U.S. Civil War: Battle of Fredericksburg

The Cincinnati Commercial noted, "It can hardly be in human nature for men to show more valor or generals to manifest less judgment than were perceptible on our side that day." 160 years later, that still pretty much sums up the US Civil War’s Battle of Fredericksburg from the Union side. Yet, the fact is that, as bad as it was, and it was truly awful, it did not provide the South with any lasting strategic advantage. In fact, within seven months, the tables would turn after their own costly frontal assault.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Union soldiers from Franklin's ‘Left Grand Division’ charge across the railroad during the Battle of Fredericksburg.

General Robert E. Lee's survival at Antietam was remarkable. McClellan missed numerous opportunities to create total disaster for Lee's army, and Lee likely recognized some fundamental errors in his strategy. Yet, Lee emerged with his army intact, high morale, and a new adversary.

After McClellan's lack of aggressive pursuit post-Antietam, he was relieved of command on November 5. His replacement, Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, assumed command on November 9, under pressure from Washington to act swiftly. Burnside devised a plan to reach Richmond ahead of Lee's forces.

Situated near Warrenton, Virginia, Burnside was west of Richmond and Washington, at approximately the same latitude as Manassas. Continuing on the roads from there would lead to Culpeper and Charlottesville, necessitating the crossing of both the Rapidan and the Rappahannock Rivers.

Burnside’s Plan

Burnside proposed abandoning the southwest movement of the army, which led away from any specific target. Instead, he planned to move southeast rapidly toward the lower Rappahannock River, positioning the Union army at Falmouth, just across the Rappahannock River from Fredericksburg. From there, he aimed to launch a direct attack on Richmond, avoiding Lee's forces in Culpeper, and positioning himself between Lee and the direct route to Richmond. On paper, Burnside's plan held great promise, but successful execution hinged on speed.
The direct route from Warrenton to Fredericksburg was approximately 35-40 miles. It was a single country road in late Fall, presenting logistical challenges in organizing troops and supplies. However, Burnside managed to move his 100,000-man army to Falmouth on the north bank of the Rappahannock in just two days. Fredericksburg lay opposite Falmouth, a riverport town.

Lee had conducted a cautious retreat from Sharpsburg, ensuring his rear was secure in case McClellan launched an attack, which never materialized. This route brought Lee closer to the Shenandoah Valley than to Richmond. Lee, positioned at Culpeper, had a slightly shorter distance of about 35 miles to cover to reach Fredericksburg, but he had to cross the Rappahannock River. Thus, a race was on between the two armies.

When Burnside assumed command, he found himself in a strategic predicament. McClellan had left him in a remote location with a supply line that relied on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, which extended to Culpeper Court House before heading east to Orange and Charlottesville. This placed Burnside far to the west of his desired destination, and there was no established supply line to support a rapid eastward movement. This situation raised concerns for Lincoln and Halleck, given that Burnside, a relative rookie as a general, aimed to move faster than his army had ever moved before, and he faced a cunning adversary who could launch attacks along the way.
However, Burnside devised a clever plan to address this challenge. Knowing that Longstreet was positioned at Culpeper, and Jackson was on his right flank, Burnside recognized that Longstreet had a shorter distance to reach Fredericksburg once his movement was detected.

The leadership in Washington believed that the primary target should not be Richmond itself, but rather Lee's army. They wanted Burnside to attack Longstreet at Culpeper while Jackson was separated from him. Burnside believed that this move was quite obvious and that Lee would anticipate it. He envisioned a scenario similar to the Second Battle of Manassas, with Jackson launching a flank attack against him. Burnside proposed feigning an attack on Culpeper, which would hold Lee in that area just long enough for Burnside to reach the eastern side of the Rappahannock River. He began moving supplies to Falmouth, located just north of Fredericksburg and close to the Potomac River. The plan was to reach Falmouth swiftly, resupply, and have a pontoon bridge constructed across the river before Lee could arrive. Halleck disagreed with Burnside’s plan but left it to President Lincoln, who chose to go along with it.

Crossing the Rappahannock River

Pontoon bridges have been essential in warfare for centuries. These floating bridges use floats or shallow-draft boats to support a continuous deck for infantry, artillery, cavalry, and supply wagons. The buoyancy of the supports limits their maximum load. Strong currents and storms can disrupt these bridges, making their use typically temporary, just long enough to cross a river. Connecting the bridge to the shore requires designing approaches that are not too steep, prevent bank erosion, and accommodate movements during changes in water levels (such as tides). During the Civil War, both armies commonly used pontoon bridges. They played a crucial role in key crossings, such as Grant's crossings of the James and Mississippi Rivers. Lee's use of a pontoon bridge over the Potomac River during the Gettysburg campaign is another notable example.

The plan for a pontoon bridge wasn't particularly complex, as it required old boats and wooden planks. When Burnside initiated his plans for this campaign, he requisitioned these materials on November 7, submitting his plan to Halleck. The plan was sent to Brig. Gen. George Washington Cullum, the chief of staff in Washington, on November 9. The pontoon trains were deemed ready to move on November 14.

However, when the Union Army commenced its march on November 15 and the first units arrived in Falmouth by November 17, they found no bridges built, no materials for construction, and no engineers to undertake the task. The pontoon materials were ready to move on November 14, except for the absence of the 270 horses needed to move them. Burnside was unaware until he arrived that most of the building materials had not been transported. Burnside arrived in Falmouth by November 19, but the pontoons that he planned to use to cross the Rappahannock were delayed because some functionary in Washington had failed to send the pontoons when Burnside asked for them. They were supposed to be there when he got there. Communications between Burnside's staff engineer Cyrus B. Comstock and the Engineer Brigade commander Daniel P. Woodbury indicate that Burnside had assumed the bridging was en route to Washington based on orders given on November 7.

So, when General Sumner arrived in Falmouth on November 17th, he ordered his men to race to Fredericksburg and cross the river. Except when he got there, there was no bridge. There were only 500 troops in the town and occupying the commanding heights to the west. Burnside became concerned that early winter rains would make the fording points unusable; that might make Sumner vulnerable, he could be cut off. Instead, Burnside ordered Sumner to wait in Falmouth.

Lee didn't ascertain Burnside's movement early enough to launch an attack. The part of the plan that Halleck had expressed concern about worked out favorably. Lee believed that Burnside would outpace him and cross the Rappahannock River first, prompting Lee to prepare for defense along the North Anna River instead. This plan, however, was met with dissatisfaction from President Davis, who considered it too close to Richmond . Lee recognized that Burnside had beat him to the Rappahannock – and now found himself on the wrong side of the river. Instead of moving to the North Anna, he had Longstreet move instead to the heights above the river on its south side above the town.

