The Italian Front in World War One

When conjuring up images of the First World War one may visualize the iconic and murderous trenches of the Western Front. Or perhaps the epic dogfights fought between intrepid pilots in rickety machines when aircraft was only in its infancy.  But the global nature of the war witnessed fighting on a massive scale from the frigid waters of the North Sea to the scorching deserts of the Middle East and the mountains of the Alps where. In the Alps close to 700,000 Italians and half as many Austro-Hungarian (Habsburg) combatants would ultimately lose their lives in a brutal meat grinder in which combat was at times the not even the most dangerous contender.

Brian Hughes explains.

An trench of the Austro-Hungarian Army at the peak of the Ortler in 1917.

On May 23, 1915, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary thus abandoning her initial neutrality. It had been nine months since the largest war in European history had begun, starting in August of 1914 when the other Great Powers of Europe, Great Britain, France, and Russia (The Entente) went to war against Germany and her ally Austria-Hungary (The Central Powers) in a complicated yet lethal system of alliances with one of the main aims of the Entente being to check the rising power of Germany on the continent. Italy, like the other belligerent nations, entered the war with the goal of “reclaiming” regions inhabited by Italian speaking peoples such as the Trentino in the Alps and Trieste on the Adriatic Coast, then in the possession of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Italy had only been unified as a cohesive nation in 1861, the first time in which they entire peninsula had coalesced under one government since the Roman Empire. The Entente hoped that by opening a brand-new front especially one so close to the heartland of Austria-Hungary would significantly relive the immense pressure in which the Central Powers had been administering to their foes in the Eastern and Western Fronts respectively.

Italy’s initial plan at the start of war was to begin a major offensive through the mountains of the Trentino in the Alps. Their objective was simple. Utilizing an overwhelming advantage in manpower the massive army would slice through the undermanned and poorly equipped Austro-Hungarian defenses like a hot knife through butter. Exploiting the gaps created by the enormous offensive thrust, the Italians would not only quickly retrieve the much sought-after Trentino region but simultaneously open roads to Ljubljana in present day Slovenia and Vienna, the Imperial Capital. But not everything went according to plan.

For starters, the Italian Peninsula is not ideally poised for offensive military operations to her northeast given that the mountain ranges of this region are amongst the highest in Europe. This gave the Austro-Hungarian defenders a significant advantage in that they could subsequently negate the numerically superior adversaries. Another factor was the lack of combat experience in the Italian Armed Forces. Prior to the outbreak of World War One Italy had fought a series of colonial wars in Africa against the Ottoman Empire. These engagements were comparatively small and drastically differed in men, material, and terrain now present on the Italian Front. This, combined with the outdated and draconian leadership within the Italian Army embodied especially by Chief of Staff Luigi Cadorna would yield disastrous results.  It seemed that the Italian High Command did not seem to notice or comprehend the brutality in which industrialized warfare enabled horrific carnage in France, Belgium, and the Eastern Front throughout the first year of the war. In addition to this, recent Central Power successes in Galicia enabled additional troops with valuable combat experience to be moved to the new front.

War at altitude

Prior to the 1984 Siachen dispute between Indian and Pakistani troops battles had for the most part never been waged in as high of altitudes such as in places like the Julian Alps of the Italian Front where peaks rise to an average height of 1300 meters. When fighting in these conditions an enemy’s bullet or stray shell could sometimes be less deadly than the environment itself. Soldiers had to contend with avalanches, rockslides, frostbite, freezing temperatures, and razor-sharp rocks to name just a few of the appalling hazards do not present in other theatres of the Great War. In order to tactically operate under these harsh conditions both Italian and Austro-Hungarian armies fielded units of specially trained Mountain soldiers who maintained the proper skills for conducting warfare in the mountains. The Alpini, on the Italian side were formed in 1872 and were the oldest “mountain corps” in the world. Recruited from the towns and villages along the Italian Alps, the Alpini were adept climbers, skiers, and hunters who were familiar with the latest innovations in mountaineering equipment and could sustain themselves for prolonged periods of time in hazardous mountainous surrounding as often they found themselves perched upon dangerous precipes and slopes in which they had to bivouac. The Habsburg Army confronted the Alpini with their own specially trained mountain corps knowns as the Alpen Kaiserjager. Like the Alpini, these men were recruited from mountainous regions throughout the Empire such as the Carpathians, Tatras, and Balkans. Heroic clashes and counter attacks between these elite units would become a trademark of the war.

The Isonzo (Soca) River Valley would become the major geographical focal point of the conflict, witnessing twelve major Italian Offensives all of which yielded horrific casualty rates. Once again, the Italian High Command did not seem to notice or even care about the difficulties exasperated by the terrain and poor quality of their troops. These murderous offensives would eventually culminate in October 1917 at the Battle of Caporetto, one of the deadliest battles of the Great War in which a combined Habsburg-German army valiantly resisted and ultimately routed a major offensive push by the newly equipped and colossal Italian Army. Caporetto would ultimately be the worst defeat suffered by the Italian Army throughout the war. Roughly 280,000 prisoners were taken in addition to the mass desertions of near 350,000 and some 40,000 killed or wounded.

Recovery

Despite these detrimental setbacks the Italians remarkably recovered. Chief of Staff Luigi Cadorna would ultimately be sacked and was replaced with General Armando Diaz. The war would continue for another year until eventually the Habsburg Army who had held out for years undergoing unimaginable stress and demoralization from near constant shelling, hunger, cold, and the despair of losing friends and comrades would lay down their war weary arms. The last major chapter of the Italian Front occurred on October 23, 1918, in which finally a massive Italian artillery barrage accompanied by an equally formidable offensive finally routed the Austro-Hungarian army forcing an armistice on November 3rd, 1918.

World War One displayed loss of life and unimaginable suffering not yet seen in the course of human history. Despite the inconceivable numbers of men, animals, and materials lost the Italian theatre remains to this day one of the more obscure fronts as ultimately it became yet another stalemate in which old fashioned commanders ordered suicidal charges indifferent to the casualty rates just as on the more famous Western Front. The major difference being the terrain in which the soldiers fought. Instead of the mud in Flanders tit was the snows of the Alps where countless numbers of young men from all over Europe fought, died, and now rest under the placid valleys and dazzling peaks of one of the most beautiful corners of the continent.

What do you think of the Italian front in World War One? Let us know below.

Sources

Websites 

Siachen dispute: India and Pakistan’s glacial fight - BBC News

Caporetto, Battle of | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1) (1914-1918-online.net)

Books 

Gooch, John: The Italian Army and The First World War Cambridge University Press

Macdonald John: Caporetto And The Isonzo Campaign and Sword Military 

Thompson Mark The White War Life and Death on The Italian Front 1915-1919 Basic Books 

Sweet Home Chicago: Migration and Music in Post-War America

The music of early post-war America has become synonymous with one style: Rock ‘n’ Roll. However, it was The Blues that was key in creating Rock ‘n’ Roll. Here, Matt Austin looks at migration and music in post-war America.

Muddy Waters in 1978. Source: Jean-Luc Ourlin, available here.

It is one of the great narratives of American History: The post-war boom. Following the Second World War, the United States enjoyed rapid, almost limitless, economic development. With Europe reeling from the devastation of war, the United States industrialised quickly to respond to the demand for wartime production. It therefore found itself in a far stronger economic position than prior to the war, to the extent that it was able to pull itself out of the Great Depression, which had ravaged the country throughout the 1930s.

As outlined by Sarah Pruitt, factory production, which had proven to be essential to the war effort, quickly mobilized for peacetime, rising to the needs of consumers.(1) This newfound ability to produce on a mass scale contributed to a post-war boom that was entirely consumer driven. Those who had saved money during the war now had an unprecedented amount of expendable income and as such, the opportunity to purchase affordable houses, cars, clothes and leisure activities, including of course, records.

The music of early post-war America has become largely inseparable with one style: Rock ‘n’ Roll.(2) The rise of Rock ‘n’ Roll and its youth revolution has come to dominate the narrative surrounding the development of music in this period. However, it is often overlooked that it was in fact a different genre that experienced an incredible transition, incorporating styles that would later feed into the vastly more popular Rock ‘n’ Roll: The Blues.

The Blues

As is a frequent consequence of wartime, an increased demand for production results in an increased demand for labour. This was certainly true of the Second World War in the United States, with a large increase in rural to urban migration, most notably among African Americans. This took place against the backdrop of The Great Migration, a period between 1910 and 1970 in which 6 million African Americans moved from the rural South to urban centres in the Northeast, Midwest and West.(3) The demand for labour created by the First World War had initially resulted in considerable spikes in migration,(4) whilst the Second World War created a “second wave” of wartime migration, in which a further influx of migrants moved north seeking to ditch the fields for the factories.(5) Isabel Wilkerson identifies the importance of this decision, noting that: “it was the first time that the nation’s servant class ever took without asking.”(6)

The African Americans who made the trip carried with them what little belongings they had, but more importantly than possessions, they brought a culture that had been cultivated in the rural South. With it they brought their “outdoor” music to urban centres, such as New York or Chicago.(7) These cities subsequently saw a huge rise in street performers, with many notable Bluesmen beginning their careers busking on street corners, such as the Mississippi born influence of the Rolling Stones, Jimmy Reed. It is important to note, however, that the big city was not a complete unknown to Southern Blues musicians of the early 20th Century. For musicians during this time, it was expected, as was industry standard, that records were to be made in the North, with many performers having to make the pilgrimage to record in Chicago or New York, among them “Father of the Delta Blues,” Charley Patton. This northern exposure even extends to the fact that the seminal 1928 recording “It’s Tight Like That” by Georgian born Tampa Red, is often referred to as the first “city” blues, with its style anticipating much of what would follow in later decades.(8)

Difference

Nevertheless, there was however something different about the Blues of the post-war era. Even Tampa Red’s style, although ahead of its time, had a distinct rural quality. The post-war Blues was new, exciting, and revolutionary. These are characteristics it owes to one word: amplification. It is not certain how or when the decision was made to transition from acoustic from electric guitar, but it was a seamless, almost overnight phenomenon, as if the guitarists of the North woke up in the morning and decided to go electric. Francis Davis suggests that the amplification and big beat added to the Blues of the post-war era may have been a necessary response to the roar of the big city.(9) Muddy Waters, upon his arrival in Chicago in 1943, was one such musician to quickly make the transition from acoustic to electric, reasoning that “couldn’t nobody hear you with an acoustic”, against the overpowering noise in the city’s overcrowded clubs.(10)

This created an ever-growing disparity between the music of the rural South and its harder, faster, rougher contemporary in the urban North. What marked this emerging style as clearly different to its elders lay with the increased urgency and flamboyance of its guitar playing.(11) Possibly the greatest example of this can be heard in Elmore James’ 1951 hit, “Dust My Broom”. A tribute to his Delta predecessor Robert Johnson’s 1937, “I believe I’ll Dust My Broom”, in adopting an electric guitar and a slide, Elmore James unknowingly went on to create one of the famous riffs in The Blues.(12) Despite being recorded in Mississippi, James’ version has become emblematic of big city Chicago Blues and more importantly as a symbol of the transition from acoustic to electric, from rural to urban. Only a mere fourteen years separate these songs, yet they sound worlds apart.

Unlike many of his contemporaries, Elmore James was not one of the quarter million African Americans to migrate to Chicago in the 1940s. Rather, upon completing his military service during the war, he returned home to Mississippi. Following early success with a handful of hits, he followed the music and made the move north in the early 1950s. His legacy has endured as a founding influence on the Chicago Blues scene and it is clear why, when listening to the up-tempo, heavy beat of his 1961 “Shake Your Money Maker”, for example. He may have had his start in the delta, but like many of his contemporaries, his style heralded in a new era of popular music; a new era of African American culture.

The Blues is a genre that takes its influence from the everyday troubles faced throughout life. However, one of the most surprising elements of the post-war Blues is an incredible lack of reference to its musician’s surroundings in the industrial North. Despite its new and upbeat style, the music of artists such as Muddy Waters was evocative not of a day spent working in the train yards and factories, but of one in the fields.(13) Guitar mentor Lynwood Perry notes that the Blues of the North was played to dance to, but the Blues of the South possessed a deeper message, telling of the many troubles in life.(14) Where the post-war northern blues truly stand out, is that it ultimately contained elements of both. Not only did it rely on a fast-paced pounding style that would lay the groundwork for Rock ‘n’ Roll, it also had a nostalgic quality to it, an echo of the Southern Country Blues on which many of its artists had been raised. No track better exemplifies this than Muddy Waters’ 1948, “I Can’t Be Satisfied”, with the B-side, “I Feel Like Going Home.” The latter track, with its rather unsubtle title, sent those who listened to the record back home to Mississippi, if only symbolically.(15) This was, in fact, as suggested by Davis, as close to a return trip as many African Americans would have wanted to take.(16) It is certainly true that life was better to Northern migrants than those in the southern states, a notion long held before the Second World War. Giles Oakley states that many compared the pilgrimage North to the Flight Out of Egypt.(17) This homage to the bible would present the North as the Promised Land, an opportunity to escape racial segregation and intimidation in the South.

Tough life

Life in the North however, was not easy. Muddy Waters, despite possessing a highly trained ear and a knack for the guitar, had made the journey for work. And for a black uneducated southerner in 1940s Chicago this meant one thing: hard, manual labour. He possessed no illusions as to his chances of music stardom, and whilst he may have held such fantasies deep in the back of his mind, he ultimately took the first job he could find at a train yard. This was, after all, the last era of American popular music in which its stars were neither youthful, or naïve. They had experienced largely ‘normal lives’ up until that point, as the early Chicago Bluesmen had, after all, moved north for opportunities, and whilst they would certainly have been confident in their abilities (why else would Muddy have packed his guitar?), they were under no illusion that success was not guaranteed.

This is in no way to belittle the efforts of those breaking into the music world in the following decades, a feat that has and will be never be easy. However, the few months spent by Elvis Presley as a truck driver, or George Harrison as an electrician cannot compare to years spent in the fields and factories. This is what arguable gave the big city Blues its distinct, inexhaustible style.

The Second World War modernised America and its musical styles. The Blues was especially not immune to change as a consequence, the transition from field to factory made the slow country blues of the rural South seem even further detached from the pounding electric blues of the urban North. It was the war that brought them there, and the likes of Muddy Waters and Howlin’ Wolf carried with them not only their guitars on their backs, but also the dream of a better life. They took their early influences and adapted them to the harsh backdrop of the urban North and like the cities they now called home, the Blues became fast-paced, loud, and most importantly, inescapable. They were the country’s first Rock stars, a statement that is inclined to make the most devout Blues fans wince, but the decision to amplify the sound of the rural South in the urban North would ultimately place the Blues on a rapid, irreversible path towards its sudden explosion as Rock ‘n’ Roll, the phenomenon that would change the face of American popular music.

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

1 Sarah Pruitt, “The Post World War II Boom: How America Got Into Gear,” History, accessed 12/08/22, https://www.history.com/news/post-world-war-ii-boom-economy#:~:text=After%20years%20of%20wartime%20rationing,war%20to%20peace%2Dtime%20production.&text=Collection%2FGetty%20Images-,After%20years%20of%20wartime%20rationing%2C%20American%20consumers%20were%20ready%20to,war%20to%20peace%2Dtime%20production.

2 Robert Palmer, “The 50s: A Decade of Music That Changed the World”, Rolling Stones, accessed 12/08/22, https://www.rollingstone.com/feature/the-50s-a-decade-of-music-that-changed-the-world-229924/.

3 “The Great Migration (1910-1970)”, African American Heritage, National Archives, accessed 12/08/22, https://www.archives.gov/research/african-americans/migrations/great-migration.

4 “America: The Story Of Us”, Episode 8: Boom, History, 2010, accessed 12/08/22.

5 Mike Evans, The Blues: A Visual History (Atglen: Schiffer Publishing, 2014), 82.

6 Ibid, 83.

7 Bruce Conforth and Gayle Dean Wardlow, Up Jumped the Devil: The Real Life of Robert Johnson (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2019), 240.

8 Francis Davis, The History of the Blues: The Roots, The Music, The People (Boston: De Capo Press, 1995), 138.

9 Ibid, 181

10 Ibid, 179.

11 Ibid, 198-199

12 Gerard Herzhaft, Encyclopedia of The Blues (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1992), 442.

13 Davis, The History of the Blues, 181.

14 Evans, The Blues: A Visual History, 14.

15 Davis, The History of the Blues, 180

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid, 180-181.

