George McClellan: Problematic U.S. Civil War Commander

Major General George McClellan was one of the central figures of the Civil War. He served as commander of the Department of Ohio, the Army of the Potomac, and was Commander-in-Chief of the Union Army for 5 months. Historically, his command decisions have been criticized and his personal qualities are examined minutely. He represents a paradox: a superbly prepared and highly intelligent man who, during his moment on the world stage, failed in almost every task he performed.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

George B. McClellan. Portrait by Mathew Brady.

Background

McClellan came from a wealthy, elite Philadelphia family.  His father was Dr George McClellan, a foremost surgeon of his day and the founder of Jefferson Medical College. A great grandfather was a brigadier general in the Revolutionary War. After attending the University of Pennsylvania for two years, he left to enroll at West Point, where he graduated second in his class at age 19 in 1846, losing the top spot because of weaker drawing skills. He was friends with aristocratic southerners including George Pickett, Cadmus Wilcox and AP Hill.

He was breveted a second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. During the Mexican War he served as an engineer building bridges for Winfield Scott’s army. He was frequently under fire and was breveted to first lieutenant and captain. Since his father was friends with General Scott, he received a coveted spot to perform reconnaissance for the general.

He returned to West Point as an engineering instructor after the war. He was given charge of various engineering projects. He was also sent on a secret mission to Santo Domingo by the Secretary of State to scout its military preparedness. In 1852 he helped to translate a manual on bayonet tactics from French. In 1853, he participated in land surveys to scout a transcontinental railroad route. The route he advised through the Cascade Mountains, Yakima Pass, was known to be impassable during the winter snow. The Governor of Washington territory, himself a top of the class graduate of West Point and a mathematics whiz, had made his own survey. He knew that McClellan hadn’t studied the situation carefully. Time has shown that he missed three greatly superior passes in the near vicinity, which were eventually used for railroads and interstate highways.

He was then appointed By Secretary of War Jefferson Davis as captain of the new First Cavalry Regiment, one of two that would be the proving grounds for the Civil War. Because he spoke French fluently, he was sent to be an observer during the Crimean War. There he conferred with military leaders and the royal families on both sides. He observed the siege of Sebastopol first-hand. His report was hailed for its brilliance. McClellan's observations and insights from the Crimean War played a role in shaping his views on military organization, logistics, and the importance of proper training. He was particularly impressed by the Allied forces' well-organized supply lines, medical services, and use of siege warfare. However, he totally missed the significance of how rifled weapons had changed military strategy, an error that would have substantial repercussions in the conflict ahead. McClellan wrote a cavalry manual and designed a saddle, called the McClellan saddle, which is still in use for ceremonies. This was a promising young man with a great future.

But the fact is, promotion in the small pre-war army was very slow, and McClellan was an ambitious man. At age 31, he resigned to become Chief Engineer of Illinois Central Railroad, a position with a huge increase in salary. There he would be promoted to Vice President and work with an obscure railroad lawyer named Abraham Lincoln.

McClellan was, frankly, bored with railroad management. He served as chief engineer and vice president of the Illinois Central Railroad, and then became president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad in 1860. McClellan supported the presidential campaign of Stephen A. Douglas in the 1860 election. He also married Mary Ellen Marcy, a woman who had fielded 8 prior proposals, rejecting 7 of them, including a prior one from McClellan; the man she had accepted was not liked by her family, so he withdrew. Finally McClellan asked again, and they were married in New York City in May 1860.

Start of the Civil War & Rapid Promotion

The firing at Fort Sumter changed the trajectory of a lot of people’s lives. For McClellan, it was transformative: he found himself a highly regarded and sought after authority on large scale war and tactics, having written two volumes on the subject. He was wanted by the Governors of 3 states to lead their militias, and he settled on Ohio. He was commissioned a major general in the regular army on Amy 14, 1861, outranking everyone except Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, the general-in-chief. McClellan's rapid promotion was partly due to his acquaintance with Salmon P. Chase, Treasury Secretary and former Ohio governor and senator. Once again, political connections moved him rapidly to the top.

After losing First Manassas, Lincoln needed a military leader who could win battles. McClellan had several victories in western Virginia including Rich Mountain and Cheat Mountain, and was being hailed as the “Young Napoleon” and “Napoleon of the Present War” in the press. But the fact is, McClellan’s actions there showed a number of disturbing features that in retrospect were prescient. McClellan failed to attack at Cheat Mountain several times despite action being underway. Colonel Rosecrans was promised reinforcements but McClellan didn’t send them, forcing him to achieve victory on his own; McClellan’s report gave him no credit.  Another subordinate was warned to follow cautiously but then criticized in the report for moving slowly.

Positive Attributes

There can be no doubt that he was a fabulous administrator and logistician. He excelled in organizing and training the Union Army at the start of the war, preparing them for the battles ahead. His meticulous attention to detail and emphasis on discipline contributed to a well-structured and efficient force. Additionally, he implemented effective supply and transportation systems to support his troops. His skills in these administrative tasks were superb and are appropriately admired by all.

Criticisms as Commander in Chief

Throughout his tenure as a commander, McClellan consistently exhibited a tendency to overestimate the strength of his opponents and to be overly cautious in his decision-making, often erring on the side of preserving his own forces rather than aggressively engaging the enemy. McClellan was reluctant to begin his offensives, routinely delayed attacking, demanded an impossible number of reinforcements even though his army greatly outnumbered the enemy, displayed insubordination to the President and civilian leaders, allowed the enemy to escape repeatedly, and retreated several times despite not having lost a battle. He had an inability to create original or innovative ideas, despite being tremendously smart and a quick study. His cautious approach to battle and reluctance to take decisive offensive actions limited his overall success as a military leader.

Over-Cautiousness

Several instances highlight McClellan's consistent pattern of over-cautiousness, which led to missed opportunities and strategic setbacks:

• Peninsula Campaign: McClellan's Peninsula Campaign was marked by his excessive caution. Despite having a numerical advantage over Confederate General Robert E. Lee, McClellan moved slowly and hesitated to press his advantage, allowing Lee to consolidate his forces and ultimately repel McClellan's advances.

• Seven Days' Battles: During the Seven Days' Battles, McClellan's caution led him to withdraw his forces in the face of Lee's attacks, despite having numerical superiority. This retreat allowed Lee to successfully defend Richmond and avoid being decisively defeated.

• Maryland Campaign: After discovering Special Order #191, McClellan has been criticized traditionally as moving slowly. Even though McClellan had gained intelligence indicating that Lee's forces were divided, he still proceeded cautiously. However, recent scholarship has questioned the accuracy of this conclusion.

• Battle of Antietam: This battle became the single bloodiest day in American history, and McClellan's failure to exploit his opportunities to defeat Lee's army decisively was attributed to his caution.

• Following the Battle of Antietam, McClellan was slow to pursue Lee's retreating army, allowing them to escape across the Potomac River into Confederate territory. His hesitation to pursue and engage the enemy hindered the Union's success in taking advantage of its tactical success.

Repeated Inflated Estimates of Enemy Strength

McClellan’s propensity to inflate enemy troop numbers occurred so routinely that it’s beyond possibility that it wasn’t intentional, and perhaps psychologically motivated.

The pattern of inflating enemy troop numbers was a recurring theme that marked McClellan's career. McClellan doubled the number of troops he had defeated at Rich Mountain, making his victory appear spectacular. He tripled the number of actual troops facing him across the Potomac, leading to a crisis sense and elevation to commander in chief. In the Peninsula Campaign, the process reached its zenith: hyper-inflate the numbers of the enemy, lament about what was necessary to win, when it was impossible to provide that number to reluctantly proceed anyway, and blame superiors if victory wasn’t achieved.

Procrastination

McClellan’s fatal flaw as general was that he was viewed as a procrastinator. His continual delays and refusal to move against the Confederates allowed them to call in reinforcements and win key battles with less than half the manpower.  McClellan had a long history of delaying attacks. Maybe he thought that he had to plan in great detail before launching them. But these delays were never beneficial and never justifiable. His delay to initiate the battle at Antietam cost him a decisive victory and ultimately led to his dismissal.

He was an excellent administrative general, but as a tactician he was incapable of taking chances, and war is all about chances. Strategically he really wasn’t bad: Peninsula was an interesting idea but he did not follow through tactically. He wanted to cross the James, as Grant would do 2 years later, but was denied. He had a great advantage at Antietam and won, but he failed to pursue the enemy. He might have been incapable of responding creatively to the real time exigencies of battle.  He could not creatively adjust his plan. Thus, at Antietam, when his plan of assault did not unfold like a predetermined Napoleonic success, he was unable to develop any new concepts on the spot to adapt to the changed circumstances.

It is also possible that there were cynical benefits to General McClellan's exaggerated reports of the enemy's size. By consistently overestimating the enemy's strength, McClellan could have positioned himself as the savior of the Union, creating a narrative that he was the only one capable of defending against such a formidable foe. This could have enhanced his political stature and potentially garnered more support from certain factions. McClellan's tendency to exaggerate the enemy's strength could have provided him with a convenient excuse for his reluctance to engage in battle or take more aggressive actions. This allowed him to avoid the risks associated with decisive battles, while placing the blame on the perceived overwhelming enemy forces .And, by portraying the enemy as stronger than they actually were, McClellan might have been able to secure additional resources, troops, and supplies for his own forces. This could have allowed him to build up a larger and more well-equipped army, potentially boosting his own reputation in the process. Finally, the exaggerated reports could have been a way for McClellan to deflect blame for any failures or setbacks onto the supposedly formidable enemy forces. By doing so, he could have avoided taking responsibility for any missteps in his own strategy or decision-making.

Psychological Profile

Psychological profiling of historical figure is fraught with hazard. Nevertheless, historians have found McClellan to be an excellent subject for this kind of analysis. McClellan has been portrayed as “… proud, sensitive, overwrought, tentative, quick to exult and to despair”. He was a competent administrator and engineer who had no skill at winning battles. McClellan's actions and exaggerations might have been influenced not only by strategic considerations but also by his own ambitions and self-preservation. His reluctance to engage in battle can be attributed in part to his fear of failure. His job was to lead, he was supposed to be a great leader, but he was afraid to be wrong. McClellan was more concerned with not losing than with winning. In his mind, as the fate of the Union rested on his shoulders, he could not allow a defeat.

Stephen Sears wrote: “There is indeed ample evidence that the terrible stresses of commanding men in battle, especially the beloved men of his beloved Army of the Potomac, left his moral courage in tatters. Under the pressure of his ultimate soldier's responsibility, the will to command deserted him. Glendale and Malvern Hill found him at the peak of his anguish during the Seven Days, and he fled those fields to escape the responsibility. At Antietam, where there was nowhere for him to flee to, he fell into a paralysis of indecision.”

A fragile ego covered by conceit was reflected in many of his letters to his wife.

He had to build himself up because in fact he lacked self-confidence. McClellan often suggested that divine intervention had chosen him to save the Union. McClellan frequently thanked God for allowing him to be the deliverer of the nation. His letters to Ellen Marcy, his wife, have been widely quoted in this regard (see Table). Many of the letters were intentionally destroyed or burned in a fire after the war, and there is a great deal of speculation as to exactly why the ones that remained still exist. Allan Nevins wrote, "Students of history must always be grateful McClellan so frankly exposed his own weaknesses” in his memoirs.

************************************************************************

Some well-known quotes from his letters to his wife:

“I find myself in a new and strange position here: President, cabinet, Gen. Scott, and all deferring to me. By some strange operation of magic I seem to have become the power of the land … I almost think that were I to win some small success now I could become Dictator. . . . But nothing of that kind would please me. Therefore I won't be Dictator. Admirable self denial!”

“Half a dozen of the oldest made the remark . . . ‘Why how young you look — yet an old soldier!! ... It seems to strike everybody that I am very young. . . . Who would have thought when we were married that I should so soon be called upon to save my country?”

“The President is no more than a well-meaning baboon. I went to the White House directly after tea, where I found "The Original Gorilla", about as intelligent as ever. What a specimen to be at the head of our affairs now.”

““It may be that at some distant day I too shall totter away from” Washington, “a worn out old soldier. . . . Should I ever become vainglorious & ambitious remind me of that spectacle.”

“I ought to take good care of these men. I believe they love me from the bottom of their hearts. I can see it in their faces when I pass among them.”

************************************************************************

Doris Kearns Goodwin wrote that a review of his personal correspondence during the war, especially with his wife, reveals “a tendency for self-aggrandizement and unwarranted self-congratulation.” McClellan thought of himself as the only man who could save the union, and was willing to sacrifice anything and anyone—mentors, colleagues, his own men—to further his ambition.  In that sense, George McClellan's memoirs and letters provide some indications of his personality and mindset, and a narcissistic tendency is suggested. But drawing definitive conclusions about his psychological condition, such as labeling him as a narcissist, solely based on these sources can be misleading.

In contradistinction, Lincoln had failed in life before; he made himself a success by hard work and careful thought, and wasn’t afraid of risk. McClellan had been handed everything, had always come out on top, and was afraid to fail. In war, as in much of life, fortune favors the bold. McClellan’s fear of failure and routine promotions on the basis of political connections would be his downfall.

Relationship with President Lincoln

The personal and professional conflict between General McClellan and President Lincoln that manifest in 1862, and continued into the election of 1864, is one of the fascinating subthemes of Lincoln’s presidency. Lincoln and General McClellan didn’t like one another and didn’t get along well. McClellan believed he had a superior education and family background; Lincoln knew he was being looked down upon, but with his superior emotional quotient, he knew that what was important was getting victories, and if this man could, then he would put up with him.

They originally met before the war: Lincoln was an attorney for the Illinois railroad and the two spent time together between cases. He saw Lincoln as socially inferior and intellectually not nearly on his level. He found the country stories Lincoln told to be below him.

Once the war began, Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan clashed repeatedly. McClellan constantly ignored Lincoln’s orders, and did not share his plans with anyone including the president. McClellan let it be known that he had contempt for Lincoln. He called him the ‘original gorilla’ in public. On November 13, 1861, Lincoln Seward and Hay stopped at McClellan’s home to visit with him. McClellan was out, so the trio waited for his return. After an hour, McClellan came in and was told by a porter that the guests were waiting. McClellan headed for his room without a word, and only after Lincoln waited another half-hour was the group informed of McClellan’s retirement to bed.

Historian William C. Davis wrote that in 1861, “believing what the press and an admiring circle of sycophants on his staff and high command said about him, Little Mac bristled at being subordinate to the civil authority, and especially to Lincoln, of whom he almost instantly developed a condescending and patronizing opinion. He not only regarded the president as his intellectual and social inferior, but also passed on that attitude to those around him – or even fostered it.”

Famously, President Lincoln came to visit General McClellan on October 3rd. As you can see from the photo by Alexander Gardner, the temperature of the meeting was frosty.  Abraham Lincoln spent four days travelling over the field, just two weeks after the guns fell silent. He met with McClellan, trying to prod his young Napoleon into action, met with other generals, and with thousands of wounded soldiers, Including both Union and Confederate. His trip was well-documented, and the photos of his visit are among the most famous of the entire war.