The materials for one bridge arrived November 25, 8 days after the Union army. This is truly a failure of the Union Army quartermaster department. The fact that Burnside ended up taking the blame for this is unfair; there was plenty of blame for everyone. Burnside was looking for a place to ford the river. The arrival of the bridge was much too late to cross the river without a battle. He knew only half of Lee’s army was across the river. Still, Burnside had an opportunity because at that time only half of Lee's army had arrived and were not yet dug in. Had Burnside acted more expeditiously and attacked Longstreet sooner, he might have won a victory before Jackson arrived. Part of his reluctance to move was his fear that if only some of his army crossed, an attack by Longstreet might be decisive.  It has always intrigued me that Burnside had delayed his attack at Antietam across the bridge and was criticized for not finding fords downstream; and 3 months later, he is criticized for the delays in looking for fords downstream.

Longstreet's arrival on November 23 marked a critical moment in the lead-up to the Battle of Fredericksburg. General Lee strategically positioned his forces, placing them on the commanding ridge known as Marye's Heights, west of the town. This defensive formation included Anderson's division on the far left, McLaws positioned directly behind the town, and Pickett's and Hood's divisions anchoring the right flank. Lee recognized the significance of holding this high ground.

Meanwhile, Lee had dispatched a message for General Stonewall Jackson on November 26, anticipating the need for his Second Corps. Jackson, known for his remarkable swiftness, had already foreseen the call and initiated a forced march of his troops from Winchester starting on November 22. They covered as much as 20 miles a day, a remarkable feat considering the challenging terrain. Jackson's timely arrival at Lee's headquarters on November 29 reinforced the Confederate position.

As General Burnside awaited the construction of crucial pontoon bridges, General Lee organized his army for the impending battle. Lieutenant General James Longstreet's wing shifted eastward from Culpeper, securing a formidable position on Marye's Heights, which offered a commanding view of Fredericksburg from the western vantage point. To the south, Lieutenant General Stonewall Jackson's troops entrenched themselves along a line stretching from Prospect Hill to Hamilton's Crossing, a strategic position four miles south of the town. 

However, as Burnside's wait for the bridges extended, he missed a valuable window of opportunity. Lee recognized this delay and anticipated that Burnside would eventually attempt to cross the Rappahannock River. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s wing moved east from Culpeper, and Lt. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s men hurried toward the Rappahannock from the Shenandoah Valley. Longstreet took up a position on Marye’s Heights, overlooking Fredericksburg from the west. To the south, Jackson’s men were entrenched in a line stretching over Prospect Hill and onto Hamilton’s Crossing, four miles from the town. Burnside had squandered his opportunity. During this delay, Lee anticipated Burnside’s crossing the Rappahannock. This strategic maneuvering and positioning by both sides set the stage for the dramatic events that would unfold in the Battle of Fredericksburg.

Originally, Burnside had planned to cross east of Fredericksburg at Skinker's Neck, a shallow marshy area downstream from the town. However, upon Jackson's arrival and Confederate movements in that area, Burnside changed his plan to cross at the town itself, hoping to surprise the enemy. When Jackson arrived, he placed DH Hill and Early in that area when he received notification of Union gunboats there. Union spy balloons detected this movement, so Burnside was aware of it. Since it seemed that Lee had moved toward his right, then a smarter place to cross would be to Lee’s left, so he decided to cross at the town itself, thinking it would surprise the enemy.

Union engineers finally began to assemble 6 pontoon bridges on December 11. They were designated to be placed as 2 north of the town center, 1 south of the town center, and 3 more south. In the pre-dawn hours, a regiment of Union engineers began assembling the pontoon bridges opposite the town. Confederate riflemen harassed the engineers and slowed their progress.

The delay between November 25 and December 11 was partly due to the weather. But several years later, Halleck reported to Stanton that he had never approved of the plan, and had suggested using the fords upriver instead. After the war. Burnside wrote that he had told Halleck that during the movement he wouldn’t be unable to receive telegraphic messages. I get the impression, reading these notes well after the fact, that Halleck just didn’t order things be done and Burnside didn’t think he had to be certain about this detail. https://civilwartalk.com/threads/why-were-burnsides-bridges-late-at-fredericksburg.7791/?amp=1

As Union forces under General Hunt positioned over 220 cannons on Stafford Heights, it seemed they held an impregnable advantage against any Confederate counterattack. In the late morning, the Union unleashed a formidable bombardment, This relentless shelling wreaked havoc, causing considerable damage to numerous buildings and instilling terror among the civilian population. After approximately four hours of intense bombardment, the engineers resumed their work on the pontoon bridges, but Confederate riflemen wasted no time in resuming their sharpshooting.

However, a significant challenge remained in the form of Confederate sharpshooters entrenched in the basements of buildings within Fredericksburg. It was then that General Hunt proposed a bold solution. He suggested that Burnside deploy infantry across the river to engage the sharpshooters directly, effectively proposing urban combat in the heart of Fredericksburg.

Faced with the bridging process grinding to a halt due to enemy fire, General Burnside authorized a daring plan to dislodge the Confederate snipers.

As the plan unfolded, 135 infantrymen from the 7th Michigan and the 19th Massachusetts courageously crowded into small boats, with the 20th Massachusetts following soon after. Colonel Norman Hall, a brigade commander from the nearby Second Corps, volunteered his brigade to row across the Rappahannock. Under enemy fire, these regiments successfully crossed the river and formed a skirmish line to eliminate the Confederate sharpshooters. While some Confederate soldiers surrendered, the fighting intensified as Union and Confederate forces clashed street by street throughout the town. Ultimately, the riflemen were driven from their positions on the riverbank.

By late afternoon, Sumner's Right Grand Division began its crossing at 4:30 p.m., although the bulk of his troops did not complete the crossing until December 12. Hooker's Center Grand Division followed on December 13, utilizing both the northern and southern bridges.

Union artillery unleashed over 5,000 shells upon the town and the ridges to the west, transforming Fredericksburg into a scene of destruction. By nightfall, four Union brigades occupied the town, engaging in looting on a scale hitherto unseen in the war, enraging General Lee, who likened their actions to the ancient Vandals.