The Red Menace – Britain’s Communist Scare of the 1920s

Three decades before McCarthyism made its name in the USA, Britain experienced her own version of a “Red Scare” in the 1920s. The British press and the Conservative Party went through strenuous efforts to convince the British public that the Bolsheviks were trying to gain a foothold in Britain and advance the Communist cause. Steve Prout explains.

UK Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald with Christian Rakovsky, Head of the Soviet diplomatic delegation, in 1924.

Post War Britain

The political demographics in Britain had changed in the interwar years. The electorate had expanded to include all males under the age of twenty-one. Many had fought in the war and were returning home to a land promised “fit for heroes” which did not materialise. All women over thirty were now eligible to vote for the first time.

These changes had made their impacts on the long-established two-party dominance of the Liberals and Conservatives in British politics as the Labour had now emerged as a credible political party. They began their first government in 1924 much to the surprise of everybody even the party itself. Alarmists were claiming that socialism was gaining a damaging foothold consequently were opening the doors to Bolshevism. The right wing-controlled media would try to ensure the public believed that this was the reality.

The economy was now becoming under pressure and the post war boom was starting to wane exacerbating already tense industrial relations. Strikes were regular and union membership was growing. The mining industry was feeling the adverse effects of competition from the German and Polish mines who had now challenged British exports in the European market. It gave further concern to the already nervous Conservatives

Socialism was new to the British and its intention were not completely understood. Being as the Russian Revolution was still fresh in people’s minds the combined efforts of the press and Conservatives would blow the picture out of all proportion, but what was happening in Britain was as remote as it could get from the recent events that happened in the USSR.

The Conservative and the First Labour Government

The success of the Labour Party’s first election victory that came as a surprise to everybody including the Labour Party itself and so began this fabrication. The Conservatives stirred up anti Soviet hysteria that they could connect to the Labour Party and thus damage their image. They had plenty of material to exploit and mould into the fearful image they wanted to project. This is what we would call today “Fake news” but it did have its effect.

The new Labour Government immediately attracted unflattering quotes and Churchill, true to literary form, offered no restraint himself by announcing that “The enthronement of a socialist government is a serious national misfortune”; elsewhere on the same topic the Chairman of the Leeds and Yorkshire Bank clearly expecting a blooded coup stated, “now is the time for unflinching courage.” Their fears were completely unfounded.

Labour in fact kept to the mainstream path of politics and the status quo of British politics remained unviolated. By the time Labour had achieved office the members that were of a Trade Union affiliation comprised less than half (98 out of 191). Furthermore their membership was no longer exclusively working class - middle and upper classes had also joined their ranks. For a myriad of reasons many viewed old guard politicians as the reason for the cause of the Great War which still remained unforgiven and left deep scars in every village and town in Britain.

Another subtle fact also ignored by the antagonists was that Labour also actively avoided recruiting communists into their ranks, a fact the press chose to overlook. Only two MPs, Walther Newbold and Shapurji Saklatvala, for a short amount of time were on the benches in the House of Commons. The former quickly lost his seat and his enthusiasm from communist ideals. In fact, they repeatedly refused Communism in both the Party and the Trades Union Congress.

Even if Labour were a radical party, they did not command a majority in Government to bring any change about as they depended on the support of the Liberals to vote in their favour in the House of Commons. The reality was Labour also lacked experience, and the economic and political picture of this period was one that required stability not radicalism so in effect they were realists. As MacDonald would remark they were “in office but not in power. “

Labour’s early recognition of the USSR in 1924 created another furore. So did the financial negotiations on trade that ensued but came to no fruition. The Labour Government in fact showed no favouritism to the USSR. The talks of a loan to the Soviet Union were subject to certain conditions, one being the satisfaction of the war debt owed to Britain. There was an idea of opening British goods to the Soviet market that would help Britain’s floundering economy. There was nothing in these negotiations to indicate a blossoming friendship.

Much to the media’s silent disappointment, there would be no socialist revolution.

The Russian Revolution and its aftermath

The USSR was still augmenting its post revolution position and was far too weak economically and militarily to even consider further communist expansion beyond its borders. She was still recovering from losing a succession of wars with Poland where she ceded ninety percent of her lucrative industrial lands. She was isolated with no dependable allies, the exception being the Rapallo Treaty with her former and future adversary, Germany.

This did not stop the British press - it was determined to manufacture a threat and another opportunity came along in the form of a fake document called the Zinoviev letter purported to be from Moscow ordering underground communist sedition in Britain. It coincidentally appeared and was published while MacDonald’s first Labour government was in office. The incident was more akin to a damp fuse than a major incident. Taylor terms it “a puzzle of no historical importance” and it did not actually cause the demise of the first Labour Party. Its authenticity was questioned by the King himself, but it did not reach the public ear and it would have been too late for his words to have any impact.

Internally the USSR had a multitude of problems meaning her energies had to be focused on these issues, namely the famines which resulted in Lenin appealing for help from the wider world. Lenin even contemplated on back-pedalling on some of his communist policies to introduce a limited degree of private enterprise to combat the economic devastation. Any talk of worldwide revolution within the ranks in the USSR was purely fanciful words expressed only by the deluded and the wishful thinking idealists. The media had to look elsewhere and further afield that place was in China.

The Chinese Uprisings

In March 1927, another opportunity was seized upon by the media. In Nanjing, China local soldiers began looting the British, US and Japanese embassies in what was known as the Chinese Uprisings; six foreign nationals were killed two of whom were British which resulted in an immediate demand for retribution. The media immediately saw this as tangible evidence of a Red Menace showing its hand and threatening British interests. Meredith Atkinson summed up the anti-Soviet hysteria spread at the time by comparing it with the crusades of previous centuries: “All Holy wars fade into insignificance beside the fanatical Jehad of the Red International.” This was an exaggeration.

The Comintern (a Soviet backed international organisation founded in 1919 to expedite the spread of communism) was no tangible threat anywhere and it played little part in the unrest in China. The disquiet was more down to Britain’s application of her imperialism that resulted in unequal commercial and trading terms. Nationalistic fervor rather than any communist intent was the underlying driving force all along and Britain was seeing this grow in her possessions around the globe, namely Iraq, India, Ireland, and Egypt. The truth was that the British failed to recognize the changing times and an Empire that was becoming untenable to maintain.

The typical British response was to use force to re-impose their authority as they did in Iraq and Ireland failing to realise that their own heavy-handed suppressive ways did nothing to calm the discontent or arrest the Empire’s decline - if anything it accelerated it.

The Home Front and the aftermath of the General Strike

The judiciary, law enforcement and the government all but abused their positions to suppress any communist presence or opinions. Britain had only recently become a proper more inclusive democracy in the early part of the century with expanding the electorate, but it appeared people could still be persecuted for their political beliefs if it were not palatable with the newly elected Conservatives.

The Home Secretary William Joynson-Hicks whom HG Wells described at the time one as somebody who “represents the absolute worst element in British political life” was particularly energetic in these endeavours. Hicks was renowned for his ruthless persecution of members of the British Communist Party. In 1925 he would be instrumental in the imprisonment of twelve individuals just based on their political beliefs, one of who was Harry Pollit, the General Secretary of the British Communist Party.

This antipathy was evident in his early political career when he called Kier Hardie a “leprous traitor.”  Hickson was a strange and contradictory individual who on the one hand was a firm supporter of the female vote but on the other could discard democratic ideals.

The General Strike of 1926 for all its grand scale and disruption only resulted in four thousand arrests out of millions of strikers. There was minimal property damage and Churchill's forebodings of mass violent action and sedition failed to happen as only a thousand of those arrested served a prison sentence. The strike was unsuccessful and did not require the use of any governmental emergency powers. The desire revolution never existed in mind or body of the people or the strikers, but this did not stop Churchill trying his best in being typically provocative by labelling British workingmen as the enemy. Bellicose and true to form he used a newly founded British Gazette to loudly promote this distorted view. His attitude during the strike was one of a minister being on a war footing and demanding an “unconditional surrender” of the strikers rather than seeing it as a genuine protest with genuine grievances and concerns

Attitudes in 1925 emanating from the Trade Unions were about negotiation, as AJP Taylor remarked, and were not about Bolshevism. Incidents of striking by 1925 were only a tenth of what they were in 1921, further pointing to evidence that any intensity was diluted. Most union leaders did not see class war as a tool for change. The old class arguments were outdated and were replaced by more progressive attitudes. Ernest Bevin in fact wanted to work with the employers to bring change.  The press of course continued its antagonistic line unnecessarily.

Conclusion

The Red Menace incident was an isolated piece of British history that was forgotten amid the headlining events that shook Europe between the two world wars and the. It is interesting and frightening how the British government could easily meander around the judicial and democratic ideals to deal with opposing political views for a threat that was essentially contrived by themselves.

Had this have been a decade later in the 1930s then there would have been some justification for a Red Menace as the USSR executed its purges, intervened in Spain, and allied itself to the Nazi Regime in 1939. Even so, this does not excuse the political suppression at home or abroad.

The inter war years do have their interesting aspects as we see how Britain came to terms with the changes following the First World War and how she behaved in the build up to the second.

What do you think of Britain’s 1920s communist scare? Let us know below.

Now, read Steve’s article on Britain’s relationship with the European dictators in the inter-war years here.

References

Ariane Knusel -British Conservatives, the Red Menace and Anti-Foreign agitation in China 1924-1927 – Cultural History 2013- Edinburgh University Press

AJP Taylor – English History 1914-1945 – Oxford University Press

Extracts from Chronicles of the Twentieth Century – Longman -1987

Jonathan Dimbleby -Barbarossa: How Hitler Lost the War – Penguin Books 2021

Collaboration: The Foreign Forces who helped to build the Japanese Empire

During the 1930s and into World War 2, the Japanese Empire was expanding its reach. Here. Felix Debieux returns and looks at five foreign forces who helped the Japanese from China, Myanmar/Burma, indigenous Taiwanese people, Inner Mongolia, and India.

Wang Jingwei, leader of the Reorganized Government of the Republic of China.

While domination is a core aspect of all empires, most empire builders would not have succeeded without establishing collaborative links with the populations they aimed to subjugate. The Roman Empire, for instance, closely collaborated with local elites who effectively did the Empire’s dirty work. Likewise, the establishment of collaborative relations with indigenous elites formed a vital part of the maintenance of the British Empire. Meanwhile, historians have tended to locate people’s responses to Nazi domination on a scale between outright resistance at one pole, and active collaboration at the other. While the reasons for collaborating are very broad – opportunism, coercion, necessity, ideology – the fact remains that all empires have relied on at least some degree of collaboration.

The Japanese Empire is no exception to this rule. Indeed, even before the decision was taken to bomb Pearl Harbour, intelligence officers across the Empire had been working hard to cultivate links with nationalists, freedom fighters and independence movements who Tokyo thought could help realise its expansionist objectives. To the people of Asia, Japan propagated an image of itself at the helm of a so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere – an imagined bloc of self-sufficient Asian nations freed from the shackles of the Western powers. Like all empires which came before it, Japan found that there were collaborators across the continent who were willing to fight under the banner of the Rising Sun in hopes of one day achieving independence. At the same time, Japan learned quickly that its outnumbered military would have to rely on collaborators for policing, guard duty, insurgency, infiltration and for sheer manpower in some of the war’s most important operations.

The five examples provided here are by no means exhaustive. However, they are enough to illustrate the key role which collaborators played in Japan’s war effort.

Collaborationist Chinese Army

It might come as a surprise to learn that China, the country that perhaps suffered the most under Tokyo’s expansionism, provided the largest contribution of soldiers to the Japanese Empire. The origin of these collaborationist forces can be traced back to as early as 1937, when the occupying Japanese established local police and fighting forces to tighten their hold over the country. By 1940, these were combined into what was formally known as the Reorganized Government of the Republic of China under Wang Jingwei. A long-term rival of China’s generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Wang is typically remembered as a traitor of the anti-Japanese resistance – and not without good reason.

On March 30, 1940, Wang became the head of state for the Reorganised National Government. Later that year, Wang’s puppet government signed the “Sino-Japanese Treaty”, which contained a wide range of economic, political and military concessions. This collaborationist relationship was solidified when Wang visited Tokyo in June 1941, where he gave a public radio address. Wang’s broadcast praised the Japanese Empire, pledged to support Japan’s fight against communism and Western imperialism, criticised the government of Chiang Kai-shek and, crucially, affirmed China’s subordination to Japan.

In terms of military support, the new collaborationist Chinese army had by 1943 pledged forty-three divisions – approximately 500,000 men – to the Japanese Empire. Of the 500,000, the only men which Japan considered reliable and combat-ready were those assigned to Wang’s 30,000 strong guard division, and the army of his close associate, Zhou Fohai. Most of the collaborationist forces fell under the command of former warlords, whose loyalty was doubted by both Wang and his Japanese overlords. As such, they were not provided with expensive modern weaponry, and they were trusted with only a limited role in the war effort. Indeed, the bulk of the collaborationist soldiers found themselves assigned to anti-partisan operations or to the defence of military installations. While unglamorous, this had the benefit of freeing up Japanese forces and enabling them to carry out offensive operations elsewhere.

What became of the collaborationist Chinese forces? Very few units remained loyal to the fragile Reorganised National Government, which was unable to survive the surrender of its Japanese master in 1945. Among those which continued to serve the government were the Central Military Academy cadets, who attempted to fortify Nanjing before internal skirmishes broke out. Most of the collaborationist units, however, peacefully surrendered to – and eventually joined - Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist Kuomintang forces. Some would even go on to distinguish themselves during the Chinese Civil War.

Burmese National Army

Unlike China, the Japanese Empire paid little attention to Burma before 1940. This changed, however, when Staff Officer Keiji Suzuki was given the task of devising Japan’s strategy for South East Asia. Suzuki would later come to be known as the “Japanese Lawrence of Arabia” for his advocacy of Burmese independence from the British Empire. This reputation began in 1940, when he convinced the nationalist Aung San to allow Japan to train his followers for espionage and guerrilla warfare. On 28th December 1941, the Burmese Independence Army was officially founded and aided the Japanese conquest of the region. The army played an important role in rallying support from the local Burmese population, its numbers swelling to 23,000 men by May 1942.

As the Japanese experienced in China, foreign auxiliaries could be of questionable effectiveness. Indeed, the Burmese Independence Army was disorganised, lacked experience, and had not been trained for regular warfare. Its soldiers not only committed atrocities against Indian forces and Burma’s ethnic minority groups, but they also suffered heavy casualties in their struggle against the British Army. Furthermore, the army proved difficult for the Japanese to control once its goal of independence had been achieved.

Indeed, in August 1943 the campaign against the British ended and Burma declared itself an independent nation. Almost immediately, tensions boiled between Tokyo and Burma’s nationalists over the question of independence. Aung San now commanded more than 15,000 trained and well-equipped light infantry under the newly reconstituted Burmese National Army, but was dissatisfied with the limited sovereignty granted to Burma by the Japanese. Not wanting to back a losing side, Aung San opened independence talks with the British which ultimately led to a merger with Allied forces. When in March 1945 the Burmese National Army was ordered to confront the Allied advance into central Burma, the time had come to switch sides. The National Army rallied yet another nation-wide rebellion, turning against their Japanese occupiers by cutting off supply lines and seizing control of huge swathes of territory. Just as Japan had used Burmese forces to weaken the British, Aung San used the Japanese in his country’s struggle for independence, abandoning the alliance when it no longer suited his goals.

Takasago Volunteers

Not to be confused with ethnic Chinese Taiwanese volunteers, the Takasago were indigenous Taiwanese peoples recruited into the Imperial Japanese Army. Also known as Taiwanese aborigines, the Takasago had been the target of a Japanese policy of cultural assimilation ever since Taiwan’s annexation in 1894. Of great interest to the Japanese was the deployment of the Takasago in the tropical and sub-tropical regions of South East Asia, sweltering conditions seen as more suited to the hunter-gather culture of the Takasago than their Japanese counterparts. Indeed, the Takasago volunteers were renowned for their jungle survival abilities, and training therefore focused on insurgency, infiltration, demolitions, camouflage, and guerrilla warfare more generally.

In the build-up to the Second World War, the Japanese military recruited somewhere in the range of 1,800 to 5,000 young men from friendly indigenous groups. Initially, the Takasago were assigned to transport and supply units. However, the gradual deterioration of Japanese forces necessitated an increasingly important role for the Takasago. Indeed, volunteers were deployed across the frontlines of the Pacific theatre. In the Dutch East Indies, the Solomon Islands, New Guinea and the Philippines, units made up entirely of Takasago volunteers served with distinction in ferocious clashes with the Allies.