Lincoln expected McClellan to pursue Lee and engage him in a decisive battle as soon as possible. Although the Union outnumbered the Confederate army by almost three to one, McClellan did not move his army for over a month. McClellan overestimated the size of Lee’s force, suggesting that 100,000 troops were in his command, when he likely had just more than half that number. McClellan also noted that his requisitions for supplies had not been filled. Although traditionally these complaints are dismissed as a manufactured excuse, substantial documentation suggests that McClellan had a genuine supply crisis.

It may be that top Lincoln administration officials ruined his reputation intentionally for political reasons. Knowing that he was popular with the troops and a Democrat, they could see where 1864 was leading. That is not to say that McClellan wasn’t slow at times, but it may have been exaggerated in retrospect when he became Lincoln’s opponent.

What were McClellan’s political opinions about slavery, defeating the South, and his post bellum vision?

McClellan’s view on how the war should be prosecuted differed significantly from Mr. Lincoln’s views. McClellan was a Democrat. He was anti-emancipation. He made clear also his opposition to abolition or seizure of slaves as a war tactic, which put him at odds with the executive branch and some of his subordinates. He had a set of political beliefs almost completely at odds with the Republican Party, the party in power. Most of the officers in the United States Army were Democrats. The army was a conservative institution and many of these officers didn’t agree with the vision for the United States that many of the Republicans had, especially the radical Republicans in Congress, who even departed more radically from Lincoln.

What McClellan wanted to do was to restore the Union to what it had been. He was very happy with that Union. And that was not going to be possible during the war once it had gone past a certain point. McClellan was very clear about what kind of war he wanted. He wanted to beat the Rebels just enough to persuade them to come back under the Union. He didn’t want to slaughter their armies. He didn’t want to overturn their civilization, and he wanted to keep emancipation out of the picture.

McClellan had different views about race and southern aristocracy then we do today and that Lincoln had then: but he was not a traitor, and he did want to win the war, not lose it. McClellan emphasized the fact that he previously led the Union military effort in the War and that he was and remained committed to "the restoration of the Union in all its integrity" and that the massive sacrifices that the Union endured should not be in vain.

As he wrote to one influential Northern Democratic friend, and I’m quoting him here, “Help me to dodge the n____. I’m fighting to preserve the integrity of the Union.” That’s McClellan’s take on the war. He was not fighting to free the slaves, and he was not alone. McClellan almost never spoke of African Americans, and when he did it was always in disparaging terms. McClellan was a quiet racist, one who wanted to ensure that the Civil War ended soon so that the question of black emancipation would not become the leading element.

Now, it must be emphasized that up to that stage of the war, Lincoln was also highlighting union and not slavery. He downplayed emancipation because he thought it would alienate the border states, and he wanted to make sure that they stayed in line. After Antietam, Lincoln thought the North was ready for emancipation, but McClellan never changed his attitude.

Quotes from President Lincoln’s Letters to General McClellan

“After you left, I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington, and Manassas Junction … My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of Army Corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected– It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell– … I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Mannassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was not satisfied…”

“There is a curious mystery about the number of the troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War, a statement, taken as he said, from your own returns, making 108.000 then with you, and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85.000, when all en route to you shall have reached you– How can the discrepancy of 23.000 be accounted for?” (April 7, 1862)

“And, once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow– I am powerless to help this– You will do me the justice to remember that I always insisted, that going down the Bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty — that we would find the same enemy, and the same, or equal, intrenchments, at either place– The country will not fail to note — is now noting — that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy, is but the story of Manassas repeated–“

“You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?” (October 13, 1862)

“Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is “to operate upon the enemy’s communications as much as possible without exposing your own.” You seem to act as if this applies against you, but can not apply in your favor.”

“I have just read your despatch about sore tongued and fatiegued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigue anything?”

************************************************************************

The 1864 Presidential election

By the summer of 1864, the Civil War had gone on for over three years. Over 250,000 Union soldiers had been killed, with many more injured permanently. Victory was not yet in sight. Democrats knew that many of the policies of Lincoln  were not popular, including many of those we take today as the reason for the conflict, such as emancipation, the military draft, the use of black troops, and violations of civil liberties. Democrats further suggested that the Republicans were advocating in favor of miscegenation and trying to destroy the traditional race relations. They believed they could win, and famously, Lincoln thought that too.

But then the Democratic Party blundered. The convention adopted proposals by Copperheads like Clement  Vallandigham calling for a cease fire and a negotiated settlement to the war; but then they selected George McClellan as their candidate. His central argument was that he could win the war sooner and with fewer casualties than Lincoln & Grant. He did not run on a platform of surrender, as is often alleged.

To get the nomination, McClellan had to defeat his opponents Horatio Seymour, New York Governor, and Thomas Seymour, Connecticut governor. Both were real “peace” candidates. Once he was nominated McClellan repudiated the Democratic Party platform. As a result, whatever message intended to be sent to separate their views from Lincoln was garbled. McClellan’s campaign floundered as his repudiation of the peace plank in the Democratic platform provoked discord.

As late as August 23, Lincoln considered it “exceedingly probable” that he would not be reelected. He thought the copperheads would force McClellan into accepting a negotiated settlement, so he made his Cabinet secretly promise to cooperate with McClellan if he won the election to win the war by the time that McClellan will be inaugurated.

Many civil war histories suggest that the victories at Atlanta and the Overland Campaign changed public opinion from the summer of 1864, and surely they did. But a good part of the reason Lincoln was re-elected was that the Democratic Party self-destructed in the campaign.

History books gloss over the closeness of the popular vote. They cite that Lincoln received over 90% of the total electoral votes (212 versus 21 for McClellan). But a 10% margin is relatively close under the circumstances. McClellan ran against Abraham Lincoln, a sitting president, our greatest president, as the war was being won; and garnered 45% of the popular vote. Not only isn’t that pretty under the circumstances of voting against a sitting president in a war (the US has NEVER done this), but the Democratic Party of the 19th century was a fundamentally southern party.  In other words, McClellan got 9/20 votes in a population that was northern, running on a platform of stopping the war and reversing emancipation. Moreover, McClellan won 48% of the total vote in a bloc of states stretching from Connecticut to Illinois (Lincoln's home state); Lincoln underperformed in 1864 relative to 1860 in several crucial U.S. states (such as New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana); and that the Republicans lost the Governorship in his (McClellan's) home state of New Jersey.

What do you think of George McClellan? Let us know below.

Now, read Lloyd’s article on the Battle of Fort Sumter and the beginning of the U.S. Civil War here.

References

• https://www.historynet.com/george-mcclellan/#:~:text=He%20graduated%20second%20in%20his,through%20often%20rugged%2C%20inhospitable%20terrain.

• https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-rocky-relationship-between-abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2088&context=etd#:~:text=McClellan%20loved%20his%20troops%20and%20they%2C%20in%20turn%2C,of%20the%20relationships%20he%20developed%20while%20in%20command

• https://www.historynet.com/mcclellans-war-winning-strategy/

• https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/civil-war-gen-george-mcclellan-deemed-a-savior-then-a-failure/2011/09/21/gIQAfpF6SL_story.html

• https://www.wondriumdaily.com/american-civil-war-the-fault-lines-in-the-lincoln-mcclellan-relationship/   

• https://www.abrahamlincolnsclassroom.org/abraham-lincolns-contemporaries/abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-rocky-relationship-between-abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. ISBN 0-306-80913-3.

• Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-X.

• Bonekemper, Edward H. McClellan and failure. McFarland & Co, 2007

• Waugh, John C. Lincoln and McClellan: The Troubled Partnership Between a President and His General. Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2010

• Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Team of Rivals, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.

The Early History of U.S. Presidential Campaigns

Since the founding of the nation, this United States has had a president in office. This fact has not changed over the years, but the campaign leading up to the election has. In the country’s formative years, it was practically unheard of for a presidential candidate to actively campaign for office. However, over the years this changed. Richard Bluttal explains.

American photographer Mathew Brady, 1875.

In the early years of presidential campaigns, it was up to local supporters to organize campaign events and speak on their behalf. Parades, rallies, and stump speeches by surrogates were followed on Election Day by voter drives in taverns and on the streets. Partisan newspapers were another part of the mix aligning themselves with a particular party and openly slanting news coverage to favor allies and excoriate enemies. Commercial publishers quickly realized they could make money by printing and selling broadsides, cards, and prints depicting the candidates of all parties.

In American presidential campaigns from 1789 through the 1820s, Presidential candidates thought it was undignified to campaign. Political parties were embryonic and in flux – nothing like the organizational powerhouses they are today. Before the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 there was no mass electorate. In most states, legislatures, not citizens, chose presidential electors. Enslaved people, free women, and free propertyless men – constituting most of the adult population at the time – were denied the vote. Throughout this period, however, both an electorate and campaign machinery began to develop.

From 1800 onward presidential campaign songs and songbooks filled the air at rallies, parades, and debates. A watershed moment in campaign music history occurred during the 1840 campaign of General William Henry Harrison against incumbent President Martin van Buren. “Tippecanoe and Tyler Too” was the official song supporting Harrison and his running mate, John Tyler. Harrison had defeated American Indians at the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811 and helped defeat the British in 1812. Like almost every other campaign song in every presidential campaign going forward, this song was a contrafactum: a popular preexisting tune matched to new lyrics. Set to the tune of Yankee Doodle, the chorus declared “Old Zack Taylor! Keep Him up! / Honest, Rough and Ready! / We’ve a voucher in his life / He’s good as he is steady.”

By the early 1830s, cheap newspapers, known as the “penny press,” allied themselves with political parties, and a growing network of roads, canals and railroads began to carry political information nationwide.

1830s

The Democratic Party’s first association with the donkey came about during the 1828 campaign of Democrat Andrew Jackson. Running on a populist platform (by the people, for the people) and using a slogan of “Let the People Rule,” Jackson’s opponents referred to him as a jackass (donkey). Much to their chagrin, Jackson incorporated the jackass into his campaign posters. During Jackson’s presidency the donkey was used to symbolize his stubbornness by his opponents.

By the election of 1860, parades, banners and music were part of the political landscape, as were newspapers that openly supported political parties. Advances in printing technology by the mid-19th century allowed Americans to express their political sympathies through their choice of cigars and stationery. Cigar box labels in 1860 included images of Republican presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln and his democratic opponent, Stephen A. Douglas. For those who might have heard of “Honest Old Abe” and the “Little Giant” but had never seen their likenesses in print, the cigar box label introduced the candidates’ faces to the public. In early March 1860, Abraham Lincoln spoke in Hartford, Connecticut, against the spread of slavery and for the right of workers to strike. Five store clerks, who had started a Republican group called the Wide Awakes, decided to join a parade for Lincoln, who delighted in the torchlight escort back to his hotel provided for him after his speech. Over the ensuing weeks, the Lincoln campaign made plans to develop Wide Awakes throughout the country and to use them to spearhead large voter registration drives, since they knew that new voters and young voters tend to embrace new and young parties.

Members of the Wide Awakes were described by the New York Times as "young men of character and energy, earnest in their Republican convictions and enthusiastic in prosecuting the canvass on which we have entered." In Chicago, on October 3, 1860, 10,000 Wide Awakes marched in a three-mile procession.

Mathew Brady

Mathew Brady was one of the earliest American photographers and the owner of a successful photography studio. He photographed celebrities, presidents, and, most famously, scenes of his country’s Civil War. From 1860 to 1864. Those picturing President Lincoln—in particular a portrait taken on February 27, 1860, after the speech at The Cooper Union, in New York City, which launched his presidential campaign—sold widely. A number of acclaimed historians believe that his portrait of Lincoln that went nation wide was greatly instrumental in Lincoln being elected President.

Political buttons touting presidential candidates increased in popularity during the 19th century. Metal campaign buttons were available in 1860, but the election of 1896 saw the first use of the mass-produced, pin-backed, metal buttons. These became ubiquitous and collectible in 20th-century presidential campaigns and remain so today.

The earliest connection of the elephant to the Republican Party was an illustration in an 1864 Abraham Lincoln presidential campaign newspaper, Father Abraham. It showed an elephant holding a banner and celebrating Union victories. During the Civil War, “seeing the elephant” was slang for engaging in combat so the elephant was a logical choice to represent successful battles.

Thomas Nast, his cartoons, and those by his predecessors and contemporaries, were published in mass market magazines—as well as in newspapers and as separate, sheet prints are credited with widely influencing voters at a time when most would never see or hear their White House candidate in person. Instead, the public read campaign materials, attended barbecues, picnics, parades, mass meetings, and rallies. Campaign songs written about candidates fit right into a culture where singing was popular. Many of these early voter solicitation activities are still staples of presidential campaigns today in one form or another. From the 18th through the 19th centuries, these political cartoons were a popular form of political protest and often depicted rival politicians in satirical or unflattering ways and of course are still in use today.

Gilded Age

The Gilded Age (c.1877-1900) presidential elections split between Democrats and Republicans along mostly sectional lines – a legacy of the Civil War. The imagery on Grant’s poster linking him and his running mate to “common man” themes hearkens back to an earlier era as did his decision not to refrain from actively campaigning. Noting that only presidential candidates who had taken to the trail had lost, he declared: “I am no public speaker and I don’t want to be beaten.” The tradition continued with Grover Cleveland in 1888 whose front-porch talks with visitors were published in newspapers and brochures. Smear campaigns persisted through the 19th century. In 1884, supporters of Republican Party candidate James Blaine coined a jingle that alluded to an illegitimate child that his opponent Grover Cleveland had allegedly fathered:

Ma, Ma, where's my Pa?

Gone to the White House,

Ha, ha, ha!

Cleveland's party responded with a tune of their own:

Blaine, Blaine, James G. Blaine,

The Continental Liar from the State of Maine!

Presidential campaigns, however, soon started to shift. Instead of remaining silent, candidates began to give speeches, often referred to as “stump speeches.” William McKinley gave a variant on this during the 1896 campaign when he delivered a speech on his front porch. This became the centerpiece of his so-called “front-porch campaign,” and he continued to deliver speeches from his home. His opponent, William Jennings Bryan, chose instead to conduct a “whistle-stop campaign,” traveling the country by railroad and giving speeches at various train stops.

This 1896 campaign is probably the most famous campaign in U.S. history. It is remembered for Bryan's precedent-shattering speaking tour as well as for the carefully orchestrated and impressive front-porch campaign of William McKinley. An estimated 5 million Americans across 27 states heard one of the 600 passionate and substantive speeches Bryan crave during the campaign. McKinley stayed home but still managed to speak to 750,000 people in the 300 or so speeches he gave. Neither Bryan nor McKinley shied away from issues, the former focusing almost exclusively on free silver while the latter preferred to harp on the virtues of the protective tariff.

McKinley’s 1896 poster shows him as the champion of American capitalism, upholding the gold standard and linking prosperity and American power. Bryan wanted the U.S. on a silver standard which he believed would help workmen and farmers hurt by the depression. Bryan’s famous “Cross of Gold” speech, brilliantly delivered at the Democratic convention on July 9, 1896, secured him the nomination. His vivid language still resonates today.

Conclusion

It used to be considered ill-mannered for presidential candidates to openly campaign for themselves. Times have changed. Presidential campaigns are now billion-dollar operations that involve attack ads, social media strategy, and lots of stump speeches.

What do you think of early U.S. presidential campaigns? Let us know below.

Now read Richard’s article on the role of baseball in the US Civil War here.