December 12: The Slaughter Pen

On December 12, the remainder of Burnside's army successfully crossed the river and established their presence in Fredericksburg. As the evening developed, Burnside formulated a strategy to secure the areas surrounding the town. His plan involved utilizing the nearly 60,000 troops in Major General William B. Franklin's Left Grand Division to crush General Lee's southern flank, commanded by General Jackson. Simultaneously, the rest of Burnside's forces would maintain General Longstreet's position on Marye's Heights and provide support to Franklin if required.

However, the planning that evening left everyone in a state of uncertainty. Despite Burnside's verbal instructions, which outlined a primary attack by Franklin, supported by General Hooker on the southern flank, with General Sumner leading a secondary attack on the northern flank, his written orders on the morning of December 13 were vague and confusing to his subordinates. These orders did not reach Franklin until 7:15 or 7:45 a.m., and when they did, they differed from Franklin's expectations. Rather than ordering a full-scale assault by the entire grand division, Burnside instructed Franklin to maintain his position but send "a division at least" to seize Prospect Hill around Hamilton's Crossing. Simultaneously, Sumner was to send one division through the city and up Telegraph Road, with both flanks ready to commit their entire commands. Burnside appeared to anticipate that these limited attacks would intimidate Lee into withdrawal.

Franklin, who had initially advocated a vigorous assault, interpreted Burnside's order conservatively. Map inaccuracies further compounded the confusion. Interestingly, Burnside's use of the word "seize" conveyed less forcefulness in 19th-century military terminology than the command "to carry" the heights.

The attack finally began when General Reynolds led the way, selecting General George Meade to initiate the movement. However, substantial artillery fire from Pelham's Cavalry artillery and later Walker's artillery on Prospect Hill delayed Meade's advance until nearly 1 PM. The attack eventually gained momentum, but Jackson had concealed approximately 35,000 Confederate troops on a wooded ridge.

The battle on the southern end of the field, known as the Slaughter Pen, resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. General A.P. Hill's poor performance at Fredericksburg led to a significant portion of Confederate casualties in Jackson's corps. A triangular patch of woods extending beyond the railroad, swampy and dense with underbrush, created a 600-yard gap between the brigades of Brigadier Generals James H. Lane and James J. Archer. Brigadier General Maxcy Gregg's brigade was stationed approximately a quarter mile behind this vulnerable gap. Meade's 1st Brigade entered the gap, ascended the railroad embankment, and turned right into the underbrush, catching Lane's brigade in the flank. This maneuver enabled Meade to attack both Confederate brigades from the flank.

However, Gregg, for unknown reasons, ordered his troops not to fire, believing mistakenly that the approaching Union forces were friendly. It is suspected that his partial deafness may have prevented him from hearing the sounds of battle and gunfire. Tragically, he was struck in the spine by a minie ball and succumbed to his injuries two days later. As the situation escalated, Archer called for Gregg to send reinforcements, but by then, Gregg's brigade had suffered defeat. Early and Taliaferro moved their divisions to cover the gap, effectively halting Meade's advance. A counterattack by Early and a counter-counter charge by Union generals Gibbon and Birney eventually forced the Confederates to withdraw into the hills south of town. Had Franklin supported Meade with all of his men the gap might have led to a rout.

The main Union assault against Jackson initially achieved success. In an area later known as the Slaughter Pen, Major General George G. Meade's division briefly penetrated Jackson's line, posing a threat to the Confederate right. However, a lack of coordinated reinforcements and Jackson's resolute counterattack thwarted the Union effort. The battle resulted in heavy casualties on both sides, with neither gaining a significant advantage.

December 12: Marye’s Heights

On the northern end of the battlefield, Brig. Gen. William H. French's division of the II Corps stood ready to advance, despite facing a barrage of Confederate artillery fire raining down upon the fog-shrouded city of Fredericksburg. General Burnside had instructed Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, the commander of the Right Grand Division, to send "a division or more" to secure the high ground west of the city. This move was initially seen as a diversionary tactic, with the main thrust of the Union assault expected to occur in the south. . General Burnside's orders to Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, commander of the Right Grand Division, was to send "a division or more" to seize the high ground to the west of the city, assuming that his assault on the southern end of the Confederate line would be the decisive action of the battle.

Marye’s Heights, a prominent geographic feature overlooking the river and the city, presented an imposing obstacle. The low ridge, composed of several hills separated by ravines, including Taylor's Hill, Stansbury Hill, Marye's Hill, and Willis Hill, rose 40–50 feet above the surrounding plain. This gives an impression that it’s not an especially steep approach. While the approach was relatively open, it was punctuated by scattered houses, fences, and gardens, hindering the movement of Union forces. To reach the base of the heights, Union soldiers had to leave the relative cover of the city, descend into a valley crossed by a water-filled canal ditch, and then ascend an exposed slope of 400 yards.

Close to the crest of the ridge, specifically Marye's Hill and Willis Hill, a narrow lane in a slight depression known as the Sunken Road was protected by a 4-foot stone wall, supplemented with log breastworks in some areas. Initially, McLaws had placed about 2,000 Confederate soldiers on the front line of Marye's Heights, with an additional 7,000 in reserve positions on the crest and behind the ridge. At the front of Longstreet's position, the Sunken Road was packed with Confederates three ranks deep. Confederate artillery covered the plain below, making it a deadly approach. General Longstreet had received assurance from his artillery commander, Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, that they could effectively sweep the field with gunfire: "General, we cover that ground now so well that we will comb it as with a fine-tooth comb. A chicken could not live on that field when we open on it."

Burnside's original diversionary attack against Longstreet's defensive position behind the stone wall resulted in horrendous Union casualties. Wave after wave of Federal troops advanced across the open ground, only to be met with withering rifle and artillery fire from the strongly fortified Confederate position. Lee, witnessing the carnage, famously remarked, "It is well that war is so terrible. We should grow too fond of it."

The initial plan had been to distract Longstreet with this attack while the main effort took place elsewhere, but when the secondary engagement at the Slaughter Pen stalled, this ill-fated assault became the primary focus of the battle.

Sumner's Right Grand Division was the force behind the initial assault, which began at noon, kicking off a relentless sequence of attacks that persisted until nightfall. As Northern forces moved out of Fredericksburg, Longstreet's artillery rained destruction upon them. The Union troops encountered a perilous bottleneck at the canal ditch, crossed by only three narrow bridges. Once they surmounted this obstacle, they formed shallow battle lines, seeking cover behind a slight bluff that provided concealment but no protection.

