of odd things in the sky only became perceived as a truly global phenomenon with the arrival of flying saucers in June 1947.

Flying saucers

The term ‘flying saucer’ was coined by newspapers after civilian pilot Kenneth Arnold saw nine glittering craft flying over Mount Rainier, Washington on June 24, 1947. He described them as thin, nickel plated, tailless, pie plate shaped objects with a convex triangular rear section. The objects flew in an unusual fashion like saucers skimming across water, travelling at an estimated 1,200 mph, a speed much faster than any known aircraft of that time.

This story from a reliable witness soon triggered many more sightings throughout the world. Yet, most people described seeing a disc or saucer-shaped craft in-line with what the term flying saucer inspires, rather than bat-shaped or tadpole like craft described by Arnold.

This was ‘coincidentally’ at the beginning of the Cold War. One of Arnold’s first thoughts was that he was seeing US jet planes. Yet, his sighting was so troubling he reported it to the media in an effort to find out what he saw.

When he discussed it with fellow pilots, he said ‘Some of the pilots thought it over and said it was possible. Some of them guessed that I had seen some secret guided missiles. People began asking me if I thought they were missiles sent over the North Pole. I don't know what they were, but I know this - I saw them.’

Sonny Robinson, a former Army Air Forces pilot who was operating dusting operations at Pendleton, Oregon, told Arnold: ‘What you observed, I am convinced, is some type of jet or rocket propelled ship that is in the process of being tested by our government or even it could possibly be by some foreign government.’

However, a Washington, D.C., army spokesman said that guided missiles like the V2 rocket travelled too fast to have been responsible for Arnold’s sighting and in any case no experimental tests were conducted in that area at that time.

In secret the Army Air Force was worried about these sightings, and in July 1947, Army Air Force intelligence officers Lt. Frank Brown and Capt. William Davidson interviewed Arnold and were convinced that he was an honest witness.

Inquiries were made to see if the Soviets had developed a saucer or flying wing aircraft using captured Nazi designs and scientists, but this drew a blank and it was equally clear that it wasn’t a US secret weapon either.

UFO Hysteria

Debunkers soon turned to claiming such sightings as misperceptions or the product of Cold War hysteria; believers soon started thinking the saucers were extraterrestrial craft on a mission to save us from starting an atomic war.

Concerned that UFOs sightings would block essential channels of communication, and be used as a psychological weapon by foreign enemies, the policy of US government agencies soon turned to providing mundane explanations for sightings or covering them up, to prevent the outbreak of UFO hysteria.

The longest running official UFO investigation was Project Blue Book, which was set-up by the USAF on March 25, 1952. It had a policy of demystifying UFO reports.

Blue Book became the public face for official UFO investigations, but it mainly operated as a repository of information and an outlet for debunking cases. After collecting 12,618 sighting reports, of which 701 remained unsolved, it ended on January 30, 1970, based on the view that: “Careful consideration of the record as it is available to us leads us to conclude that further extensive study of UFOs probably cannot be justified in the expectation that science will be advanced thereby.”

At least 10,000 UFO reports collected by Project Blue Book have been put online and many other governments have released their UFO files. So we have an embarrassment of riches that have been largely ignored by UFO researchers, yet they could provide lots of information about types of sightings and their patterns over time and place.

Government Secrets

The problem is alien saucers and body parts remain as elusive now as they always have been, and it frustrates the hell out of conspiracy mongers and ufologists. To fill this gap there have been numerous whistleblowers about UFO secrets, plus various U.S. agencies have used the belief in UFOs to cover-up other nefarious or top-secret activities.

On the question of government cover-ups and the possibility that various authorities are spreading disinformation UFO researcher Kevin Randle agrees that the USAF has been involved in such activities. However, for him, ‘I think the real problem with tainted information is the UFO community." People can come along with impressive stories backed-up by documents just for the notoriety. It takes an enormous amount of time and effort to verify or disprove their claims that could be devoted to more productive areas of investigation. He added,  "I’ve said for some time that those running the cover-up don’t need to do anything. We do it to ourselves all the time.’

Randle complains that: ‘No one inside the UFO community will look at evidence that some of the top 'whistleblowers' were inventing their tales. UFO research will improve if they start vetting the witnesses and making sure that the stories told are credible or that the information is of great importance.

‘Ufology, at least what I consider the scientific aspect, comes at the problem from the point of view that we don’t really know what is causing all these mysterious objects and lights but we believe them to have a physical existence. It is the study moving toward an answer rather than an answer moving toward questions.’

Yet, there is a burning hope that in June 2021 the U.S. government will finally reveal all. There has been a frenzy in the media that U.S. Navy figure pilots and sailors have seen and tracked Unidentified Aerial Objects (UAPs). So far only fuzzy pictures of UAPs and inconclusive radar data has been released but UFO expert Dr Bruce Maccabee believes: ‘The new radar and observational data confirm what has been reported ever since the first UFO sightings in the late spring of 1947, namely that these objects can undergo extreme acceleration and reach very high speeds.’

He thinks, like many other UFO experts and influencers, that the forthcoming disclosures will prove UAPs are vehicles controlled by non-human intelligence (NHIs). He goes as far as to say:

‘The origin(s) of these NHI is (are) unknown but they may come from other planets using transportation technology based on very advanced physical principles. President Joe Biden of the U.S.A. and leaders of other countries may find it necessary to develop a single, uniform, world-wide policy for co-existing and interacting with NHI. The policy should be world-wide because allowing various countries to develop their own policies could result in some form of disaster.’

