I Introduction: Power pillars after the civil war
Throughout the civil war and after that Greek remained a parliamentary democracy. To a certain extend and especially during the years of the fighting this was because of the need of the Americans and the British to appear to the public as supporters of a democratic regime that faced an imminent communist threat. Three very general political groupings could be distinguished that corresponded to right-center-left wings: The Right wing of the political spectrum was covered by the traditional anti-Venizelism, loyal to the throne and anti-communist. The Center had its historical roots in the Venizelist space that distinguished it form the right and was opposed to the communist left. The Left included non-communist components but was dominated by the Communist Party. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 17-22)
The latter was declared illegal, as post war Greece was an anti-communist cold war democracy pursuing the political and social exclusion of the Left, and thousands of its former partisans were imprisoned on remote Greek islands or excluded from state jobs. (Heneage, 2021, p. 204) Nevertheless, Greece never reached Stalinist Russia and there was much more freedom in the country compared to Franco’s Spain or Tito’s Yugoslavia. Thus, the Left had the opportunity to participate in the political arena with the United Democratic Left (Eniea Dimokratiki Aristera – EDA), a party whose control from the communists was an open secret, achieving good elections results. Furthermore, clientelism and the powerful and ubiquitous networks of the Greek family were always present and managed to mitigate the effects of political and social exclusion. It was not unusual then for leftists to be recruited into the public sector, from which they were officially excluded, through family political networks. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), pp. 169-170) (Heneage, 2021, p. 206)
Within this framework there were also extra-parliamentary pillars of power. First, there was the palace and the king. The role of king George II was reconfirmed with the referendum of 1946, (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) but he died soon after in April 1947 and was replaced by his son Paul. The palace would try to shape the political scenery according to its likings. This led the king to consecutive ruptures with all political wings and, from time to time, with the Army. (Rizas, 2008, p. 24)
The Army was the winner of the civil war and foremost agent of anti-communism. Although in the past the officers looked for political patronage with only some autonomous action (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023), by 1949 the Army was a well-organized and well-equipped mechanism with war experience and confidence. It felt a kind of detachment and contempt for parliamentarism, although the stance of individual officers against the palace, on foreign policy issues and on certain parties and politicians varied. In any case, the real possibilities of the political establishment to control the military apparatus were small. (Rizas, 2008, p. 25)
Finally, there was the American factor. For Washington, Greece had critical geopolitical interest as part of the ‘northern frieze’, together with Turkey and Iran, that would prevent soviet access to warm waters in the Near and Middle East. Thus, they favored a political establishment consistent with this end. The political parties in Greece on the other hand, although with gradations among them and except for the communist Left, favored the integration to the US sphere of influence as a deterrent to the ‘threat from the North’, where traditional enemies, like Bulgaria, now joined the communist bloc. As they lacked the means for the country’s recovery, essential for their survival, and the retention of sufficient military force, American help was essential. The fragmentation of the political forces facilitated further the American intervention, but occasionally the latter faced strong political movements. Thus, the USA was neither the all-powerful factor that steadily and unimpededly shaped the scene at will, as a popular narrative of part of the historiography and political-journalistic literature claims, but nor the non-participating observer of Greek politics, without interests and perceptions, as they claimed from time to time in Washington. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 32-34)
II The way to dictatorship
Attempts for reconciliation (1949 – 1952)
It is only natural that the Greeks should look for reconciliation amongst the rivaling parties after the end of the civil war. The Americans wanted the ratification of the end of the war and the reconciliation of the main political factions to come through the people’s vote. A new, more representative parliament, compared to that running the country during the civil war, was necessary. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 172) In fact, it was time for the struggle to become political and mostly economical with significant means for the necessary reconstruction arising from bold cuts in military spending. (Rizas, 2008, p. 64) American influence was ensured as foreign aid at the time covered 90,6 % of the deficit in the balance of foreign payments, 80,7 % of public spending for the reconstruction and 56,7 % of the Greek fiscal deficit. (Rizas, 2008, p. 119) Thus, the elections took place on the 5th of March 1950 using the electoral system of proportional representation.