The order for the final advance echoed across the field. The terrain beyond the canal ditch offered little cover, with few buildings and fences. Southern cannons wasted no time resuming their barrage on these exposed targets. As Federals covered about half the remaining distance, a torrent of bullets erupted from the Sunken Road, causing severe casualties. Survivors sought refuge behind a small depression in the ground or retreated to the safety of the canal ditch valley.

Darius Couch and the II Corps were at the forefront of this attack. His corps was ordered to assault the Confederate position at the base of Marye's Heights overlooking Fredericksburg. From the courthouse cupola, Couch watched as French's division, followed by Hancock's division and then Howard's, suffered heavy casualties. The II Corps alone sustained 4,000 casualties in this part of the battle. One may wonder why a flank attack was not attempted instead of a direct assault; in fact, Couch ordered Howard to march his division toward the right and flank the Confederate defenses, but the terrain did not permit such a maneuver; all such attempts were crowded back to the center.

Why Did Burnside order this attack?

The Assault on Marye's Heights resulted in a casualty rate estimated at 15-20% for Union troops, contributing to a total Union casualty count of 8,000. Although the assault was tactically devastating, it had minimal strategic impact on the war. It became the most one-sided Confederate victory in the war, yet it did not alter the overall trajectory of the conflict.

Several factors influenced Burnside's decision-making. There was a breakdown in communication and coordination among Union commanders. Burnside received reports of limited success in the diversionary attack on the Confederate right flank, leading him to believe that a more aggressive assault on Marye's Heights was needed to divert Confederate attention. Pressure to achieve a decisive victory and optimism may have clouded his judgment.

Burnside believed in his numerical advantage and hoped to dislodge the Confederate defenders through overwhelming force. Given the circumstances, Marye's Heights seemed the most promising target due to its proximity to the shelter of Fredericksburg and the less steep terrain.

While some subordinate commanders, including General William B. Franklin, expressed reservations, Burnside persisted in ordering piecemeal attacks. Hooker, Sumner, and several others told Burnside it was futile, but he continued to order piecemeal attacks

Aftermath

As darkness descended on the battlefield, strewn with the fallen and the wounded, it became evident that the Confederates had secured a decisive victory. The night resonated with the harrowing cries of the wounded, described as "weird, unearthly, terrible to hear and bear."

Burnside, undeterred by the grim outcome, issued orders to renew the assaults on December 14, even expressing a desire to personally lead them. However, his subordinates persuaded him against this perilous endeavor. On December 15, Burnside orchestrated a skillful retreat across the Rappahannock River, dismantling the bridges behind his army as they withdrew to Stafford Heights.

As darkness descended upon the battlefield, it revealed a haunting scene of devastation, strewn with the fallen and wounded. The cries of the wounded, described as "weird, unearthly, terrible to hear and bear," echoed through the night, serving as a grim testament to the horrors of war. The wounded soldiers who lay on the battlefield faced dire circumstances as there were limited means to evacuate them. Many had fallen in front of the Confederate lines, making any rescue attempt perilous and likely to result in even more casualties. Regrettably, many of the wounded likely succumbed to their injuries who might have been saved under different circumstances. Undoubtedly many of the wounded exsanguinated who might have been saved.

As a consequence of this tragedy, the role of Jonathan Letterman, appointed in June 1862 as the medical director of the Army of the Potomac, became pivotal. Letterman initiated a comprehensive overhaul of the Medical Service, armed with a charter from army commander Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan to enact necessary improvements. By the time of the Battle of Antietam in September, Letterman had established a system of forward first aid stations at the regimental level, introducing principles of triage. He implemented standing operating procedures for the intake and treatment of war casualties and was the first to apply management principles to battlefield medicine.

Letterman also introduced mobile field hospitals at division and corps headquarters, along with an efficient ambulance corps that operated under the control of medical staff rather than the Quartermaster Corps. He streamlined the distribution of medical supplies. Regrettably, at Fredericksburg, Letterman's innovative system was often countermanded by Union officers. Nevertheless, it was adopted by the Army of the Potomac and other Union armies after the Battle of Fredericksburg, eventually becoming the official procedure for the intake and treatment of battlefield casualties.

Amidst the grim aftermath, one story of extraordinary compassion emerged. Richard Rowland Kirkland, known as "The Angel of Marye’s Heights," displayed remarkable humanity. Kirkland, a devout Christian, could not ignore the pleas of the dying Union soldiers. Initially denied permission by his commander, Brigadier General Joseph Kershaw, due to concerns for Kirkland's safety, he eventually received approval to assist the wounded Union soldiers, symbolizing a moment of humanity amidst the brutality of war.

The Battle of Fredericksburg was the single most lopsided victory in the war. The outrageous repetitive attacks on Marye’s Heights had led to an unnecessary attack and thousands of casualties. Although profoundly discouraging for Union soldiers and the Northern populace, did not deliver a decisive impact on the overall course of the war. Despite being the most one-sided Confederate victory in the war, it had minimal strategic significance. Confederate morale surged, despite their numerical disadvantage, while Union morale had already suffered due to the replacement of the popular McClellan with Burnside. Burnside's errors in planning and leadership led to rising insubordination and his infamous ineffective second offensive against Lee in January 1863, mockingly referred to as the “Mud March.”

Understanding the lack of a long-term advantage is essential in comprehending the broader dynamics of the Civil War. Although a resounding tactical victory for the Confederacy, the Battle of Fredericksburg proved to be a hollow triumph. The North's vast resources soon compensated for Burnside's losses in manpower and supplies. Conversely, Lee faced difficulties replenishing both missing soldiers and much-needed supplies.

Strength:

- Union: 122,009 (114,000 engaged)

- Confederate: 78,513 (72,500 engaged)

Casualties and losses:

- Union: 12,653 total (1,284 killed, 9,600 wounded, 1,769 captured/missing)

- Confederate: 5,377 total (608 killed, 4,116 wounded, 653 captured/missing)

The casualty ratio was about 2:1, which, when expressed as percentages, equates to approximately 11.1% for the Union and 7.4% for the Confederacy. While it was a clear Confederate victory, the casualties were not as catastrophic as some accounts suggest. Lee's forces suffered 5,300 casualties but inflicted over twice that number of losses on their Union counterparts. Notably, of the 12,600 Federal soldiers killed, wounded, or missing, almost two-thirds fell in front of the formidable stone wall at Marye's Heights.

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The Crossword of Black History: Decoding the Real behind the so-called ‘Paternal Relation’ between Masters and Slaves

For a few centuries, the United States of America has been known as ‘the land of the free and home of the brave.’ Here, Aarushi Anand argues that in the context of slavery, the adage still holds true for the past three centuries, only the narrative gets reversed.