The Battle of Fort Sumter & the Beginning of the US Civil War

The firing on Fort Sumter was the immediate action that started the Civil War. Once the Confederates under PGT Beauregard fired on US Federal property, a line had been crossed and a rebellion had begun. At issue was whether federal property in a state that seceded was now property of the new government.

Charleston SC was the most important port on the Southeast coast. The harbor was defended by three federal forts: Sumter; Castle Pinckney, one mile off the city’s Battery; and heavily armed Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan’s Island.

Here, Lloyd W Klein looks at the beginning of the U.S. Civil War.

The attack on Fort Sumter by the Confederacy.

The Construction and Deed to the Fort

The island in Charleston harbor on which Fort Sumter is built was originally just a sand bar. In 1827, engineers performed measurements of the depths and concluded that it was a suitable location for a fort. Construction began in 1829. Seventy thousand tons of granite was transported from New England to build up an essentially artificial island. By 1834, a timber foundation that was several feet beneath the water had been laid. The fort was built in the center of the channel to dominate the entrance to the harbor. Along with the shore batteries at Forts Moultrie, Wagner, and Gregg, the idea was to cover the harbor from invaders. The brick fort was designed to be five-sided, 170 to 190 feet long, with walls five feet thick, standing 50 feet over the low tide mark, and to house 650 men and 135 guns in three tiers of gun emplacements. The majority of the gun emplacements faced out to sea, to cover the entrance to the harbor (not facing the city). Construction dragged on because of title issues, and then problems arose with funding such a large and technically challenging project. Unpleasant weather and disease made it worse. The exterior was finished but the interior and armaments were never completed. On December 17, 1836, South Carolina officially ceded all "right, title and, claim" to the site of Fort Sumter to the United States Government. For these reasons, at the time of the bombardment, not only was this a federal fort, but also it was legally land ceded by the state of South Carolina.

Fort Sumter was covered by a separate cession of land to the United States by the state of South Carolina, and covered in this resolution, passed by the South Carolina legislature in December of 1836.

Reports and Resolutions of the General assembly, Page 115, here: https://www.carolana.com/SC/Legislators/Documents/Reports_and_Resolutions_of_the_General_Assembly_of_South_Carolina_1836.pdf

This resolution was made in response to a private SC citizen claiming ownership, which was denied. There can be no clearer statement that Fort Sumter had been ceded to the US Government by the state of SC.

https://studycivilwar.wordpress.com/2013/04/14/who-owned-fort-sumter/comment-page-1/#comments

In 1805, a prior land resolution of the SC legislature turning over all of the forts in the harbor to the US Government was made. Sumter did not exist at that time, so arguably it didn’t apply, although the language would be inclusive. It can be found on pages 501-502 here: https://books.google.com/books?id=S7E4AAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

South Carolina had freely ceded property in Charleston Harbor to the federal Government in 1805, upon the express condition that "the United States... within three years... repair the fortifications now existing thereon or build such other forts or fortifications as may be deemed most expedient by the Executive of the United States on the same, and keep a garrison or garrisons therein." Failure to comply with this condition on the part of the Government would render "this grant or cession... void and of no effect." Hence, continued development was a condition, which did occur in spurts.

The Crisis Begins

On December 26, 1860, only six days after South Carolina seceded from the Union, Major Robert Anderson abandoned the indefensible Fort Moultrie, spiking its large guns, burning its gun carriages, and taking its smaller cannon with him. He secretly relocated companies E and H (127 men, 13 of them musicians) of the 1st U.S. Artillery to Fort Sumter on his own initiative, without orders from his superiors, because it could not be defended from a land invasion. The fort was still only partially built and fewer than half of the cannons that should have been available were in place.

In a letter delivered January 31, 1861, South Carolina Governor Francis W Pickens demanded that President Buchanan surrender Fort Sumter because "I regard that possession is not consistent with the dignity or safety of the State of South Carolina." Over the next few months repeated calls for the evacuation of Fort Sumter from the government of South Carolina were ignored.

In February 1861 South Carolina's Attorney General, Isaac Hayne sent a letter to the U.S. Secretary of War, John Holt about their intent to take possession of Fort Sumter and wished to negotiate monetary compensation threatening that if the United States refused to vacate, then force would be used to seize it. Holt responded that the United States' interest in Sumter is not that of a proprietor but that of a sovereign which "has absolute jurisdiction over the fort and the soil on which it stands. This jurisdiction consists in the authority to 'exercise exclusive legislation' over the property referred to. and said "the President is, however, relieved from the necessity of further pursuing this inquiry by the fact that, whatever may be the claim of South Carolina to this fort, he has no constitutional power to cede or surrender it. The property of the United States has been acquired by force of public law, and can only be disposed of under the same solemn sanctions. The President, as the head of the executive branch of the Government only, can no more sell and transfer Fort Sumter to South Carolina than he can sell and convey the Capitol of the United States to Maryland, or to any other State or individual seeking to possess it."

Realizing that the garrison at Fort Sumter was undermanned and undersupplied, General Winfield Scott, the General-in-Chief of the US Army, sent the Star of the West to reinforce Anderson. On January 9, 1861, several weeks after South Carolina had seceded from the United States but before other states had done so to form the Confederacy, Star of the West arrived at Charleston Harbor to resupply troops and supplies to the garrison at Fort Sumter. The ship was fired upon by cadets from the Citadel Academy and was hit three times. Although Star of the West suffered no major damage, her captain, John McGowan, considered it to be too dangerous to continue and left the harbor. The mission was abandoned, and Star of the West headed for her home port of New York Harbor.  Even this minimal attempt at strengthening the fort was resisted (Mc266).  President Buchanan had been lukewarm about defending Charleston harbor in the first place and had seriously considered succumbing to southern popular opinion and ordering the defenders back to the indefensible Fort Moultrie.  He had only agreed to this single ship expedition after a cabinet shake-up bringing hardliners Edwin Stanton and Jeremiah Black to his advisory group. Yet in response to this attack on a federal ship, which might itself have triggered the war, he did nothing.

Over the next few months, Jefferson Davis was named president of the Confederacy and Abraham Lincoln inaugurated as US president. Confederate Brigadier General P. G. T. Beauregard was sent to lead the Confederate forces in Charleston, where his command included several thousand state militia and a few dozen seacoast guns and mortars. Davis sent commissioners to Washington to negotiate transfer of the fort. Anderson prepared the fort for battle as best as possible: remarkably, of the 60 guns placed in the fort, only 6 were capable of being turned around to face the town.

Lincoln searched for a political solution for the next 6 weeks. Most of his cabinet, including Scott, advised that he pull the troops out of Fort Sumter because it was indefensible. William Seward, Secretary of State, Simon P. Cameron, Secretary of War, and Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy favored withdrawal. Supporting the fort would require a military force comprised of both army and navy units way beyond what existed. But Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury and Montgomery Blair, the Postmaster General, argued that surrender would diminish morale and would lead to official recognition of the Confederacy. Only Blair opposed the withdrawal firmly because it would convince the rebels that the US administration lacked determination and firmness, would dishearten the Southern Unionists and push the foreign countries to recognize the Confederacy de facto. Moreover, the northern media called on Lincoln to make good his inaugural promise to defend federal property. Lincoln concluded that if the Union troops evacuated Fort Sumter, secession would be a fait accompli.

Lincoln was aware that a large - scale attempt to supply Fort Sumter by firing warships would result in the North as aggressor. It would unite the South and make Lincoln accountable for breaking out a war. Blair provided a person who would find a solution to the problem: Gustavus V. Fox. Fox suggested to supply Fort Sumter via some motorized barges while the US warships, off shore, would intervene only the Confederate guns would fire on the barges. Thus, he sent supplies only, while the warships would be ready to intervene if the Confederate guns had fired on the flotilla. If the Confederates had fired on the unarmed motorized barges hauling supplies only, they would be accountable for having attacked a humanitarian relief mission. At a cabinet meeting on March 28, 1861, the decision was made to send a small flotilla of vessels loaded with supplies. Realizing that Anderson's command would run out of food by April 15, 1861, President Lincoln ordered a fleet of ships, under the command of Gustavus V. Fox, to attempt entry into Charleston Harbor and supply Fort Sumter. It was plainly recognized that this small group of ships could not enter the harbor by surprise and would not be able to reach the fort unless the South Carolina batteries allowed their unfettered passage.  (https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2011/march/sumter-conundrum). Lincoln told Pickens the ships were on their way for re-supply.

Pickens contacted Robert Toombs, the CSA Secretary of State, Robert Toombs, who advised Davis that he was being set up by Lincoln and tricked into starting the war. Nevertheless, a Confederate cabinet meeting on April 9 endorsed Davis’s order to Beauregard to reduce the fort before its arrival. Fearing that a lack of action would revive Southern Unionism, Davis decided the Federal presence had to go, that is, Brigadier General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard was authorized to use the force to surrender Fort Sumter. Retrospectively, Davis would have been wise to have taken Toombs’ advice.  As a fort built to keep out ships, it served no purpose at that moment other than to allow Lincoln to use it as bait to trick the Confederates into starting the war, handing Lincoln reason/pretext and to claim the Confederates fired first.  But Davis  in fact wanted war; it was the only possible way to convince the ambivalent Upper South and border states to secede and join the CSA. Davis had considered attacking Fort Pickens instead, but Braxton Bragg correctly objected because Pickens would have been tough to attack by amphibious warfare and, unlike Sumter, had a secure sea lifeline.

On April 6, 1861, the first ships began to set sail for their rendezvous off the Charleston Bar. The ships assigned were the steam sloops-of-war USS Pawnee and USS Powhatan, transporting motorized launches and about 300 sailors; the USS Pocahontas, Revenue Cutter USRC Harriet Lane, and the steamer Baltic transporting about 200 troops, composed of companies C and D of the 2nd U.S. Artillery; and three hired tugboats with added protection against small arms fire to be used to tow troop and supply barges directly to Fort Sumter. However, the Pocahontas never did make it due to multiple countermanding orders. The first to arrive was Harriet Lane, on the evening of April 11, 1861.

Events Leading to the Bombardment

Also on April 11, Beauregard sent three officers to demand the surrender of the fort: Senator/Colonel James Chesnut, Jr., Captain Stephen D. Lee (later general), and Lieutenant A. R. Chisolm. Anderson declined, and the aides returned to report to Beauregard. After Beauregard had consulted the Confederate Secretary of War, Leroy Walker, he sent the aides back to the fort and authorized Chesnut to decide whether the fort should be taken by force. Anderson, stalling for time, waited until 3 AM April 12 to tell them he would not leave the fort. They then returned to Fort Johnson where Chesnut ordered the firing to begin. So it was that on April 12, 1861 at 4:30 AM, the Civil War began when Confederate batteries opened on the fort. Although Edmund Ruffin, the noted Virginian agronomist and secessionist, claimed that he fired the first shot on Fort Sumter, and did, in fact, fire a signal shot, Lieutenant Henry S. Farley, commanding a battery of two 10-inch siege mortars on James Island actually fired the first shot at 4:30 a.m. No attempt was made by the Union to return the fire for more than two hours because there were no fuses for their explosive shells, which means that they could not explode. Only solid iron balls could be used. At about 7:00 a.m., Captain Abner Doubleday, the fort's second in command, was given the honor of firing the Union's first shot, in defense of the fort. Although he did not invent baseball as the Mills Commission erroneously concluded, in every other way, his life was eventful and fulfilling.

During the bombardment, according to the diary of Mary Chesnut, the Senator’s wife, and other accounts, Charleston residents along what is now known as The Battery, sat on balconies drinking salutes to the start of the hostilities.

The bombardment lasted for 34 hours. The Union return fire was intentionally slow to conserve its ammunition.  The next morning, the fort was surrendered. During the attack, the Union colors fell. Lt. Norman J. Hall risked his life to put them back up, burning off his eyebrows permanently. A Confederate soldier bled to death having been wounded by a misfiring cannon. One Union soldier died and another was mortally wounded during the 47th shot of a 100-shot salute, given after the surrender. For this reason, the salute was shortened to 50 shots.

PGT Beauregard

PGT Beauregard was the perfect combination of military engineer and charismatic Southern leader needed at that time and place.  It is highly suggestive that a man of Beauregard’s accomplishments was there at Charleston – before a war had started. Its also interesting that the South Carolina militia had been called out and that they had cannonballs with fuses but the US Army in the fort did not. These and other factors demonstrate that the new CSA was prepared for a battle. The South Carolina Militia had been in position for months. They were there when Citadel cadets fired on the Star of the West on January 9, 1861. They were on duty the previous December when Anderson abandoned Fort Moultrie for Sumter.

Beauregard was the first Confederate general officer, appointed a brigadier general in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States on March 1, 1861.  His brother in law, James Slidell, was instrumental in convincing Davis to make this appointment. To me, the idea that the Union escalated violence to provoke the war is odd considering that the CSA had created an army at least 6 weeks before firing on Sumter. After the Mexican War, during which he contributed at least as much as Captain Robert E Lee did in terms of reconnaissance and strategy, his positions involved engineering in ports so he was the perfect man for this mission. He had recently been named superintendent of West Point January 23 1861, but these orders were revoked by the Federal Government 5 days later when Louisiana seceded. He returned to New Orleans with the hopes of being named commander of the Louisiana state army. On July 21, he was promoted to full general in the Confederate Army, one of only seven appointed to that rank; his date of rank made him the fifth most senior general, behind Samuel Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, and Joseph E. Johnston. Beauregard was honored in the South for its first victory. He was ordered to direct the troops at Bull Run.

Anderson had been Beauregard’s artillery instructor at West Point in 1837, and Beauregard was serving as superintendent there until secession. Anderson told Washington that Beauregard would guarantee that South Carolina's actions be exercised with "skill and sound judgment." Beauregard wrote to the Confederate government that Anderson was a "most gallant officer". He sent several cases of fine brandy and whiskey and boxes of cigars to Anderson and his officers at Sumter, but Anderson ordered that the gifts be returned.

Aftermath

The state legislature appointed Braxton Bragg on February 20, 1861.Bragg had been a colonel in the Louisiana militia. Aware that Beauregard might resent him, Bragg offered him the rank of colonel. Instead Beauregard enrolled as a private in the "Orleans Guards", a battalion of French Creole aristocrats. At the same time, he communicated with Slidell and the newly chosen President Davis, angling for a senior position in the new Confederate States Army. Rumors that Beauregard would be placed in charge of the entire Army infuriated Bragg.  Their personal animosity was one of the subthemes of the western theater for the next 4 years.

Anderson’s valor and commitment to duty was recognized in the Union.  The Fort Sumter Flag became a popular patriotic symbol after Major Anderson returned North with it. The flag is still displayed in the fort's museum. The Star of the West took all the garrison members to New York City. There they were welcomed and honored with a parade on Broadway.

What do you think of the events at Fort Sumter? Let us know below.

Now, if you missed it, read Lloyd’s piece on how the Confederacy funded its war effort here.

The 3 Key Reasons for European Empires

European colonization took place over many centuries and for varied reasons, but some reasons were more important than others. Here, Parthika Sharma and Aarushi Anand look at the three key reasons that led to the growth of European empires.

Rudyard Kipling in Calcutta, India, 1892.