The elections showed a clear lead for the Center – Left parties. This adds to the controversy over their decision to abstain from the 1946 elections, after which the civil war entered its most lethal phase. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Charged with the mission of implementing a policy that would seek to overcome the consequences of the civil war and emphasize on reconstruction and income redistribution, they failed to stand up to the occasion yet again though. Their division into several groups spreading from the Center – Left to the Center – Right (Nikolaos Plastiras, Georgios Papandreou and Sophocles Venizelos, the son of Eleftherios, were leading the most important ones), hostile to one another, rendered cooperation difficult in matters such as that of general amnesty and the policy of leniency towards those exiled, imprisoned (including death row inmates) or prosecuted as communists. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 172)
Things were further perplexed by international developments at that time. The Korean War (25th June 1950) completely changed the perceptions and priorities of the Americans. (Rizas, 2008, p. 75) The Marshall plan was to expire in 1952 (Rizas, 2008, p. 60) and American support was reduced from 250 million dollars in 1950-51 to mere 84 million in 1952-53. At the same time there was no talk anymore for a cut in military spending that took 10 % of the national income in 1951. (Rizas, 2008, p. 123) This led to a complete revision of an ambitious 4 year program elaborated in 1948 aiming at the exploitation of the national water and mineral resources for electrification, which was a prerequisite for the country’s industrialization as a means of economic growth and poverty alleviation. The Americans were not favoring industrialization anymore suggesting alternatives for economic growth, like tourism. This created resentment in political circles and the public opinion, which perceived the American policy as imposing colonial terms on the Greek economy. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 120 - 121) In fact, the most famous monography on the development of Greek heavy industry at the time came from the communist Dimitris Batsis. (Batsis, 1977 (11th Edition)) Its author, together with 3 more members of the communist party (Nikos Beloyiannis, Ilias Argyriadis and Nikos Kaloumenos), were executed as spies in March 1952, as the anti-communist vigilance intensified again. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 174)
In a nutshell, the Cold War climate after 1950 imposed that the development effort would have to be undertaken and paid for with mostly Greek resources, making the stabilization of the economy by any possible means, while at the same time maintaining a high level of military forces and spending, paramount. (Rizas, 2008, p. 120 ) Thus, the Centrist governments implemented a strict stabilization program, which cost them electoral losses and paved the way for the ascent of the conservative Right to power. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 125 - 129)
The conservative Right to power (1952 – 1963)
Alexandros Papagos
The dominant figure of the Right was field marshal Alexandros Papagos. Coming from the high Athenian society, he was Chief of the Army General Staff at the beginning of the Greco-Italian war of 1940 and later assumed the rank of major General of the Army. He was arrested during the occupation and sent to a concentration camp in Germany until 1945. The military stalemate of 1948, during the civil war, was the reason for the return to his duties as commander in chief. In this capacity he managed to close the war against the communists victoriously and received the title of field marshal in October 1949 at the age of 66. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 60 - 61)
Papagos’ profile obviously matched the political climate of the time as he was surely anti-communist and further posed as an alternative to a political establishment in crisis. (Rizas, 2008, p. 93) Nevertheless, a dictatorship was not an option for Washington. The Americans would not object though, if Papagos ran for office and was elected. (Rizas, 2008, p. 79) To this end he had to resign from his post, which he did in May 1951. His resignation caused reactions in the Army and members of the Sacred Bond of Greek Officers (Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatkon - IDEA), a secret military organization, which, according to its Constitution, ‘should establish a dictatorship if the political leaders were unable to protect the country’s national interests, namely to contain communism’, (Arvanitopoulos, 1991, p. 99)(Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 208-209) occupied the General Staff building, the radio station and other places in Athens. The movement ended within a day by the intervention of Papagos, which proves that at the time of his resignation he was in full control of the armed forces. (Rizas, 2008, p. 83) (Tsoucalas, 2020, σ. 209) Furthermore, characteristic of the Army’s power and independence was the fact that grace was granted to those involved in the movement and the matter was closed there. (Rizas, 2008, p. 90) This came to the dismay of the palace as the king particularly disliked the fact that Papagos was not willing to go into politics under his tutelage. (Rizas, 2008, p. 82) He even tried to bring the Army under his influence after Papagos’ resignation, but this met the opposition of the Americans. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 84, 85, 95, 99 - 100)