From a historical perspective, this is nothing new. Countless predictions have been made about the proverbial flying saucer landing on the White House lawn, to prove the existence of aliens from outer space or some other exotic origin.

The subject of flying saucers offers a valuable insight into the impact of social expectations on how we interpret odd things seen in the sky, and it also helps show how it has evolved and changed into the conspiracy led state of ufology today.

What do you think of UFOs in history? Let us know below.

Nigel Watson is the author of the UFO Investigations Manual published by Haynes, and UFOs of the First World War published by the History Press. His latest book is 'Captured by Aliens? A History and Analysis of American Abduction Claims' published by McFarland, 2020 (Amazon US | Amazon UK).

References

A Different Perspective. Kevin Randle blog site: www.KevinRandle.blogspot.com

Dr Bruce Maccabee Research Website: www.brumac.mysite.com/

Sirius Disclosure website: siriusdisclosure.com/

Exopolitics Journal: www.exopoliticsjournal.com

Russia’s 4 Great Resets: From the Romanovs to the End of the Cold War

Russian history has been beset with a number of seismic changes. Here, Daniel McEwen considers four key ‘resets’ in Russian history – the start of the Romanov dynasty, two early 20th century revolutions, and the end of the Cold War.

Vladimir Lenin, a beneficiary of one of Russia’s ‘resets’. A 1920 depiction by artist Isaak Brodsky.

“Reset” was the buzzword on speakers’ lips this past January during [an online version of] the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. In words as lofty as the Alps in the background, Klaus Schwab, the event’s impassioned founder hailed the Covid pandemic as “a rare but narrow window of opportunity to reflect, re-imagine, and reset our world." 

Ironically, his idea was swept overboard by Covid’s next wave and hasn’t returned, perhaps because its advocates have since checked their history books. Resets have a chequered track record at best, with the 1789 French Revolution revered as the most notable, the Russian Revolution as the most execrable. And it was only one of that country’s four attempts to exploit a “rare but narrow window of opportunity to reflect, re-imagine, and reset their world ". Their failure explains why journalist Vladimir Pozner arguing Russia has never really been a democracy.

Reset #1 - 1613

Ivan the Terrible is dead. One third of the fledgling nation’s population has been wiped out in the internecine warfare known as “The Time of Troubles”. Weak and leaderless, the country is beset by enemies on all borders. Desperate to end the violence, the Zemsky Sobor, an assembly of the realm’s elites, gather to reset their system of governance. 

This was a mountaintop moment in the country’s history, never to be repeated; a singular chance for Russians to shrug off the yoke of autocracy and rule themselves. But not one of the gathered could spell democracy let alone run one. Self-rule sounded like a lot of work. Had Fyodor Dostoevsky lived then, no doubt he would have been heard telling his countrymen that: “to go wrong in one's own way is better than to go right in someone else's.” Not that anyone would have listened. Instead of a reset, they rebooted the old system. 

Historian Abraham Pailtsyn listened in on this assembly and was struck by what he didn’t hear – there was nobody speaking up for running the country for the people. Easier to just hand things over to the Romanov clan, the least objectionable of several candidates for the job. It was led by a 16 year-old teenager. His first official act was to hang a rival for the throne and his eight-year-old son, setting the tone for the next three hundred years.

Pailtsyn blamed this fateful lethargy on a deep national apathy.

Indeed it was. The appalling inhumanity of serfdom under the Romanov’s thumb approached can be compared to slavery. Nine tenths of the population lived in squalor, worked like beasts of burden to generate the unconscionable wealth enjoyed by the other one tenth. Little wonder the largest country in the world could do no better than a GDP barely equal to Spain’s! Quaintly embarrassing at first, this state-sponsored feudalism threatened the empire’s very survival when the forces of technological, social and political change began shifting the tectonic plates of world power. 

Had it been the best of times, czarist Russia would still have needed Paladins of Enlightenment to guide it along the perilous path to modernization. But it was the worst of times - disingenuous czars, amply aided and abetted by motley crews of corrupt cabinet ministers, sadistic secret police and a supine nobility used brutality and repression to manipulate modernization to their exclusive benefit.  

Typical of their tactics was the subverting of the abolition of serfdom, often depicted as the country’s ‘Great Leap Forward‘ to social and economic modernity. Some leap. Russia’s Emancipation Act of 1860 improved the quality of life for serfs about as much as the American Emancipation Act three years later improved the quality of life of slaves there. The czar and his minions retroactively limited, diluted and prolonged their people’s emancipation. At least freed American slaves did not have to pay compensation to their owners for the loss of their labor as was required of Russian serfs. In the end, emancipation offered the overwhelming majority of Russians basically two career options: over-worked, underpaid farmer or over-worked, underpaid factory worker.

Reset #2 - 1905

Still considered by many to be the ‘real’ Russian Revolution, this aborted reset was the high-water mark of Romanov duplicity. Japan had sent Czar Nicholas’ grand vision of a Pacific Empire to the bottom of Tsushima Bay in a naval defeat so shameful it nearly cost him his throne. Humiliated, he was forced to agree to a constitutional monarchy. Bells rang throughout the kingdom, people partied in the streets, and newspaper editors rhapsodized about the dawning on a new age of freedom. 