One particularly notable contribution of the Takasago to the Japanese war effort was a daring suicide attack on a US landing strip in Leyte, Philippines, which consisted of fifteen officers and forty-five enlisted Takasago volunteers. The greatest embodiment of Takasago bravery and dedication, however, surely belongs to Teruo Nakamura. Nakamura goes down in history as the last soldier of the Japanese Empire to formally surrender in 1974. Incredibly, Nakamura spent almost twenty solitary years in the jungles of Indonesia, before being lured out of hiding by searchers who waved the Japanese flag and sang the country’s national anthem.

Inner Mongolian Army

Among the earliest supporters of the Japanese Empire were the nationalists of Inner Mongolia. Their relationship with the Japanese can be traced back to the 1920s, and to talks which followed the Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1932. Believing that an alliance was the surest way to secure his people's freedom from China, the ambitious Prince Demchugdongrub elected to side with the Japanese. In 1939, Demchugdongrub was rewarded with leadership over the puppet state of Mengjiang. Eventually, however, the prince had little choice but to submit to the incorporation of Inner Mongolia into the Japanese-run Reorganised Government of China. Submission to China, even to a China dominated by Japan, must surely have pained the prince. Given the historic poor performance of Mongol troops, however, Demchugdongrub had no choice but to acquiesce.

Indeed, it is doubtful the Mongol army could have broken free of Chinese rule without Japanese backing. In 1936, for example, Demchugdongrub suffered a catastrophic defeat in an ill-conceived attempt to expand into northern China. Heavy casualties were suffered again during a joint Japanese-Mongol offensive at the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War just a year later. Despite being reorganised several times, the effectiveness of the Mongol army was extremely limited. By 1945, the army consisted of four light infantry divisions, two calvary divisions and three Chinese brigades totalling 10,000 men. Yet a lack of training and modern equipment hindered the army’s combat readiness and manoeuvrability. It had no mobile or heavy weaponry, and was armed with only a pitifully small stock of field artillery, light machine guns, and antiquated rifles. Unable to serve as much more than an auxiliary force, the Mongol army met its end when in 1945 the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, brushing aside the few units which tried to resist.

Indian National Army

Distinct among Japan’s auxiliaries is the experience of the Indian National Army. Unlike the territories ruled (directly and indirectly) by Tokyo, the Japanese Empire did not conquer India, and did not envision the Indian subcontinent as part of its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan, however, could not ignore the fact that Britain’s resistance to its territorial ambitions depended heavily on Indian soldiers. Nor could Japan pass up the opportunity to undermine Britain’s presence in South East Asia by supporting various factions of Indian nationalists.

Prior to 1941, Japanese intelligence officers made contact with Indian nationalists exiled in Thailand. Once British resistance in Burma and Malaya had crumbled, a campaign was launched to recruit Indian POWs. Simultaneously, Japan raised an Indian National Army under the command of Mohan Singh, and established a Bangkok-based Indian Independence League under the Bengali Rash Behari Bose. Unfortunately for Japan, the League was reluctant to take direct military action against Britain without an explicit order from the Indian National Congress. While this was no doubt a setback for Japan, the League was not the only influence it held over Indian nationalism.

One such influence was Japan’s relationship with the radical nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose, whose anti-British credentials were well-known to the Japanese. Indeed, the nationalist returned to Asia from Nazi Germany in 1943 having helped the Wehrmacht to establish the “Tiger Legion”, a force of around 4,500 Indian POWs and expatriates in Europe intended to topple British rule in India. Bose came to terms with the Japanese, and declared the independence of a Singapore-based Provisional Government of Free India in October 1943. The army at its command consisted of three lightly armed infantry divisions totalling approximately 40,000 men. A small number of volunteers were even sent to Japan for aviation training.

In terms of service, the Indian National Army participated in the 1944 Indian Offensive, one of the last major Japanese offensives of the Second World War aimed at the Brahmaputra Valley. While the army’s 1st and 2nd divisions saw heavy fighting in Arakan and Imphal, their wider objective – to advance into the Northern Indian Plains and spark a guerrilla conflict – did not have the desired effect. An anticipated mass defection of Indian soldiers serving the British Empire never took place, and the Japanese offensive was eventually pegged back. Nevertheless, the Indian National Army continued to fight alongside the Japanese in Burma until the end of the Second World War.

What do you think of the foreign forces who helped the Japanese Empire? Let us know below.

Now read Felix’s article on Top Secret World War 2: Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany and their Submarine Trade Missions here.

Further reading

Fighting for the Empire – Meet Japan’s Foreign Volunteers of WW2, Florian Heydorn, 2019.

Rays of the Rising Sun: Armed Forces of Japan's Asian allies, 1931-45. Volume 1: China and Manchuko, Philip S. Jowett, 2001.

Collaborators with Imperial Japan, Wikipedia.

Collaborators and National Memory: The Creation of the Encyclopedia of Pro-Japanese Collaborators in Korea, Jeong-Chul Kim and Gary Fine, 2013.

The Imperial Japanese Army’s Takasago Volunteers, Glenn Barnett.

Collaborationist Chinese Army.

The Forgotten Army: India's Armed Struggle for Independence 1942-1945, Peter Ward Fay, 1994.

Burma Independence Army.

The Puppet Masters – How Japan’s Military Established a Vassal State in Inner Mongolia, Florian Heydorn, 2017.

Resistance and Collaboration in Hitler's Empire, Vesna Drapac and Gareth Pritchard, 2017.

How the US Misjudged Fidel Castro: Part 4 - What the US Got Wrong

At the moment of Fidel Castro's triumphant entry into Havana, Cuba on January 9, 1959, the charismatic revolutionary leader was a relatively unknown quantity. Many are surprised to discover that Castro at first enjoyed much popular support in this country. Early reports on the rebel leader featured positive, if sometimes guarded, reactions. Even Ed Sullivan, America’s premier show man, got caught up in the excitement. He journeyed to Cuba himself to interview the victorious rebel leader shortly after the latter’s entry into Havana. He was but one of myriad journalists who descended on Cuba to cover the exciting changes in the island.

In this series, Victor Gamma returns and considers how the US misjudged Fidel Castro. Part 1 on Castro before the revolution is here, part 2 on Fidel taking power is here, and part 3 on Fidel going to the US is here. Here, we look at what the US got wrong in its assessment of Castro, including how Castro waited until he consolidated power and the role of the US media.

Fidel Castro at the UN General Assembly in 1960.

How can we explain the failure of US intelligence to correctly assess the threat? Some, such as Earl Smith, blamed the State Department and the CIA. Later he wrote a book about his Cuben experience called The Fourth Floor. By “Fourth Floor” he meant the upper-level officials who determined US foreign policy. He accused them of the mindset “better a leftist dictator than Batista.” Thus, according to Smith, they took no proactive measures to prevent someone like Castro coming to power.

The CIA. indeed, were the nation’s first line of defense. The CIA is the organization supposed to analyze present and potential threats to US national security including threats to the Western Hemisphere. Especially, they would prevent the Soviet Union from gaining any foothold in this hemisphere and any Marxist regime from taking root.  According to the CIA 

“ … it is demonstrable that the Agency was far more perceptive than the policy-making bodies in recognizing the threat to the Western Hemisphere posed by Castro’s communist affiliation.” And, yet, instead of the CIA, it was many other individuals, such as Earl Smith, various Cuban politicians and some American who in the early days tried to alert about the dangers of Castro. According to Ambassador Smith, the CIA underestimated the communist threat in Cuba. He asked the agency to re-check its estimate of communist party strength in Cuba. However, he found that the Chief of the CIA attached to the embassy was more of a hindrance than a help. He found him so sympathetic to Castro that Smith would sometimes call him a Fidelista, only half in jest. The Chief of the Central American Bureau of the CIA visited Smith did share fears of the communist threat in Cuba but did not consider Castro himself to be a communist. Why did Earl Smith come to a different conclusion than the CIA: namely that Castro was dangerous - while the CIA wallowed in indecisiveness? It must be noted that the Kirkpatrick fact-finding mission was sponsored by Bacardi Rum with the goal of reducing American worries about Castro and his movement. Their interest was to maintain investment and business. It could be that the Kirkpatrick mission did not WANT to find out that he was a dangerous and unstable extremist. Smith had no such agenda. His goal was to determine if Castro was an acceptable alternative to Batista or not.

Additionally, evidence indicates that Castro was not an inflexible ideologue. He was first and foremost intent on maintaining the revolution and his own control. He ultimately decided the best way to accomplish this was to move the Island in the direction of hard-line communism. Within weeks after Castro’s return to Cuba, communists were openly serving in the Cuban government.

Waiting game

Before his power was consolidated, however, he found it expedient to keep any such tendencies quiet. Instead, he played a clever waiting game, introducing communist reforms and elevating communists to power gradually. He had used this strategy before. When fighting Batista’s troops, he once called for a truce as a mere ploy to buy time. A part of this long-term strategy was to keep his true intentions under the radar until he was strong enough. On his first visit to the US he purposefully brought along some officials whose views matched those of Eisenhower. This was a mere subterfuge. As was later shown, he never intended to allow these men any influence. He kept his distance from the Cuban Communist Party (Partido Socialista Popular) and downplayed the importance of communists in his movement. Castro was well aware of the CIA coup in Guatemala that had toppled President Jacobo Árbenz and replaced him with Trujillo. The Caracas Resolution also led Castro to exercise caution. This declaration firmly condemned communism and expressed a determination “to eradicate and prevent subversive activities” in the Western Hemisphere. Castro did not want to give the US any excuse to try a similar intervention in Cuba against him.

Furthermore, many people simply took Castro at his word. They took Castro’s reassuring statements of democratic liberalism at face value and based their support on these and their own idealistic aspirations. Despite Castro’s efforts to distance himself from communists, his actions during the anti-Batista struggle displayed unmistakable signs of extremist tendencies that should have informed US policy. They may have been more perceptive than policy-makers but they were, in hindsight, less perceptive than a number of Cuban leaders and the US ambassador Earl Smith. A more telling approach should have been based on his actions. For example, Castro repeatedly stated that his goal was a democratic government. But how did he actually treat those guilty of “crimes” against the people? During his years in the Sierra Maestra, he led raids against rich landowners. After a rigged trial they were executed and their lands handed over to the poor. This was not the behavior of a committed believer in constitutional rights but a Marxist dedicated to class-war. These incidents were either unknown or overlooked. Dean Acheson, on meeting him during his visit to the United States, for example, called him “the first democrat of Latin America.” This was a strange judgment coming just weeks after hundreds of Batista’s followers had been executed without a real trial by the in-coming revolutionaries. Others promoted the idea that Castro was an anti-dictator and was not under the influence of the extreme leftists.

Media

Another factor to consider was the media. While government officials fretted over Castro, the American news establishment fell over each other in adoration of him. They cannot be judged too harshly for this, after-all, any reporter worth his salt is looking for one thing: a good story. And here was a real-live bearded, charismatic, fire-breathing revolutionary, clad in combat fatigues, emerging from the mountain jungle to overthrow a powerful dictator. It was irresistible. Herbert Matthews turned him into a celebrity which captured the imagination of many, including some in the CIA. It was the American Society of Newspaper Editors that extended its personal invitation to Castro to visit the United States. All of this helped take eyes off of the disturbing facts of Castro’s actions,ideology and agenda. The guerrilla leader was presented as a champion of liberty, a reasonable person who had his heart in the right place. The great Edward R. Murrow interviewed the Cuban leader with a TV broadcast from Castro’s living room. Castro appeared in his pajamas. His son Fidel was brought out to speak to answer some questions. Expressions of friendliness towards America were expressed. The set looked like a typical middle class home, comfortable and homey, with Castro playing the determined but soft-spoken, doting father. Anyone watching would have a hard time imagining him as a brutal dictator. Ambassador Earl Smith testified to the Department investigation committee that journalists like Herbert Matthews helped to influence US policy in favor of Castro.

Moreover, rivalry within the revolutionary movement may have played a part. Rarely have revolutions been achieved without some infighting. Was it only the scheming of brother Raúl and Che Guevara that forced Castro towards Moscow? The differences between the more pragmatic Fidel, still in the US, and the ideologically-driven Raul and Che resulted in a power-struggle and threatened to split the movement. On April 24 or 25 Fidel and Raúl engaged in a loud argument over a long-distance phone. Raúl was overheard accusing Fidel of “being seduced” by “them.” Fidel made several public comments that risked undermining communist goals. Raúl and Che seethed with indignation and threatened to go their own way. Perhaps realizing that danger, Fidel decided to commit himself more fully to the communist/progressive agenda. Ultimately, he opted to abandon moderation. In December, 1961 he openly proclaimed his communist ideology, “I am a Marxist-Leninist and shall be one until the end of my life,” he proclaimed in a televised speech. While Fidel was in America studiously downplaying communist influence in the revolution or ties with the Soviet Union, both Raúl and Che were aggressively promoting both. As for Fidel, he was not yet ready to formalize ties with the USSR or even associate with the PSP. As late as mid- May 1959 his public utterances brimmed with goodwill and moderation. That May 10, he praised the American people for their “enthusiasm” and understanding of the revolution. He expressed the desire for good relations with all of America and condemned any attempt to export the revolution to other Latin American nations. If Eisenhower had made a serious effort to form an accord with him, some say, history may have turned out differently. This theory overlooks the influence of those like Raul & Che, who would have nothing to do with such an arrangement.

Soon, though, Castro dashed any hopes of normal relations. That July, the Fundamental Law or Original Act 425 made it illegal to oppose the Castro regime. It also gave him dictatorial powers. And yet it was not until March, 1960 that the US determined firmly on a policy of regime change. Although one may argue the rightness or wrongness of the CIA-sponsored coup in 1954 Guatemala, a similar action may have taken place to keep Castro from power if it had been implemented firmly earlier. For example, unlike the case with Arbenz in 1954, there was no skillfully coordinated plan including a serious anti-communist propaganda campaign which could have martialed support against Castro.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the US misjudged Castro because many of those who were in positions of power underestimated the communist threat and failed to read the warning signs about Castro. A large groundswell of support for Castro was allowed to build up. It is now clear that from the moment he came to power, Castro began to steer Cuba in the direction of a communist state, working with both old-time communists and more recent communist colleagues. After 1965, when Cuba became officially communist, Castro remarked several times that it had always been his intention to turn Cuba into a Marxist state. His denials of communism in the early days of the revolution, he claimed, were all a deception. An investigation involving a multitude of interviews revealed, decades after the Revolution, that Castro and his associates built a “hidden” parallel government, readying it to take power when the time was right. The US did not present a united front as to Castro. Those who recognized Castro as a dangerous demagogue vied with those, both in the State Department, the embassy at Havana and the media, that championed his cause. All indications are that Castro never intended to do anything other than establish a dictatorship in Cuba. Unfortunately for Cuba and the World, this reality was recognized too late. 

What do you think of US intelligence’s view about Fidel Castro during his early days in power? Let us know below.

Now read Victor’s series on whether Wernher von Braun was a dangerous Nazi or hero of the space race here.

Sources

Fursenko, Aleksandr  and Naftali, Timothy  One Hell of a Gamble

Krushchev, Castro, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1958-1964,New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997.

Smith, Earl E, The Fourth Floor, An Account of the Castro Communist Revolution. New York: Random House, 1962.

Central Intelligence Agency 1961 Psychiatric Personality Study of Fidel Castro 

https://s3.observador.pt/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Psychiatric-Personality-Study-of-Fidel-Castro.pdf

Dispatch From the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba to the Department of State describing conditions immediately after the fall of Batista, Jan 6-14, 1959.

Dispatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, Havana, September 26, 1958 Subject: 1958 Elections: Electoral Outlook Six Weeks Prior to Elections.

"Myths of the enemy: Castro, Cuba and Herbert l. Matthews of the New York times," Anthony DePalma Working Paper #313 - July 2004

Face the Nation with Fidel Castro, in Cuba broadcast on January 11, 1959.

A Gentile’s View of the History of Modern Israel - 20 Questions & Answers

Modern Israel has had a varied and challenging history since its establishment in 1948. Here, Thomas P. Papageorgiou returns and looks at the State of Israel through 20 questions.

David Ben-Gurion is shown proclaiming the Israeli Declaration of Independence on May 14, 1948.