Nevertheless, one thing on which there was a consensus within the power establishment at that time, with the exceptions of the Left, was the need to join a collective security system. (Rizas, 2008, p. 112) The difference was that for the Center this was perceived as an opportunity to deter the threat from the communist countries in the north with reduced military spending (Rizas, 2008, p. 122), whereas Papagos believed that Greece could ensure its inclusion in the allied planning only if it maintained a significant military capability. (Rizas, 2008, p. 109) In any case, Greece’s participation in the Korean War, in response to the United Nations appeal for assistance, (Wikipedia, 2023) was included in this context, and the country finally joined the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), together with Turkey, in February 1952. (Rizas, 2008, p. 117) (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 213-214)
Papagos’ party, the ‘Greek Rally’, came to power a few months later in November, winning 49.2 % of the votes and 247 out of 300 seats in the parliament. (Rizas, 2008, p. 130) His predominance was facilitated by the fact that the elections were in this case conducted using a majoritarian electoral system. In fact, the changes of the electoral system in a way to facilitate the formation of strong one-party governments away from collaboration is a characteristic of the parliamentary system of Modern Greece that remains to this day. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 200) This tactic obviously reinforces the phenomena of division and the client state. The result of EDA (9,6 %) confirmed the existence of a hard core of communists, but the party was left out of parliament. (Rizas, 2008, p. 131)
This did not go unnoticed by Papagos, who established a bureaucracy of ‘national security’ imbued with anticommunism, whose activity would normally remain opaque. The Central Intelligence Service (Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion – KYP) was established in May 1953. (Rizas, 2008, p. 132) He also completed Greece’s integration into the Atlantic security system with the bilateral Greek – American agreement on granting military bases to the USA in October 1953. While the agreement is linked to NATO’s strategy, the operation of the bases was controlled exclusively by the Americans. (Rizas, 2008, p. 162) Further concessions to the Americans included the use of the Greek road and rail network by the American armed forces, low fees and tax exemption for the American activities, and the granting of US military and civilian personnel the right of separate jurisdiction. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 216)
Papagos’ government made an opening to Europe as well, in view also of the reluctance of the Americans to finance the Greek development program, as we saw before. The outstanding pre-war public debt, whose settlement was not allowed by Greek public finances, resulted in the creation of the European credit mechanism. The Greek government submitted specific projects to foreign governments, which they undertook to finance indirectly or directly, often in the form of export guarantees. From now on, West Germany will become Greece’s most important economic partner. (Rizas, 2008, p. 163)
In the field of foreign policy, the minister of foreign affairs Stefanopoulos signed the Balkan Pact with Yugoslavia and Turkey in February 1953 followed by a military agreement in August 1954. The Balkan Pact was perceived as a way for the Western allies to bring Yugoslavia into their sphere of influence in case of Soviet aggression. (Wikipedia, 2023)The undertaking was short-lived though after Tito’s reconciliation with post-Stalinist Soviet Union and the conflict between Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus issue. (Rizas, 2008, p. 163) (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 216-217) The latter arose after an unofficial referendum on the island in 1950 that called for a unification with Greece (Wikipedia, 2023). Nevertheless, whereas previous governments avoided raising the issue as there were other priorities, e.g. joining NATO, and British opposition was fierce, (Rizas, 2008, p. 166) Papagos worked more intensively on it. As we have seen, Great Britain obtained Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire and by 1950 the island was ruled by the British for almost 70 years. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 217-218) (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021)
For Papagos and most of the Greeks unification with Cyprus was a matter characterized by strong emotional and psychological charge. (Rizas, 2008, p. 167) Although the catastrophe of the Asia Minor Campaign practically put an end to Greece’s concept of the ‘Great Idea’ for expansion to its ancient territories (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023), here we find remnants of exactly this concept. (Rizas, 2008, p. 165) Facing fierce British opposition on a bilateral level, Papagos tried to internationalize the issue by appealing to the United Nations in August 1954. The appeal was fruitless as it also met the American reaction. (Rizas, 2008, p. 168) The Americans had made it clear to Athens, that Greece had to devote itself to its economic and social reconstruction and political stabilization and that its general situation did not allow for redemptive adventures. (Rizas, 2008, p. 166)They also considered the need to safeguard Cyprus’ strategic advantages for Britain, that was now on retreat from the Middle East and Suez, and the Western security system. (Rizas, 2008, p. 167)
The next step for Athens was to recourse to armed action. This started on the 1st of April 1955 by the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston – EOKA) led by the Greek Cypriot colonel of the Greek Army Georgios Grivas. (Wikipedia, 2023) The British responded to the increased Greek and Greek-Cypriot pressure by bringing Greece’s arch-rival into the game. In August 1955 they convened a tripartite conference in London with the participation of Turkey. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 220-221) (Rizas, 2008, p. 169)