All the man had to do was keep his word and he, his family and some hundred million Russians would have lived happily ever after, never having heard of Vladimir Lenin. But always more a ruler than a leader, Nicholas stayed true to his family colors and cravenly reneged on the deal, dismissing the reformers behind it as deluded dreamers. Egged on by a witless wife in the thrall of a charlatan monk, Nicholas all but dedicated the last twelve years of his reign to giving those dreamers even more reasons to want to him gone – dead or alive!

Reset #3 - 1917

Three years into World War One, two million Russian soldiers are dead and five times that number of peasants have died of starvation or disease. Millions more face the same fate, caught between the scorched earth policy of their own retreating soldiers and the pillaging by the advancing German troops. In the cities, people are starving to death, if they don’t freeze first, awaiting trains of wheat that rarely arrive. Ever bereft of empathy or wisdom, Nicholas felt not the slightest obligation to feed his own people, breaking their three-hundred year near-religious faith in the Czar as an all-knowing, all-caring ‘Little Father’. Not surprisingly, none of them felt the slightest obligation to save him when mutinous troops stopped his train. He went without a whimper. The bang was still to come.

Free at last of their Romanov masters, there was none of the apathy of 1613 and no going back like in 1905. This time rank and file Russians knew exactly what they wanted: participation in power, a fairer share of the nation’s wealth and no more czars! Unlike 1613, this time there was lots of talk. And talk. And talk. And so enters a man author/historian Edward Crankshaw described as “one more bacillus let loose to spread infection in a tottering and exhausted Russia.” 

How Russians ended up with Vladimir Lenin and the tyrannical czars of Bolshevism is a question a library of books have attempted to answer. The most charitable explanation seems to be that a destitute, disillusioned people were simply too cold and too hungry to read the fine print on their deal with the Devil. 

However it happened, Vladimir Lenin played a ghastly game of bait-and-switch, promising ‘Peace, Bread, Land’, but delivering war, terror and death. For this unwitting lapse of judgment, another ten million citizens would perish in the civil war that followed World War One. Its hapless survivors were condemned to seventy years in the gulag of Soviet-style socialism, notorious for short trials and long bread lines. Tellingly, the USSR’s GDP did not rise above a third that of arch-rival America’s.

Reset #4 - 1991

The catastrophic Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 opened Russians’ eyes to the true magnitude of the corruption and incompetence inherent in the Soviet system. Profoundly shocked, they began publicly questioning their leaders’ fitness for office. Five years later the Berlin Wall fell, burying Leninism in the rubble. At that time, per capita GDP was $23,000 in the United States, $16,000 in Western Europe and $6,800 in the rapidly dissolving ‘workers’ paradise’.

The Soviet Union was formally dissolved on December 26, 1991 but much to their dismay, the long-suffering proletariat were no sooner free of the iron grip of communism than Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to shackle them to unregulated capitalism – and barely escaped with his life for his trouble! When the dust of Glasnost had settled, Vladimir Putin and his oligarch friends had installed themselves in the Kremlin. While he labors mightily to restore the nation to a dubious former glory, its inglorious GDP has now shrunk to one-fifteenth that of United States.

What’s next?

Speculation about when and how Reset #5 will occur keeps pundits’ tongues wagging. Incredibly, the notion persists that Russians actually like strongman rulers. No one likes being bullied, surely the Russians least of all.  

What do you think of Russia’s ‘resets’? Let us know below.

How Strong were Britain’s World War Two Alliances with France and the Soviet Union?

Britain had two major alliances in World War Two prior to the USA joining the war. These were with France and the Soviet Union. Here, Steve Prout considers their effectiveness, including how Britain fought with France and also overlooked several aggressive acts committed by the Soviets.

Vichy France leader Petain meeting Hitler in October 1940. Source: Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-H25217 / CC-BY-SA 3.0, available here.

For people who take the Hollywood pictures as gospel the Second World War was essentially one “set of good guys”, being the allies, versus one “set of bad guys”, being the axis.  The reality was far more interesting. Alliances were not as static as is what has been portrayed in such simplistic Hollywood war film formulae or the stories we all enjoyed in our childhood comics.

Not quite standing alone

At no point was Britain alone in facing the Axis threat from the European continent.  From the beginning the combined forces of the Dominions and Commonwealth were present but Britain also had two other principal allies that joined and left at various stages. These were France and the Soviet Union.  The former was an ally that that became for all intents an adversary and the latter started the war in collaboration with the Nazis to be later courted by the British.

France

By the middle of 1940 the allies were in full retreat.  A month after the Dunkirk evacuation France had signed an armistice with Nazi Germany that would establish a “new order” and new political climate in France and her overseas territories.  This new order saw a shift to an Anglo-phobic attitude and the establishment of pro-German authoritarian regime under Petain.

Britain and France: The pre-war alliance

There was always underlying tension in Franco-British relations. As recent as the 1890s both nations almost come to blows over the Fashoda incident due to colonial rivalry.  However, the Entente Cordiale of 1904 and the World War I alliance managed to put a plaster of sorts over such differences, but there still deep down remained the old suspicions as demonstrated in 1925 in the Treaty of Lausanne and disagreements over the treatment of Weimar Germany.  

However, these differences did not prevent these two nations from collaborating again in the face of a growing and repeat threat from Germany.  Britain and France were to form a military alliance to contain German aggression in 1939 but by June 1940 this came to an end with French defeat and subsequent armistice.