Take up the White Man's burden -

    Send forth the best ye breed -

Go bind your sons to exile

    To serve your captives' need;

To wait in heavy harness

    On fluttered folk and wild -

Your new-caught sullen peoples,

    Half devil and half child.

-Rudyard Kipling, White Man’s Burden

Since the beginning of time, humans have sought to dominate their counterparts. The Assyrian empire was superseded by the Persian empire, preparing the way for Greek expansion, which peaked under Alexander the Great, with its borders threatening to spill out of the Indus. The easternmost expansion was accomplished with the conquest of Bengal and the founding of the Delhi Sultanate under Muhammad Ghori. The urge for expansion is in human nature.

In its simplest form, imperialism can be defined as the process by which one state expands its dominance over another through conflict, conquest, and exploitation. In the long histories of the USSR, Japan, the USA, and Europe, two distinct phases of imperialism can be recognized, when it reached unprecedented extent and ferocity.

During the Age of Discovery, following the footsteps of the Portuguese; Britain, Spain, and France, colonized lands throughout North and South America in pursuit of the 3Gs- Gold, God and Glory. However, the so-called "New World" of the Italian explorer and cartographer Amerigo Vespucci was in fact not at all new: People had been living in the Americas for centuries; people, who would eventually become slaves in their own land.

This was however not the end. After a short period of calm, there was an explosion of imperialism yet again that had long lasting repercussions and has been seen by certain scholars as one of the leading causes of the war to end all wars- World War 1, changing the world forever. In 1885, only 10% of Africa was colonized by European powers, by 1905, only 10% was not colonized. Britain and France were the first nations to embark on colonial missions in the 19th and 20th centuries and they were after the 3Cs- Christianisation, commerce, and civilisation as mentioned by Livingstone.

But why was the need for 3Cs suddenly so important that it transformed different polities, cultures and economies and why now? Over the years, historians have offered a variety of hypotheses and justifications to make sense of the issue.

Economic Reasons

The answer to this question for liberals and Marxists is economy. Liberals such as J.A. Hobson argued that capitalism rising at this time led to the masses having less and less and capitalists having large surpluses which could not be invested internally as there was little purchasing power. This underconsumption of masses and oversaving of capitalists made foreign investment "the taproot of imperialism," with government intervention to safeguard the investments that followed.

For Marxist scholar R. Hilferding imperialism was the final and most advanced phase of capitalism.  Monopoly capitalists like Germany and Britain looked to imperialist expansion as a way to ensure reliable supplies of raw materials, markets for industrial goods, and avenues for investment. VI Lenin described imperialism as the pinnacle of capitalist progress, which could only be overthrown by revolution. He highlighted the necessity of seeking out new investment opportunities, and the need of preventing others from acquiring a monopoly. Imperialism and war were therefore necessary since it is a fundamental aspect of capitalism that wealth will eventually end up in fewer and fewer hands.

However, was the economy really the answer? Certain avenues go against the argument. Governments like Britain made investments in places like Argentina that weren't colonies. Because of a lack of finance, industrialization in France during the 19th century was extremely sluggish. In the end, it invested more money in Russia than it did in itself. At the end of the 19th century, northern nations like Norway, Denmark, and Finland had industrialized but had no interest in colonizing. Thus it seems like the imperialists wanted more than just resources.

Karl Kautsky postulated that imperialism results from the persistent desire of industrialized capitalist nations to enlarge the agricultural regions dependent on them. Only when the hinterland builds its own industrial capability and uses the tool of protective tariffs to break free from its economic dependence does sovereignty become important.

Social Reasons

According to Joseph Schumpeter, the older pre-capitalist class whose riches depended on expansionist strategies were motivated by economic considerations. Only Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia were truly imperialist nations because imperialism flourished where absolutism had the strongest hold. According to this argument, when modern industries developed, the Yukur class felt as though the entrepreneurial elite was pushing them out of the way. They could only keep their position by putting the military at the center, which was crucial in colonialism.

Few others believe that imperialism was all about balancing and unbalancing power relations. The conservative argument states that imperialism was required to uphold the current social order and prevent social revolution in the more industrialized nations. On a similar note, political theorists argue that imperialism was simply a manifestation of the balance of power and through this a nation tried to achieve favorable change in the status quo. The notion of prestige and power was advanced by D.K. Fieldhouse. The desire to establish national prestige meant gaining "places in the sun" for the French and the Germans.

Cultural Reasons

But the most popular arguments are probably the racist ones. Charles Darwin's theory of the survival of the fittest was applied to social conditions by Herbert Spencer, resulting in the argument of Social Darwinism, which claimed that White European conquerors were more biologically adapted to the struggle for survival than the colonized. The White Man's Burden by Rudyard Kipling suggested that they had the "burden" of conveying the blessings to the native people. The ‘best race’, the whites had taken up the responsibility of ‘taming’ the “fluttered folk” and “wild”, the “half devil, half child”, without actually consulting if the natives wanted their ‘superior culture.’

This is expanded into the favor argument. It is argued that imperialism also had a humanitarian achievement of abolishing slavery. However, it is imperative to point out that these countries were the ones who started it. Establishment of Indian universities, introduction of technologies like steamships, canals and railways were turned to beneficial ends. However, the technologies were first introduced only to aid British functioning. It was argued that the Western medicine benefited indigenous people by eradicating epidemics- cholera, yellow fever, malaria, dysentery and plague. But it spread more diseases than it eradicated.

As pointed out by Edward Said, the formation of imperial culture has major roots in Orientalism, illustrated by disparaging and unflattering assertions and stereotypes. In terms of popular culture, Victorian era novels such as Jane Eyre (which contrasts Indianness with the true Christian British self) and adventures of Sherlock Holmes, (associating the East with wealth, mystery, and criminality), are classic instances of panoptical delusion.

Perceptions rooted in culture govern acculturation of ideas and goods: cross culturalization was also marked by exotica. Claude Monet’s water lilies and Japanese bridge displays an Asian-influenced water garden with a shade of spirituality in Giverny, France. Paul Gaugin painted the locals of the Pacific island of Tahiti with an intense focus on /through the prism of sexuality.Maile Arvin notably observes that a logic of possession through whiteness animates colonial subject, transforming both the land and its people into exotic, feminine objects owned by the whites. Thus the mimetic response to defend the tyranny of "the other" and boost imperial self-esteem was to create a cultural contrast between Europeans and Non-Europeans.

What do you think were the key drivers of European colonialism? Let us know below.

Bibliography

• Joll, James. "Europe since 1870: an international history." (No Title) (1973).

• Gallagher, John, and Ronald Robinson. "The imperialism of free trade." The Economic History Review 6.1 (1953): 1-15.

• Brewer, Tony. Marxist theories of imperialism: A critical survey. Routledge, 2002.

• Etherington, Norman. "Reconsidering theories of imperialism." History and Theory 21.1 (1982): 1-36.

• Porter, Andrew. "European Imperialism, 1860-1914." (2016).

• Pugh, Martin, ed. A companion to modern European history: 1871-1945. John Wiley & Sons, 1997.

Author Bio

Aarushi is a graduate in History honors from Miranda House, University of Delhi. Her areas of interest include Medieval history and Art history. She likes watching movies and writing blog reviews. She is also interested in sketching, origami and semantics.

Parthika is a graduate in History honors from Miranda House, University of Delhi. Her interest lies in Mughal History, Art Restoration and linguistics. She loves painting, clicking photographs, engaging in impromptu choreography and learning new strings on her guitar.

Three Times Russia was Invaded in History

Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, and the conflict continues to this day, with many commentators predicting it will last well into 2024 and maybe even beyond that. But Russia has been involved in a number of invasions of its territory - here, Michael Thomas Leibrandt looks at 3 times that Russia was invaded in history.

Napoleon's retreat from Moscow by Adolph Northen, painting from 1851.

The Ukrainian counter-offensive against the Russian military continues. Last month, the Ukranian military launched a counter strike in the Zaporizhzhia region.

The counter-offensive is in response to the ongoing war in Ukraine which began with a Russian invasion. On February 24, 2022, Russian forces supported by tanks began an invasion of Ukraine from northeastern, southeastern, and southern fronts. Underestimating the resolve of the Ukrainian people, the support of the western powers, and major military tactical mistakes all had effectively stalled the Russian invasion.

Russia has a long history of repelling invaders themselves.

Invasions of Russia

Genghis Khan had long planned to invade Russia before he ordered his grandson, Batu Khan to make it a reality. In the late months of 1236 AD, Khan led approximately 40,000 mounted archers across the Volga Bulgaria and conquered Kievan Rus.

By the end of 1241 AD, the Mongols had conquered almost all Russian cities, including Kiev. The Mongol army was adept at withstanding the Russian winter conditions, and only supply issues prevented them from conquering all of Russian territories at that time.

The Mongols who settled in Russia became known as the Golden Horde and ruled for almost 250 years. The Mongol invasion led to the construction of mighty stone castles all over Russia, many of which still stand today.

In 1380 AD at the Battle of Kulikovo, the Russian army defeated the Mongol Horde. The victory led to the expulsion of the Mongols in Russia. Over time, Russia would reclaim territory controlled by the Mongol Golden Horde.

But Khan was not the only famous invader of Russia.

French invasion

On June 24, 1812 and leading the largest invasion force that Europe had ever seen, Napoleon Bonaparte (Emporer of France and the Master of Europe) crossed the Nieman River into Russia with nearly 600,000 men.

Over the course of the next six months, Russian forces baited the massive invading army into a war of attrition. After capturing a deserted Moscow, Napoleon’s army would suffer horribly during a retreat that exposed his troops to supply shortages, severe winter weather conditions, and calculated guerrilla tactics by Russian Cossacks.

Of the original invading force, 380,000 of Napoleon’s troops would perish before the last of the his army crossed the Berezina River into French territory and burned the bridges behind them on November 28th. Invading Russia was the beginning of the end for the man who conquered almost all of Europe. In October of 1813 in Germany at the Battle of Leipzig, Napoleon suffered a defeat by a coalition army that included Russian forces.

World War II

One hundred and twenty-nine years later on June 22, 1941 nearly 4,000,000 troops from Germany and its allies under Operation Barbarossa began their attack on Russia around the Caspian Sea. Just like in 1812, it was the largest invasion force that Europe had ever seen including over 7,000 artillery pieces, 2,500 aircraft, and around 3,000 tanks.

Culminating in February 1943 and the Russian victory at the Battle of Stalingrad, Operation Barbarossa suffered through multiple brutal winters, was rife with logistical problems, and a failed vision of a short campaign without clear and attainable capitulation.

All very similar oversights that Emporer Napoleon would make a century earlier.

And like the French retreat in freezing temperatures in 1812, the surviving German soldiers who had not surrendered to the Red Army, killed, or captured, were pushed back across the Dneiper River in 1943 and eventually into Prussia and Germany. The Russian Red Army would take Berlin in May 1945.

Of the three major world powers that have invaded Russia since 1236 AD, all have eventually been repelled. Germany and Napoleonic France were forced into eventual capitulation in part by Russian forces.

Russia’s vast history will loom large as their military prepares for defense against Ukrainian forces. They have only to look at their own ancient, defensive stone castles built centuries ago when Russia needed to defend itself, much like Ukraine.

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

Michael Thomas Leibrandt lives and works in Abington, PA.

The Maryland Campaign of 1862 in the U.S. Civil War

The Maryland Campaign was the first invasion of Union territory by General Robert E Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. The Eastern Theater in 1862 had gone very well for the Confederacy. Southern leadership hoped that a victory on northern soil would provide unassailable proof that their new nation was solid and strong, perhaps bringing Great Britain in to mediate a peace agreement.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Abraham Lincoln and George McClellan at Antietam, Maryland, October 3, 1862.

Consequences of Second Manassas

The Confederate victory at Second Manassas August 28-30, 1862 followed victories in The Valley Campaign and the Peninsula. The casualties incurred by the Army of the Potomac included 14,000 killed or wounded of 62,000 engaged, compared to about half of that for the Army of Northern Virginia. Then on September 1, Stonewall Jackson defeated a Union cohort retreating from the battlefield, resulting in the deaths of 2 iconic Union generals. The Battle of Chantilly further supported the notion that the Confederate was invincible.

General Pope was relieved of command and sent to Minnesota, never to be heard from again. A subordinate would state about Pope, “I dare not trust myself to speak of this commander [Pope] as I feel and believe. Suffice to say ... that more insolence, superciliousness, ignorance, and pretentiousness were never combined in one man.” Pope would blame Fitz-John Porter for the loss, even though that wasn’t the case; Porter would be heard from again at Antietam but his career would be destroyed soon after.

It would be hard to imagine what President Lincoln was going through at that moment. After a year plus of fighting, none of his generals had ever defeated the Rebels in the eastern theater, although General Halleck had done well enough in the west, thanks in large part to a crazy general named Sherman and a drunken one named Grant. The backbiting in the army was at full swing, the blockade was having only a moderate effect, and his diplomat to Britain, Charles Francis Adams, was afraid that PM Gladstone would force negotiations to end the conflict. The soldiers who had been enlisted for one year were now done unless they wanted to re-enlist. Casualties were high and there was a pervasive sense of incompetence at the top of the military leadership.

And even worse, General Lee was rumored to have crossed the Potomac on September 3rd. The United States was being invaded, the Union army had no commander, and the national mid-term elections were coming up in 2 months. President Lincoln had a serious crisis on his hands, perhaps the most serious threat to the United States in our history.

General George McClellan

Following the Peninsula Campaign, Lincoln had fired McClellan for his incompetence as a general and his arrogant attitude. But now, 6 months later, Lincoln grudgingly called McClellan back into action in defense of Washington. Lincoln felt compelled to take this step because McClellan had the confidence of the soldiers. In the early stages of his command, McClellan was able to build up the Union army into a more powerful unit than the Confederacy had faced at Bull Run. He was really a brilliant administrator and he had amassed a well trained and supplied army, had planned a clever strategy to take Richmond, and his army greatly admired him. Despite these organizational successes, his apparent slowness, almost an unwillingness, to fight a battle slowed the war beyond what Lincoln could politically accept.

His repeated unforced retreats in the Peninsula led to a lack of confidence. But now, Lincoln needed a general to meet an imminent threat and he went back to McClellan. McClellan was very popular among the soldiers and the military. The parallels are really very interesting with the one at the onset of the Gettysburg campaign, when Hooker was dismissed on the eve of battle during an invasion after a large loss in Virginia.

It is believed that McClellan purposely withheld his men from helping Pope at Second Manassas.  In late August, two full corps of the Army of the Potomac had arrived in Alexandria, but McClellan would not allow them to advance to Manassas because of what he considered inadequate artillery, cavalry, and transportation support. He was accused by his political opponents of deliberately undermining Pope's position. But he is especially criticized by historians for his letter to his wife on August 10, "Pope will be badly thrashed within two days & ... they will be very glad to turn over the redemption of their affairs to me. I won't undertake it unless I have full & entire control." He told Abraham Lincoln on August 29 that it might be wise "to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe.”

After his severe defeat, Pope was relieved of command, McClellan reinstated. Lee’s invasion of Maryland and the Battle of Antietam occurred just 3 weeks later.

General Lee

After Second Manassas, General Lee enjoyed widespread popular acclaim and the confidence of the president and his cabinet. He had turned every battle into a victory, defeating two union commanders in just a few months. While supplies and armaments were in short supply, at this stage they seemed adequate.  It was a propitious moment to plan an invasion of the north. But with autumn coming, and the events it would bring, Lee had to move quickly and efficiently.