Turkey was opposing Cyprus’ unification with Greece for strategic reasons. It did not want the completion of a chain of islands enclosing the Turkish coast from the northern Aegean to the south. To this end it used the Turkish Cypriot minority that made up 18 % of the island’s population. The Turkish position does not accept minority status for the Turkish Cypriots and considers that their presence should be equal in the management of the affairs of the island. In fact, in 1955-56 Ankara went through a maximalist phase requiring either the continuation of the British rule or the return of the island to Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 167 - 168) Thus, the tripartite conference failed completely, because of the unbridgeable approaches of the participants. To make things worse for the Greeks, the Greek minority in Constantinople suffered a pogrom because of the tension. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 221) (Wikipedia, 2023)
The US and British stance on the Cyprus issue caused the dissatisfaction of the Greek public opinion, including that of the Right press. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 222) The Left saw an opportunity to cause a rift in pro-Atlantic perceptions and in the nexus of international and internal arrangements of the post-civil war era. (Rizas, 2008, p. 165) Stalin’s death in 1953 brought about a change in the rigid and dogmatic practises of the Communist Party, which would now seek cooperation with the Center-Left and Center parties on the basis of a joint effort to oust the ‘Greek Rally’ from the government. Indeed, in the municipal elections of November 1954 the joint candidates of the Center-Left and the Left clearly prevailed in the three largest cities, Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus, and showed good results in a number of other municipalities as well. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 139 - 140)
The most significant development after the municipal elections of 1954 was Papagos’ illness (he eventually died in October 1955), that created the need for his succession to the leadership of the ‘Greek Rally’ and the premiership. The case as it developed is simultaneously indicative of the structural weakness and opacity of the Greek political and party system. As there is no stable party structure and institutionalized process of intra-party functioning and leadership succession, due to the political culture and tradition that structures party organization around persons, the natural eclipse of the leading figure allows informal processes to fill the gap, in which extra-parliamentarian factors have a prominent role. (Rizas, 2008, p. 156) The result of such processes including the extra-parliamentarian power pillars described in section I as well as interest networks formed by politicians and businessmen (see next section) resulted in Konstantinos Karamanlis taking over as prime minister. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 209-212)
Konstantinos Karamanlis
Konstantinos Karamanlis is the founder of one of the few families that ruled over modern Greece (other famous ones include those of Trikoupis, Venizelos, Papandreou and Mitsotakis) significantly reducing the inclusiveness of the Greek political institutions. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021) He was the minister of public works in the Papagos’ administration and his rise through the ranks of the Greek politics was quick after World War II . (Wikipedia, 2023) Karamanlis had the support of the palace (Rizas, 2008, p. 145) (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 209, 232) and king Paul gave him the mandate to form a government on the 5th of October 1955. (Rizas, 2008, p. 160) For the Americans, that after Papagos’ death turned to the king, who had the institutional capacity to be a factor of anti-communism continuity (Rizas, 2008, p. 152), this was a welcome development. The Left was on the rise again (see above) and the Americans were interested in the retainment of the Right in power (Rizas, 2008, p. 145), although the armed forces constituted a backup security force for the political and social establishment in case of exhaustion of the parliamentary means. (Rizas, 2008, p. 172) The British embassy was in agreement. (Rizas, 2008, p. 144)
This foreign consent was interpreted by the opposition press as the result of Karamanlis’ unpopular opinion referring to the need for a compromise solution to the Cyprus issue. (Rizas, 2008, p. 155) The fact was that there was a revision of the British strategic needs in Cyprus. London had concluded that to fulfill British commitments in the Middle East it was sufficient to maintain military bases in Cyprus rather than rule over the entire island. (Rizas, 2008, p. 241)The British made it clear that the Cyprus issue now depended very much on Turkish perceptions and sensitivities, which had to be taken into account as a priority, if the Western powers did not want to alienate a necessary ally in the critical region of the Middle East. (Rizas, 2008, p. 239)
Eventually, the idea of unification with Greece was given up and Cyprus was proclaimed an independent state on the 16th of August 1960. The organization of the new state was based on the London and Zurich agreements of February 1959. (Wikipedia, 2022) These were met with displeasure in Greece, also by a portion of the officers corps, as the position of the Turkish – Cypriots was strengthened and the new state would operate under international and constitutional restrictions that contradicted the right of the majority to direct Cypriot affairs as they wished. In fact, the content of the agreements was considered roughly equivalent to national concession, abandoning the ideal of the union. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 233, 244) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 225) The leader of the Center Georgios Papandreou pointed out that with the London and Zurich agreements it was the first time that Turkey was returning to territory it had lost after the establishment of the modern Greek state. (Rizas, 2008, p. 245) Greece was on the retreat.