Tensions already existed and were growing even before the allied armies were awaiting evacuation from Dunkirk and considering surrender terms. During the life of the allied alliance, as France saw herself contributing most of the land forces compared to a smaller British contribution who had, by the time of Dunkirk, only contributed less than ten divisions, one tenth of the allied force.  Further reluctance to commit the RAF fighters as events turned even more impossible meant France saw Britain as only looking out for her own interests and not fully committed to the alliance. The actions and the clumsy rhetorical manner of some of the British high command, primarily Lord Gort, did little to persuade the French that the British had no other reasons than self-preservation.

French soldiers were repatriated from British shores back to their home soil less than a week after the mass evacuation, with no commitment of significant British forces. It was very much now seen as a separate battle of France and a separate battle of Britain with France being left to her fate.  Churchill, to restore faith and confidence, offered a union of the two nations but Petain likened it to being “fused with a corpse” and senior ministers considered “better a Nazi province at least we know what that means”.  To say it was a non-starter would be an understatement and so the Vichy Government was formed.

Life after the French Surrender - Vichy

Once the armistice was signed a defeated France adopted an Anglo-phobic stance and established a near fascist state seeking parity with Germany and a part in the New Order. British and French forces would soon clash in various areas of the globe.

The British were concerned that the French Navy and the French colonies would be utilized by the axis against Britain.  Churchill feared the Nazis would demand the surrender of the French Fleet.  Unbeknown to Britain, Germany at the time did not require the surrender of the fleet but German intentions offered no reassurances and so the British warned the French to surrender or face destruction of their fleet as a last resort, which the British navy high command were loathe to do.  The French refused to surrender the fleet and so hostilities commenced.

Fighting with the French – “an old and new adversary”

The first clash in July 1940 was in very limited scale and saw four casualties with three deaths (British) from small arms fire in Devonport, Plymouth as the Royal Navy boarded the destroyer Sarcouf which was docked in British waters.  A wider scale operation named Operation catapult a few weeks later saw the destruction of a large part of the French Fleet and the deaths of 1,300 French sailors at Mers-Al-Kebir, Algeria. The political damage was more severe and the propaganda value to the Nazis was invaluable. The French were in an unforgiving mood.

In September 1940 the loyalty to Vichy and unforgiving attitude to the British had reached the far reaches of the French Empire.  The British and a Free French force were repulsed at the French colony in Dakar, Senegal.  What was apparent was not only hatred for the British but also dislike for the De Gaulle’s Free French movement whom his countrymen seemed to largely view as a traitor.  In retaliation to this attack French bombers flew two sorties over Gibraltar, again causing limited damage.  This was enough to find favor with the Germans but minimal enough not to cause any British reprisals.

Dakar presented many oddities and revelations. It tested the resolve of Vichy and the real level of support of De Gaulle and his Free French movement.  It was set apart from the main theatre in Europe - French fought fellow countrymen and Vichy forces used US planes to fight French and British counterparts.  Nowhere in this were the axis forces, the principal enemies.  The British would fail in this operation.

Britain would find herself in conflict in Syria and the Middle East against significant Vichy French Forces. Admiral Darlan wanted to assist the Germans by offering the territory to oust the British from Iraq and take the Iraqi oil and resources, but the Germans had other ideas and both objectives were nevertheless unsuccessful. Meanwhile, in Europe, Petain, like Darlan would continue to win German favor to achieve equal status with Germany in the European New Order. 

France’s behavior was not helped by British actions like Dakar and Mers-El-Kebir, but on balance was understandable for the time in the face of nefarious Nazi intentions.  Admiral Darlan however alludes to a deep distrust he held to his former ally - in December 1941 he was quoted as saying “I worked with the English for fifteen years, they always lied to me. I’ve negotiated with the Germans for 3 months, and they have never misled me.”  It is said that Darlan was finding excuses retrospectively, however flimsy, to account for his collaboration tendencies. On close inspection of De Gaulle’s Free French army and the domestic resistance forces, several sources say this contribution and effectiveness has been inflated and exaggerated over time to hide the shame of collaboration by Vichy France, who had become effectively a co-operative and willing German vassal.

It is interesting also that twenty thousand servicemen chose to join the SS Charlemagne and were one of the last divisions to hold out tenaciously in 1945 in Berlin.  On top of the forty thousand personnel in Vichy Syria and West Africa, 200 Vichy airmen in Europe, a significant French force, had opposed their former ally.  The numbers even suggest that France was truly a co-operative German Vassal.

There were to be more twists and turns. In another bizarre yet tragic twist of fate, the French themselves in November 1942 scuttled their own fleet in Toulon when the Nazis attempted to take the French feet and hand it over to Italy. At the same time Darlan, conveniently forgetting his Anglophobia, also defected to the allies.

The USSR “Supping with the devil” – the unlikely alliance

In June 1941, a year after the French surrender, Britain entered an alliance with the USSR after the German invasion, Operation Barbarossa. There were pre-war efforts to bring the Soviets on the allied side, but Polish objections and allied deliberations derailed this.

It was a curious pairing when looking at the recent history of the USSR at the time, which was anything but reassuring. There are few who could argue with Churchill’s analogy about “supping with the devil” to achieve victory as the USSR was a totalitarian state equally as barbaric and ruthless as Hitler’s Germany.  The more divisions that were used on the Eastern Front, the fewer there would be on the Western Front.  The strategy for the west was simple - the human cost would be borne by the Soviets. Stalin saw through this, under no illusion and prepared to pay this. It was more an alliance of expediency and it would barely endure the end of the war itself.  Suspicion between the Allies and the USSR was present throughout.

British minds had been wary of Russia since as far back as the Crimean War, with an only a brief respite in World War One.  Despite royal family ties there was still an abhorrence of the “Russian Bear”. The communist revolution in 1917 and the subsequent events did little help this.