He had two excellent Corps Commanders in Longstreet and Jackson. His division commanders were also terrific, but their spirit was high, and their personalities clashed with their superiors. Still, success tends to dampen such disagreements.

Lee had these objectives with an invasion of the North:

• To move the focus of fighting away from the South and into Federal territory.

• Recruit in western Maryland and bring secession leaning citizens hope

• Achieve a military victory in the north,

• Perhaps could lead to the capture of the Federal capital in Washington, D.C.

• Confederate success could also influence impending Congressional elections in the North and

• Persuade European nations to recognize the Confederate States of America. 

This was the single moment in the war that Lee was truly in the ascendancy. Unlike the Gettysburg campaign 9 months later, which was a desperate move, this invasion made military and political sense. This likely was the real high water mark of the confederacy. Clearly Lee recognized that Stonewall Jackson thrived on independent action especially attack situations, and placed him in that position at Harpers Ferry. He also saw Longstreet as embodying the main army, as an attacking defender, and used him for that purpose in the campaign.

The Campaign Begins

Lee started off September 3 and crossed the Potomac at two fords west of Washington.  His army moved to Frederick, camping in a field 2 miles south of the town at Best’s Farm.

The idea for the invasion was well conceived. Although many modern day civil war enthusiasts consider this a terrible idea and suggest that the Confederacy should have stayed on defense, not fritter away their resources. Lee actually had a bold plan that few civil war buffs know about, in large part because it didn’t work. Lee's invasion of Maryland was intended to run simultaneously with an invasion of Kentucky by the armies of Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith. Lee is typically criticized as lacking that kind of vision in coordinating attacks, as Grant for example had. But this is the case that proves that criticism wrong.

Fredrick, Maryland is centrally placed between Washington and Baltimore. The B& O RR set up a supply line to that town. It is also well located to Harper’s Ferry. And, it was the new capital of Maryland when it removed from Baltimore. It today is a very cute small town; the National Medical Civil War Museum is located there. This was appropriate, as the town was overfilled with the wounded after Antietam.

In September 1862, Confederate forces crossed the Potomac River at several places. Here are the main crossing points utilized by Lee's army prior to the Battle of Antietam:

• White's Ford: Located near Leesburg, Virginia, White's Ford was the major crossing point used by Lee's army as they entered Maryland (see drawing). They crossed the Potomac River here on September 4-6, 1862, and began their advance into Union territory.

• Cheek’s Ford: Upstream of White’s Ford, also was used by Confederate forces

• Noland's Ferry: Situated downstream from White's Ford, Noland's Ferry was another crossing point used by Lee's forces. They crossed the Potomac here on September 7-8, 1862, continuing their movement into Maryland.

Lee wanted to use Leesburg as his stepping off point to get to Frederick. The turnpike leading out of Snickers Gap goes to Leesburg, This turnpike was an old Indian trail that white settlers had widened and had become the main thoroughfare between the Shenandoah and Loudon County. Up to this point, Lee was using main roads for supply lines, which was clever strategically, as there were no railroads except as connected to Harper’s Ferry.

Lee was moving to attack Harpers Ferry, which is west of Frederick. He was not moving to advance on the big eastern cities. It is a fable that General Lee’s invasions had major cities as targets. His supply lines were too tenuous to try: he couldn’t have held them, in any case.

Harpers Ferry was a critical strategic point early in the war. It was the north-south crossroads from the Shenandoah Valley to Western Maryland, and the joining of the Potomac and Shenandoah Rivers. It contained a large arsenal and was a concentration for military manufacturers. All of these factors played key roles in why it was a crucial military goal. In fact, control of the town changed 8 times during the war, remaining in Union control for most of it.

Surrounded on three sides by steep heights, the terrain surrounding the town made it nearly impossible to defend; all one had to do with take the heights and shell the town until it surrendered. Stonewall Jackson once said he would rather “take the place 40 times than undertake to defend it once.”

The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal were crucial supply lines connecting the east with the west, and they ran right through town. These assets were the real reasons why Harpers Ferry was so strategically important.  If you take Harpers Ferry the RR is cut in half and the east can’t get supplies to the west without a large detour. And most importantly, Lee could then use this town as his supply depot for further operations deeper into Maryland. In the Gettysburg campaign, Lee skipped this step and instead went further west, in order not to have to hold territory. This decision helped him speed up on the way to Gettysburg, but could have led to disaster on the retreat.

McClellan Takes Command

General McClellan assumed command of an army that was truly leaderless. When McClellan took charge of the Union forces on Sept. 1, he inherited four separate armies, thousands of untrained recruits and numerous other small commands that needed to be made ready in a hurry. To further complicate matters, three of his senior commanders had been ordered relieved of duty, charged with insubordination against Pope.

McClellan knew that Lee was in his northwest and moved, supposedly slowly, to that region. By the time he arrived in Frederick on September 13, Lee had been gone for 4 days. Classic histories portray McClellan's army as moving lethargically, averaging only 6 miles a day.

McClellan commanded in theory 28 cavalry regiments. But the disastrous Manassas campaign had worn out the horses of almost half the Union regiments, while most of the remainder were stranded at Hampton Roads by gale-force winds. For the first week of the campaign, McClellan could only count on perhaps 1,500 cavalry from two regiments and a few scattered squadrons from his old army to challenge some 5,000 Confederate cavalry soldiers screening Lee’s army.

In the week it took for Lee's army to march to Frederick, McClellan's army traveled an equal distance to redeploy on the north side of Washington. This was accomplished as he reshuffled commands, had his officers under charges reinstated and prepared to fill out his army with untrained recruits. Although he is rightly criticized for having “the slows”, criticisms of his aggressiveness in this campaign have not held up to in depth scholarship.

Special Order #191

Lee and the Confederate Army bivouacked on the Best Farm, about 2 miles south of Frederick, near the Monocacy River. This site would 2 years later be the location of the Battle of Monocacy but on September 9, 1862, the Union army was nowhere around. On the farm field showed in the photo, General Lee set up headquarters and had orders written that laid out the campaign plans for the next couple of weeks. Special Order #191 was written here, and couriers were directed to bring copies to the corps and crucial division leaders.

In Special Order #191, General Lee outlined the routes to be taken and the timing for the attack of Harpers Ferry. It provided specific details of the movements his army would take during the invasion of Maryland.

*****************************************************************************

“Special Orders, No. 191

Hdqrs. Army of Northern Virginia

September 9, 1862

The citizens of Fredericktown being unwilling while overrun by members of this army, to open their stores, to give them confidence, and to secure to officers and men purchasing supplies for benefit of this command, all officers and men of this army are strictly prohibited from visiting Fredericktown except on business, in which cases they will bear evidence of this in writing from division commanders. The provost marshal in Fredericktown will see that his guard rigidly enforces this order.

Major Taylor will proceed to Leesburg, Virginia, and arrange for transportation of the sick and those unable to walk to Winchester, securing the transportation of the country for this purpose. The route between this and Culpepper Court-House east of the mountains being unsafe, will no longer be traveled. Those on the way to this army already across the river will move up promptly; all others will proceed to Winchester collectively and under command of officers, at which point, being the general depot of this army, its movements will be known and instructions given by commanding officer regulating further movements.

The army will resume its march tomorrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harpers Ferry.

General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt, with reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.

General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown will take the route to Harpers Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harpers Ferry and vicinity.

General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Key's Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, cooperate with General McLaws and Jackson, and intercept retreat of the enemy.

General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, &c., will precede General Hill.

General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, bringing up all stragglers that may have been left behind.

The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.

Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance—wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood &c.

By command of General R. E. Lee

R.H. Chilton, Assistant Adjutant General”

*****************************************************************************

Lieutenant General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson was to lead the advance and capture Harper’s Ferry. DH Hill was designated to guard the rear. General Longstreet was to encircle the towns and roads leading to Harpers Ferry. Jackson was to take Harpers Ferry while the rest of Lee's army was posted at Boonsboro under command of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet. Lee hoped that after taking Harper's Ferry to secure his rear, he could carry out an invasion of the Union, wrecking the Monocacy aqueduct, before turning his attention to Baltimore, Philadelphia, or Washington, D.C. itself. Unlike the Pennsylvania Campaign, Lee had a real plan. Lee did not expect to be attacked by McClellan at this vulnerable moment. He was hiding at Boonsboro precisely to keep McClellan guessing. He could not know that McClellan knew where he was.

The places where parts of the army were sent controlled the roads into and out of Harpers Ferry. Martinsburg holds the road across from Whites Ford. Boonsboro hold the road north of Harpers Ferry.  Once Lee’s various divisions were in place, Harpers Ferry was in essence surrounded.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Chilton, Lee’s assistant adjutant general (chief of staff), wrote out 8 copies of the order, 1 to each of the generals named and 1 to President Davis. At the time that Special Order #191 was written, Hill was under the command of Jackson, his brother-in-law. Jackson personally copied the document for Hill, because once the army crossed into Maryland, the order specified that Hill was to exercise independent command as the rear guard. For this reason, Jackson copied and sent Hill the order because he didn’t know if Chilton had done so. But, since Special Order #191 conveyed Hill’s having an independent command once entering Maryland, Chilton had in fact sent Hill a copy. DH Hill received only the letter from General Jackson, and never received the copy written by Chilton. Since he had received his orders, no one was concerned that a copy had been lost.

Famously, the order was lost, and was found 4 days later by men under General Alpheus Williams.

https://emergingcivilwar.com/2022/02/24/who-lost-the-lost-order/

and later found by the Union army about a half mile north and east of this location.

https://www.rebellionresearch.com/special-order-191-ruse-of-war-part-1

https://www.theodysseyonline.com/the-insignificance-of-special-order-191

When General McClellan came into the possession of Special Order #191, he had an accurate and timely picture of exactly where the components of the Confederate army were located and what routes they were going to be using in the next several days. He knew that the Confederate army was divided and he knew exactly where they were. Lee had dangerously split his army into five parts. Three columns had converged on Harpers Ferry to capture the Federal garrison there, a fourth column was in Hagerstown, and a fifth column was acting as a rear guard near Boonesboro, Md.

Most traditional histories of the Antietam Campaign assert that McClellan was given Gen. Robert E. Lee's plans in Frederick, Md. at noon, Sept. 13. The narrative states that he waited 18 hours before acting on the find. By waiting before taking advantage of this intelligence and reposition his forces, he squandered the best opportunity in the war to defeat Lee conclusively.

These criticisms stem from the belief that McClellan moved too slowly and cautiously to attack Lee. They assert that when a copy of Lee’s plans fell into McClellan’s hands, the Union general wasted precious hours before advancing. Politicians from the 1860s onward and countless historians have claimed he could have easily destroyed Lee’s army during the campaign and ended the war in 1862, sparing the country another two and a half years of bloody conflict.

A more recent re-evaluation disputes this sequence of events entirely, citing long overlooked evidence that McClellan moved quickly and there was no 18-hour delay. Some historians believe that for this reason, the loss of the Special Order #191 wasn’t as decisive as history makes it out to be. That it had in fact little impact on subsequent events. Gene Thorp in a 2012 article in The Washington Post cited evidence that the vanguard of Army of the Potomac was in motion all day on the 13th due to orders McClellan issued. After the war, McClellan held to the claim that he acted immediately to put his armies on the move.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/in-defense-of-mcclellan-at-antietam-a-contrarian-view/2012/09/06/79a0e5cc-f131-11e1-892d-bc92fee603a7_story.html

Early in the morning of Sept. 13, most of the Union army was on the move to Frederick, Md. including McClellan, who was relocating his headquarters there from Urbana. At the conclusion of the march, a copy of Lee’s orders was found in an open field. What time this "Lost Order" was found, and when McClellan received it, has been relatively unchallenged until recently.

In "Landscape Turned Red," Stephen Sears asserts that McClellan verified before noon that the papers were legitimate, then exhibited his usual excessive caution and failed to move his army for 18 hours. To back up this theory, Sears cites a telegram that McClellan sent to Abraham Lincoln at "12 M" — which Sears says stands for meridian or noon — in which McClellan confidently informs the president that he has the plans of the enemy and that "no time shall be lost" in attacking Lee. In summary, the traditional view is:

1. McClellan had the Lost Order by noon as is proven by the telegram from him to Lincoln that is dated "12M" for Meridian.

2. McClellan waited 18 hours before moving his troops after finding the Lost Orders

The original telegram received by War Department is clearly dated "12 Midnight". After the book's publication, though, the original telegram receipt was discovered by researcher Maurice D'Aoust in the Lincoln papers at the Library of Congress. It shows that the telegram was sent at midnight (the word was written out) — a full 12 hours later than Sears thought. D'Aoust points this out in the October 2012 issue of Civil War Times in an article entitled " 'Little Mac' Did Not Dawdle."

In the disputed telegraph, McClellan wrote Lincoln, "We have possession of Catoctin [Mountain]," which is important because those two passes were still held by the Confederates at noon. The Braddock Pass was not gained until 1 p.m. and the Jefferson Pass further south was not taken until near sunset. This is evidence that there was no noon message.

McClellan is known to have been riding through the town of Frederick at the 11 am hour (see photo), to raucous crowds, thrilled to see him. Its hard to square this with being told of the orders and telling President Lincoln about it less than an hour later.

The Lost Order was not found until after the 12th Corps, of which the 27th Indiana Regiment belonged, ended its morning march. At least five accounts show that the Corps completed its march about noon, which would make it impossible for McClellan to have written and sent a telegraph that contained information about the Lost Order at the same time it was found. The commander of the unit that found the order notes that it was found after its march ended at noon and that it was carried to army staff soon thereafter.

McClellan issued orders at 3 p.m. for his cavalry chief to verify that the Lost Order was not a trick. It seems out of character for someone who is normally considered so cautious to confidently inform Lincoln of the find three hours before he tried to confirm the accuracy of its contents. From this, we can deduce that McClellan had the orders at 3 pm or sooner but after noon.

The Signal Corps reported that "in the evening" it transmitted a message from Lincoln to McClellan, and a return message from McClellan to Lincoln. The report mentions no other transmittal of information between the two men at any other time of the day.

McClellan had the vanguard of the army, Burnside's 9th Corps, on the move at 3:30 p.m. These men filled the road west to Lee's rear guard at South Mountain well into the night. Near sundown, at 6:20 p.m., he began to issue orders for the rest of his army to move, with most units instructed to be marching at sunrise. (They were roused from sleep at 3 a.m.) In the midst of this activity, at midnight, the general telegraphed the president to tell him what was going on.

By 9 a.m. on Sept. 14, the first troops had climbed South Mountain and met the Confederate rear-guard in battle. By nightfall, McClellan's army carried the heights and forced a defeated Lee to find a new defensive position along Antietam Creek. McClellan pursued the next morning and within 48 hours initiated the Battle of Antietam, which forced Lee back across the Potomac River. This seems like a pretty expeditious sequence of events, not a delay.

Additionally, a detachment of the 9th Corps in conjunction with cavalry marched from Frederick and took the southern Catoctin pass at Jefferson before sunset.