Karamanlis’ attempt to put the Cyrpus issue ‘on the self’ was done in order to manage to deal with the financial problems as a priority. (Rizas, 2008, p. 155) In fact, as minister of public works he had already won the admiration of the US Embassy for the efficiency with which he built road infrastructure and administered American aid programs. (Wikipedia, 2023) Furthermore, his premiership initiated the beginning of a period, that extended well into the 1970s, in which GDP grew nearly 7 % a year and per capita income trebled. It wasn’t far short of the German postwar miracle. (Heneage, 2021, p. 204) Karamanlis’ administration also pursued the association with the European Economic Community and the relevant agreement was signed in Athens in July 1961. (Rizas, 2008, p. 248)
Nevertheless, the Greek economic development of the 1950s and 1960s was based on foreign support (also in the form of tourism), that did not favor the industrialization of the country, (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 184) shipping and state intervention. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 190-191) (Rizas, 2008, p. 257) Favorable arrangements with Greek and foreign businessmen repeatedly provoked discussions of ‘colonial-style’ contracts, while the state’s capabilities (i) in selecting ‘partners’ to lease state-owned enterprises or (ii) to lend to commercial and industrial activities from state-controlled banks are such that they have certainly created networks of public and private interests (Rizas, 2008, pp. 258 - 259)starting a tradition that continues to this day. In fact, the Governor of the Bank of Greece at that time Xenophon Zolotas criticized the mentality of the Greek ‘entrepreneur class’ and the failure of the banking system to work against this mentality aiming at the hoarding of profits or the acquisition of consumer goods rather than the use of these profits for productive investments. (Rizas, 2008, p. 260) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 188)
It is then not inexplicable that from 1951 to 1963 405 thousand Greeks left the country in search for better luck elsewhere. Actually, the annual remittances to their families back home reached 173 million dollars in 1963 contributing also to the country’s development. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 191) By 1980 immigration would exceed 1 million, that is about a quarter of Greece’s active workforce. (Eleftheratos, 2015, p. 182) (Heneage, 2021, p. 204)Thus, the country continued to foster non-inclusive political and financial institutions, as discussed also previously (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021), which according to Acemoglu and Robinson are characteristic of a failed state. (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013)
Karamanlis and the Right was also accused, not unjustly, of authoritarianism and oppression. After his appointment as a prime minister he reorganized the ‘Greek Rally’ as ‘National Radical Union’ (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi -ERE), that concluded the transformation of the old anti-Venizelist faction to a conservative party of the post-war era, (Rizas, 2008, p. 174) and asked for the affirmation of the king’s choice through the public vote in February 1956. This was the first time that the Greek women were granted with voting rights. (Rizas, 2008, p. 179) He won only thanks to a carefully chosen electoral system that gave him 165 seats in the parliament with 47,4 % of the votes against the Center-Left alliance that gathered 48,1 % but only 132 seats. This immediately raised issues of political legitimation for the government. (Rizas, 2008, p. 181) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 233) Karamanlis’ position was nevertheless strengthened with another round of elections in May 1958, (Rizas, 2008, p. 204) but the result reserved the unpleasant surprise of EDA becoming the largest opposition party. (Kostis, 2018, p. 333) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 233)Karamanlis then responded with the intensification of police action against the Left, arrests and deportations. (Rizas, 2008, p. 206) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 234) When a third round of elections came in the autumn 1961 the leader of the Center Georgios Papandreou accused Karamanlis that he used the oppressive state mechanism set up by the Right during its rule, the army and paramilitary organizations against all rival parties and ERE’s victory was seen as the product of force and fraud. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 201-207) (Kostis, 2018, p. 333) He called the people to an ‘unyielding struggle’ (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 239-242) that managed to mobilize the electoral base of the Center as well as wider social strata, especially since the demand for new elections was linked to other political, economic and social issues such as the Cyprus issue, unemployment, poverty and immigration described above. (Rizas, 2008, p. 269) The tension culminated with the assassination of EDA MP Grigoris Lambrakis in May 1963 by a right-wing extremist organization under conditions that made even Karamanlis wonder ‘Who in God’s name is running this country?’. The truth is that Karamanlis’ relations with the other power pillars of section I were worsening after 1961 and especially the palace, that was also targeted by the ‘unyielding struggle’, was looking for a way out of the crisis. Karamanlis was replaced as prime minister by another king’s man, Panagiotis Pipinelis, but it became obvious that the only way to relief the tensions was free elections. These took place in November 1963 and Papandreou’s ‘Centre Union’ (Enosi Kentrou – EK) removed Karamanlis’ ERE from the government. The twelve-year rule of the Right had ended. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 242-245)
The short-lived government of the Center (1963 – 1965)
The Center won, but the majority in Parliament was small (42% of the votes and 138 seats against ERE’s 39.4% and 132 seats) (Rizas, 2008, p. 284) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 245) and the reaction of the, much closer to the Right, Army to the result of the elections unknown. Thus, Papandreou avoided extensive interventions in the latter at this phase and sought new elections, to obtain an independent majority in the Parliament. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 285, 292) Indeed, the Army remained in the barracks and Centre Union won an overwhelming majority of 52,7% of the votes and 171 seats (out of 300 in total) in the elections of February 1964. (Rizas, 2008, p. 293) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 247)
Significant changes in the social stratification of the country had occurred since the last government of the Center. The economic conditions described above did not cause only external but internal immigration as well. Whereas in 1958 the ratio of rural to urban income per capita was just over half (220 to 437 dollars), by 1964 it was significantly less (282 to 621). (Rizas, 2008, p. 295) No wonder then that the rural dwellers sought for a better fortune in the cities. The urban population increased from 37.7% in 1951 to 43% ten years later with another 13% living in semi-urban areas. 62.7% of this increase was absorbed by the city of Athens. By 1961 Greece’s capital had a population bigger than the total urban population of the rest of the country and was established as the most important center of the socio – economic life. It absorbed more than 50% of those working in the industry, received 80% of the country’s imports, paid 75% of the direct and 65% of the indirect taxation, the income of its population was 40% higher than the average national income, bought more than 50% of the daily newspaper sheets, had the highest amount of hospital beds, 85% of qualified doctors and housed the bulk of those working in the public sector. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 181 - 182) This dominance of Athens remains to this day.