Mid-19th century painting Slaves Waiting for Sale - Richmond, Virginia. By Eyre Crowe.

America was the land of free people, of its native people. With the advent of British imperialism in the eighteenth-century slavery became the norm. Different degrees of freedom coexisted, from the slave stripped completely of liberty to the independent slave-owner who enjoyed a full range of rights. The settlers’ success, however, rested on depriving Native Americans of their land and, in some colonies, importing large numbers of African slaves as laborers. Freedom and lack of freedom expanded together from seventeenth-century to nineteenth-century America. 

In writings from the eighteenth century, the image of the “grateful slave,” becomes commonplace. Such a stereotype provided readers and viewers with what appeared to be a seemingly positive alternative to the injustices of human trafficking and exploitation:  a willing and even desperate captive who served a beloved White master out of gratitude for their good deeds. In the latter half of the century the vision of the “grateful slave” contributed to colonial practices of White supremacy.

Historiographical trends in analyzing relationship between master and slave

By the 1960s, U.B. Phillips had become a paradigm for the racist and regressive aspects of slave historiography. He substantiates his arguments by stressing on availability of amenities: adequate food, clothing, housing, medical care, along with instruction in contemporary technologies to “civilise" the slaves. Only occasionally were slave laws enforced, and owners hardly ever sold their slaves, "except in emergencies." Despite its significance in structuring Southern society, Phillips addresses the unprofitability of enslaved labour which slowed down the industrialization process, restricted crop diversification, and wasted soil fertility. His claim that "a negro was what a white man made him" reflects his beliefs that Blacks were culturally blank and retained few native African qualities after enslavement. 

Innumerable historians have responded unfavourably to Phillips' writings. Historian Kenneth M. Stampp dismantled Phillips' portrayal of benign paternalism and presented a starkly cruel reality to the academics and students of the South. Slaves in Charleston could not “swear, smoke, walk with a cane. or make joyful demonstrations.” For some crimes, Florida's laws permitted branding, mutilation, and even execution. Working hours from sunup to sunset, course food, exacting work, limited medical care were other forms of exploitation.  According to Stampp, absence of paternal authority and no legal sanction for slave marriages weakened the Afro-American kinship system: “the slave woman was first a full-time worker for her owner and only incidentally a wife, a mother and homemaker.” Additionally, the sale of family members separately led to “widespread sexual promiscuity” among both men and women, typified by a Kentucky female slave labour “who had each of her seven children by a different father.” 

Stanley Elkins argues that the origin of North American slavery had capitalistic tendencies which gave paramount rights to slave owners, and barred slaves from appealing to institutions, like the church or the state, which in Spanish America might protect them from some forms of exploitation. The "shock" and trauma of the slave trade, along with the adaptation to the “closed system" of the Southern plantations, resulted in the infantilization of the Afro-Americans and their absolute subservience to authority.

Initiating a new chapter in the debate over slavery, historian Eugene D. Genovese draws upon the writings of U.B. Phillips. Genovese saw the plantations as pre capitalist firms and the slave South as a distinctive civilization that was anti-bourgeois. He contends that plantations were inefficient in the South and that plantation owners were unable to make investments in labour-saving efficiency to preserve the worth of their slaves. His Marxist vision is ironic in the sense that he talks about the slave economy on the one hand, but he minimizes the degree of exploitation in the relationship between slaveholder and slave on the other. He envisioned a mutual acceptance of paternalism by both master and slave. Paternalism contained resistance, perpetuated class rule, and gave slaves moderate bargaining power.

His analysis of slave religion reveals it to be a religion of resignation which was not conducive to revolutionary political or ideological tradition. Slaves had no prophetic heritage, therefore plantation owner’s control over slave religion and Afro-American culture continued to be dictated by the whims of the planters. Genovese discredits the humanity of Africans and emphasizes the Biblical endorsement of human enslavement in order to rebut the abolitionists’ contention that slavery must be abolished on the grounds of Christianity, reason, and property ownership.

Some historians focus on the high rates of slave mortality in the rice plantations, where owners’ absenteeism was frequent, while others stress on the slave trade. In terms of housing slaves had one or two-room cottages that were situated on agricultural fields, had no ventilation and were unbearably hot. They were more susceptible to illnesses than their owners were because of poor nutrition, unhygienic living conditions, and excessive work. Skin irritations, toothaches, rickets, beriberi, and scurvy were all exacerbated by vitamin deficits. Juxta positioned with racist historiography no kind slave owner would disperse familial groups, sever the bond of father and child, or exploit slaves in the above-mentioned manner.

Debunking the narrative of father-son relationship through slave resistance

Emphasis on African antecedents provides a viable interpretive framework for understanding the subtle ways in which they provided resistance. Slaves typically hold out to music from their native countries. This implies preservation of their own culture through the memorialization of their homeland in songs, poems, and fables was a kind of resistance to white civilization. Sabotage, sluggish labour rates, and escape from plantations were the more visible forms of resistance. To limit the quantity of their services slaves encouraged their masters to underestimate their intelligence by damaging tools and feigning illnesses. Depending on the severity of the white master's brutality or the type of order disobeyed, the penalties varied from starvation and limited ration to physical violence and death. The number of laws enacted to keep the institution working gives clinching evidence of the amount of resistance slaves offered. 

An additional form of resistance was the occasional murder of overseers or masters. Additionally, slaves who had access to the master's residence would make attempts to assassinate them. One of those suspected of killing the master was the barber (as he got extremely close to him when providing grooming services and had access to long blades for shaving). Another strategy is to inflict severe discomfort or a bleeding nose on the master. People with access to a White man's household, such as female slave servants, could kill the occupants by slow poisoning, which involves putting a small amount of arsenic in meals to simulate kidney failure and demonstrate natural death.

Female experience of slavery

New work on gender and slavery throws light on the experiences and extent of resistance offered by women. Sexuality imposed an implicit price constraint on the worth of enslaved labour. The cost of female slave labour was cheaper than male slave labour, particularly when planters applied to black women the same tax-exempt status that applied to white female servants. Slave pregnancy was one of the best ways for a slave owner to increase slave numbers without being forced to buy new ones. To curb sexual attacks on White women Black females were originally brought from Africa to act as companions (sexual gratification) for the male slaves. 