During Stalin’s purges in the 1930s Britain managed to ignore the fact that some her own subjects in the Soviet Union had become victims of the purge. On the economic front the USSR’s five-year plans had advanced her industrial capacity, becoming a rival for the Western industrial powers which at the same time inspired international supporters of communism.  The involvement of the USSR in the Spanish Civil War was also interpreted as a Soviet communist regime trying to impose itself on the Western sphere of influence.

Throughout the 1930s the Germans had been broadcasting venomous propaganda against the USSR. Then something very unexpected happened. Stalin in August 1939 signed the infamous Nazi-Soviet pact, which gave Hitler the open door to begin World War Two because he was no longer contained and fearing a war on two fronts.

As the Nazis invaded the West of Poland, Stalin took full advantage of the recent pact and invaded the Eastern Part and imposed a Soviet form of brutality that was not dissimilar to the Nazis’.  Soviet territorial ambition was not limited to Poland. In December 1939, Stalin began a bitter four-month Winter War with Finland where eventually the USSR took 11% of Finnish territory.  After worldwide condemnation, the USSR followed the example of other aggressor states such as Germany, Italy and Japan and left the League of Nations.

Not only had the USSR allowed the war to happen at this stage, they also violated further sovereign states by annexing Bessarabia, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania to their territorial gain, thus re-acquiring newly independent territories that she lost after the First World War.

Clearly a deal with the Nazis was more beneficial to the USSR and the excuse that these acquisitions offered a buffer against German strength was a weak one used in hindsight, as the USSR was a co-operative ally in all areas and cut from the same cloth as the axis powers.  There was little threat from the East due to a Neutrality Pact signed in 1941 between Japan and the USSR, freeing Japan to wage her own war. The USSR was in every event an Axis ally.  It is interesting to note that the two very pacts the USSR signed with Japan and Germany were highly instrumental in allowing both a European War and Pacific war to happen.  Was appeasement’s failure the only reason for the start of World War Two?

Curiously the pretext that drove Britain to declare war on Germany, namely the invasion of Poland, was not strong enough to provoke a similar action against Russia who did the same thing.  Interestingly the West at an early point in the war considered the USSR an enemy and considered military action in two arenas. Whilst the Winter War with Finland was in progress Britain and France considered bombing areas of Russia such as the oil fields of Baku. Also, during the Nazi’s Norwegian Campaign in 1940 the motive was not only to deprive Germany of Iron Ore from Scandinavia; it was also to assist the Finns by creating a supply route in their fight against the USSR. 

Katyn and Iran

This alliance, until close to the war’s end, would center only on Europe, with Britain and later America taking on Japan with minimal Soviet help. The benefit in this alliance meant the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Act enabled Stalin to move military resource from the eastern reaches of the USSR to the western theatre of war.  

The British would deliberately overlook Soviet perfidy as displayed with the discovery of a massacre of twenty thousand Polish officers in the Katyn Forest. They would help propagate lies that placed the responsibility on the Germans rather than the Soviets for the sake of the wartime alliance. They would at the same time pressure another ally, the Polish Government in exile, to accept these falsities.

The first military act with the USSR was a joint invasion of Iran to deny the axis powers access to the Middle East and allow an alternative corridor to supply the Soviet Union. This would not be to the Iranians’ benefit. Indeed, what the Soviets and British were prepared to do in other sovereign states show what the British would conveniently overlook once again. 

Both occupying powers commandeered much of Iran’s grain supplies for their own troops, which caused hyperinflation and starvation in Iran.  After the war the Soviets reneged on the promised withdrawal after Hitler’s defeat, and continued to occupy the country until 1946 after trying to set up two short-lived separatist and destabilizing republics on Iran’s border. 

Conclusion

The period of history from the beginning of the war until the German invasion of the USSR was an ever-changing political landscape of alliances and allies becoming foes and foes becoming allies.  This period has many other interesting oddities, peculiarities, and different perspectives but that is for another time.

What do you think of Britain’s World War Two alliances with France and the Soviet Union? Let us know below.

Now, you can read Steve’s article here on “Britain and the 1920 Iraq Mandate: Signs of the British Empire’s Decline?”

Was the Italian Military in World War 2 Really that Bad?

The Italian military has often been portrayed as having not performed very well in World War Two. But is that true? Here, Daniel Boustead looks at this by considering the Italian wars in the 1930s, their impact on Italy’s performance in World War Two, and how Italy fared during fighting in the war itself.

Italian Troops in Addis Ababa during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War in May 1936.

In the years following World War II, the Italian military has been satirized in popular culture as well as historical scholarship. The Italian military was weakened by military conquests in Ethiopia, Spain and Albania before World War II. Their equipment, weapons and leadership were inadequate which caused their numerous defeats. Furthermore, while the 10a Flottiglia MAS was the most successful unit, it pales when compared to British Special Forces and German Special Forces. The unpopularity of the war and lack of Italian military success resulted in Mussolini’s fall from power in July 1943. Civil war followed.  Was Italy’s Military the weakest Axis Power? Let’s examine the facts.