My country’s (Greece’s) longing for a powerful ally that will help it crash its enemies is a typical characteristic of its modern history. First it was the Russians, during the War of Independence (1821) and then the French, the English, the Soviet-Russians (for the Communists during the 1946 – 1949 civil war), the Americans, the EU etc. This did not come without a price and Greece should eventually learn from its mistakes. In any case the latest trend is Israel. The small but powerful country that has repeatedly crashed its enemies, retains powerful connections to the superpowers and especially the US, has a strong economy with a high-tech defense industry at its core that seems to share with us a common view and common interests in the eastern Mediterranean region. Thus, following my recent interest in modern Greek history, it was a matter of time before I turned my attention to the study of this new ally. This first article summarizes my view of Israel’s modern history in 20 questions with their answers from 20 easy to obtain references.

1. Why did the Jews pursue the creation of the modern State of Israel?

For almost 2,000 years, after their exile from Judea by the Romans in 70 CE, the Jews settled in the Mediterranean basin and elsewhere were often prosecuted as the crusifiers of Jesus Christ. It has been argued, though, that, however the Temple establishment prompted them to do so, it was the Romans that killed Jesus. But, at the time of their expansion, most Christians did not want to be enemies of the Roman Empire and sought to play down the role of the Romans in the story. (MacCulloch, 2009, p. 92) Nevertheless, the demonization of the Jews often had ulterior motives like the confiscation of their belongings or the relief of social tensions because of famine, plague, economic stagnation or other reasons. The last and worst massive prosecution, before the establishment of modern Israel, The Holocaust, was carried out by the Germans during the Second World War. They killed 6,000,000 Jews, one-third of the world’s Jewish population. (Gordis, 2016, p. 3)

Thus, the Jews needed a place, where they would not rely on others for their defence. A place, where the ΄΄new Jew΄΄ would take history in her/his own hands. The establishment of modern Israel is the result of the Jews’ refusal to remain passive, weak, fearful, and huddled over ancient, sacred texts. Of their refusal to be victims on call. (Gordis, 2016, pp. 4-5)

2. What is Zionism?

Zionism was the political movement whose central idea was the Jewish people needed a state, and they could create one. It was launched by Theodor Herzl, with the publication of his book The Jewish State in February 1896. (Gordis, 2016, pp. 22-23)

The Zionist program, drafted during the First Zionist Congress opened in Basel on August 1, 1897, reads as follows:

Zionism seeks to secure for the Jewish people a publicly recognized, legally secured homeland in Palestine …

To achieve this goal, the Congress envisages the following methods:

1. By fostering the settlement of Palestine with farmers, laborers, and artisans.

2. By organizing the whole Jewry in suitable local and general bodies, in accordance with the laws of their respective countries.

3. By strengthening the national Jewish feeling and national consciousness.

4. By taking preparatory steps to attain any Governmental consent which may be necessary to reach the aim of Zionism. (Gordis, 2016, pp. 26-27)

3. Who are the Israelis?

As is evident from the first point of the Zionist program, Israel is built by waves of immigration. It is home to Jews of different colours, Jews of different ethnic backgrounds, Jews who speak different languages, Jews both secular and religious-and many non-Jews as well. (Gordis, 2016, p. 7) In any case, the entire Zionist discourse is based on the idea that Jews are a nation. The difficulty is that when it comes to deciding who does and who does not belong to that nation, religion is the only possible criterion. From the late nineteenth century on, Jews and others have often tried to find some other criterion, whether based on the colour of the people’s hair or on their genes; so far all have failed. (Creveld, 2010, p. 79)   

Israel’s Law of Return defined as Jewish anyone with at least one Jewish grandparent. This is a symbolic overturning of the Nazis’ Nuremberg Laws that used the same definition. (Gordis, 2016, p. 198) When Israel was established in 1948, merely 6 percent of the world’s Jews lived in it; by 2015 that number had grown to almost half of the world’s Jews. (Gordis, 2016, p. 199)

4. How was the Zionism program implemented?

Apart from immigration, Zionism itself had nurtured civil institutions from the period of the Balfour Declaration for ‘… the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, …’ in 1917 (Gordis, 2016, pp. 97-98) to the establishment of Israel in May 1948. The movement had built universities, hospitals, trade unions, banks, a sick fund, a pension system and a proto government, The Jewish Agency. Thus, when the Zionists declared the state, they had already built it. (Ross & Makovsky, 2019, pp. Chapter 1 / 2:26:00 - 2:27:00) Some institutions like the Zionist Organization (1897) or the Jewish National Fund (1901) in charge of buying and developing land in Palestine for Jewish settlement date even before that period. A self-defence force, the Haganah (The Defence), was also created in 1921. (Gordis, 2016, p. 104)

Thanks to the single-minded efforts of one man, Eliezer Ben Yehuda (1858-1922), a common language was established (Creveld, 2010, p. 27) and an early focus on education helped strengthen a national feeling and consciousness, with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem being established in 1925 on land purchased especially for that purpose during World War I. (Creveld, 2010, p. 38) Indeed, at the time of the British Mandate in Palestine six times as many adult Jewish males as Arab ones could read with the Jewish literacy in Palestine being higher than that of several European countries. The number of new Hebrew-language books on the market exceeded that of Arabic ones by a hundred to one, no less. All of the above would be impossible without the moral, political, and economic support of millions of the diaspora Jews (Creveld, 2010, p. 37) among which some of the most respected Jewish families from the Rothschilds down. (Creveld, 2010, p. 32)   

As far as international relations are concerned, the Jewish leaders proved much more flexible during the process that led to the establishment of Israel compared to their Arab counterparts, even if that meant giving up land that they thought was rightfully theirs. (Gordis, 2016, p. see notes in Map 4 & Map 5) This did not mean that they hesitated to take up arms against the British, when deemed necessary, or the armies of their Arab neighbours during the 1947-1949 War of Independence.

5. How was the situation in Israel during the first years after its establishment?

The living standards in Israel, after its establishment in 1948 were low. (Creveld, 2010, p. 88) Hundreds of thousands of Jews from Europe, Africa and the Middle East immigrated to the new state and its population more than doubled by the end of 1951. These were practically penniless Jews (Creveld, 2010, p. 87) in dangerous places or in places where they could not stay. Those who were comfortable did not come. Ben-Gurion was disgusted by the fact that fewer than two thousand came from the United States which had a Jewish population of over five million. (Gordis, 2016, pp. 216-217)

Thus, it is almost impossible to exaggerate Israel’s economic difficulties during its first years. It did not only have to pay for the recent War of Independence, but to somehow finance feeding, housing, and finding employment for hundreds of thousands of mostly penniless, often unskilled, not seldom sick immigrants. A rationing system of twenty-six hundred calories per person per day was instituted (Creveld, 2010, p. 102), much of which was abolished in 1953, although some rationing remained in force until 1959. (Creveld, 2010, p. 104) Large families were squeezed into one bed-room prefabricated flats or into tiny houses that dotted the countryside. Schools, public transport, and medical services were rudimentary. (Creveld, 2010, p. 88) Anything with an electric motor in it, such as cars, was defined as luxury. The same applied to electronic equipment, such as television sets (that remained rare until the late 1960s), radios, record players tape recorders, and even telephones. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 109-110)

6. How did Israel overcome the initial difficulties?

Reparations payments from West Germany (from 1953 to 1964), that did not come without raising controversy in Israel, played an important role in overcoming the financial difficulties of the newly founded state. By the best available calculations, individual survivors of the Holocaust received about 1.75 billion U.S. dollars and the state received about half as much. The reparations provided significant help in developing shipping, power systems, railways, fishing, and several major industrial plants. They financed 26 percent of all imported Israeli capital goods, 11 percent of imported production factors (mainly fuel) but only 3 percent of consumer goods.

And here lies the rub. Since 1945 numerous so-called developing countries have received foreign assistance, some of it fairly massive. However, too often it has been frittered away – either to buy consumer goods or ending up in rulers’ secret Swiss bank accounts. Several Israeli prime ministers though, died with hardly a penny in their names. Others were very well off, but none became a billionaire (as far as we know) or ended his or her career by having to flee abroad. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 104-105)

Although Israel has neither a written constitution nor a bill of rights (Gordis, 2016, p. 207), its democratic politics (proportional election system) faithfully reflect society and enable it to change without bloodshed (civil war). Not once has Israeli democracy been seriously challenged and no government was ousted by a coup d’ėtat, military or otherwise although retired officers, many of the battle hardened, occupy a large place in the upper echelons of government (Creveld, 2010, pp. 83-84)

In fact, the difficult financial situation of most immigrants and the fact that they were surrounded by hostile neighbours made them adopt socialist and collectivist ways of life. During the 1960s socialism made Israel into a complete welfare state, in many ways even more so than such countries as Labour Britain and Social Democratic Sweden. All this, plus heavy taxation, meant that gaps between rich and poor were smaller than in any other Western country, contributing to social solidarity. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 114-115)

The above helped Israel achieve a very high growth rate of 10 percent annually between 1954 and 1965, ahead even of Germany and Japan. (Creveld, 2010, p. 112) (Gordis, 2016, p. 245) Although most Israelis stuck to the centuries-old Jewish tradition of working in the service sector (Creveld, 2010, p. 106) as early as 1939 they were using more tractors per acre of land than their colleagues in other countries (except in the US) and Jewish yields per acre and per cow were much higher than among their Arab neighbours. (Creveld, 2010, p. 100) In 1960 – 1965 manufacturing also expanded at almost 14 percent annually, focusing on metal, electric, and electronic products as well as textiles. Whereas in 1950 agriculture had accounted for a third of all exports, fifteen years later its share had fallen to about one eighth. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Technion in Haifa, and the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot provided first-class higher education and research facilities to support this growth. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 112-113)  Indeed, education has been important for Israel from the very beginning (also for the assimilation of the Jewish immigrants that flooded the new state) commanding the second largest budget after defence.

7. Did the Israelis show flaws?

The above does not mean that Israelis were perfect. In many ways ‘native Israelis’ treated immigrants by looking down on their culture, discriminating against them, exploiting them economically, and in general lording it over them. (Creveld, 2010, p. 88)

Things were especially difficult for Oriental Jews. Different though they were in many respects, these Jews often encountered a widespread condescending worldview on the part of the European immigrants who had been part of early immigration waves, who had developed the Yishuv (Wikipedia, 2022)  and who were running the country. The issue was not racism. It was a matter of cultural elitism, a genuine belief that European culture was the more developed of the cultures, and that it would be best for the new-born country if that elite culture would be the one that was taught to all. (Gordis, 2016, p. 204)

In some ways the reception given to Holocaust survivors was even worse. One of the prime objectives of Zionism had been to create a new kind of ‘fighting Jew’ – ‘a proud and cruel race’. The very fact that immigrants from Europe had gone through the Holocaust proved that they did not correspond to this stereotype. ‘Why didn’t they fight?’ It was with the Eichmann trial that the Israeli society started to comprehend and understand. (Gordis, 2016, pp. 239-257) (Creveld, 2010, pp. 90-92)

  Other societal flaws include a culture of tax avoidance and evasion and a lively black market serving as a safety valve to heavy taxation and lack of consumer goods. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 109-111)

There is also evidence that corruption is a legitimate problem in Israel (Creveld, 2010, p. 94) although not to an extend that would significantly affect development and investment in the country. (Wikipedia, 2022) In any case, the judiciary is at low risk of corruption and has in several cases convicted public officials of crimes and misdemeanours. (Wikipedia, 2022)

8. What happened to the Arabs in the state of Israel?

Perhaps the hardest criticism against Israelis relates to their behaviour towards the Arab residents of the land that in 1948 was declared the state of Israel. Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, understood the demographic issue and the need to establish a (viable) Jewish state without a large Arab minority. Some seven hundred thousand Arabs left Israel during the War of Independence, for various reasons, including expulsion from the Israelis. (Gordis, 2016, p. 187)

Those who remained were under military administration for eighteen years until 1966. (Creveld, 2010, p. 94) Under the military government, Arabs were tried by military courts, they had to obtain permission to leave their villages, opportunities for higher (or even elementary) education or a career in politics were severely limited, and employment in the centre of the country was difficult to find. Very few Arabs were also allowed in the Israel Defence Force (IDF). (Gordis, 2016, p. 213)

The military administration over Israel’s Arabs was explained as a security measure (Israel was worried about an internal fifth column). During this period tragedies could not be avoided. In 1956, as Israel was preparing to launch the Sinai Campaign (Wikipedia, 2022), an IDF patrol massacred forty-seven Arabs from Kafr Kassem returning home after work beyond a five-p.m. imposed curfew. Ben-Gurion called the incident a ‘dreadful atrocity’, but though several officers were arrested and later convicted, all were released from jail shortly thereafter. (Gordis, 2016, pp. 231-232)

The Six-Day War of 1967 (Wikipedia, 2022) perplexed things once again as the seven hundred thousand Arabs that found their way to neighbouring countries during the War of Independence found themselves again under Israeli control. In fact, there were, in 1967, some 1.25 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved to this day. (Gordis, 2016, p. 280)

9. How important is religion in Israel?

The importance of religion for the definition of the Jewish identity has already been stated in the answer to question no. 3. At the same time though, as we saw in the answer to question no.6, at the beginning Israelis adopted a socialist and collectivist way of life. To the dominant socialists, a state controlled by religion was an abomination. To many Orthodox Jews (Haredim), a state not controlled by religion was a product of ‘Satan and all his hosts’. In fact, at any time there was at least one religious party that regarded the Zionist dream, if not outright apostasy, as essentially irrelevant to the real content of Jewish life, i.e., religion. (Creveld, 2010, p. 76)

Nevertheless, the system of proportional representation has often created situations where the religious parties with their shares of votes usually between 8 and 12 percent (Creveld, 2010, p. 76) held the balance in the parliament (Knesset). (Creveld, 2010, p. 78) The Haredim used their leverage (by leaving any coalition they could bring the government down and force elections) to gain a largely independent school system (in which students study virtually no non-religious subjects) and exception from military service to avoid exposure to the secular Jews in the army. (Gordis, 2016, p. 211) Furthermore, the rabbinate is in charge of marriages and divorces (and as Jewish law forbids marriage between Jews and non-Jews, Israel is the only country where a Jew cannot marry whomever he or she likes) and decides who is to become an Israeli citizen or not. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 80-81)

The above create interesting challenges for the future, (e.g.,  by 2010, the number of Haredim excused from military service reached 62,500 annually – an increase of 15,000 percent compared to the 400 exemptions at Ben-Gurion’s time, when Israel’s population grew only 1,200 percent in the same period) (Gordis, 2016, p. 212) considering also the fact that Israel is found in the top 20 of the most atheist countries, with only 39 percent of its population describing themselves as religious. (World population review, 2022)

10. What was the situation in Israel after the Six-Day War of 1967?

By 1967, Israel had survived an onslaught of unrelenting attacks, had absorbed over a million immigrants, had emerged as a player on the international stage, and was quickly cultivating national, political, and cultural traditions. It had fared far better than anyone might have dared to imagine after its establishment in 1948. (Gordis, 2016, p. 259)

After the war of 1967, and although Israel continued to fight the so called ‘War of Attrition’ until August 1970, (Creveld, 2010, pp. 139-140) the country started experiencing an unprecedented economic boom. First, the need for self-sufficiency in arms and mass spending in the defence sector (defence spending more than doubled compared to the 1957-1966 figures and rose to 21.6 percent of the GNP in the years following 1967 (Creveld, 2010, p. 141) to reach 28 percent in 1976-1980 (Creveld, 2010, p. 152)) did yield a powerful and highly innovative military-industrial complex. (Creveld, 2010, p. 179) By the late 1970s Israel was capable of designing many excellent weapons from scratch, producing them at reasonable cost, and exporting them to many countries around the world. By 1980 arms exports amounted to perhaps $1.3 billion a year and growing fast. (Creveld, 2010, p. 182)

The necessary talent for the boom came from immigration and especially that from the Soviet Union (although the Soviets at the time were the main supporters of the Arabs against Israel (Creveld, 2010, p. 136)) that brought skills that were often equal or even superior to those of the native population. (Creveld, 2010, p. 149)

Diaspora Jews contributed much of the necessary money as the war led to a dramatic rise in voluntary contributions as well as an increase in the purchase of bonds. (Creveld, 2010, p. 148) Especially the American Jews established a new relationship with Israel. Knowing that they had underreacted during the Holocaust, they were not prepared to make the same mistake again. They contributed money, organized rallies (a rally in New York in support of Israel attracted 150,000 people, the largest rally American Jews had ever staged), and applied political pressure in Washington. (Gordis, 2016, p. 269)

Thus, per capita GNP raised from $1,590 in 1965 to $2,410 in 1973. The Israelis were now living in larger apartments, owned more cars, electronic appliances and telephones, and enjoyed better health. (Creveld, 2010, p. 151)

Arab lives were improved too. In the years after the Six-Day War, between 1967 and the 1980s, annual per capita income in the Gaza Strip increased from $80 to $1,700. In the West Bank, the GNP tripled in the same period. The number of cars in the territories increased tenfold. In 1967, only 18 percent of households in Gaza had electricity. By 1981, when Gazan communities were connected to the Israeli electric grid, that number rose to 89 percent. Israel also encouraged higher education in the land it now controlled, and seven universities were established in the West Bank and Gaza compared to none prior to the Six-Day War. (Gordis, 2016, pp. 352-353)

11. What happened after the Yom Kippur War of 1973?

Whereas the Six-Day war had the character of a pre-emptive strike, the Yom Kippur War caught Israel by surprise. Although eventually the country prevailed militarily, this did not come without significant consequences.