Papandreou increased the agricultural subsidies from 2.6 to 4.4% of the state budget, (Rizas, 2008, p. 297) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 250) but this could do little to reverse the fact that Greece had also entered the stage of mass urban societies when the spirit of the 1960s was spreading through the western world. (Wikipedia, 2023)Combined with an ongoing economic boom, under the name ‘Trente Glorieuses’ in France (Wikipedia, 2023) or ‘Miracolo Economico’ in Italy (Wikipedia, 2023), this drove the demand for increased consumption and services through an income redistribution. Thus, Greece could not remain unaffected. (Rizas, 2008, p. 299)
Indeed, EK raised the daily wages, pensions, instituted vacations pay equal to ½ of the monthly salary and generally aimed at boosting the demand as a driver of accelerating economic growth. The result was that the increase in consumption exceeded the productive capacity of the domestic industry. In 1965, for the first time the value of industrial output exceeded the value of agricultural output. Thus, the Greek bourgeoisie also had every reason to be satisfied with the economic policy of EK during this period. Protective tariffs were in place, the credit process was simplified, prices were kept at stable heights and economic growth reached 8%. Business was going well, and profits were high. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 250 - 251) (Rizas, 2008, pp. 297 - 298)
The liberal, redistributive, and developmental spirit of the time was also present in Papandreou’s highly popular educational reform. He increased the time of compulsory education from six to nine years and established messes in elementary schools and scholarships for high schools to facilitate the access of children from the weaker social classes to them. To this end, the vernacular was also established as an equal language with the so called ‘clean’ (kathareuousa), that was based on the ancient Greek language and was mostly used by the elitist social strata. Ancient texts were also now to be taught translated in high school. The tuition and examination fees in higher education were abolished and a new university was established in Patras. Plans for two more in Epirus and Crete were laid. Finally, the Pedagogical Institute was also created, responsible for applied educational research, the creation of syllabi and the renewal of textbooks. (Rizas, 2008, σσ. 301 - 303) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 252)
In foreign policy, once again, the Cyprus issue was dominant. Here Athens did not have the control of the developments and Papandreou was particularly worried about the unbound and uncontrolled initiatives of the Greek-Cypriot leader and first President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios. (Rizas, 2008, p. 312) The latter announced in December 1963 his intention to proceed with a unilateral revision of the constitution in order to limit the extensive veto rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority. (Rizas, 2008, p. 307) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 226) This caused tensions and armed conflicts between the two communities that culminated to the dispatch of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) to the island in spring 1964. This marked the consolidation of a situation rather favourable to the Greek-Cypriot side, which in the meantime prevailed in 95% of the island’s territory and had under its full control the state apparatus. (Rizas, 2008, p. 310) Nevertheless, the bombardment, in August 1964, of Greek-Cypriot positions on the islands by the Turkish Air Force, following an attack on a Turkish-Cypriot village by the Greeks, indicated that Turkey was not going to give up its ambitions on the islands easily. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 227)
Apart from appealing to the UN, several alternatives to solve the crisis were also brought forward by the Americans and NATO going as far as the partition of the island between the two communities. The rejection of these plans by the Greek government were interpreted as the result of the influence of the prime minister’s son Andreas Papandreou. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 313 - 317)
Andreas Papandreou was an economist and former university professor in the USA. Nevertheless, he represented a more radical left wing within EK. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 253) This was met with scepticism by the Americans, especially after J. F. Kennedy’s assassination and the assumption of the presidency by Lyndon Johnson that marked a shift in American policy from the need for liberal openness to more traditional notions credible from the point of view of Cold War strategy. (Rizas, 2008, p. 358) Andreas was also perceived as an obstacle for the personal ambitions of many EK politicians that hoped to succeed his aged father. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 253) Some of these, like Konstantinos Mitsotakis (the father of today’s prime minister), had also strong reservations about the economic policy, as they considered that the capacity for further benefits of any kind had been exhausted, and the prime minister’s handlings regarding the Cyprus issue that created tension in the Greco-American relations. (Rizas, 2008, p. 345)