Wars in the 1930s

On October 2, 1935 Fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia (then Abyssinia) and did not conquer the country until May 5, 1936, when Italian troops entered the capital of Addis Ababa ([1]). The Ethiopian war cost the Italians about 1,500 men ([2]). The Italian support to Francisco Franco during the Spanish Civil War (from 1936 to 1939) cost the Italians 3,819 soldiers dead and 8.5 billion lire ([3]). The Italian military conquered the country of Albania in April 1939 ([4]). While the conquest of Albania was a success, it exposed the problems that plagued the Italian Army in the coming conflict. In Albania, the Italian military sent men who had never operated motorcycles to motorcycle companies (5). They sent men who did not even know Morse Code to signal units! (5) A member of the Italian Foreign Minister Ciano’s staff commented about the Italian military’s performance in Albania saying, “If the Albanians had possessed one well-armed fire brigade they could have driven us back into the Adriatic” (5).  By the time Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, Italy had drained away the gold it had collected from its citizens during the Ethiopian war of 1935 to 1936 (6). This meant that Italy did not have enough gold to help finance a major conflict (7). These small conflicts combined with the Spanish Civil War debt would result in fatal consequences when Italy entered the war in 1940.

Entering World War II

The Italian military was not ready to go to the war by the time Mussolini declared war on France and Great Britain on June 10, 1940(9). The Fascist Italian military organization was so inept that the Army, Navy, and Air Force would frequently squabble, plot and sometimes spy on one another’s activities (8). Dictator Benito Mussolini’s belief that “Italy was an unsinkable aircraft carrier” and his decision to place all of Italy’s air power under the command of the Italian Air Force, deprived the Royal Italian Navy of an air force and aircraft carriers (8). The Italian Navy became dependent on the Royal Italian Air Force for both long-range reconnaissance and for air cover in its many battles in the Mediterranean (8). The Air Force would fail in their assigned duties at such battles as the Battle of Cape Spada and the Battle of Calabria (8). The military command was flawed because promotion came as often by political favoritism as by military skill (10).  Mussolini not only stifled debate in his military, but even fired one general on the spot for counseling him not to go to war, and he judged his military officers almost solely on “Fascist merits”(10). 

The Royal Italian Army had a lack of uniforms and equipment, which badly compromised their battle readiness (10). The recruits usually were trained less than the required 18 months that was prescribed by Italian law (10). In 1940 the Royal Italian Army had rifles that dated back to 1891, horse drawn artillery, no heavy tanks, 70 medium tanks, and 1,500 light tanks that had armor that was so thin machine gun bullets could penetrate them (11). They were ill-equipped, ill-trained, and skeptical of Fascism’s propaganda (10). In 1940 the Royal Italian Air Force only had 3,296 fighters and bombers, and they had neither the speed nor the armament to match Allied Fighters (10). The Royal Italian Navy’s ships were also not equipped with radar, which would prove a fatal flaw in various battles to come (12).

1940 to 1941

The Italian military would suffer numerous defeats in 1940 and 1941. The combination of lack of radar, lack of aircraft carriers, poor reconnaissance and air support resulted in 1 out of 2 Royal Italian light cruisers being lost at the Battle of Cape Spada against the British Royal Navy in July, 1940 (13). The Royal Italian Army invaded Egypt on September 13, 1940 (14). The British forces launched Operation Compass to counter the Italian invasion on December 9, 1940 (15). By the time Operation Compass ended in February 1941, the British forces had pushed the Italians 500 miles back into Libya and taken 130,000 Italians as prisoners (16). The Italians were rescued in North Africa when the Germans sent the Afrika Korps commanded by General Erwin Rommel (16).

On October 28, 1940 the Italian Army invaded Greece (17). By the end of December 1940 the Greek Army drove the Italians out of Greece and were controlling more then one quarter of Albania (18). Hitler decided in November 1940, in the immediate aftermath of Mussolini’s invasion of Greece, to also invade Greece. This was not so much to bail out Mussolini but to protect and to prevent British Royal Air Force bombers from bombing the Ploesti Romanian oil fields that were supplying his forces for the invasion of the Soviet Union (19). Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union was initially scheduled for May 1941 (19). Indeed, had Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in May 1941 the war in the east might have turned out differently.

On November 11 to 12, 1940 the British Navy launched an aircraft carrier raid on the Italian fleet at Taranto, Italy (20). This raid resulted in three battleships, two cruisers, and two destroyers being sunk or severely damaged (20). They were useless for months (20). The raid on Taranto also forced the Italian Navy to retire to Naples (20). This was too far to be a hindrance against British convoys in the Mediterranean (20). In late March 1941 the British Royal Navy, using intelligence from Bletchley Park’s Ultra and exploiting the Italian’s ship lack of radar, fought the Battle of  Matapan (21). Italy lost three cruisers, two destroyers, and 2,400 men (21). The defeat at the Battle of Matapan was so devastating for the Italian Navy that Mussolini ordered his fleet confined to waters under firm Italian control (22). Fascist Italy’s military also suffered a further defeat on May 5, 1941 when Haile Selassie and his British forces entered the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa (23).

A more successful attack

The 10th MAS Flotilla was formed on March 15, 1941 and consisted of Frogman, Manned Torpedoes, and Assault Motorboats and was renamed Xa Flotilla in autumn 1943 (24). This group in both incarnations sunk, between March 1941 and April 1945, 12 Allied ships and damaged two British Battleships (25). The 10th Flotilla MAS’s units’ greatest success came in December 1941 when their frogman severely damaged the British Battleships HMS Valiant and HMS Queen Elizabeth (25). This put them out of action for more than a year (25). This action left the British Royal Navy with only three light cruisers, and a handful of destroyers in the east and central Mediterranean, thus altering the balance of naval forces in favor of the Axis (25).