The war cost the economy $238 million per day, bringing the total price tag to approximately $4.2 billion, which compared with a GNP of $6 to $6.5 billion at that time. (Creveld, 2010, p. 151) These were the years of the so-called energy shock, which got under way in 1973-1974 and lasted throughout the rest of the decade. Between 1973 and 1982 the cost of imported oil rose from 1.5 percent to 10 percent of the GNP. No wonder that, by 1978, the trade deficit was running at three times the 1972 figure. Growth came to a halt and by 1981 per capita income had only risen to $2,550. (Creveld, 2010, p. 153)

Between 1977 and 1979 inflation, which had been running at 35 percent, rose first to 50 and then to 80 percent. By the end of 1984 inflation was running at almost 1,000 percent. Already before that, in late March 1983 the stock market started declining as people put their money into foreign currency or index-linked government bonds. In the autumn the stock market collapsed. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 155-160)

To make things worse, the diplomatic assault on Israel was far from over. During this period, European countries, intimidated by the Arab oil embargo, succumbed to Arab and Palestinian pressure, to make the assault more effective. In November 1974, Yasser Arafat gave his ‘Olive Branch and Gun’ speech at the United Nations and merely a year later, the General Assembly granted the PLO observer status at the United Nations. The UN assault on Israel continued and in November 1975 the General Assembly approved Resolution 3379, which stated that ‘Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination’. (Gordis, 2016, p. 323) Israel had turned into a true pariah state. (Creveld, 2010, p. 146)

The growing economic difficulties, as well as Israel’s international isolation, led to a profound cultural crisis deeper than anything the country had experienced until that time. (Creveld, 2010, p. 162) There were growing doubts that surrounded the Zionist enterprise itself. Might Zionism, instead of leading to the gradual disappearance of anti-Semitism be producing the opposite effect? Had the establishment of the state, with all the tremendous sacrifices that it involved, in fact been the worst error ever committed by the Jewish people? After all, Israel was now the only place on earth where Jews, just for being Jews, were in real danger of losing their lives. As a result, more and more Jews leaving their countries chose the United States, Canada, Australia, or similar countries over Israel as their new homeland. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 177-178)

Furthermore, the Yom Kippur War, for many, was a test that should never had taken place, had military planning, military doctrine, military organization, and, above all, military intelligence done their job; and the country and its leaders passed only with mediocre grades, if at all. Thus, the positive feelings that had prevailed over the IDF, the peak of the Zionist enterprise, before 1973 were shaded by doubt. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 168-169)

The Israelis also withdrew to their private sphere and were presented as petty bourgeois characters that are held prisoner by their petty ambitions, their fears, and their unfathomable narrow-mindedness. As people retreated into private life, the percentage of those taking an active part in politics by attending rallies and the like went down. Parties, instead of representing well-defined groups and classes, were coming to be seen as little but organized mafias where hacks - sometimes, hacks who could not make it anywhere else - competed among themselves for power, money, and glory. Among the clearest sign that values were shifting, and that social change was well under way could be found in the decline of those showpieces of the ‘First Israel’, the kibbutzim. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 170-174)

In short, Yom Kippur would never be the same in the Jewish state. A religious holiday of deep personal introspection had been transformed into - and remains to this very day - an annual remembrance of incompetence, grief, loss, and the shattering of Israeli illusions. (Gordis, 2016, p. 319)    

12. How important was American support for Israel?

Amid the turmoil that followed the Yom Kippur War, Israel had to fight yet another war. The roots of this conflict are found at the end of the War of Attrition. At this time King Hussein of Jordan, worried that the various Palestinian terrorist organizations were getting out of control - they had hijacked four western airliners, flown them to the kingdom, and blown them up - launched a major offensive against them and, massacring thousands, broke their power. Having been expelled from Jordan, Palestinians went to Lebanon, hitherto the most peaceful of all Israel’s neighbours. (Creveld, 2010, p. 140)

By 1982, over fifteen thousand Palestinian guerrillas were operating in southern Lebanon, from Beirut down to the area increasingly called ‘Fatah-land’. On the 6th of June Israel launched Operation Peace for the Galilee expanding its military presence in southern Lebanon up to the year 2000 in what was called Israel’s Vietnam. Nevertheless, Arafat and the PLO were no match for Israel’s massive fire power. Eventually, after being forced out of Jordan in 1971, the PLO now had to leave Lebanon, too. The campaign was overshadowed by the massacre of the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps leaving Israel permanently embittered and plagued by guilt. (Gordis, 2016, pp. 341-345) The war further increased the economic burden on Israel. The gap between its foreign currency holdings and its obligations widened to over $15 billion. This was five time the 1973 figure and twenty times the 1965 one. (Creveld, 2010, p. 161)

It was very largely thanks to Uncle Sam that financial ruin was averted at five minutes before zero. (Creveld, 2010, p. 162) Already at the beginning of the 1970s U.S. government aid rose from practically nothing to $250 million a year - as well as long-time loans. (Creveld, 2010, p. 151) By 1984-1985 U.S. aid was raised to $3 billion annually and a further $1.5 billion arrived in the form of emergency assistance. In fact, aid was more extensive than these sums indicate. To them should be added two brand-new air bases built in the Negev; American orders for Israeli-made military hardware; joint military-technological R&D; and the construction on Israeli soil of depots in which U.S. military equipment was stored. (Creveld, 2010, p. 161)

In the diplomatic arena, after the Israelis with the 1977 elections rid the country of an elite that, in the eyes of many, had turned into little but a slogan-spouting, money grabbing mafia with no ideology and no sense of what it wanted except to hold on to as much power as it could for as long as it could, (Creveld, 2010, p. 181) the Americans mediated during the Israel-Egypt peace negotiations. Although president Carter’s role is sometimes described as ambiguous, if not pro-Arab, (Spencer, 2019, pp. 118-134) the Camp David Accords agreement, signed on March 26, 1979, left both sides fairly content with their achievements. (Wikipedia, 2021) (Creveld, 2010, p. 189) Once Egypt had left ‘the circle of hostility’ Israel was more secure than ever in its history; the more so because, in September 1980, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War ended any fear of an ‘eastern front’. (Creveld, 2010, p. 192)

13. Did Israel rely only on American help?

American support alone was not enough. The main factors that helped Israel rebuilt its economy was:

1) Education. By the end of the 1970s education accounted for 8.4 percent of the GNP; as of 2008 the figure was 8.5 percent, which is higher than any of the OECD countries. (Creveld, 2010, p. 234) Priority was given to natural sciences (Creveld, 2010, p. 237) that tend to boost the economy, provided that the corresponding funds are used effectively. To this end Israeli students seem to have an advantage compared to their foreign counterparts. Before they enrol, they serve two, three, or even four (if they get a commission) years in the military. There, some of them carry heavy responsibilities indeed. After their discharge they are wont to spend a year or so traveling abroad, seeing the world and sowing their wild oats. As a result, they are older, much less childish, than their counterparts. (Creveld, 2010, p. 236) In brief, Israeli universities, are an integral part of the economy, yet retaining a great deal of academic freedom and avoiding submission to the whims of the commercial world or, what can   be even worse, those of their students. (Creveld, 2010, p. 235)

2) The Army. Israel’s security consumes a significant amount of the national resources. Even before Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 defence was consuming about 30 percent. This allowed for the development of a national defence industry allowing also for significant exports. The developed technologies, as is often the case, were then forwarded to civil life. Indeed, as of 2007, high tech industries, employing 7 percent of the workforce, accounted for 23 percent of foreign sales. Many of the people that started these companies first met during their military service. After their discharge from R&D agencies of the IDF, making use of the informal character of Israeli life and the country’s small size, they stay in touch. They latch on to some interesting idea and start a new company in their homes or even a garage. In 2007, Israel was said to have the highest number of start-up companies per capita in the world. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 227-231)

3) Innovation. As many visitors will soon note, Israelis are utterly lacking in social discipline. They gesticulate, they raise their voices, and they treat any queue as an invitation to jostle one another. They drive like madmen and will smoke a cigarette under a ‘’no smoking’’ sign. Certainly, this system comes with disadvantages. It might explain why Israeli firms are not that good in building and managing large-scale enterprises. This, in turn may explain why they have so seldom succeeded in producing consumer goods that crowd the selves of developed countries as Canon, Seiko, Sony, Toshiba, Samsung and others.

On the other hand, this lackadaisical, disrespectful, and often noisy approach to life is not without certain advantages, too. A certain kind of mental rebelliousness is almost definitely an indispensable prerequisite for creativity and inventiveness. All this may explain why Israelis, though they may not have developed and sold many famous consumer products, do provide many of the programs and devices that go into these products. In 2000, high-tech firms exported over 45 percent of their product. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 232-233)

4) Reform. Israel implemented a stabilization program, that, as foreign economists wrote, was among the most successful in the entire world. As very often in such cases, cuts in subsidies and transfer payments - from 22 percent of the GNP in 1979-1983 to 17 percent in 1980-1984 and 15.4 percent in 1985-1989 - made people extremely unhappy. Israeli society, which had been smothered by the state for so long as to become almost identical with it, finally started casting off its socialist shackles. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 214-215) One can sum up the process by saying that during the entire period from 1997 to 1992, Israel did much to push itself away from state-directed socialism toward a market economy, complete with a very active and often volatile stock exchange. (Creveld, 2010, p. 222) Yet the state was far from having sold all its assets and the role the government played in the economy remained considerable. Thus, the extend of the shift should not be exaggerated. (Creveld, 2010, p. 225)

Similarly, fourfold answers for Israel’s success given in the book of Ari Shavit include: the infrastructure of the defence industry, Israeli innovation and improvisation, Russian skill (immigration), and the integration of different fields of knowledge in small, daring groups (Shavit, 2013, p. 352) or reducing government spending dramatically (from 51 percent of GDP in 2022 to 42 percent in 2011), reducing the national dept significantly (from 100 percent of GDP in 2002 to 75 percent in 2011), maintaining a conservative and responsible financial system, and fostering the conditions required for Israeli high-tech to continue to flourish. (Shavit, 2013, pp. 354 - 355)

14. How did the peace process evolve during this period?

The Lebanese adventure, grown out of grandiose nationalist-religion dreams concerning the need for and the feasibility of Israel’s hold on ‘’the complete’’ Land along with its Arab residents, marked the end of any desire on Israel’s part to wage large-scale offensive war against its neighbours- that is unless it is left with no other choice. It also ended any illusion that the country would ever be able to impose peace on its neighbours through force of arms. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 209-210)

By the end 1987 Israel and its security forces faced new challenges. The first intifada broke out in December and the IDF, used to fight against enemies, who, on paper at any rate, were much stronger than itself, now faced an ‘’enemy’’ consisting of men, women, and children without proper organization, proper training, proper weapons, proper anything. As usual in such cases sympathies are with the weaker and the breaking, in some cases, of the rules of engagement meant to prevent civilians from being hit caused a gradual break down of the mutual trust among the troops and the society they served. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 239-244)

Eventually, in 1993, at a time when the PLO’s fighters in Israel’s northern border were started to be replaced by those of the Hezbollah, Yasser Arafat met Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and President Bill Clinton on the White House Lawn. (Creveld, 2010, p. 209) With the Oslo Accords, signed in August of that year, Israel and the PLO formally recognized each other. A Palestinian National Authority (PA) was set up, and it committed itself to changing the Palestinian National Charter, which had called for the destruction of Israel. Disputed territories were divided into three zones: Zone A were to come under the full control of the PA. In Zone B Israelis would look after security and the Palestinian Arabs civil affairs. Zone C areas, which included settlements established by Israelis, were to remain under full Israeli control, which however did not extend to the Arab civilians. These arrangements were to maintain in force for five years, during which an overall settlement would be negotiated. (Creveld, 2010, p. 249)  Two years later, following an agreement known as Oslo II, Israel gave the Palestinian Arabs self-rule in the towns of Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Tul Karem, as well as some 450 smaller settlements. (Creveld, 2010, p. 251)

In the past any Arab leader who was suspected of cooperating with the Jews promptly put his life at risk. The list of those assassinated is long: Jordan’s king Abdullah I (1951), Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat (1981), Lebanon’s President Bachir Gemayel (1982) … (Creveld, 2010, p. 36) Now it was time for an Israeli to pay the price for the peace negotiations. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was murdered in Tel Aviv on November 4th, 1995.

15. Did the piece process work out though?

The Israeli side heavily criticized Yasser Arafat for hir role in the failure of the 2000 Camp David Summit (Wikipedia, 2022) to reach a final agreement on the peace process. It is said that as long as negotiations dragged on, the international community would fete him as a reformed fighter now dedicated to peace. Were he to sign an agreement, however, the international community would expect him to govern and would hold him accountable for what unfolded in his newly founded state. With time, fewer and fewer people were inclined to believe that Arafat had any intention whatsoever to make the transition. (Gordis, 2016, p. 377)

Bill  Clinton also expressed his disappointment by telling Arafat, when the latter tried to assuage the outgoing president by telling him what a great man he was, in January 2001: ‘’Mr. Chairman, I am not a great man; I am a failure; and you have made me so.’’ (Creveld, 2010, p. 262)

The blame for the failure rests not on one side though but on both. From their side, the Israelis never ceased settling the disputed territories (Creveld, 2010, p. 256) and lit the fuse for the second intifada, also known as the Al Aqsa Intifada after one of the mosques on the Temple Mount, visited by Ariel Sharon on the 28th of September 2000, although the latter claimed ‘’ this has nothing to do with me’’. Desperate attempts by Clinton and prime minister Ehud Barak to reach cease – fire and renew the Camp David talks led nowhere. (Creveld, 2010, p. 263)

16. What is to (will) be done for the settlement of the Palestinian Israeli – Arab conflict?

The attempt for peace negotiations, even though it did not succeed and perhaps even assuming that it could not have succeeded, was well worth making – for the simple reason that talking is always better than shooting. Certainly, it did nothing to harm Israel’s security. As long as it lasted it raised the country’s international standing, and its own self – image, to unprecedented heights. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 255-256) Thus, it is reasonable to assume that some form of peace negotiation will always be in place between Palestinian Israelis and Palestinian Arabs.

At the same time though, one should keep in mind that a secure homeland for the Jewish people is a principal goal of Zionism (see question2). Furthermore, David Ben-Gurion’s concern for the demographic issue and the recognition of the need to establish a (viable) Jewish state without a large Arab minority remains in place (see question 8). These, together with the fact that the majority of the Israeli’s, in spite of the bitter opposition on the part of hard-liners, has repeatedly shown itself prepared to give its approval for the secession of land for peace, (Creveld, 2010, p. 269) point out, at least to me, that a two – state solution is more favourable for Israel.

It is doubtful that this is also the case for the Arabs and especially the Israeli – Arabs. It is reported that each time the possibility of transferring land from Israeli to Arab rule is mentioned, they become almost hysterical. And with very good reason: Visiting the occupied territories, and travelling in the Arab world, they can see first-hand how poor, how backward, how contemptuous of the individual most of that world is. Becoming part of the West Bank would mean joining a society where per capita income is less than 10 percent of the Israeli figure. To make things much worse still, they would be entering a world where ‘’rights’’ do not exist. (Creveld, 2010, p. 312) Nevertheless, I believe that the decision for the outcome of the whole process lies mostly on Israel’s side with the Arabs having little, if any, means to affect it.