Slavery, according to some historians, was an opening for a white man's sexual playground. Female slaves received the nickname "Fancy maids," and they were auctioned off into the "fancy trade." This "fancy trade" was expressly established to sell mixed-race women for sexual liaison and trafficking. Female slaves frequently attempted to flee, but since they were more concerned with the welfare of their children, their mobility was restricted and likelihood of capture raised. In addition to their physical labour, women's reproductive work was aggressively exploited. As a result slave women suffered from difficulties arising due to birthing complications, and sexually transmitted infections. To provide resistance, women in the fertile stage practiced birth control and abortion to avoid remaining in a perpetual state of pregnancy.  Thus, in the lives of slave women, financial affairs and the biological process entwined in intricate and tragic ways.

Historian Ira Berlin rightly contends that comprehending the economic, social, and political evolution of North America, particularly the United States, requires confronting slavery's key role in the nation's foundation. While the ruthless oppression of slaves constituted the foundation of colonial American society, traditional historians viewed the dehumanizing institution through rose-tinted spectacles. The revisionists' study of data pertaining to several fugitive laws, reports on death, violence and an agonizing living experience of slaves destroy the conception of a father-child bond between slave and slave owner. When Eric Foner remarked "parents do not typically sell their children," the institution’s non-paternalistic, exploitative bent gets highlighted. No wonder slavery is referred to as the nation's original sin.

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

References

·       Genovese, E.D. (2011). Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made. 9th edition. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.

·       Morris, Richard B. "The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South. By Kenneth M. Stampp. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1956. Pp. xxi, 435. $5.75." The Journal of Economic History 18.1 (1958): 89-90.

·       Genovese, Eugene. (1989). The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South. Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press.

·       Stampp, K. The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South. New York: Vintage, 1989.

·       Deborah Gray White; ‘The Nature of Female Slavery’; “Aren’t I am Woman? Female Slaves in the Plantation South”; W.W. Norton and Company.

Jacob Riis: The Danish-American who Made a Big Impact in the Late 19th Century

Jacob Riis (1849-1914) was a Danish-American who had a big influence in America during his lifetime. He was a social reformer, journalist, photographer – and confidante to presidents. Richard Bluttal explains.

Jacob Riis in 1906.

The great mass. . . . of newsboys who cry their “extrees” in the street by day . . . are children with homes who contribute to their family’s earnings, and sleep out, if they do, either because they have not sold their papers or gambled away their money at “craps” and are afraid to go home . . . . In winter the boys curl themselves up on the steam-pipes in the newspaper offices that open their doors at midnight on secret purpose to let them in.

Imagine it's 1888, New York City. The Lower East Side is the most densely populated place on Earth: block after block of tenements house the working-poor immigrants of the city, including Italians, Irish, Germans, Jews, Czechs and Chinese. Imagine the darkness of an unlit corridor in one of those tenements, a corridor that opens onto windowless rooms, 10 feet square, where entire families live and might even work — sewing or rolling cigars. Out of the darkness, a door opens. A man with a Danish accent leads a team of amateur photographers, who are accompanied by a policeman. They position their camera on a tripod and ignite a mixture of magnesium and potassium chlorate powder. A flash explodes, illuminating their squalor. It would take the photographers a few minutes to reload that early ancestor of the flash bulb. And then, on to another tenement scene. And despite the blackness of a room or an unlit street, a picture is taken, a document of urban poverty.

In 1873, Riis became a police reporter and was assigned to cover New York City’s Lower East Side. This role, as described by Riis, meant he was “the one who gathers and handles all the news that means trouble to someone: the murders, fires, suicides, robberies, and all that sort”. His investigations led him to some stunning discoveries, including the horrible living conditions of New York tenements. He found that some tenement conditions were so abysmal that the infant death rate was 1 in 10. These experiences drove Riis to continue his efforts; by the late 1880’s, Riis was conducting in-depth investigations into the conditions of the slums, using flashbulb photography to capture these deplorable conditions.

Social activist

At what point did Riis become a social activist. As the story goes, “One cold night of wandering led to a chance encounter with a little dog, who loyally followed him around the city. When Riis sought refuge in a police lodging house, the dog was denied entry. Riis awoke in the middle of the night to find another lodger had robbed him. When he complained to a policeman, he was called a liar and thrown out of the lodging house.

His loyal friend, who had been patiently waiting at the door, reacted to seeing Riis treated this way by attacking the policeman and biting his leg. The policeman grabbed the dog and smashed him against the station steps, killing him. Riis was beside himself with grief and rage and pinpoints this exact moment as launching his life as a social activist. 

The kind of police lodging where Riis had attempted to spend the night had become an increasingly since the 1860s. Low Life author Luc Sante estimates that between 100,000 and 250,000 people per year took shelter there. As Eric Monkkonen documents in Police in Urban America, these cold, leaky, drafty lodging houses were a petri dish of diseases that would spread quickly through their populations and onto the police force.

One police doctor lamented, “More miserable, unhealthy, horrible dungeons could not well be conceived of,” which sounds pretty rough by 19th century standards. The most common afflictions were tuberculosis, lice, and syphilis. Reformers had long hoped to shut such institutions down. In 1894, when Riis met Teddy Roosevelt, they got their best chance.

Confidante

Jacob Riis was once one of the most famous men in America: and became a close friend and confidante of President Theodore Roosevelt and the epitome of the immigrant made good — good, in his case, being measured by political and social influence, not by wealth. One of his books, How the Other Half Lives (1890), exposed the horrors of tenement life. It caught the attention of Civil Service Commissioner Theodore Roosevelt, who viewed it as a call to action. Immediately after finishing this book, Roosevelt marched into Riis’s office to tender his assistance. In 1895, when Roosevelt was New York Police Commissioner and Riis was employed as a police reporter at the Mulberry Street station, the two often worked together. They ventured out on urban expeditions together to witness first-hand the calamitous conditions affecting the poor. Through their investigations, they hoped to bring about better living situations as well as to eliminate corruption within the police department that added to the burden of destitute New Yorkers. . On February 8, 1896, Riis took Roosevelt on a tour of police lodging houses, including the specific one that had mistreated him nearly 20 years earlier. A disgusted Roosevelt promised Riis, “I will smash them tomorrow.” A week later, Commissioner Roosevelt shut down all of the police lodging houses in the city. Afterwards, Riis wrote, “The battle is won. The murder of my dog is avenged.” For the for the rest of his career, Riis would end lectures thundering, “My dog did not die unavenged!”Through their investigations, they hoped to bring about better living situations as well as to eliminate corruption within the police department that added to the burden of destitute New Yorkers. Riis was active in bringing about anti-child labor and tenement reform laws.