Later in the war

Mussolini was deposed in July 1943, in large part because the Royal Italian Military had suffered numerous defeats, first by the Fascist Grand Council on July 24, 1943 and then by King Victor Emmanuel III on July 25, 1943 (30). The aftermath of Italy’s surrender on September 8, 1943, split the Italian military into two sides, the Kingdom of Italy’s military, which fought for the King, and the other side for Mussolini’s Italian Social Republic (24). Following this, a group of German Paratroopers and SS Soldiers were sent on a raid to rescue deposed Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini at Gran Sasso massif (28). This German Special Forces raid was significant because it allowed Mussolini to rule as head of the German backed Italian Social Republic until his death in April 1945 (29).

The Royal Italian Military’s performance has been much maligned since World War II. Its military was weakened by pre World War II conflicts. Italy was not prepared to go to war in June 1940. The weakness of the Italian military is not a stereotype but an established historical fact. 

What do you think of Italy’s record in World War II? Let us know below.

Now, you can read more World War II history from Daniel: “Did World War Two Japanese Kamikaze Attacks have more Impact than Nazi V-2 Rockets?” here and “Japanese attacks on the USA in World War II” here.

[1] Bosworth, R.J.B. Mussolini’s Italy: Life Under the Dictatorship 1915-1945. New York: New York. Penguin Books. 2005. 367. 

[2] Elson, Robert T. Prelude to War. Alexandria: Virginia:  Time-Life Books, Inc. 1977. 158. 

[3] Bosworth, R.J.B. Mussolini Italy: Life Under the Dictatorship 1915-1945. New York: New York. Penguin Books. 2005. 402. 

[4] Bailey, Ronald H. Partisans and Guerrillas. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 18. 

6 Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1982. 39. 

7 Adams, Henry. Italy at War.  Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1982. 33 to 39. 

9 Whipple, A.B.C. The Mediterranean. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1981. 21

8 Adams, Henry. Italy at War . Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1982. 53. 

10 Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time Life- Books, Inc. 1982 59.

11 Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time Life-Books, Inc. 1982. 58. 

12 Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time Life-Books, Inc. 1982. 61. 

13 Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1982. 52 to 53. 

14 Collier, Richard. The War in the Desert. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1977 and 1999. 8. 

15 Collier, Richard. The War in the Desert. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1977 and 1999. 26. 

16 Collier, Richard. The War in the Desert. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1977 and 1999. 33 to 35. 

17 Bailey, Ronald H. Partisans and Guerrillas. . Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 17. 

18 Bailey, Ronald H. Partisans and Guerrillas. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 19. 

19 Bailey, Ronald H. Partisans and Guerillas. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 22

20 Whipple, A.B.C. The Mediterranean. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1981. 72 to 75.

21 Whipple, A.B.C. The Mediterranean. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1981. 92 to 98. 

22 Bailey, Ronald H. Partisans and Guerillas. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 24. 

23Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1982. 101. 

24Battistelli, Pier and Crociani, Piero. Elite: 191: Italian Navy & Air Force Elite Units & Special Forces 1940-45. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 8 to 42. 

25 Battistelli, Pier and Crociani, Piero. Elite: 191: Italian Navy & Air Force Elite Units & Special Forces 1940-45. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 16 to 44. 

30 Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1982. 156. 

28 McNab, Chris. Weapon: German Automatic Rifles 1941-45: Gew 41, Gew43, FG 42 and StG 44. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 43 to 44. 

29 Bosworth, R.J.B. Mussolini’s Italy: Life Under a Dictatorship 1915-1945. New York: New York. Penguin Books, 2005. 506. 

References

Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1982.

Bailey, Ronald H. Partisans and Guerrillas. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978.

Battistelli, Pier and Crociani, Piero. Elite: 191: Italian Navy & Air Force Elite Units & Special Forces 1940-45. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013.

Bosworth, R.J.B. Mussolini’s Italy: Life Under the Dictatorship 1915-1945. New York: New York. Penguin Books. 2005.

Collier, Richard. The War in the Desert. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1977 and 1999. 

Elson, Robert T. Prelude to War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1977.

Ford, Ken. Campaign: St. Nazaire 1942: The Great Commando Raid. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2001. 

McNab, Chris. Weapon: German Automatic Rifles: 1941-45: Gew 41, Gew 43, FG 42, and StG 44. Osprey Publishing. 2013.

Whipple, A.B.C. The Mediterranean. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1981.

Why was the Nazi’s Luftwaffe Air Force in Terminal Decline by September and October 1944?

The Nazi Luftwaffe air force played a key role in World War II, causing havoc as it rampaged through Europe in the early years of the war. However, by 1944 it was in terminal decline. Here, Matt Whittaker looks at the reasons for the Luftwaffe’s decline by focusing on September and October 1944.

Messerschmitt Bf 109 G-6 in September 1943. Source: Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-487-3066-04 / Boyer / CC-BY-SA 3.0, available here.

Introduction

The Nazi air force, the Luftwaffe, was in a critical spot in September and October 1944. Germany was fighting a three-front war each with demands that put pressure on the economy. The Allied bombing campaign had grown since the start of the year, wreaking havoc with economic and oil industry targets. The D-Day landings in June increased the stresses that wrecked the Luftwaffe in the West.

By September, the Germans got an unexpected gift from the Allies: logistics problems. The Allies could not keep their forces sufficiently supplied. This led to a halt to most pursuit, giving their opponents some space. The air war did not slow, however.