If a Palestinian Arab state is established, it is suggested that Israel should not pretend that this establishment has solved or will solve anything. On the contrary, it should recognize from the first moment that this is the state of an inveterate enemy and act accordingly. (Spencer, 2019, pp. 220-221) Roadblocks, walls and other tested means to supress jihadist activities will most probably remain in place and probably be reinforced at the border with the Arab state. Furthermore, a bright light would be shed on such activities challenging the shapers of international opinion. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 267-271) (Spencer, 2019, p. 221) It is unlikely that the Israeli political Left could help loosening Israel’s grip on the envisaged  Palestinian Arab state, if the latter was to be proven hostile to the Jews, as its evisceration during the second intifada has proven. (Gordis, 2016, pp. 383-384) The Palestinian Arabs would still have a choice though, to loosen this grip by electing an authority that would work towards the built of mutual trust with Israel for the benefit of both states.

Were Israel to opt for the assumption of full political control over the Arab territories (one state solution), the security measures in place could only lower its international standing, enhancing the accusations for an apartheid state.   

17. Where do Israeli – Arab relations stand today?

The establishment of the state of Israel was followed by a combined attack from its Arab neighbours aiming at its elimination. The state of Israel is not threatened by its Arab neighbours anymore. There are peace relations with Egypt and Jordan. The situation in Lebanon and especially Syria casts any threat of war from these countries as negligible. In the wider circle of Arab countries surrounding Israel, Iraq, after years of war and foreign interventions, is also not a threat anymore. The activities of terrorist groups in these countries are a nuisance indeed but no threat for the sovereignty of the Israeli state.

The danger lies further to the north-east in Iran and its nuclear program. Notably the threat is also perceived by other Arab countries that joined the so-called Israeli – Arab or Israeli - Sunni alliance. (Wikipedia, 2022) Given Israel’s own nuclear teeth, which are sharp and constantly growing in number, to attack it without acquiring nuclear weapons first would be madness; to attack it after acquiring such weapons, much greater madness still. (Creveld, 2010, p. 316) Nevertheless, in the past Israel had the ability to implement the Begin Doctrine of pre-emptive strike in a way that guaranteed its future. The destruction of the nuclear reactors in Iraq (Operation Opera) (Wikipedia, 2022) and Syria (Operation Outside the Box) (Wikipedia, 2022) speak for it. But it has been suggested, that as time passes, this capability is eroding. (Shavit, 2013, p. 381) The execution of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, chief of Iran’s nuclear program (Wikipedia, 2022) in 2020 speaks for the opposite though. Still Iran represents the biggest challenge in Arab – Israeli relations today.

18. What about Israel and the rest of the world?

In question 11 we saw how back in 1975 Israel was practically declared as a pariah state with UN resolution 3379. The problems of Israel with the UN continued also in recent years. Between 2003 and 2012, the UN issued 314 resolutions concerning Israel, nearly 40 percent of all resolutions in that time. At the end of 2013 of the 103 resolutions about individual countries from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), 43 of them (42 percent) had condemned Israel. Israel was the subject of more emergency sessions in the UNHRC than any other country. (Gordis, 2016, pp. 393-394) Thus, Israel needs to carefully tackle issues mainly related to the Palestinian Arabs (see question 16) to keep the country’s international standing high and avoid feeding initiatives like BDS. (Wikipedia, 2022)

In any case, today, Israel can by no means be considered a pariah state. As, after the end of the Cold War, the American colossus straddled, or seemed to straddle, the globe, Israel’s special relation to the U.S. helped it improve its international position out of all recognition. Many countries were eager to resume or improve relations with it, seeing that the road to Washington appeared to lead, to some extent, through Jerusalem. More recently, the alternative to the American hegemony seems to be a world divided among five large powers: the United States, the European Union, Russia, China, and India. Israel keeps (or should try to keep) a good relationship with all five. Maintaining normal relations with them, and assuming a minimum diplomatic skill, it ought to be able to maneuver among them even if, one day, it can no longer rely on the U.S. as its principal protector. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 315-316)

19. What are the main internal challenges that Israel faces today?

In the answer to question 13 we discussed the four pillars of Israel’s success. When the discussion goes to the perils the country faces, there are four problems: (i) The education system has deteriorated, and it endangers Israel’s ability to sustain technological excellence. (ii) The employment rate among ultra-Orthodox men is only 45 percent. (iii) Most Arab women do not work. (iv) Fewer than twenty business groups control much of the local market and thus restrict competition. (Shavit, 2013, p. 355)

As far as the problems (i) and (iv) are concerned, retaining and growing talent and diversification in the economy should not be taken lightly, but relay totally on political will. Influencing the beliefs and corresponding habits of the ultra-Orthodox Jews and non-Jewish minorities [problems (ii) and (iii)] is much more complex. Especially for the latter (see also question 16).

Regarding ultra-Orthodox Jews a way of political action is based on the, unpleasant, cut-off of government subsidies like child allowances in order to force many Orthodox men to look for work. Presumably, secular studies, to prepare them for work, and secular jobs will draw them closer to the mainstream and a different lifestyle; even if this does not happen, the fact that people have jobs will allow them less free time in which to follow the rabbis’ call, descend into the streets, and demonstrate against this or that alleged violation of religious law. (Creveld, 2010, p. 308) Should Israel fail to contain its ultra-Orthodox elements, then a situation similar to the ulema-state alliance that tortures the Muslim world cannot be excluded with unexpected consequences for Israel, the Middle East region and the rest of the world. (Kuru, 2019)

20. What (how) is today’s Israel?

Israel belongs to the West. Thus, the American influence on the country’s social, economic and political life is to be expected. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 287-291) The characteristics of the Mediterranean part of the western world are also present though, as we saw in question 13, in its people’s lackadaisical, disrespectful, and often noisy approach to life. Yet this is just one side of how things are. The other consists of a society that, in many ways, is as varied, friendly to foreigners, open minded, and above all, creative as any other on earth. (Creveld, 2010, p. 287) Indeed, starting as a desperately poor ‘’developing’’ country whose main product was oranges, and in spite of the most important obstacle of all, the absence of peace, Israel has been able to increase exports eleven thousand times in nominal terms. (Creveld, 2010, p. 274) Looking at other western countries around the Mediterranean basin, Israel is now richer than Portugal and Spain, not very far from the richer but much bigger France and Italy and significantly richer than Cyprus or Greece.

Rich or poor, over 90 percent of Israel’s inhabitants now live in the towns. Old or new, many of the towns consist mainly of blocks of flats, some of them prefabricated. While the northern half of Israel has some of the world’s highest population densities, the southern half is desert. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 280-281) Looking at two of its most important cities, whereas Tel Aviv is rich, Jerusalem, two-thirds of whose population is either Jewish Orthodox or Arab, is relatively poor. It is also a place filled with fanatics of every possible religion, creed, and belief. The place teems with tensions and fierce hatreds of every kind. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 277-278) In spite of history and tradition issues then, maybe it is worth considering whether modern Israel would really like to have Jerusalem as its capital after all.

As is so often the case, the change from its socialist roots to capitalism did not come without a cost. Israel’s welfare state, though comprehensive, had always been rather elementary. The distribution of property and income also became less egalitarian. (Creveld, 2010, p. 274) Indeed, compared to what Israelis had been used to, the new world they were now building was in many ways cold, competitive, and harsh. It was however, also one in which opportunities abounded as never before and which was prepared to bestow extraordinary rewards on the young, the talented, the hardworking, and the successful. (Creveld, 2010, p. 276) The trend towards more and more individualism continues. In part this is because Israel is no longer engaged in a daily fight for its existence. (Creveld, 2010, p. 283)

Thus, in Israel a woman who takes up a career faces a choice. Either she must remain childless (often single as well), or else she must have several others who will clean for her, (Creveld, 2010) wash for her, and look after her children for her. For many parents the solution comes from relatives, especially mothers and mothers-in-law, incidentally, another excellent example of the way the ‘’liberation’’ of women usually comes at the expense of other women. In any case, many parents have grown so anxious about their offspring that the latter barely learn how to move a finger for themselves. This fact is not without importance when it comes to Israel’s competitiveness and its ability to wage war and defend itself, when necessary. (Creveld, 2010, pp. 292-300)

Few if any of these problems though are unique to Israel. Other similarities with the western world and especially south and south-eastern Europe include worries about corruption, (Creveld, 2010, p. 301) aggressive media eager to publish only what they think will sell that usually does not include good news about good people performing good deeds, (Creveld, 2010, pp. 302-303) and other problems that are usually summarized to a comparison with Scandinavia with its near perfect external peace, very high environmental standards, economic justice, far-reaching social equality, and stolid, all but corruption-free political establishment that provides citizens with a very good administration indeed. (Creveld, 2010, p. 313)

But then this is only one side of the coin. In the eyes of many people, much of Scandinavia stands for a pompous bureaucracy that thinks it always knows everything better than anyone else. Supposedly it is characterized by extremely tight social control over the individual, from erection to resurrection, as the saying goes. To this is added occasional inexpressible boredom - everything is so normal - coldhearted interpersonal relationships, and a higher-than-average suicide rate. Compare this with hot, messy, noisy, sweaty, heterogeneous, undisciplined, warmhearted Israel (and here I add my home country Greece and south and south-eastern Europe); the kind of place where almost anybody will lend you his or her cell phone in an emergency and where, sneezing near an open window, one may hear some invisible passerby call out ‘’Bless you’’. Assuming the stereotype is more or less correct, should we really want to be like Scandinavia? (Creveld, 2010, p. 313)

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

Now you can read Thomas’ series on the Modern Greek State here.

References

Creveld, M. V. (2010). The Land of Blood and Honey, The rise of modern Israel. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, An imprint of St. Martin's Press.

Gordis, D. (2016). Israel, A consice history of a nation reborn. New York: Harper-Collins Publishers.

Kuru, A. T. (2019). Islam, Authoritarianism and Underdevelopment, A global and historical comparison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MacCulloch, D. (2009). A history of Christianity. London: Penguin Books Ltd.

Ross, D., & Makovsky, D. (2019). Be Strong and of Good Courage, How Israel's most important leaders shaped its destiny. Audible Audiobook.

Shavit, A. (2013). My promised land, The triumph and tragedy of Israel. New York: Spiegel & Grau.

Spencer, R. (2019). The Palestinian Delusion: The catastrophic history of the Middle East peace process. Nashville: Bombardier Books (An Imprint of Post Hill Press).

Wikipedia. (2021). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_David_Accords

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yishuv

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corruption_in_Israel

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Israeli_public_officials_convicted_of_crimes_or_misdemeanors

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Crisis

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Camp_David_Summit

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab%E2%80%93Israeli_alliance

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Opera

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Outside_the_Box

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohsen_Fakhrizadeh

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boycott,_Divestment_and_Sanctions

World population review. (2022). Retrieved from https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/most-atheist-countries

Bacon’s Rebellion: Treason or Justified Rebellion?

Bacon's Rebellion was an armed rebellion launched in Virginia by settlers from 1676-77. It was led by Nathaniel Bacon against Governor William Berkeley. from Here, Madilynn McCarroll looks at the background and reasons for the rebellion.

A depiction of the burning of Jamestown form the 19th century.

Throughout history, many events have defined the USA, such as the Civil War which gave slaves their freedom, or the Boston Tea Party which showed what the new colonists would do for their independence. Without the Civil War, African Americans may still be enslaved. One man can change the course of history whether for the better or the worse. Bacon’s Rebellion holds more weight than people may think, it’s more than a feud between two relatives. It is what defines the colony of Jamestown and what it could have been. Would Jamestown be the colony as we know it to be or would it have been eradicated?

Nathaniel Bacon

Nathaniel Bacon was hot-headed and very full of pride, not willing to conform to the authority that was put in place to keep the colony from going awry. Bacon challenged Governor Berkeley’s power from day one and refused to back down. In Tales from a Revolution, the author discusses the effects that Nathaniel Bacon’s rebellion caused in Virginia and how it caused a rebellion in the state. The author believed that Bacon was 100% in the wrong and that he did nothing but reap chaos and destruction for the colony, and he is the reason for most of the problems they had with Native Americans. Most of the issues and reasons for this rebellion are because of the stubbornness of both Governor Berkeley and Bacon. Nathaniel Bacon earned a quick reputation for himself from the day he stepped foot in Jamestown and became known as“very ambitious and arrogant.” (rice 2012, pg.28) So, it was no surprise that Bacon did exactly what he wanted instead of submitting to Governor Berkeley.

The main reason for the rebellion was an argument between Berkeley and Bacon about the colonists and Native Americans. This was the beginning of Bacon's Rebellion because this small argument would lead the way to bitterness and anger between the two relatives. The Native Americans in the area were stealing from the colonists and Berkeley decided to wait it out and hoped that they wouldn’t do it again. This infuriated Bacon and he completely disagreed with the Governor’s approach to the matter. Bacon decided to serve his own justice on the Native Americans but ended up crushing the peace that Governor Berkeley had tried to have with them.

Nathaniel Bacon also led a very diverse group of people and some were even former slaves. Bacon granted these indentured servants their freedom if they agreed to become a part of his rebellion. Many scholars believe this justifies Bacon’s Rebellion because of the freedom he gave the slaves, but in reality, it endangered their lives. They were no longer innocent as they were enemies of the state of Virginia. In the end, Governor Berkeley pleaded with Bacon’s followers and offered them redemption and mercy if they turned themselves in. He promised not to harm them just like Bacon did with the indentured slaves.

Impact

Since the Rebellion many things have changed and shaped American history. According to this article scholars believe that the Rebellion is a mix of “fundamental restructuring, of patterns of war, exchange, society, and diplomacy throughout eastern North America.” (Rice 2014, pg.4)  We have learned to deal with war and changes in society because of this and it has taught Governors since Berkeley ways to avoid and overcome similar problems that were created by Bacon. Nathaniel Bacon didn’t agree with Berkeley’s decision because he believed that it would lead to the destruction of Jamestown and that the Native Americans would take advantage of the colony.  I believe that Nathaniel Bacon was in the wrong and his Rebellion was treason. His actions were based on pride and arrogance which led to a massacre of innocent Native Americans. Although he promised slaves their freedom he led them to their graves instead. Governor Berkeley however should have done more to prevent such chaos and he should have done his duty as Governor and protector of Jamestown. If Nathaniel Bacon didn’t stand up against the Native Americans in the way that he did, Jamestown could have suffered greatly. People looked to Bacon as a protector, for example the people of Henrico County knew that he was an outlaw but agreed that he would do everything to defend them. Governor Berkeley eventually got the last say and ended the Rebellion and gained back his power as Governor of Virginia. I may not have agreed with Berkeley at the beginning but by the end the Governor was right and Nathaniel Bacon got what he deserved as a rebel of the state of Virginia.

What do you think of Bacon’s Rebellion? Let us know below.

Bibliography

Oxford African American Studies Center and Bradford J. Wood. 2006. “Virginia.” (December). https://oxfordaasc-com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780195301731.001.0001/acref-9780195301731-e-45086?rskey=VRqNxm&result=4.

rice, James d. 2012. Tales from a Revolution: Bacon's Rebellion and the Transformation of Early America. 1st ed. N.p.: Oxford University Press, Incorporated. https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/lib/liberty/reader.action?docID=4704490.

Rice, James D. 2014. “The Journal of American History.” Bacon's Rebellion in Indian Country 101 (December). https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/stable/44286295?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

The 216BC Battle of Cannae: An Un-Cannae Defeat

Whether the pun in the title made you laugh or cringe, it is fitting for the event that this article is about, the Battle of Cannae—indeed an uncanny defeat. Here, Nathan Richardson explains what happened in the 216BC battle between the Roman Republic and Carthage, part of the Second Punic War.

The Death of Aemilius Paulus at the Battle of Cannae. A 1773 painting by John Trumbull.