After Roosevelt resigned as Police Commissioner, he and Riis remained close. United by their passion for reform, the pair’s unlikely friendship surpassed purely political matters Riis was active in bringing about anti-child labor and tenement reform laws.

Photos

One of Riis' most famous photos was taken on Bayard Street. It's called "5 Cents a Spot," which shows a room full of people bedding down for the night. (A "spot" meant a place on the floor.) They must have been shocked. Magnesium flash powder was something new. It was developed in Germany in 1887. Riis' burst of light must have been a stunning surprise, but it made the dim, airless lives of the poor visible to the middle class.

Bonnie Yochelson and Daniel Czitrom, co-authors of Rediscovering Jacob Riis,  took a walk through the neighborhood.  The neighborhood is recently gentrified, but this was where Riis campaigned against the housing conditions of the day. "You can still see the really small size of the building lots," says Czitrom, who is a historian. "The typical building lot in New York for a tenement was 25 feet wide and 100 feet deep going back," and the buildings often took up the entire lot, he says. So-called rear tenements, built behind other tenements, would have no access to light or air, and all the rooms were interior rooms, Czitrom says.

A court decision from that era essentially said there is no right to light or air for a renter or an owner, he says. "So, the idea that you have a right to a window or the right to some breathing space was not a legal right that anyone recognized until much later," Czitrom says.

Riis thought of himself as a writer, and he was evidently a gripping storyteller in the lectures he gave to accompany his lantern slideshows.

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Republicans in the Presidency: Criminal Dealings?

Donald J. Trump is in court for a number of reasons currently, although he still remains favorite for the Republican nomination for the presidency. With that in mind, here Larry Deblinger looks at some of the criminal (or possibly criminal) dealings of some former Republican presidents.

Harding’s Gang? President Warren G. Harding’s first cabinet in 1921.

The Republican party of the United States is in flux as it seeks to forge its future with or without the leadership of former president Donald J. Trump. While Trump holds a commanding lead in the polls in the race for the 2024 GOP presidential nomination, he is also facing trial on four criminal indictments encompassing 91 separate charges. Republican politicians and rank-and file-voters must decide whether they will support Trump should he be both their party’s nominee and a convicted felon. Depending on the trial outcomes, it may be a stark choice of Trump or the law.

But the stakes of the present moment for the future of the Republican party, and, potentially, of American democracy, can only be fully appreciated in light of the GOP’s past. The history of the presidencies of the Republican party, which often brands itself “the party of law and order,” includes a long criminal record, spanning almost the entire existence of the party, of which the Trump administration, despite some unprecedented aspects of its law-breaking, is only the latest chapter. What Republicans decide today will help determine whether that heritage of lawlessness at the highest levels of national government, where a political party is expected to assemble its best and brightest and promote its core tenets, will continue to stain the character of the GOP.

Grant’s Invasion

The criminal record of Republican presidencies substantially begins a mere 15 years after the 1854 birth of the GOP, with the administration of Ulysses S. Grant (1869-1877). At this time, corruption in government was common since the so-called “spoils system,” as in “to the victor go the spoils,” held sway in American politics, determining government jobs, favors and funding through political patronage.1 But federal executive branch corruption erupted to unprecedented and shocking levels under Grant. The scandals, too numerous to detail in total, ran from bribery, fraud, and extortion to embezzlement and financial market manipulation and permeated the departments of the Treasury, Interior, Justice, War (now called Defense), the Navy, and the Postal Service, reaching to top cabinet officers and the vice-president.2

The malfeasance by the end of Grant’s first term was such that it helped trigger a breakaway faction of his party who called themselves the Liberal Republicans and opposed Grant’s 1872 re-election. Among other points of opposition to Grant, the Liberals charged that “The Civil Service of the Government has become a mere instrument of partisan tyranny and personal ambition, and an object of selfish greed. It is a scandal and reproach upon free institutions, and breeds a demoralization dangerous to the perpetuity of republican government.”3

The Whiskey Ring

The most extensive of the Grant administration scandals was the Whiskey Ring. Grant had sent an old friend whom he had appointed to the Treasury, General John McDonald, to head up federal tax revenue collection in Missouri, a hotbed of support for the Liberal Republicans. Once there, McDonald observed that whiskey distillers had been bribing federal revenue agents for years to allow them to underpay what they owed in taxes. Rather than curtail the illegality, McDonald and other Republican operatives got in on the action, forming the Whiskey Ring in conjunction with distillers, ostensibly to divert the unpaid tax money to a slush fund for Grant’s re-election in 1872 and other Republican campaigns.4 Storekeepers, treasury clerks, revenue agents and others in the whiskey chain were forced to cooperate, sometimes through impressment and blackmail.4 After the 1872 elections, the Whiskey Ring outgrew its original, perhaps specious political purposes to become a nationwide crime syndicate operated entirely for the enrichment of the conspirators. After it was uncovered and investigated by Grant’s Justice Department starting in 1875, 110 conspirators, including MacDonald, were convicted of crimes (e.g., defrauding the US Treasury) and over $3 million in stolen revenues were recovered.5  

Despite the scandals of his administration and opposition of the Liberals, Grant, the former top general of the Union army and Civil war hero, won re-election handily. Grant appeared to be unaware of the various corrupt activities in his administration, and urged prosecution of the malefactors when informed of them.6 But he was drawn into the Whiskey Ring scandal when his private secretary, Orville Babcock, was indicted and tried in criminal court for involvement in the scheme. Grant testified on behalf of Babcock, denying his guilt and defending his character, in a deposition taken at the White House. Owing largely to Grant’s testimony, Babcock was eventually acquitted, but was later accused of complicity in another corrupt scheme.4,5 For years afterwards, fairly or not, the term “Grantism” was synonymous with government corruption.7

Harding’s Gang

Following Grant, the Progressive era of the late nineteenth and early 20th century in the US promoted “good government” policies which helped to curb government corruption. Progressive Republicans such as Theodore Roosevelt played prominent roles in this movement.8 But Americans came to tire of Progressivism under the strident leadership and activism of the Democratic president Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), and in 1920, they voted a conservative Republican, Warren G. Harding, into the White House. Harding had run on the campaign theme of a “return to normalcy.”9 If by normalcy Harding meant a return to Republican officials criminally abusing the powers of the Federal government, he delivered in spades.

A handsome, statuesque, and genial man with a turbo-charged sex-drive, Harding had risen through the shady world of Ohio politics and brought his cronies from that milieu to the executive branch. Known as the Ohio gang, Harding’s associates generated a font of corruption.