Thus, in spring 1965 started a sequence of events that led to the eviction of Papandreou from the premiership and are often treated as the product of conspiracy by the American factor in collaboration with the palace, where the new king Constantine II had succeeded his father Paul that died in 1964, and defectors within EK. In May, the existence of an officers’ organization under the name ASPIDA (shield) became public. (Rizas, 2008, p. 337) Its aim, according to the indictment, was the establishment of a Nasser-style dictatorship. Politicians were also, supposedly, involved among which was Andreas Papandreou. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 260) The government perceived the accusations as an attempt of the Right to purge the army of pro-government officers and contrary to his original stance Georgios Papandreou now decided to intervene. (Rizas, 2008, p. 339) His proposals, among which was to take over the ministry of national defence himself, were rejected by the king though. The prime minister felt obliged to resign. Before even submitting his resignation in writing, the king had already appointed a new government supported by ERE and dissidents (defectors) of the EK. By July 1965 Georgios Papandreou was ousted, and his son faced charges of high treason. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 261)
The colonels come to power (1965 – 1967)
The 25 years old king Constantine had overestimated his powers. The dismissal of Papandreou was in direct opposition to the principles of parliamentary democracy. The attempt to form a government with defectors from EK was met with disdain by the Greek people. After two years of the more liberal Papandreou government the latter would now express its dismay in a dynamic way. For weeks, hundreds of thousand of people would demonstrate against the methods of the defectors and the palace. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 263 - 265)
Furthermore, the departure of the defectors from EK strengthened its more radical wing and Andreas Papandreou, who declared that: ‘The Nation’s infrastructure, transport and communication, the credit system and education must be owned by the state. In general, heavy industry should be state-owned and light industry private. There is a primary need to make efforts to limit or even eliminate heavy consumption and the import of luxury goods. It is necessary to stop the granting of monopoly privileges which help the entry of foreign capital.’ (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 268 - 269)Advocating national sovereignty, he also appeared skeptical of NATO and Greece’s integration into the European Economic Community. (Rizas, 2008, p. 391) The king was not spared from accusations of practices that exceeded the limits of constitutional monarchy and at the same time Andreas Papandreou was raising the issue of perceived American interference in Greece’s internal affairs. Finally, he argued that a fairer distribution of the national income was necessary by attacking the wealthier classes. (Rizas, 2008, p. 393) Greece’s elites had every reason to feel worried.
The army was also worried. The parliament did not lift Papandreou’s immunity for the case of ASPIDA and it was obvious that his father would give up his original stance of non-intervention in the army after that. In fact, there was a group of mid and low-level officers established in 1956 already, that exercised pressure on the respective military leadership for a coup, whenever it appeared that the Left and Center would get a majority in the parliament. The leader of this group was colonel Georgios Papadopoulos. (Rizas, 2008, p. 388)
Thus, in the 22 months that followed Georgios Papandreou’s eviction from office the Greek people remained agitated, EK strong in the electorate, Andreas Papandreou’s rhetoric radical, Greece’s elites and the Americans consequently worried and the king also feeling threatened, as his interventions had caused a revival of the issue of choice between monarchy and democracy, (Rizas, 2008, p. 393) was avoiding calling elections using government schemes supported by the Right and defectors from EK. Obviously, the margins for a parliamentary solution to the dispute had become very narrow. On the 21st of April 1967 colonel Georgios Papadopoulos’ group made their move: Dictatorship.
III Dictatorship
In his book on the many military interventions in the Greek politics between 1916 and 1936 Thanos Veremis distinguishes them in two categories: 1) The one refers to those interventions that gained national importance and were supported by a large portion of the public. 2) The second refers to those that aimed only to serve private interests or were an expression of discontent of a military faction. (Veremis, 2018, p. 280) Thus, if we were to follow the same distinction, then the military coup of 1967 belongs to the second category.
Veremis further interprets the people’s tolerance to these regimes as disappointment from and consequently discontent for the political establishment. (Veremis, 2018, p. 279) Nevertheless, tolerance is by no means acceptance. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the repressive mechanisms of the 1967 junta cannot be ignored. The center-left and left-wing resistance organizations established immediately after the coup were quickly neutralized, and the protagonists were in many cases brutalized and tortured. The same is true for the democratic officers of the army (Rizas, 2008, p. 442)
The junta was also ad odds with the king. After all the coup did not come from the high ranking officers of the latter’s entourage, as discussed previously, and as the junta was aiming at the establishment of a permanent regime confrontation with Constantine II was inevitable. (Rizas, 2008, p. 434) In fact, on the 13th of December 1967 the king carried out a counter coup, but once again junta’s reaction was swift and Constantine found himself in exile.
There was also a wide spread belief in a large part of the population, that fed anti-Americanism for many years, that the political question could not be solved by the Greeks themselves, but by the sovereign will of the Americans, who were held responsible for imposing and maintaining the dictatorship. (Rizas, 2008, p. 443) The truth is that for Henry Kissinger, the American national security advisor, the nature of the regime was not an issue for Washington (Rizas, 2008, p. 453) as long as it identified itself with NATO and the western world and Greece remained an ally of the West in the Cold War. (Rizas, 2008, p. 432) The junta did.