In 216 BC, the Roman Republic faced not only defeat, but the possible dissolution of their empire. The foreign armies of Carthage, Rome’s rival from across the Mediterranean on the North African coast, tread on Italian soil. Hannibal Barca, one of history’s most renowned and daring generals, and Carthage’s best hope of victory, cowed Rome’s allies and threatened Rome herself. Having traveled from the Iberian Peninsula, through southern Gaul (modern-day France), across the nearly-impassable Alps, and down into Italy, Hannibal rampaged into the very heart of the burgeoning empire of Rome. Hannibal smashed three Roman armies in quick succession: the Battles of Ticinus (in 218 BC) Trebia (also in 218) and Trasimene (in 217) (Goldsworthy, 22-27). The Carthaginian general, whose father had reportedly made him swear eternal enmity for Rome, seemed undefeatable (Goldsworthy, 15). Each battle the Romans fought brought them closer to complete destruction. Each time the Roman army faced the Carthaginians in the open field, Rome’s vital manpower was further depleted. Each defeat, additionally, began to erode the various Italian cities’ confidence in Rome to defend them. In the north of Italy in the Po River Valley, many recently-conquered Gauls living there flocked to Hannibal’s side and threw off the Roman yoke (Keppie, 25-6). Rome stood determined still, yet the question remained whether Roman resilience would outlast Hannibal. Rome buckled under these crushing defeats, yet far darker days lay ahead.

Fabius’ Plan

In response to this crisis, the Romans elected a dictator to see them through the trials ahead—a man named Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (in the future, simply Fabius). Fabius realized that Hannibal would likely defeat the next hastily-prepared Roman army just like the last three. He saw no point in throwing another army of untested Romans against Hannibal’s experienced and hardy mercenaries and allies. Therefore, Fabius resolved to keep his army in being, and carefully avoided pitched battles with Hannibal—all the while shadowing the Carthaginians and attempting to disrupt their supplies. Hannibal, no doubt, preferred to annihilate one hastily-assembled and ill-trained set of legions at a time—until Rome was forced to sue for peace. Yet Fabius did his best to not do Hannibal the service of fighting him in the open. If Fabius could keep this up, he would slowly deprive Hannibal of food and wear down his multi-ethnic army (Goldsworthy, 27-32). Hannibal, after all, was quite vulnerable. He was an invader in a foreign land, and many of his men would only fight so long as they were paid and taken care of (Goldsworthy, 46). If the Romans haunted Hannibal’s steps, kept him from properly resupplying, and provided Hannibal’s men no source of spoils, their morale would eventually decline, and Hannibal could possibly be destroyed or driven out of Italy.

However, the Roman people soon began to tire of Fabius’ strategy, interpreting them as hesitancy or even cowardice. Cunctator (“the Delayer”) was the moniker the people soon gave him (Keppie, 26). According to the Greek historian Plutarch, Hannibal, aware of Fabius’ unpopular strategy of non-engagement, purposed to further discredit Fabius. To do so, he sacked and burned the lands surrounding Fabius’ personal holdings, yet left Fabius’ property untouched—going so far as to post guards around Fabius’ property to ensure it stay unmolested. When word of this reached Rome, Fabius’ reputation took a serious downturn, and slanderous rumors of treason circulated around Rome (Plutarch, 217). Once his six-month term as dictator expired, Fabius left the army and returned to Rome (Goldsworthy, 31). Not only did Fabius leave office deeply unpopular, but his strategies would be disregarded by his successors.

With the dictator out of power, Rome again appointed two Consuls to lead her through this crisis. These two Consuls were Paullus and Varro. Responding to the impatient voices of Rome, the two Consuls hastily raised a new army, this time made of eight legions and troops from various allies of Rome (probably in the form of light infantry and cavalry), and set forth to meet Hannibal. This army that Paullus and Varro led was indeed massive, numbering around 75,000 men. Their army outnumbered Hannibal’s force nicely, which numbered only 40,000 men (Keppie, 26). If all else were equal, an army with such a numerical advantage must surely win a pitched battle. However, Hannibal’s skill as a tactician, as well as the Roman consuls’ poor decisions, would hobble Rome in taking full advantage of her superior numbers. Additionally, Rome’s hastily formed force, man for man, was far from the Carthaginian’s army’s equal.

The Battle

The Romans and the Carthaginians met by the Aufidus River (now called the Ofanto) near the town of Cannae in southeast Italy. The ground chosen by the Romans favored the Roman situation, since the Aufidus running on the Roman right and rough land on Roman left limited the space open on either flank for Carthaginian cavalry (which was superior to the Roman’s) (Goldsworthy, 99). Additionally, the ground offering little room for maneuver complemented the Roman tactics for this battle. Their plan was blunt: they would launch a full-frontal assault and attempt to use their enormous numbers to brute-force their way through the Carthaginian line. However inelegant it might be, the plan’s lack of complexity did not ask too much of the poorly trained and hastily organized army the Roman’s fielded (Goldsworthy, 113-16).

Between the two Consuls, Varro is typically depicted as the braggart fool who bumbled his way into Hannibal’s trap, and Paullus as the martyred prudent commander. Though it is difficult not to blame the day’s commander for the calamity about to befall the Roman army, especially since Varro was most certainly the bolder of the two commanders, this characterization is likely an exaggeration at least (Goldsworthy, 84, 72-3). However, it must be remembered that neither consul had ever commanded such a massive force (this was one of the largest armies Rome would ever put into the field), and both consuls were entirely outmatched by Hannibal in generalship (Goldsworthy, 66, 64).

Hannibal’s arrangement of troops was key to the Carthaginian success. Contrary to the Roman’s expectations (and possibly good sense), he placed his least experienced and least reliable troops (the Celtiberians from modern-day Spain) as his center in the battle lines. He also arrayed these troops in an arc, bowing out towards the Roman lines. These troops provided a very tempting focal point for the Roman charge. So, with a deliberately weak center, Hannibal posted his best troops, his Libyan heavy infantry, on either flank (Keppie, 26). On each far flank, both sides posted cavalry on either side. Though vastly outnumbered in terms of infantry, Hannibal did possess more cavalry and of higher quality than the Romans mustered. This equestrian superiority would become another key element of Hannibal’s victory (Keppie, 26).

In typical ancient warfare form, the battle commenced with light infantry of both sides armed with javelins, bows, or slings running forward and attempting to break up the enemy’s formations with projectiles. The light infantry also served another purpose: they helped to screen the movements of the main army from the enemy’s view. If the Roman commanders had been able to see Hannibal’s arrangement of troops, they may have realized what kind of trap lay in store for them. Thus, light infantry assisted in blinding the commanders on either side from having a complete picture of their enemy’s designs (Keppie, 26). Further, Plutarch states that a strong wind blew sand into the eyes of the Romans during the battle, giving the Carthaginians a further edge over the Romans (Plutarch, 223).

Trap

Paullus’ and Varro’s army blundered forward, intent on smashing through the weak Carthaginian center. While this drama played out in the center, the Roman and Carthaginian cavalry engaged in a heated melee on the flanks. The cavalry situation was less in Rome’s favor. On the Roman right, Hannibal’s allied Celtic cavalry beat the Roman cavalry on that side, and forced the Romans to flee. Meanwhile, on the Roman left, the Roman cavalry managed to hold off Hannibal’s Numidian cavalry. But the Roman left soon broke and fled when the victorious Celtic cavalry, abandoning their pursuit of the Roman right’s horsemen, turned against the Roman left’s cavalry (Keppie, 26). Thus, the Roman cavalry on either flank were beaten and driven off, leaving the Carthaginian cavalry unopposed.

While the Roman cavalry fought and fled the field, the Roman infantry, though still superior in numbers, pushed themselves further and further into Hannibal’s trap. As the Romans pressed forward, Hannibal’s center fell back and began to break, inverting the arc that the Carthaginian line formed. However, this arc did not break. Instead, the formerly concave arc turned convex. Every step forward the Roman center made was one step farther into Hannibal’s trap. As Hannibal’s center fell back with the Roman push, the Libyan infantry, on the extreme ends of the line, began wrapping like tentacles around the Roman flanks, eventually transforming the orderly host of Roman infantry into a disorganized mass of men, where all semblance of formation disappeared, and the enemy were suddenly present on three sides—Celtiberians in the front and Libyans on either flank (Keppie, 26).

The Roman Legions’ fate was sealed with Hannibal’s final move: the victorious Carthaginian cavalry charged the Roman rear. With just-victorious Carthaginian cavalry nipping at their heals, the Roman infantry in the rear began to melt away. The poor Romans in the very front did not flee—they could not. The veteran Carthaginian infantry bore down on them, and a massive noose, encompassing tens of thousands of Romans, began to tighten. They were pushed into a tighter and tighter mass, so much so that the legionnaires could not properly use their weapons. Many men were forced to stand and wait for all the men in front of them to be hacked down before they met their own end (Goldsworthy, 177). Only about 10,000 managed to escape the slaughter and limp dejectedly back to Rome. The rest, over 50,000 Romans, were slaughtered where they stood or as they fled (Goldsworthy, 183). Among the lucky survivors was Varro, the impatient Consul who fell for Hannibal’s trap so nicely. Paullus, on the other hand, died with his men.

Aftermath of Defeat

The defeat Rome suffered at Cannae was colossal. A large proportion of Rome’s men of fighting age had been slaughtered. A defeat such as Cannae would have been the end for almost any other empire. Yet, Rome was not like other empires. Rome did not sue for peace. A galvanized Senate and People of Rome were more determined than ever to rid Italy of Hannibal and the world of the hated Carthage (Goldsworthy, 197). New armies were raised, and the Fabian strategies resumed (Keppie, 28). Hannibal, having doubtlessly suffered heavy casualties at Cannae (though light compared to the Romans), did not follow up his victory with a march on Rome, against the advice of his more aggressive generals. One of his generals is recorded by Livy as having told the great Hannibal, “Truly the gods do not give everything to the same man: you know how to win a victory, Hannibal, but you do not know how to use one” (Goldsworthy, 189). Instead, Hannibal focused on trying to turn more Italian cities (allies of Rome) to his side in order to get the men and supplies he needed. Though many flocked to his banner after Cannae (notably, Italy’s second-largest city, Capua), not enough of them did. Rome still held firm, and so would many of Rome’s allies (Keppie, 28). The war continued in Italy for over a decade more. In 204 BC the famed Roman general Scipio Africanus made an invasion of North Africa from Sicily, with the intent of assaulting the city of Carthage itself. He was not known as Africanus then, but his upcoming campaign in North Africa would soon earn him that title. In response to this threat, Hannibal was recalled from Italy to defend the seat of the Carthaginian empire (Goldsworthy, 202). In total, Hannibal and his army had ravaged Italy for nearly fifteen years—fifteen years of brutal, bloody conflict across many battlefields. Yet, Cannae would be the one battle that Rome remembered the clearest as one of their darkest days—though a dark day that was not the end of Rome.

Influence of Cannae

Hannibal executed a near-perfect encirclement of eight Roman Legions by the Aufidus River in southeast Italy. In awe of this achievement, generals throughout history have attempted to replicate it. The “double-envelopment”, “Pincer movement”, or simply “encirclement” became the dream of every ambitious general. German General von Schlieffen planned (unsuccessfully, as it would turn out) to achieve a double-envelopment of the Allied forces in the First World War. So too did US General Schwarzkopf in the Gulf War. Hannibal’s double-envelopment was and is the ultimate winning-stroke that many commanders throughout history have sought for, yet rarely achieved. Many generals throughout history have looked all the way back, over two thousand years ago, to the Battle of Cannae for inspiration (Goldsworthy, 205-6).

What do you think of the Battle of Cannae? Let us know below.

Portugal During World War I

The Western Front of World War I conjures up images of trenches, bunkers, and an artillery scarred no-man’s-land. On one side was the German Empire, on the other was France, the British Empire, and, eventually, the United States. It has long been forgotten that there was another Allied nation that fought in the trenches of Northern France and Flanders. Two divisions of the Portuguese Army fought in the British sector of the line from April 1917 to April 1918. This is not even to mention the equally large number of troops sent to fight in Angola and Mozambique against German colonial troops. Tens of thousands of Portuguese soldiers would serve in the trenches of northern Europe and in Africa. They would fight in major battles, and yet the role of Portugal in World War I is generally not acknowledged or understood.

Matt Lowe explains.

Portuguese troops going to Angola during World War I.

Revolution and a New Republic

On October 5, 1910, the Kingdom of Portugal ceased to exist. A republic was established in its place, one of only a handful in Europe. The Portuguese monarchy had been gradually weakening for decades, with numerous incidents highlighting its shortcomings at home and abroad. Notably, a disagreement over colonial boundaries in southern Africa in 1890 led to diplomatic humiliation at the hands of Britain, Portugal’s oldest ally. On February 1, 1908, King Carlos I and his heir Luis Filipe were assassinated by militant republicans. The king’s second son thus ascended to the throne as Manuel II at only 18 years of age. The monarchy was on its last legs by this point, and it was Manuel’s poor fortune to reign during such turbulent times. When the revolution finally came two years later, Manuel was forced into exile in Great Britain. A devout Portuguese patriot until his death in 1932, he would never return to his homeland. Unsurprisingly, the new republic proved to be politically unstable with a revolving door of governments over the next several years. Many Portuguese politicians wanted to prove to the rest of Europe that Portugal was no longer a political and cultural backwater. When war broke out across the continent in 1914, there was finally an opportunity to show the world that the republic was strong and that Portugal had entered the modern age politically and militarily.

A Global Conflict Begins

When the First World War began on July 28, 1914, a series of alliances rapidly brought most of the
European great powers into conflict with one another. Although Portugal did not formally join the war at this point, the war came on its own to the Portuguese colony of Angola. German South West Africa (modern day Namibia) lay directly south of Angola, and it became a battlefield as soon as news of the outbreak of war reached it from Europe. South Africa, a major British possession, had around 40,000 troops stationed there, a much larger military force at its disposal than the roughly 3,000 men of the Schutztruppe plus lower quality militia in German territory. The fighting in German South West Africa would take place mostly in the southmost parts of the colony against South African forces. Notably, however, the German military commanders in the region learned that a Portuguese expedition was being sent near the southern Angolan border. This combined with the knowledge that Portugal was Britain’s ally made them believe that this was going to lead to a Portuguese invasion from the north in conjunction with the British one in the south. Thus, the German commanders decided to send a portion of their forces to the north to launch a preemptive strike against the incoming Portuguese expedition before it could do the same to them. What they did not know, was that Portugal had no intention at the time to do anything of the sort, with the expedition’s primary role being to secure the border from German incursions and local rebel activity.

Portuguese metropolitan and colonial troops had seen intermittent fighting in southern Angola for decades and there was a fear that the war could spillover into Portuguese territory and potentially ignite a new wave of fighting. The German decision to attack was therefore almost a self-fulfilling prophecy of bringing Portugal into the war. Starting in October of 1914, a series of small battles were fought in southern Angola, most of which were won by the better trained German forces. Virtually all of these skirmishes were too small to ever be given names by either side’s historical records. The largest battle occurred on December 18 at a town called Naulila near the border, which ended in a hard-fought German victory and involved around 1500 Portuguese and 600 German troops. Ultimately, the Germans were able to occupy parts of southern Angola until July 1915, before withdrawing as the rest of South West Africa began to collapse and surrender to South African forces. As the Portuguese government predicted, there was an uptick in local rebel activity in southern Angola after it was re-occupied by Portuguese troops, due in part to the Germans distributing weapons to such groups in an effort to destabilize the region. Still, Portugal chose not to formally join the war, because, as of yet, there was more to be gained by using its neutrality to keep it safe while aiding Britain in more indirect ways.

Portugal’s Strategic Situation and Entry into the War

In spite of the 500-year-old alliance between Portugal and the United Kingdom, Portugal itself did not immediately join the war. This was largely at the insistence of the British government, as it viewed neutral Portuguese ports and shipping as more valuable assets than Portuguese troops on the battlefield. The British had a long history of exploiting its weaker ally, and the first half of World War I was merely a continuance of this trend. Between the revolution in 1910 and its formally joining the war in 1916, Portugal experienced a rapid succession of short-lived governments of different persuasions, although they were all pro-republic, they differed on their stances on formally joining the war. One of the reasons various Portuguese leaders at the time favored joining the war was to use it as a way to legitimize the republic to the rest of the world as it would fight against the arch conservative Central Powers and show that Portugal was no longer some culturally backward relic. As mentioned above, there was also a very real concern about maintaining security further from home in the African colonies. In spite of these motivations, it was not seen as being overall beneficial to fight and Great Britain exerted its not-so-subtle influence on the country. The ports of Lisbon and Porto were of great strategic value, while the Portuguese armed forces were of dubious quality at best. British diplomats knew the Portuguese would not act without the approval of the United Kingdom, and thus kept Portugal on a short leash. With Portugal officially neutral but decidedly oriented towards British interests, the United Kingdom would reap the most benefits without needing to invest many of its own resources.