The 6th Corps, about 12,000 men, marched from Buckeystown to the gap in the Catoctin at Jeffersonville, from the evening until at least 10 p.m. A night march beyond that point would have been risky since it was not known precisely where the Confederates were in the valley beyond.

The 1st Corps, about 10,000 men, marched to Frederick the evening of Sept. 13 to be ready for an advance on the Confederate rear-guard the following morning.

Harpers Ferry

There were two significant engagements in the Maryland campaign prior to the battle of Antietam. Both directly impacted the major battle to come. Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's captured Harpers Ferry on September 12. This is important because Jackson’s Corps, a large portion of Lee's army, was absent from the Battle of South Mountain and the start of the battle of Antietam, attending to the surrender of the Union garrison. To understand Antietam, the dates and times are almost as important as they are at Gettysburg.

The Battle of Harpers Ferry took place over 4 days. Stonewall Jackson found Maryland Heights stoutly defended but brigades led by Barksdale and Kershaw attacked strongly, with retreat of the Union troops across the Potomac the next day. On September 14, the rest of his infantry arrived and found Loudon Heights undefended. Jackson placed his artillery on these heights while his infantry confronted the Union army on Maryland Heights. An attack on the Union left flank was threatened by AP Hill while 50 guns began a bombardment. The Union commander realized the situation was hopeless and surrendered.

Colonel Dixon Miles was the union commander at Harpers Ferry. At age 58 he was the oldest active colonel in the Union army; a West Point graduate, he led a division at First Manassas but was held in reserve on account that he was drunk. A court of inquiry confirmed this, but he was given command of Harpers Ferry instead of a court martial. Maj Gen John Wool gave miles orders on September 5: "you will not abandon Harpers Ferry without defending it to the last extremity." Wool sent another saying "there must be no abandoning of a post, and shoot the first man that thinks of it". The Union leadership appreciated the likelihood that the town would be attacked. Why they sent no more men to defend it isn’t clear, Why Miles kept his men in the town and not positioned on the heights isn’t comprehensible. Miles was mortally wounded in the artillery barrage.

AP Hill was with Jackson at Harpers Ferry following his feud and threatened duel with General Longstreet after newspaper articles concerning the Battle of Glendale, Hill was transferred to Jackson’s command. He had performed magnificently at Second Manassas. But he clashed with Jackson during the march in Maryland, who had Hill arrested and charged him with eight counts of dereliction of duty after the campaign. For this reason, Jackson left him behind when Harper’s Ferry was captured to process the POWs.

The delay in taking Harpers Ferry had direct consequences on the Battle of Antietam. Jackson has been criticized for taking so long. It’s hard to see how things could have been done any faster. Had Miles positioned his troops with more thought, it would have taken even longer. Had Lee considered this in his placement of the troops around the town? Its not clear, but its is noteworthy that Lee didn’t try to take Harpers Ferry in the Gettysburg invasion.

The Battle of South Mountain

The implications of this delay were enormous. Recall that Special Order 191 was written September 9 but not retrieved by Union forces until September 13. Even though the intelligence was four days old, McClellan knew that Jackson was behind schedule at Harper’s Ferry, which was surrounded but not yet taken, and that Lee’s army was divided and separated over miles of Maryland countryside. Aware that a portion of Lee’s army was now vulnerable to attack, McClellan advanced toward the South Mountain range to attack Lee’s forces there.

McClellan followed Lee’s army based on the routes identified in Special Order 191. Union forces attempted to break through South Mountain to advance toward Lee's army, which would eventually concentrate near Sharpsburg. McClellan was lucky that Lee’s orders were found, that is for sure; otherwise he would have been searching for Lee all over western Maryland. But having them in his possession, he simply followed the road map Lee had drawn for him. There are 2 roads leading west from Frederick; one goes to the north gaps to Hagerstown and one goes south toward Williamsport. Lee left the southern gap exposed, likely due to limitations on manpower and supplies.

The Battle of South Mountain took place on September 14, 1862. It is very important to re-emphasize, see the timeline in the answer 2 days ago, that the lost orders were given to McClellan on September 13 and a battle occurred the very next day. Lee was surprised that the lethargic McClellan had caught up with him so rapidly. Jackson was just wrapping up Harpers Ferry. He only had Longstreet and DH Hill to defend the passes.

Although the Confederate troops ultimately had to retreat, they put up a strong resistance and delayed the Union's progress, giving Lee valuable time to reposition his forces. While Union forces were able to gain control of the mountain, they could not stop Lee from regrouping.  Confederate defenses delayed McClellan's advance enough for Lee to concentrate the remainder of his army at Sharpsburg, setting the stage for the Battle of Antietam three days later.

During the Battle of South Mountain, engagements took place at various passes and gaps within the South Mountain range. The Union forces, commanded by General George B. McClellan, aimed to seize control of the mountain passes and break through the Confederate defensive positions. In the battle, Union army attacked at 3 gaps.

The passes and gaps of South Mountain, particularly Turner's Gap, Fox's Gap, and Crampton's Gap, offered natural defensive positions. Lee was using South Mountain as a screen, but McClellan had pursued faster than was anticipated. With Jackson at Harpers Ferry, Lee fell back along the roads that led mainly to the northern gaps. Lee ordered Longstreet to be in this location to delay the Union advance.

DH Hill was at the northernmost pass with Longstreet because he had been the rear guard and naturally came to these 2 passes. A single 5,000-man Confederate division under D.H. Hill protected Fox’s and Turner’s Gaps at South Mountain. Early on September 14, Union Gen. Jacob D. Cox’s Kanawha Division of the Union IX Corps launched an attack against Samuel Garland’s brigade at Fox’s Gap. Cox’s 3,000 Ohioans overran Garland’s North Carolinians, driving the Southerners from behind a stonewall and mortally wounding Garland. However, by nightfall, Confederate soldiers still held the western edge of Fox’s gap.

At Turner’s Gap, Union Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker’s I Corps arrived on the steep mountainside near Frostown, and divisions under George G. Meade and John P. Hatch made relentless charges on the gap’s northern edge. After a brutal firefight along a cornfield fence, Hatch broke through the Rebel line. Only the timely arrival of reinforcements from Longstreet prevented the Confederate line from collapsing. By nightfall, the Confederates still maintained control of Turner’s Gap.

1. Turner's Gap: This was the northernmost and most heavily defended pass. Confederate forces, under the command of General D.H. Hill, held strong defensive positions on the slopes of Turner's Gap, while Union troops, led by General Joseph Hooker, made determined efforts to dislodge them.

2. Fox's Gap: Located south of Turner's Gap, Fox's Gap saw intense fighting between Confederate forces commanded by General Samuel Garland and Union troops led by General Jesse Reno. The Union forces eventually managed to seize control of this pass.

3. Crampton's Gap: Situated south of Fox's Gap, Crampton's Gap was the southernmost pass where significant fighting occurred. Union troops, led by General William B. Franklin, engaged Confederate defenders commanded by General Howell Cobb. The Union forces successfully captured Crampton's Gap, further pressuring the Confederate positions.

Crampton’s Gap.  Civil War enthusiasts typically overlook the Battle of Crampton’s Gap as merely a prelude, but in fact, Antietam happened precisely because of this battle. It was the key to the entire campaign.

McClellan ordered Maj. Gen. William Franklin and his VI Corps to set out for Burkittsville from his camp at Buckeystown 9/14 at daybreak, with instructions to drive through Crampton's Gap and attack McLaws' rear. Although he sent the order immediately, by allowing Franklin to wait until morning to depart, his order resulted in a delay of nearly 11 hours. When the Federals reached Burkittsville around noon, the Confederate artillery opened up. In Burkittsville, while under artillery fire, Franklin assembled his troops into three columns. At 3 p.m., after a delay of nearly 3 hours, the VI Corps finally began its assault. The reason for the delay has never been ascertained, but it would prove costly.

The Confederate force consisted of one battery of artillery, three regiments of infantry under Brig. Gen. William Mahone, one brigade under Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, and a small cavalry detachment under Col. Thomas T. Munford. After the report of a very large number of camp fires indicating a much larger Union force than anticipated, General Lee recognized the threat this posed to his split forces, so the order was sent down to General Cobb to ..."hold the gap if it cost the life of every man in my command".

Only about one thousand Confederates defended Crampton's Gap, the southernmost of the South Mountain passes. At around 4:00 p.m., Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum's division charged into the gap and dislodged the Confederates from the protection of a stone fence. The arrival of four regiments under Gen. Howell Cobb did little to stem the Union tide. Reinforced by a brigade of Vermonters, the Federals made a second attack and drove the remaining Confederates down the western slope of South Mountain, leaving the VI Corps in possession of Crampton's.

The Union attack broke the makeshift Rebel line but only at 6 pm, too late for a follow up attack. This gave Lee a chance to salvage his force.

Even though the Confederates still held onto Fox’s and Tuner’s Gaps, Lee ordered his outnumbered forces to withdraw from South Mountain. By sunrise on September 15, the Confederates had completely withdrawn. Once the gap is in Union hands, a road connects it to all of the roads behind the mountain, and so Hill and Longstreet can be surrounded. Longstreet and Hill had to retreat that evening.

Once Crampton’s Gap was taken, even though Turner’s and the Confederates held Fox’s Gap at the end of the day they were not defensible any longer. Consequently, Lee retreated.

Aftermath

The Battle of Antietam took place on September 17, 1862, 3 days after the Battle of South Mountain. More Americans died in battle on that day than in any other day in our nation’s history. The battle was a clear Union victory. The consequences were enormous. Great Britain would never become officially involved in the war or recognize the Confederacy. The Republicans won the mid=term elections. Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation in the shadow of victory.

Although McClellan defeated Lee, ending the invasion, he did not pursue the ANV despite Lincoln’s persistent entreaties and orders. McClellan was relieved of duty that October, with Ambrose Burnside taking command. McClellan would run against Lincoln for president in 1864.

What do you think of the Maryland Campaign of 1862? Let us know below.

Now, if you missed it, read Lloyd’s piece on how the Confederacy funded its war effort here.

The Second Battle of Fort Wagner and the 54th Massachusetts Regiment

The 160th anniversary of the Second Battle of Fort Wagner, in the US Civil War took place in July. As we look back, we remember the men who fought and died on Morris Island in South Carolina in this American Civil War engagement in July of 1863. Michael Thomas Leibrandt explains.

The Old Flag Never Touched the Ground by Rick Reeves. For the state of Massachusetts, 1863

Leading the Union attack was the 54th Massachusetts Regiment of Foot, one of the first African American regiments in the United States army; immortalized in a statue still seen today in Boston Common, and in Robert Lowell’s Centennial poem. The 54th was also the subject of the 1989 film “Glory” featuring Denzel Washington, Morgan Freeman, and Matthew Broderick.

The story and legacy of the 54th Massachusetts is one of the most enduring of any Union regiment from the Civil War. Here is why:

The Emancipation Proclamation authorized the formation of the 54th. Its formation was supported by famous Americans such at Frederick Douglass when its recruitment began in February of 1863. One of the men who was appointed to recruit was George Stephens, a military correspondent who assisted with the recruitment of men in Philadelphia and then joined the 54th Massachusetts as the rank of Sergeant.

The 54th was led by a member of a prominent Boston family. Chosen to lead the regiment was twenty-five year old Colonel Robert Gould Shaw.

After studying overseas in Europe, Shaw attended Harvard from 1856–1859. He was married in 1863 and was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in Company H of the 2nd Massachusetts Regiment. He served at the Battle of Antietam among other engagements. In early 1863, Captain Shaw’s father traveled to Virginia with the commission for his son to lead the 54th. The Captain was initially reluctant to take the commission, as he did not wish to leave his regiment.

The attack

The 54th Massachusetts led the Union advance on Fort Wagner. Constructed by the Confederacy in the summer of 1862 and named after Lt. Colonel Thomas M. Wagner, the fort was built to protect the southern end of Charleston Harbor. Fort Wagner was armed by fourteen cannons. Among them was a 10-Inch (250 mm) Columbiad, three 32 lb. Smooth-Bore Breech-Loading Cannons, a 42 lb. Corronade, a 10-inch Coast Mortar, and four 12-Pound Howitzers. Wagner was also protected by land mines buried in the sand dunes, a moat, and rows of abatis.

At 7:45 P.M., the 54th Massachusetts emerged and advanced up the beach. By the time that the 54th reached the parapet of Fort Wagner, they had devastating casualties. Among the 272 men lost from the regiment was Colonel Shaw, whose sword was stolen from his body immediately after the battle.

Wagner was never taken by Union forces until it was abandoned in late 1863. Today, much of the original defenses of Fort Wagner are under sea level. Periodically, a hurricane hits Charleston Harbor and unearths some Civil War artifacts or ordinance that sends the odd tourist running for cover. For years, inaccessibility to the island has kept the galant legend of the 54th Massachusetts buried under the sand.

The bravery of the 54th Massachusetts, however lives on today. In 2017, after being thought to be lost several times, Col. Shaw’s sword was discovered in a Boston attic. In 2008, the 54th was reactivated as part of the Massachusetts Army National Guard Ceremonial Unit and participated in President Obama’s 2008 Inauguration. The new unit is called the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Regiment and provides military honors at funerals.

Many famed Union regiments have been chronicled in the Civil War. Few, however have storied histories that still attract interest today and no doubt will in the future like the 54th Massachusetts.

The descendants of Colonel Robert Gould Shaw donated his sword to the Massachusetts Historical Society for all to enjoy. The Confederacy buried Shaw’s body in a mass grave with his soldiers. After the war, the United States Army requested that Shaw’s body be exhumed and returned to his family. Colonel Shaw’s father would not allow it, saying “We can imagine no holier place than that in which he lies,” he wrote, “among his brave and devoted soldiers, nor wish for him better company-what a body-guard he has.”

Adding to the honor, legend, and glory of the 54th Massachusetts.

What do you think of the 54th Massachusetts Regiment? Let us know below.

Michael Thomas Leibrandt lives and works in Abington, PA

The Ever-Changing Nature of Britain’s Health

Britain’s health has changed throughout history and what was considered healthy in the past has been proven to be unhealthy today. Some stark examples are that the average life expectancy at a time in nineteenth century Britain for wealthy adults was around 45, while this was lower in the poorer classes, and the percentage of children reaching the age of 5 was much lower in the 19th century than now.

Amy Chandler explains looks at how health and diet has evolved over time.

Sir William Beveridge in 1943.

In society today, individuals are able to take control of their health, if they wish, through the development of apps and trackers that monitor health and lifestyle. The World Health Organisation (WHO) states “social factors, including education, employment status, income level, gender and ethnicity have a marked influence on how healthy a person is”. (1) While the development and innovation of the National Health Service (NHS) in Britain has offered opportunities of free and equal access to medical services, the strain on the economy still limits the capabilities and progress of creating accessible medical treatment for all in Britain. The NHS celebrated 75 years this July and despite the innovations of the health service, the need for funding, treatment and staff equality, limits the good that the service can provide in Britain. This article explores the social, political and economic changes that impacted Britain’s health throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century to the emergence of the NHS.