The biggest three issues the Luftwaffe faced were:

1.     The Numbers Game

2.     Fuel Shortages

3.     Training Cuts

The Numbers Game

The battles above Normandy and the attempt to slow the Allied bombing campaign drained the Luftwaffe. Air defense squadrons sent west as reinforcements returned at half strength. Such was the ferocity of the battles from June to August that only 175 operational fighters were available to fight by mid-September (1). 

A big contributor was the change in American fighter tactics. Escort fighters were now freed from the bombers to range ahead, clearing any opposition. Luftwaffe groups were broken up before they organized. Airfields were strafed or fighters lurked, waiting to pounce as their opponents landed. The German pilots tangled with increasingly larger American fighter groups with inexperienced pilots and heavily armed, cumbersome bomber destroyers like FW-190s. Many were shot down before even reaching the bombers. 

On September 11, 1944 the Luftwaffe intercepted an American raid heading for oil refineries. 350 fighters were sent against 700 fighters and 1,100 bombers. 305 made contact with the bombers and escorts; 110 were shot down for a loss rate of 36% (2).  A number of bombers were destroyed, but the Americans could accept such losses. Since early 1944 raids of 1,000 plus bombers and escorts were the norm. Interceptions resulted in high losses with many pilots killed in action (KIA).

September and October were the best wartime production months for Germany, despite strategic bombing. Of 3,821 aircraft that were produced in September, 80% were fighters (3). Despite this increase, the loss rate stayed par with deliveries. Gas and pilot shortages kept many of the planes from being utilized.

Fuel Shortages

The worst predicament facing the Luftwaffe by the fall was the lack of fuel. Since the start of the war, the fuel supply was a great concern. Germany possessed few natural sources. Much of the supply came from the Soviet Union, other Axis governments like Romania or, later, synthetic production. Much has been written about the efforts to protect sites like Ploesti from Allied bombing. 

Beginning in January 1944 the American heavy bombers made a concentrated effort to target Axis refineries and synthetic oil plants. By May, the raids had reduced the output from most sources of aviation gas by 90 percent (4).  These deficiencies could not easily be made up due to the damage. The raids, which had only slowed to support the D-Day campaign, were renewed after August. Flight operations drew on existing fuel supplies which were not replenished quickly. Starting in September, the Luftwaffe grounded many squadrons, leaving mostly fighters because of the shortfalls. Spare ground personnel were formed into infantry units; some were used in the fight at Arnhem. 

The Luftwaffe had to operate with 10% of its fuel requirements for September and October. All manner of methods were undertaken to reduce usage. Pilots had orders not to taxi upon landing or takeoff. Planes were moved with teams of oxen to tow planes into position or hangars.  The shortages cut severely into operations, reducing interceptions and ground attack requests. During Operation Market Garden, more Allied aircraft were downed by flak, rather than in combat. Occasional attacks were made against bridgeheads or supply depots, but the Luftwaffe was seldom seen.

Training Cuts

The double problems of fuel scarcity and rising attrition led to increasing cuts in training hours for novice Luftwaffe pilots. Total hours were cut, starting in 1941. This only grew worse, especially as the war expanded further into Russia, Africa, and the Mediterranean. Losses started to exceed the number of pilots graduating flight schools for service. The increasing clashes with more numerous Allied fighters led to a high death rate. By fall, the average lifespan of a fighter pilot was between 8 and 30 days (5). In an attempt to increase the number of active pilots, bomber squadrons were converted to fighters and flight instructors were transferred to the front lines. The German flight schools reduced hours but even more so with the front-line types that were used. Novice pilots got basic and some advanced instruction but much less in the operational models. German pilots averaged 60 hours of training while British RAF pilots had 225 hours (6).  

As with frontline groups, training fuel allotments were cut, feeding the cycle. Perhaps the greatest hindrance was the introduction of fighters like the P-51, which meant that nowhere in Germany was safe for training. The escorts flew ahead of the bomber streams or in free flights, looking for opportunities. Training flights or their airfields were attacked which meant further reductions.

Conclusion

These two crucial months were when the Luftwaffe’s back was broken. Losses in the first six months of the year led to Allied air supremacy. Still, pressure was building on all fronts but more so in the West. The ramping up of the strategic bombing campaign and the consistent targeting of the fighter arm culminated in this timeframe. Airplane manufacturing reached all-time highs in the fall but increased losses, fewer replacement pilots and a dearth of fuel resulted in an unrecoverable spiral.

Despite the best efforts of its leadership, the Luftwaffe of September and October 1944 was outmatched and outgunned. The short respite while the Allies played logistical catch-up from their advance didn’t last. By the end of October, that spiral was too great.

What do you think of the reasons for the Luftwaffe’s weakening in September and October 1944? Let us know below.

References

1 Zaloga, Steven J., Campaign 270 Operation Market Garden The American Airborne Missions (London: Osprey Publishing 2014), p. 1.

2 Caldwell, Donald and Muller, Richard, The Luftwaffe Over Germany Defense of the Reich (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Ltd. 2014), p. 452.

 3 February 22, 2013 MILAVIA Military Aviation Specials - The Luftwaffe's Comeback in Autumn 1944

 4 May 24, 2016 Luftwaffe Lovers: The role of synthetic fuel in World War II Germany - implications for today by Dr. Peter W. Becker

 5 Murray, Williamson, Strategy for Defeat 1933-1945 (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press 1983), p. 302

 6 Murray, Williamson, Strategy for Defeat 1933-1945 (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press 1983), p. 452