This could not remain the situation, however, as the war continued to consume more and more British lives, material, and money. Most importantly, British merchant ship losses were constantly increasing. The neutral Portuguese ports offered a unique opportunity. There were dozens of German merchant vessels that had anchored in Portuguese waters early on in the war to avoid being captured by the Royal Navy. The British government made a formal request to the Portuguese Republic to confiscate these ships and hand them over for British use. Portuguese leaders had been waiting for this request and proceeded to take control of the German ships on February 24, 1916. Germany was understandably upset at this sudden violation of supposed neutrality and went on to declare war on Portugal on March 9. Portugal was now at war, although it would be several months until Portuguese troops would see combat in Mozambique and over a year until they would see combat on the Western Front.

The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps Arrives in France

The declaration of war from Germany did not translate into the immediate sending of Portuguese troops to the Western Front. Although Portuguese leaders had been seeking this outcome and the army had been mobilized since 1914, it would still take time before the necessary units could be gathered and trained sufficiently. The British, French, and Portuguese planners met to hammer out the details for how the Portuguese army would be equipped and where it would be stationed on the front. Ultimately, it was decided that the Portuguese would fight alongside the British in Northern France and Flanders. The infantry would be supplied with British arms and equipment to ease logistical concerns. A separate artillery unit would be supplied by the British as well, but it would operate under French command in a different sector. The first Portuguese troops landed in France on February 2, 1917, nearly eleven months after formally entering the war. After further training and equipping, the first units of the Corpo Expedicionário Português (CEP) would take their places in the front lines on April 3. Over the following year, the CEP would grow to two divisions with a total of 55,000 men, initially under the command of General Fernando Tamagnini de Abreu.

The section of the front the Portuguese occupied was relatively quiet. This was on purpose as it allowed the British pull out two of its divisions to use elsewhere. That is not to say that the sector was safe or inactive, however. The first Portuguese fatality on the Western Front was António Gonçalves Curado, who was killed by mortar fire on April 4. Portuguese troops treated their assignments seriously and sought out opportunities to take the fight to the Germans. The Portuguese patrolled often and conducted trench raids to capture prisoners and gather intelligence on enemy displacements. Throughout the rest of 1917 and first months of 1918, the Portuguese proved to be competent soldiers when trained and equipped properly. The primary problems that would torment the CEP, however, came from back home. Political instability had become the norm, and a de facto military junta came to power when army officer Sidónio Pais became prime minister in December 1917. In spite of the army having immense political influence, public opinion had never been strongly in favor of joining the war in the first place, and each successive government (including the junta) found it easier to ignore the problems that come with organizing and supplying a military campaign far from home. Over time, reinforcements began to dwindle, and the amount of time units spent at the front grew to ridiculous lengths. Whereas their British counterparts would cycle in and out of the front line trenches every few weeks, Portuguese soldiers had to stay for months at a time. The Portuguese logistical situation was poor and there were simply not enough spare men to go around. For their part, the British did very little to help and did not offer to replace the CEP in the line to allow for rest and refitting until spring 1918. The timing could not have been worse, because the battle that was coming would prove catastrophic for the British and the Portuguese especially.

East African Campaign

Meanwhile, the war was also being fought thousands of miles away in East Africa. German East Africa (modern day Tanzania) had been the location of major fighting since the war began, and by the time the Portuguese had formally joined the war, the German troops in the colony had begun a successful guerilla campaign against the British and Belgian invaders from the neighboring colonies. Once Portugal had formally joined the war in 1916, it sent an expedition of 4,500 metropolitan troops to Mozambique in July to shore up the colonial garrison of around 5,000 African askaris. Minor efforts were made to cross the southern border of German East Africa by Portuguese troops, but these were unsuccessful. By September of that year, the Germans had been pushed to the southern third of their colony by British and Belgian advances from the north and west respectively. At the forceful encouragement of the politicians back in Lisbon to take a more active role in the campaign, Portuguese troops launched a larger attack across the Rovuma River into the German colony. After some initial success, this attack too was pushed back across the border in October. The border area between the Portuguese and German colonies remained relatively quiet for a year. Portuguese leaders were doubtful of the value of their African colonial units and instead relied disproportionately on the metropolitan units sent all the way from Portugal. In fact, Portugal was the only country involved in the East African campaign to send significant numbers of European troops to the region. Regardless of where the Portuguese troops originated from, the German-led colonial units proved to be more effective than virtually all of the Portuguese units that fought against them. After the failed offensive, another expedition was sent from Portugal to reinforce their depleted units during the first half of 1917.

As the Allies in the north continued to press the Germans into a smaller pocket of their colony, the German commander Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck decided to invade Mozambique to acquire supplies and some breathing space for his troops. In late November 1917, the Germans attacked across the Rovuma and routed the Portuguese defenders for very few losses. With few exceptions, the Portuguese faired very poorly and the Germans captured vast quantities of food supplies, clothing, and weapons that they would put to good use for the rest of the war. British-led troops were landed on the northern coast of Mozambique to reinforce their Portuguese allies, but this only partially stabilized the situation. Von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces remained at large in Mozambique until late September 1918 when they crossed back into German East Africa and then on into Northern Rhodesia (modern day Zambia). The war ended a month and a half later with the German forces in East Africa being the last Central Powers troops to surrender on November 25, 1918. The Portuguese performance during the East African campaign was their worst showing of the war. Poor leadership, insufficient training, low morale, and ill health all contributed. The only territorial gain awarded to Portugal for its participation in the war was the Kionga Triangle at the mouth of the Rovuma River. It was a small, economically insignificant area of muddy land that seems to be symbolic of Portugal’s poor fortunes during the campaign.

The German Spring Offensives and the Battle of the Lys

On March 21, 1918, the first phase of the German Spring Offensives began, with the primary aims of pushing the British army back towards the sea and gaining a stronger position before the arrival of significant American forces on the front could tip the balance in the Allies’ favor permanently. The Lys Offensive, or Operation Georgette, would be the second major effort of the offensives, and focused on the Franco-Belgian border area. By April 1918, the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the CEP had been at the front without break for nine and five months respectively. The 1st Division had been scheduled to start cycling out of the line in March, but the German attacks further south delayed this for nearly three weeks. The 1st Division was finally pulled out of the line on April 6, but it was not replaced by any British units. This left the 2nd Division to spread itself thin to cover several miles of the front lines by itself in the meantime. Three days later, on April 9, Operation Georgette began. Twelve German divisions attacked the weakest sector of the line, that was held by the Portuguese 2nd Division and the British 40th Division. The Germans had not specifically targeted the sector because it was held by the Portuguese, but they could not have picked a better time to take advantage of its particularly weak disposition. The British and Portuguese units in the area fought back as hard as they could but were quickly overrun and those that could began to retreat. That day thousands of Portuguese soldiers were either killed or captured and, after a year of frontline operations, the CEP had effectively ceased to exist as a unified fighting force.

Although the German Spring Offensives of 1918 were ultimately unsuccessful, they did provide a severe shock to the Allies and showed that the German army would be a very difficult opponent in the coming months. The entire British line had been defeated during the early days of Operation Georgette, and the generals looked for a reason. A convenient scapegoat was found in their Portuguese allies. False claims were made that the Portuguese troops had fled without fighting and left the British units on their flanks dangerously exposed. This had not been the case, and, if anything, the Portuguese had fought as hard as any of the men that were unfortunate enough to be at the front that day. Unfortunately, the British unit histories from the time maintained the narrative that the Portuguese had shamefully faltered and condemned their allies to an ignominious defeat. The fact is that the CEP had been neglected by its government at home and its allies at the front. There was no lack of courage in the average Portuguese soldier, but this can only go so far. It was inevitable that they would not be able to hold in the event of a major attack. The Portuguese army, although still based in France, would not contribute any significant forces to frontline operations for the remainder of the war.

Conclusion

History has not been kind to the fighting men of Portugal during World War I. The memory of their exploits, limited as it is, has been defined by their failures. The burden of the most spectacular of these failures, as previously described, was unduly placed on the CEP in order to save the reputation of a supposed ally. The fact of the matter is that the Portuguese contribution to the First World War was a mixed bag. Its performance in the African theaters was mediocre at best and shambolic at worst. The performance of the CEP on the Western Front, however, was of a much higher quality. In spite of the considerable failings of the British and Portuguese leadership, the CEP was generally better led, equipped, and motivated than their countrymen further afield. Over the course of a year, the Portuguese soldiers in northern France proved that they were perfectly capable of fighting in the full complexities and horrors of modern warfare. The CEP was in the wrong place at the wrong time and has paid for this unfortunate circumstance for over a century. Overall, Portugal lost approximately 8,700 European and colonial troops during the war: 657 in Angola, 2,103 in France, and 5,961 in Mozambique (mostly due to illness).  One can only hope that the legacy of the Portuguese war effort can be rehabilitated now that it is clear that its poor reputation was largely manufactured by British historians during and immediately after the war. Today, there are a handful of solemn reminders of the sacrifice of the Portuguese soldiers. Most, of course, are located in various cities throughout Portugal. There are two, however, in France. One is a memorial sculpture outside the Catholic church in the town of La Couture in northern France, not far from the Belgian border. The other is located in the nearby town of Richebourg. Here is the Portuguese Military Cemetery, where almost 2,000 Portuguese soldiers are buried. Although these sites are small compared to the many other Great War monuments scattered throughout the region, they at least offer a quiet dignity to the men so long maligned and forgotten.

What do you think of the role of Portugal in World War I? Let us know below.

Now read about Portugal during World War II here.

References

Abbott, Peter. “Armies in East Africa 1914-18.” Oxford, United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, 2002.

Barroso, Luís. “A Primeira Guerra Mundial em Angola: O Ataque Preemptivo a Naulila.” Relações Internacionais, September 2015, pp. 127-148. http://www.ipri.pt/images/publicacoes/revista_ri/pdf/ri47/n47a07.pdf

Duarte, António Paulo, and Bruno Cardoso Reis. “O Debate Historiográfico sobre a Grande Guerra de 1914-1918.” Nação e Defesa, 2014, pp. 100-122. https://repositorio.ul.pt/bitstream/10451/17732/1/ICS_BCReis_Defesa_ARN.pdf

Pyles, Jesse. “The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in World War I: From Inception to Combat Destruction, 1914-1918.” University of North Texas, May 2012. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc115143/m2/1/high_res_d/thesis.pdf

Tavares, João Moreira. “War Losses (Portugal).” 1914-1918 Online, April 2020. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/pdf/1914-1918-Online-war_losses_portugal-2020-04-20.pdf

How the US Misjudged Fidel Castro: Part 3 - Fidel Goes to the US

At the moment of Fidel Castro's triumphant entry into Havana, Cuba on January 9, 1959, the charismatic revolutionary leader was a relatively unknown quantity. Many are surprised to discover that Castro at first enjoyed much popular support in this country. Early reports on the rebel leader featured positive, if sometimes guarded, reactions. Even Ed Sullivan, America’s premier show man, got caught up in the excitement. He journeyed to Cuba himself to interview the victorious rebel leader shortly after the latter’s entry into Havana. He was but one of myriad journalists who descended on Cuba to cover the exciting changes in the island.

In this series, Victor Gamma returns and considers how the US misjudged Fidel Castro. Here, we look at Castro’s visit to the US in 1959 and how Castro had consolidated his anti-American rule by 1960.

If you missed it, read part 1 on Cuba before the revolution here, and part 2 on when Fidel took power here.

Fidel Castro in Washington, D.C. in 1959.

In the provisional government set up by the revolutionaries, calm heads appeared to prevail. Castro also promised elections in eighteen months. The cabinet included José Miró Cardona as prime minister. This distinguished lawyer had fought with Castro for years. Once installed as prime minister on January 6, 1959, he began working to move Cuba towards a constitutional democracy. But in a move reminiscent of dictators, Castro ended up with Cardona’s job less than two months later when Cardona resigned. "I cannot run my office while another man is trying to run it from behind a microphone," Cardona complained. Ultimately, the environment in Cuba became so toxic for anyone daring to express opposition to Castro’s policies that Cardona fled Cuba. On March 3 the Castro government began a policy of nationalization and expropriation.

By the time of Castro’s visit to the United States that April, Castro’s anti-American rhetoric, his publicly stated intentions to nationalize the Cuban economy, including foreign property and his association with extreme leftists such as Che Guevara continued to sound alarm bells. The Eisenhower administration, in fact, came close to canceling Castro’s first visit. This option was discussed at a meeting of the National Security Council at Washington on March 26, 1959, just prior to Castro’s arrival in the US. On the one hand, ugly signs of an imminent dictatorship were noted. Castro’s tendency to  fall back on public tirades to galvanize support, rather than taking sound administrative steps. The opinion of the CIA was that Cuba’s new leader was “moving toward outright dictatorship.” Additionally, communists were now playing an ever greater role in the new Cuba. Further dire warnings were delivered by eyewitnesses. Castro took such actions as jailing old comrades who resigned in opposition to the growing influence of communists in the revolutionary Cuban government. The day before the meeting a telegram arrived from Gonzalo Facio, the former Costa Rican Ambassador to the US. Facio had gone with José Figueres, former president of that republic, to Havana in March. He related that in Figueres’ view Castro’s policies were characterized by “extreme, unreasoning nationalism including anti-Americanism and communism.” At the NSC meeting various options were discussed: including a refusal to allow Castro entry into the country or goading the OAS into action against him. It was decided, however, that the negative impact of these measures would outweigh the benefits.

Washington

Controversy continued to swirl about the charismatic revolutionary upon his arrival at National Airport in Washington on April 15, 1959. Senator Smathers of Florida accused Castro of supporting violent revolutionary movements. Raphael Del Pino, a one-time supporter of Castro, now hurled accusations of dictatorship and sought to alert Americans to the danger of a “Communist-controlled beach head within 90 miles of the United States mainland.” Many Americans worried about the executions going on in Cuba, Castro’s ambitions and rumors that he intended to nationalize and confiscate American investments and holdings in Cuba., Richard Roy Rubottom, Jr. called him a “dangerous nationalist” and expressed "grave doubts concerning the character and motivation" of their celebrated visitor. Reports of on-going executions and Castor’s refusal to hold elections began to generate criticism and finally drove some. Democratic media such as The Atlantic and the New Republic to join the chorus questioning the genuineness of Castro’s assertions that he was a democrat.

None of this seemed to dampen the excitement of his whirlwind tour, though. Castro was feted everywhere and given free reign to make his case. To many, it looked like we had made a friend; he placed a wreath at George Washington’s tomb and the Tomb of the Unknown soldier. He sampled such staples of Americana as hot dogs and hamburgers at Yankee Stadium. Fidel publicly projected an image of moderation. He said nothing in support of the Soviet Union and repeatedly denied that his movement was even affiliated with communists. He even declared publicly, “We are against all kinds of dictators  . . . That is why we are against communism.” A highlight of Castro’s visit was a one-on-one session with Vice President Nixon. He met with Castro privately and concluded that Castro was “either incredibly naive about communism or under communist discipline — my guess is the former.” Unfortunately, these sentiments were not a matter of public record and, upon Castro’s return to Cuba, American policy was still miserably uncertain. This uncertainty would not last for long.

Back in Cuba

The actions of Castro himself in the next few months began to dissolve any remaining doubts about the dynamic Cuban leader and the worst fears of U.S. officials began to be realized. If not a communist by name, he imitated one very well. He continued to show no sympathy for the middle class, a steady stream of which headed to Miami rather than live in Cuba. Middle class disenchantment stemmed from many causes: a crackdown on religion, including confiscation of church property and the jailing of clerics and the banning of various religious expressions. On May 17, the First Law of Agrarian Reform began the process of land expropriation.  In July the communist lawyer Osvaldo Dorticós replaced Manuel Urrutia as president.  By that Fall, it had become dangerous to question the regime. For example, Huber Matos, who had fought alongside Castro. opposed the drift of the regime towards marxism. For this he found himself jailed for 20 years.

By the end of that year, Castro's cabinet had been purged of moderates. These had been replaced with communists or communist sympathizers. In addition, moderate critics found themselves in prison. Cuba began openly courting the Soviet Union. US policy gradually hardened in opposition, but it was not until March 1960 that US policy called for outright removal of Castro. By then, his power was probably too firm to be uprooted without an all-out invasion.

What do you think about Fidel Castro’s trip to the US in 1959? Let us know below.

Now read Victor’s series on whether Wernher von Braun was a dangerous Nazi or hero of the space race here.