Diets, health and lifestyle

The industrial revolution between the years 1760 to 1840 created a boom in industry and manual labour employment in major cities such as Manchester, Liverpool and London. This industrial revolution increased social mobility into the cities and a rise of poverty and disease for the working classes. Despite the rise of infectious diseases and poor living and working conditions, the diet of the working class was not as unhealthy as historians once believed. Those who worked in manual employment, such as factories and docks, were constantly active and needed to consume more calories to sustain themselves during long working hours. The majority of the poorer classes ate food that was in season such as fruits, vegetables and less fatty meats. In comparison, wealthy classes weren’t as active and had access to an abundance of food, alcohol and sugary sweets causing rotten teeth and gout.

For the poor, food supplies were uncertain, basic in diet and didn’t provide the nutrients for a healthy body creating a prevalence of malnourished adults and children. Few had access to personal ovens and relied on open-fires, buying hot food out or eating cold meals. There was limited access to cooking utensils, with many households only using one pot for their cooking. This meant that the access and availability of hot food was scarce or expensive.(2) Many relied on buying off-cut pieces of meat that were rotting or poor quality, and these meals were small and far between. The upper classes indulged in dinners with several courses and had access to the freshest qualities of meat. Usually, household cooks would order their meats, fish, vegetables and other ingredients on the day that they were needed to ensure fresh meals, whereas the poor did not have access to the same expensive food. Furthermore, the overindulgence of rich and decadent food created a rise in obesity amongst the men of the upper class. The obese, rich male figure was seen as a symbol of high status and a display of their wealth because they could afford an abundance of sweet and fatty foods. Wealthy women were not usually obese due to the beauty standards of society, where women wore tight corsets and were expected to be fragile and thin. In modern society, the rise and health implications of obesity are impacting on the NHS.

The British Empire increased the transportation and access to many new foods, sugars and a variety of ingredients such as canned fruits and condensed meat. These new foods became widely available and impacted the health of all classes in Britain. Sugar and fatty foods were only previously available to the wealthy, who could afford the price. (3) The rise in consumption of sugar caused damage to the nation’s teeth and a frequent dental complaint reported by 1900 was the inability to chew tough foods, nuts, vegetables and fruits. The fall in nutritional standards impacted future generations, especially during times of army conscription. Furthermore, the living conditions in poverty-stricken areas created a decline in health with poor sanitary conditions, unclean drinking water and the lack of sunlight in urban slums creating a Vitamin D deficiency. The slums had dense, thick fog as a result of pollution and poor air quality, cramped, filled with rubbish, unsanitary living conditions and contaminated drinking water. These areas were also subjected to communicable diseases such as tuberculosis (TB), cholera and smallpox, to name a few. This also created a large gap between the health of the poor and the wealthy. The wealthy were not immune to these illnesses, but were less susceptible to dying of consumption or poor living conditions, but were more likely to suffer heart attacks from their rich and fatty diets. Therefore, the lives of the working class are considered healthier in terms of fitness levels, eating less fatty and sugary foods, but on the flipside many lived in unsanitary housing, likely to become unwell from the spread of fatal diseases in crowded areas and many could not access medical care.

London’s pollution also contributed to a number of respiratory health conditions coupled with the turn of the century popularity of smoking. The rise of smoking in the 1880s with the growth of industrial cigarette production created accessibility to cigarettes. The preference to using snuff declined and was replaced with cigarettes which was only encouraged during the first and second world war when soldiers were sent cigarettes in their rations. The commercialisation of smoking was seen as a good habit for people and was most commonly used by King George VI to overcome his stutter. The lack of medical knowledge on cancers and what caused these diseases meant that many became addicted to smoking without knowing or understanding the impact on their health. It is only in recent history that the UK government has attempted to tackle smoking in the population, with their strategic plan towards a ‘smoke-free generation’ in England.

The formation of the NHS

After the devastating impact of the Second World War, the health of the nation was deteriorating with rationing, war injuries and the economic burden of the war effort. These factors emphasised the long-term need for a strategy to strengthen the country. The British government needed to find a solution to improve the nation’s health, strengthen the economy and navigate post-war life. In December 1942, Sir William Beveridge compiled a report, Social Insurance and Allied Services, on the health of the nation. Beveridge’s report identified the five evils that permeated society; disease, want, ignorance, squalor and idleness.(4)  In a Parliamentary debate in 1944, Members of Parliament (MPs) suggested the NHS would be a “comprehensive and unified health service for the people”, which is part of a “process of reshaping the background of individual life” in Britain. (5) The NHS was seen as a “counter-process to all the destructiveness of war”. (5)

Throughout history, class and wealth defined people’s health, diet, lifestyle and quality of life and these differences were a continual reminder of social hierarchy. However, war was an equaliser that did not discriminate. Every member of society was impacted from conscription, bombing raids and the emotional and physical scars of war. Arguably those with money could live comfortably and safely, but everyone was equal with a collective desire for the war to end. Services that offered medical treatment like charities were fragmented and not unified. Therefore, there was a sense of openness to the idea of a national health service that was for the many not the few, however there was still opposition to a free health service. As stated in a Parliamentary debate, the service was “no scheme [designed] for giving charity to individuals or state help to particular classes or groups” and it “does not concern itself with poverty or wealth.” (5) This was a scheme that aimed at raising the nation’s health to a “higher plane and keep it there.” (5) This was a step towards equality in post-war Britain under the Welfare State. Under the umbrella of the Welfare State, each member of society was expected to pay a contributory amount of money as National Insurance. (4) The reason that Beveridge insisted on National Insurance was to ensure that the NHS did not damage an individual’s sense of pride, independence and personal responsibility. (4) The NHS created a sense of accountability for one’s health and offered the opportunity for those in poverty to better themselves.

The NHS was officially formed in July 1948 and 75 years later, the NHS is still providing a variety of care and treatment to the public. However, the nation’s health is not where it could be, the COVID-19 pandemic placed a strain on public health services and was economically struggling. NHS workers are striking for better pay and working conditions, while patients are placed on waiting list months in advance. Health issues such as smoking, obesity and mental health are areas that still need improvement, coupled with the changes in lifestyle. Many people work remotely and are not commuting in the same way causing a change in routine and in some cases causing a negative impact on their health. The introduction of the NHS in 1948 was a massive step forward in improving the nation’s health that came after education and housing reforms that cleared the slum areas, that were bombed heavily during the blitz.  Since 1948, many have benefitted from the treatment, care and expertise of health care professionals.

Conclusion

The perception of health has changed throughout history and one treatment that was once seen as effective is now seen as poisonous or ineffective. Illness was prevalent in all areas of society but the type of diseases differed depending on the living conditions, diet, lifestyle and access. What was once seen as healthy, such as smoking is now widely acknowledged as severely damaging to health and quality of life. The advancement in technology in identifying risks to increasing disease and health implications is far greater than in the past. The formation of the NHS was a changing point for Britain’s health and the desire to offer medical treatment to all classes of society in a bid for health equality. Historians often present the poor and working classes as malnourished and in poor health, however in the modern standards exercise and eating less sugar is seen as ideal and due to their lack of accessibility to fatty foods and sugar they were less susceptible to high cholesterol and other illnesses. The health and lifestyle of the working class should not be romanticised as a healthy way to live, as they were far from healthy. A digital age has allowed for more accountability, responsibility and opportunity to take our health into our own hands through fitness apps, healthy recipe boxes and ways to monitor our bodies through forms of artificial intelligence (AI). Progress is still slow in solving major health issues such as cancer, but the rise of technology can provide new ways of treating, curing and progressing our health.

What do you think of Britain’s health over time? Let us know below.

Now read Amy’s article on the history of medicine at sea here.

References

1. WHO, ‘Health inequities and their causes’, 22 February 2018, World Health Organisation, Available at < https://www.who.int/news-room/facts-in-pictures/detail/health-inequities-and-their-causes > [accessed 27 July 2023].

2. A. Whol, ‘What the Poor ate’, July 2022, VictorianWeb, Available at <        https://victorianweb.org/science/health/health8.html >[accessed 27 July 2023].

3. P. Clayton., and J. Rowbotham, ‘How the mid- Victorians worked, ate and died’, Int J Environ Res Public Health, vol. 6 (2009). Available at < https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2672390/ >[accessed 31 July 2023].

4. The National Archives, ‘1940’s origin of the Welfare State’, 2023, The Cabinet Papers, Available at < https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/alevelstudies/1940-origins-welfare-state.htm >[accessed 1 August 2023].

5. HC Deb, 16 March 1944, vol 398, cols 428 - 429.

Logistics Challenges of the Army of Northern Virginia in the Gettysburg Campaign

The intelligence and logistical problems of the Army of Northern Virginia emerged as critical determinants during the Battle of Gettysburg. The Confederate Army faced severe resource limitations. The Confederacy struggled with manpower shortages, supply line constraints, and limited access to industrial and transportation infrastructure. Lee recognized the limitations in terms of supplies, extended supply lines, and the difficulties of operating in unfamiliar territory. Lee and his staff understood that their army would have to rely on a lengthy and vulnerable supply line stretching back to Virginia, which could be impacted by weather, terrain, enemy interference, and the strain of transporting essential provisions and ammunition. Despite these challenges, Lee decided to proceed with the campaign. In retrospect, it is apparent that these logistical challenges had a significant impact on the Confederate Army's effectiveness and ability to sustain their operations during the campaign.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

The generals at Gettysburg: Union Major General George G. Meade (left) and Confederate General Robert E. Lee (right).

Confederate Supply Network

The Confederate Army invaded the north despite facing severe resource limitations. The Confederacy struggled with manpower shortages, supply line constraints, and limited access to industrial and transportation infrastructure. These limitations made it challenging for Lee to fully address and overcome intelligence and logistical issues during his planning process. Lee recognized the limitations in terms of supplies, extended supply lines, and the difficulties of operating in unfamiliar territory. Lee and his staff understood that their army would have to rely on a lengthy and vulnerable supply line stretching back to Virginia, which could be impacted by weather, terrain, enemy interference, and the strain of transporting essential provisions and ammunition. Despite these challenges, Lee decided to proceed with the campaign. In retrospect, it is apparent that these logistical challenges had a significant impact on the Confederate Army's effectiveness and ability to sustain their operations during the campaign.

Several potential strategies and actions could have been considered to alleviate problems that could have been expected. Lee could have made efforts to shorten and secure his supply lines. Lee could have used several additional resources history shows that he didn’t have in planning his invasion in June 1863:

1. Spies on the ground to reconnoiter

2. Cavalry in his front and sides to know where the enemy was.

3. Pontoons over the Potomac that he could get across in an emergency.

4. Sufficient long range artillery ammunition to sustain multiple attacks in a long offensive campaign.

5. A functioning supply line to move captured goods retrograde to any advance.

6. Improved command and control, with sufficient staff to maintain communications with corps leaders at all times.

7. With Stonewall Jackson’s death at Chancellorsville, Lee had two new corps commanders. The Confederate Army's command structure was dispersed, with multiple corps and divisions operating somewhat independently. This fragmentation made it challenging to consolidate and synthesize information from various sources and hindered the efficient gathering and analysis of intelligence.

Intelligence Flaws

General Lee faced challenges in obtaining accurate and timely intelligence regarding the location and movements of Major General Joseph Hooker and the Army of the Potomac. The lack of reliable intelligence about the enemy's positions and intentions affected Lee's decision-making and ability to plan his own movements effectively and placed Lee at a disadvantage. Confederate intelligence efforts were hampered by various factors including limited reconnaissance capabilities especially the absence of JEB Stuart. The combination of limited reconnaissance capabilities, dispersed command structure, Union defensive measures, communication limitations, and unfamiliar terrain contributed to the challenges faced by Lee in obtaining accurate intelligence about Hooker's army.

The ANV suffered from limited reconnaissance capabilities. The Confederate Army had limited cavalry resources for conducting reconnaissance and gathering information about the enemy. The cavalry, traditionally responsible for scouting, was stretched thin, and their ability to penetrate Union lines and gather reliable intelligence was hampered. Lee instructed Stuart to keep the Army of Northern Virginia informed of the movements and activities of the Union Army, maintain communication, and act as a screen to prevent the Union forces from gaining intelligence on Lee's own army. Lee's orders emphasized the importance of timely and accurate information. Allowing Stuart to circumnavigate the Union army rather than be his eyes and ears must rank among Lee’s greatest mistakes. Using what cavalry he had in guarding passes behind him was his second biggest mistake.

Lee had no formal intelligence service like General Sharpe and the Bureau of Military Intelligence of the Union army. The CSA had very few covert operatives in the north, as opposed to the south, where the citizens favored him. This is a bit surprising given the large number of KGC and Copperheads; but western Maryland and southern Pennsylvania were solid pro-Union, another factor Lee may have overlooked.

Operational Manifestations

The Confederate Army relied on a limited and overburdened transportation system to move men, equipment, and supplies. The lack of adequate railways and the reliance on horse-drawn wagons slowed down the movement of troops and hindered the delivery of essential provisions. Maintaining a constant supply of ammunition, weapons, and other necessary equipment was a challenge. The long supply lines made it difficult to ensure a steady flow of these vital resources to the troops on the front lines.

The Union used railroads and rivers to transport their supplies. But where Lee wanted to go strategically, behind the Blue Ridge Mountains to screen his movement, there was no railroad and no river. He had to move everything over land. So Lee employed a wagon train. Consequently, Lee had a 125-mile route for supplies to traverse to get to Gettysburg and more to Harrisburg. The massive wagon trains limited Lee’s ability to maneuver and to bring troops from the rear in case of an unexpected need, as happened on July 1. Moreover, the priority he placed on protecting them required the remaining cavalry units after Stuart left, leaving him without the necessary reconnaissance.

Either 4 horses or 6 mules pulled the supply wagons. They could carry 2000-2500 pounds but moved only at marching pace, about 3 miles per hour, and less if the roads were muddy or rocky. Lined up on a road, each wagon took up 60 feet of linear space. Lee’s trains stretched for dozens of miles. Infantry and artillery had to use the same roads as the wagons, resulting in traffic jams and delays. The administration of the order of march to prevent pile-ups at crossroads was labor intensive.

Wagon trains moved at a relatively slow pace compared to other means of transportation, such as railways. This hindered the army's ability to swiftly maneuver and respond to changing circumstances on the battlefield. Long wagon trains stretched over a significant distance and were vulnerable to attacks from enemy forces. Union cavalry units often targeted these trains, aiming to disrupt supply lines and inflict damage on the Confederates. Wagon trains had a limited capacity, both in terms of the amount of supplies they could carry and the number of troops they could transport. This constrained the amount of provisions and equipment that could be transported to the front lines, potentially leading to shortages.

Animals need to be cared for, fed, and rested, which added to the logistical burden and increased the strain on resources. The animals themselves required massive forage. Mules needed 9 pounds of grain 10 of fodder and 12 gallons of water daily; horses needed 14 pounds, 14 pounds and 10 gallons respectively. They needed horseshoes, and men to apply them. The waste disposal problem is mind- boggling: every day, a single animal produced 10 pounds of manure and 2 gallons of urine. Unless animals are optimally cared for, they can’t burden the loads; they move more slowly and carry less until they break down and the army is immobile.

Wagons, like all vehicles, required regular maintenance and repairs. This included fixing damaged wagons, replacing worn-out wheels, and addressing other mechanical issues. Finding the necessary resources and skilled personnel for these tasks added to the logistical challenges.