Junta’s doings in the financial sector have often been the subject of controversy. During the 2010 economic crisis, for example, when the country found itself at the brink of bankruptcy and a tough program of austerity and heavy taxation was imposed on its people, public discontent against the parties working within the parliamentary system of government gave fertile ground for references to junta’s well-organized economy, which avoided thriftlessness and empowered needy social groups such as farmers. Researchers like D. Eleftheratos showed that this was a myth and stressed the devastating effects of junta’s policies on the Greek economy. (Eleftheratos, 2015)
Thus, the international oil crisis of October 1973 challenged the sustainability of the Greek model of financial growth (Rizas, 2008, pp. 351-352) and as the passing of time inevitably led to a relaxation of the police measures popular discontent was more readily expressed. Universities in particular became a permanent hotbed. (Rizas, 2008, p. 444)The revolt of the Polytechnic University in Athens in November 1973 was violently suppressed, but a group of fiercely nationalist and anti-communist officers already worried that Papadopoulos was becoming too moderate. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 446-447) The internal conflicts of the junta culminated to a coup within the coup on the 25th of November 1973, when brigadier Ioannidis overthrew Papadopoulos and assumed the leadership of the military regime. (Rizas, 2008, p. 474)
The final blow for the junta came a few months later during another crisis in Cyprus. It was mentioned in the previous section already that even Georgios Papandreou, whose funeral in November 1968 marked one of the first massive demonstrations against the military regime, had trouble dealing with the policies of the president of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios. In fact, the dispatch of an army division to Cyprus by Papandreou in 1964, apart from the increase of the Greek deterrent power on the island, was also interpreted as an attempt to increase control over Makarios. (Rizas, 2008, p. 313) Nevertheless, the latter’s initiatives to bring Cyprus into the Non-Aligned Movement (Wikipedia, 2024), to side with the Arabs during the Six-Day War (Rizas, 2008, p. 480) (Wikipedia, 2024) or to order weapons from Czechoslovakia for the Cypriot armed forces (Rizas, 2008, p. 481) indicate clearly the structural divergence between the political system in Cyprus and the military regime in Greece.
Indeed, the junta worked towards the unification of Cyprus with Greece, but Makarios opposed the idea as Cyprus would then be subject to a dictatorship and, furthermore, the proposal included territorial concessions to Turkey (Rizas, 2008, p. 479), in accordance with American demands that Athens should consider the Turkish views in Cyprus. (Rizas, 2008, p. 482) This does not mean that an agreement with Turkey was reached. On the contrary, when the junta tried, unsuccessfully, to impose its views to the Turkish side at the end of 1967, the issue culminated to a Greco-Turkish crisis that eventually forced the junta to withdraw the Greek army division from the island. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 480-481) Later, in March 1970, the junta attempted to murder Makarios and eventually Ioannidis to overthrow him with a coup on the 15th of July 1974. Under the treaty of Guarantee (Wikipedia, 2024), this was the excuse that the Turks needed to justify their invasion in Cyprus 5 days later, that led to the division of the island that lasts to this day. On the 24th of July Karamanlis, in self-exile in Paris after losing the premiership in 1963 (see above), returned to Greece to form a government. The junta had fallen.
IV Conclusion
What we have seen in this series of articles so far is that modern Greece, since its foundation, was always able to move forward. Despite the difficulties, thanks to some capable leaders, favored also by coincidence and luck, it managed to continuously develop and expand.
Thus, at the end of the dictatorship in 1974 Greece was again a completely different country. The population had largely withdrawn from the countryside and lived in two large cities, Athens, and Thessaloniki. Financially, the rural-urban gap had narrowed, and per capita income had tripled since 1964. There was an extensive service sector, whereas the industry had developed to such an extent that about 40% of exports were industrial goods. It was thus an urbanized country, with a relatively industrialized economy that in parallel to the established relation with the USA was now pursuing admission to the European Economic Community. (Rizas, 2008, p. 490)
Nevertheless, much of all these was done through networks of public and private interests in a way that did not allow for the exploitation of the country’s full potential for the benefit of all its people. Many sought their luck abroad or became trapped in a clientelism system sponsored by exclusive political institutions. What changed after 1974 was the influence of the army. In many cases in the past the collaboration between politicians and military officers for the seizure of power resulted in mild punishments for the latter after army interventions into politics. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Although after junta’s fall in 1974 many of its collaborators were treated mildly and were even cared for by businessmen favored by the military regime (Eleftheratos, 2015, pp. 313-322) the leading officers were now sentenced to life in prison. Indeed, after 1974 the political establishment managed to eliminate the role of the army in the political developments in Greece. Nevertheless, it remains, to a significant extend, a ‘family business’ (after 1974, 6 prime ministers came from the Karamanlis, Papandreou and Mitsotakis families, for example).
It was a matter of time then before Greece started to pay the toll for its exclusive political and financial institutions. As we saw, Georgios Papandreou’s remarks for the Cyprus issue, that the London and Zurich agreements marked, for the first time, the return of Turkey to a territory it had lost after the establishment of modern Greece, could be interpreted as an indication that Greece was going on the retreat. The invasion of the island and occupation of its north-eastern part by the Turks in July 1974 made it official.
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