Lined up on a road, each wagon took up 60 feet of linear space. Lee’s trains stretched for dozens of miles. Infantry and artillery had to use the same roads as the wagons, resulting in traffic jams and delays. The administration of the order of march to prevent pile ups at crossroads was labor intensive.

This was a logistics nightmare. It would directly impact when Longstreet would reach the field, what weapons and armaments would be available, coordination of the 3 corps in battle and of course, the ultimate retreat after the battle. And the fact is, Lee lost this critical battle for precisely these reasons. The logistical limitations faced by Lee's army had a significant impact on their arrival and readiness on the field at Gettysburg. Reliance on slow-moving wagon trains caused delays in the arrival of Lee's troops. The stretched supply lines and the need to coordinate the movements of dispersed units slowed their progress, affecting their timely arrival at the battlefield.

Battlefield Impact

The extended marches and inadequate provisions necessitating foraging combined with the strain of traffic jams and slow movement, took a toll on the Confederate soldiers. Many suffered from fatigue, diminishing their physical condition and overall readiness for battle. Additionally, some soldiers straggled or fell behind due to exhaustion or the inability to keep up with the army's pace. Many Confederate soldiers were sleep deprived and fatigued when they reached the battlefield after night and forced marches, diminishing their overall effectiveness.

July 1. Major General Henry Heth commanded a brigade under AP Hill. He is traditionally assigned blame for unintentionally commencing the Battle of Gettysburg. He did send half of his division toward the town; he later claimed that he was looking for supplies, including shoes.  He apparently did not know that Early’s division had been through the village a few days previously, and any supplies were long gone. On June 30th he encountered mild resistance on the road but it was thought to be a volunteer militia, not regular army. This lack of intelligence would be the real reason the battle would start.

On the morning of July 1, Heth’s division marched down the Chambersburg Pike to perform a reconnaissance-in-force. At about 7:30 am 3 miles outside of town near the McPherson barn, the first shots of the battle were fired. The order of march was not the one a commander would choose if a battle was imminent. Pettigrew deployed his men without cavalry in front; there were no pickets and no vedettes and in fact the first enemy he ran into were Union vedettes. The front of the line was Pegram’s artillery, followed by Archer and Davis’ infantry brigades.

Lee's army was spread out over a significant distance due to the wide deployment of his troops during the march north, from south of Cashtown to Harrisburg. This dispersal made coordination and concentration of forces more challenging, impacting their ability to concentrate their strength. The splitting of the ANV during the march north meant piecemeal arrival of Confederate troops on the battlefield, which affected the initial coordination of Lee's forces. This resulted in a fragmented Confederate attack on the first day of the battle, as units arrived at different times and were not able to coordinate their efforts effectively. The arrival of troops at unplanned times and locations posed challenges to the  reinforcement and maneuverability of troops, resulting in a hindering to exploit opportunities and  limiting the flexibility of his response to Union movements. These issues were most apparent when General Ewell concluded that he lacked the resources (manpower and supplies) to attempt an attack on Culp’s Hill in the late afternoon.

July 2. Improved transportation and supply arrangements could have allowed General James Longstreet's troops to position themselves more swiftly on July 2.  Improved communications would have facilitated better coordination between Longstreet and Ewell. Better communication with his division commanders could have expedited the movement of troops and improved the response to General Sickles’ unwise move to the Peach Orchard.

Adequate logistical support would have facilitated the swift movement of wagons and artillery pieces, enabling them to reach positions in a timelier manner. Had coordinated attacks been organized, the battles in the Wheatfield and Little Round Top might have gone differently.

More effective reconnaissance and intelligence operations would have provided Longstreet with timely and accurate information about the enemy's positions, enabling him to make more informed decisions regarding the deployment of his troops, especially the fact that Little Round Top was occupied by Union forces.

July 3. The supply problems and logistical challenges faced by the Confederate Army had significant repercussions for Pickett's Charge. The movement of the ANV away from its railroads to create a screen with the mountains also caused the loss of the capacity to replenish its long-range artillery ammunition. Recognizing the limited transportation capacity imposed by a wagon train, compromises were necessary regarding the amount of artillery ammunition that could move with the army. The long-range artillery necessary to support offensive action was different from the canister and grapeshot used in defensive battles. Since Lee had no idea what the nature of the battle would be, he brought some of each, but this proved to be insufficient. Lee did order delivery of additional artillery ammunition with the Ordinance department as he moved farther north, but it never arrived. Consequently, the Confederate forces were unable to provide adequate artillery support for Pickett's Charge. The lack of artillery firepower weakened the overall impact of the assault and increased the vulnerability of the advancing Confederates.

The Bormann fuses used by the Confederate Army during Pickett's Charge were also a significant issue that further exacerbated the challenges they faced. The fuses were designed to control the timing of the explosion of artillery shells, and their malfunction or improper functioning had detrimental effects. The origin of the logistical fuse problem was an explosion and fire at the Richmond arsenal on Brown’s Island on March 13, 1863. The explosion resulted temporarily in ordnance supplies originating from Selma and Charleston. These fuses were designed with a resin filler that made them explode about 1 second later than those manufactured in Richmond. This filler softened and mixed with the powder in humid warm weather such as that in the first days of July, causing longer burning fuses and non-detonating shells. These "new" fuses burned slightly slower than what the artillerists were accustomed to.

The CSA artillerymen had no forewarning that there was a difference in these fuses that would make them burn longer than a fuse of the same length coming out of Richmond.

Consequently, in many instances fuses malfunctioning or burning at an unpredictable rate were noted. This meant that some shells exploded too late, reducing their effectiveness and impacting the intended timing of the artillery barrage preceding the charge. The inferiority of the Bormann fuse combined with the intentional overhead trajectory led to the inefficiency of the artillery. If firing overhead and the fuse explosion is delayed by a second, it will not explode until it has gone past the target.

What do you think of the Challenges of the Army of Northern Virginia in the Gettysburg Campaign? Let us know below.

Now, if you missed it, read Lloyd’s piece on how the Confederacy funded its war effort here.

Suggested Reading

• Brown, Kent Masterson. Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign. Univ of North Carolina Press, 2005.

• Wittenberg, Eric J and Petruzzi, J David. Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg. Savas Beatie, 2006.

• Coddington, Edwin. The Gettysburg Campaign. Morningside Bookshop, 1979.

• Sears, Steven W. Gettysburg. Mariner Books, 2004.

• Woodruff, Joshua D. The Impact of Logistics on General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1083715.

• Hartwig, D Scott. The Army of Northern Virginia and the Gettysburg Campaign. 2010 Gettysburg Seminar. Pages 40 – 65. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/13/essay3.pdf

• https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/workspace/handleMediaPlayer?qvq=&trs=&mi=&lunaMediaId=RUMSEY~8~1~26945~1100244

• https://www.historynet.com/were-maps-lees-real-enemy-at-gettysburg/

• Klein LW. Why Pickett’s Charge Failed. The Civil War Center.  https://thecivilwarcenter.com/2022/06/29/why-picketts-charge-failed-analysis-and-significance/

The Longest Railway in the World: How the Trans-Siberian Railway was Built

The Trans-Siberian railway was an 8,400km track that was built upon the desire to unite Russia under a single culture and to strengthen the autocratic rule of the Tsar. The idea of building a railway into Siberia was toyed with in the mid-1870s, mainly proposing short routes into Siberia. The Russo-Turkish War put a halt on the development of any railways as funding was diverted to the war effort. Then 10 years later and after the finances of Russia had recovered from the war, discussions had returned. The proposed ideas however were much grander; a train route spanning the entire continent connecting east to west. This was fueled by a new director and the Tsar’s desire to make sure his autocratic rule reached every corner of his empire. This led to the idea of the Trans-Siberian railway coming to fruition.

Kyle Brett explains.

Construction work on the Eastern Siberian Railway near Khabarovsk, circa 1895.

Origins of the Idea for a Railway

The idea of a railway connecting East and West Russia was proposed in the 1870s to connect Siberia to European Russia. This idea was proposed by an American entrepreneur Perry McDonough Collins, to the Minister of Transport Communications, Konstantin Nikolayevich Posyet. Collins wanted to connect America to Russia via telegraph and proposed a route to do that to Posyet. Posyet liked this idea as he was ambitious to develop the far east, but the state had neither the finances nor the infrastructure to facilitate this project.

The Russian state in the latter half of the 1870s decided that the minerals and political benefits of building a railway into Siberia were beneficial and had decided on a short route from Nizhny Novgorod to Tyumen. Posyet had originally proposed a similar length railway to the north and saw this as the Russian state disregarding his position as Minister of Transportation. None of this would matter in the end because of the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877 which shut down all state-sponsored railways. The state diverted a majority of its finances to the war effort, which left Posyet with the satisfaction of not having to build the railway he disagreed with. The unfortunate side effect of this war was that the war spending combined with the poor harvests in the early 1880s hurt the Russian ruble delaying discussions about a Trans-Siberian Railway until 1884.

In 1881 Alexander III would take power from his father Alexander II after he was assassinated by a socialist terrorist group. His father had passed many radically liberal laws and that had made him a target. Alexander III would spend his time as Tsar undoing many of these liberal reforms and reestablishing Autocratic rule over Russia. One of his main focuses was on Siberia and how he could unite and spread Russification and Autocratic rule throughout Russia. Upon hearing Posyet’s proposal for a Trans-Siberian railway stretching from Samara to Vladivostok he decided that was the best way to accomplish his goals.

The Borki Train Disaster

On October 29, 1888, Alexander III and his family were traveling on the Kursk–Kharkov mainline from Crimea to St. Petersburg when a combination of speeding and faulty track line caused the train to derail from the track at a high speed. After the dust had settled Alexander saw that his family was trapped under the collapsed roof of his dining car. He lifted the collapsed roof of his train car allowing his family to escape with none of them injured. In total around 20 people died and around 15 more were injured in the derailment. The trauma from this crash is what caused Alexander’s kidney failure and his eventual death.

The blame for the crash did not go to the railway manager Sergei Witte, but rather to the Russian government. Alexander wanted to close this case as quickly as possible, and this led to Posyet stepping down from his position as Transportation Manager. The man to replace him would be Sergei Witte. Imperial officials had chastised him prior to the crash, telling him that only the lines he manages are slow and all the other lines run at express speed. His response was he would prefer to not bash in the head of the emperor by increasing the speed of his rail lines. This interaction is why he was chosen to replace Posyet as Minister of Transportation.

The Project Begins

In March 1891 the Russian government announced its plan to build a railway that spanned all of Siberia. They broke ground in Vladivostok a few months later and the building of the railway was underway. The head of the project was Sergei Witte who in the years after the Borki Train disaster had risen in popularity in the government, moving his way up the chain of command. In 1892 he was selected to become the Minister of Finance, on top of being the Minister of Transportation. He would use these positions of power to turn the clunky and slow bureaucracy of the Russian government into a well-oiled machine.

His first order of business was to create the Committee for the Siberian Railroad. This committee was created with one goal in mind; to fast-track decisions that would have been slowed by the clunky bureaucracy. It would accomplish these goals by getting approval from a higher power, like the Tsar, and would then go around local administrators to keep the project moving. This ensured that the project would be kept going at a steady pace.

Witte, as Finance Minister, also had a great way to finance the building of the railway; he could raise taxes as high as the project demanded. As a result, he neglected his position as finance minister, disregarding complaints, and concerns from the peasantry as he was laser-focused on building the railway. Alexander would also turn a blind eye to these affairs as Witte got results which were good enough for him to not intervene.

The Material Cost of the Largest Railway

The Committee for the Siberian Railway had a massive challenge in solving the problem of how to get this immense amount of materials to the far reaches of Siberia. Their solution was to utilize rivers to Transport the materials to the building sites. Many of the rivers would not support the size of the boats used to move the materials. The Committee decided that the rivers were to be widened and strengthened to accommodate these boats. There was a lot of special attention placed upon Lake Baikal because of its immense size, being the deepest lake in the world, and because it would also be used to Transport materials in the near future. They surveyed weather conditions, all the port facilities on the lake, and how the ice formed on the lake to better understand how to utilize the lake for material Transportation.

Production of the railway parts was originally to be done in Siberia for convenience. Witte soon discovered that Siberia had nowhere enough infrastructure to accommodate a project of that size. The production was outsourced to Western Russia, the UK, and Poland. This meant that it took longer for the materials to arrive at the rail lines as they had to travel as far as the UK to make it into deep Siberia.

The Labor committed to the project was also quite immense, estimated by the Committee for the Siberian Railway at anywhere between 57,000 to 80,000 workers that migrated to Siberia to assist in the building. Much of the labor was from Russia, but some of it came from China. There was a good amount of convict labor utilized as well. These convicts were not treated fairly, however, and would be harassed by their leaders routinely. As for bad conditions, many of the laborers would sleep on the cold ground right up until the ground would freeze. Then when it got too cold the Committee would send people out to build mud huts for people to live in. This, as one can imagine, led to many deaths from the harsh elements. It also made it hard for laborers to do complex tasks like building bridges and utilizing dynamite to make way for tracks to be placed.

The Final Stretch

Through all the harsh conditions by 1898, the track was mostly complete. The track began in Moscow, ran to Lake Baikal then a 4-hour ferry ride across the Lake to the next station which was in Ulan-Ude. From here the train went straight through Chinese Manchuria to Vladivostok. To solve the problem of the rail line going through China a different route from Ulan-Ude to Vladivostok was built along the Amur River. This rail line did not leave Russian territory and allowed for passage to Vladivostok without the need of entering Chinese territory in the event of a territory dispute. The desire to keep the railway in Russia resulted in the Amur River route being completed in 1904.

Then in 1904 development of the Railway would hasten with the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. The Circum Baikal route around the lake was still being brainstormed, some ideas had been played around with getting around the treacherous terrain that surrounds the lake, but nothing definitive had come to fruition. With the outbreak of the war, the need to utilize the railway to move troops and supplies around lake Baikal became apparent. The only way to circumnavigate the lake was with 2 steam ships that took 4 hours to cross Lake Baikal. However, the 2 steamships, one a freight car hauler and one a passenger vessel, were not enough to accommodate the large amount of movement needed to move an army across Russia. The ships were also stuck when the water froze over, rendering them useless. Some solutions to this problem were presented, the most popular being sledges that towed supplies to the Ulan-Ude station on the other side of the lake. There were attempts to build a track straight on the ice, but the first attempt to put a locomotive on the ice caused it to go straight through, plunging into the depths of the lake. This further reinforced sledges as the solution to the problem.

The terrain on the shores of Lake Baikal was treacherous to build a track onto. It was rocky and rigid and had cliffs that were very dangerous to work on. The original plan was to make tunnels through the rocks to the other side, but when it was decided it would take around 30 tunnels to have a place to lay track it was decided that the track would be built along the shore. To make enough progress to lay track along the rocky terrain in one day it took an entire cart of dynamite. This ground down progress to an extremely slow pace, even with the hastening of progress from the Russo-Japanese War. The track, however, was eventually completed in 1905, finally connecting East and West Russia and completing the largest Railway in the world.

What do you think of the Trans-Siberian Railway? Let us know below.

Sources

Marks, Steven G. Road to power: The Trans-Siberian railroad and the colonization of Asian Russia: 1850-1917. Cornell University Press, 1991.

Tupper, Harmon. To the Great Ocean: Siberia and the Trans-Siberian railway. Brown & Company, 1965.