The disclosures began in early 1923 at the Veteran’s Bureau  (now the Department of Veterans’ Affairs), leading to the resignation of the Director, Charles R. Forbes and the suicide of the General Counsel, Charles T. Cramer. Forbes was convicted in 1924 of conspiracy to defraud the government, involving the theft of more than $200 million in bureau funds, and sentenced to two years in prison.10,11

The odor of corruption led next to the office of the Alien Property Custodian, which adjudicated claims for properties confiscated from Germans during World War I. Congressional investigators the bureau to be a sump of bribery and graft. The Custodian, Thomas W. Miller, was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the government and imprisoned.12  Harding’s Attorney General, Harry Daugherty, a key member of the Ohio gang, was brought to trial on charges of involvement in the Alien Bureau schemes and was acquitted, although it was brought out that he had burned bank ledger sheets of his and other accounts to destroy evidence.13 Daugherty was also accused of running a bribery/protection racket for alcohol dealers trying to evade the Prohibition law then in effect but was never prosecuted.14 However, Daugherty’s secretary and close friend, Jess Smith, committed suicide under mysterious circumstances.15

Oil Money Bribes

The infamous Teapot Dome scandal, also occurring under the Harding administration, was named for a federal government reserve of oil-bearing land at Teapot Dome, Wyoming, intended for use by the US Navy and managed by the Interior Department. After a series of investigations and criminal trials revealing an intricate and scandalous web of corporate-government corruption, Interior Secretary Albert B. Fall was convicted and imprisoned for receiving bribes in return for leasing Teapot Dome and other federal oil reserves to private companies.16

The full extent of Harding’s knowledge of the corruption in his administration remains unknown, largely because he died suddenly while in office in 1923. In his classic 1931 history of the 1920s, “Only Yesterday,” Frederick Lewis Allen, author and Editor of Harper’s magazine, opined that “the Harding administration was responsible in its short two years and five months for more concentrated robbery and rascality than any other in the whole history of the Federal government.”17 

Nixon’s Criminal Cohort

It is sometimes forgotten that Richard M. Nixon set the tone for his administration (1969-74) well before the Watergate scandal with his choice for vice-president, Spiro T. Agnew, Governor of Maryland. Little-known outside of Maryland, Agnew was a tough, plain-spoken politician whom the Nixonites thought would be perfect for their campaign. It turned out that Agnew was a creature straight from the Grant-Harding school of politics as criminal enterprise. Agnew had not only run a bribery racket as County Executive and then Governor of Maryland, extorting public works contractors for kickbacks of government-appropriated funds, he continued receiving the payments—in envelopes stuffed with cash—as Vice-President of the US.18 Faced with criminal charges of extortion, bribery, graft, conflict of interest, and tax evasion, Agnew pleaded to the least embarrassing charge, tax evasion, in return for resigning his office and a $10,000 fine.19

The Watergate Scandal

Then there was Watergate. The infamous burglary of Democratic National Committee headquarters and cover-up, the latter personally engineered by Nixon and his White House staff, encompassed a vast scale of illegal activities and abuses of power. As in the Harding administration, the nation’s top legal official, Attorney General John Mitchell, was a key facilitator of illegality under Nixon. A century after Republican operatives under Grant used the Whiskey Ring to raise re-election campaign funds through intimidation and blackmail, Nixon re-election campaign officials also used an illegally derived slush fund, including campaign contributions from corporations, which were outlawed at the time, to finance the Watergate break in and other crimes and “dirty tricks,” laundering the money through banks in Mexico.20,21

Overall, 69 Nixon administration officials were indicted for crimes related to Watergate or other illegal activities and 48 were convicted, including Attorney General Mitchell.22 A grand jury was set to charge Nixon with bribery, conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and obstruction of a criminal investigation but prosecution was deterred by questions over whether a sitting president could be indicted.23 In any event, like his vice-president before him, Nixon resigned in disgrace.

Reagan Restores a Republican Tradition

After the brief period of atonement known as the Ford administration (1974-77), which was most notable for President Gerald Ford’s pardoning of Nixon, the Republicans were back at it with the presidency of Ronald W. Reagan (1981-89). Reagan bore curious echoes of Harding as a genial, handsome, somewhat inattentive man promising to restore a nostalgic era of simpler times in America. And like Harding, Reagan presided over a viral outbreak of corruption in the federal government of a magnitude unseen since the days of the Ohio gang.24 Abuses of office occurred at no less than 20 different federal departments and agencies, according to Pulitzer prize-winning Washington Post journalist and author Haynes Johnson.25

“By the end of his (Reagan’s) term 138 administration officials had been convicted, had been indicted, or had been the subject of official investigations for official misconduct and/or criminal violations. In terms of numbers of officials involved, the record of his administration was the worst ever,” wrote Johnson, in his 1991 history of the Reagan administration, “Sleepwalking Through History.”26  

Cascading Corruption

The Iran-Contra affair is the most famous of the Reagan-era scandals, but that episode could at least be portrayed as a principled, if illegal, attempt to fight the spread of socialism in Central America. Less noted is that the Reagan administration was rife with raw, greed-driven corruption, which by one estimate amounted to a total theft of $130billion in public funds.27 A prime example was the Wedtech case, involving a Defense Department contractor, which Johnson described as “the kind of political corruption that extended back to the Washington (DC) of Grant and Harding: influence peddling, government contracts, cash, bribes, kickbacks, fraud and conspiracy.”28 The subsequent “Operation Ill Wind” probe by the FBI, investigating further corruption in Defense Department procurement, resulted in 50 convictions, including those of high-ranking military officers and administration officials.29

And on it went, across the federal government in a veritable feeding frenzy from the department of Housing and Urban Development, where an estimated $8 billion in public funds were stolen,30 to the Environmental Protection Agency where the director resigned rather than cooperate with a Congressional investigation of political manipulation of department funds.31 As in the Harding and Nixon administrations, the nation’s top law enforcement officer came under scrutiny for alleged lawbreaking. Edwin Meese III, Reagan’s Attorney General starting in 1984, was the object of a 14-month special prosecutor and federal grand jury investigation of alleged criminal financial improprieties. Although Meese was acquitted, he became an object of ridicule at the Department of Justice where morale plummeted.32     

Government-Sponsored Organized Crime

The Iran-Contra scandal involved a secret scheme concocted by high-ranking officials at the CIA and the National Security Agency to sell arms to Iran and use the proceeds to fund the Contras of Nicaragua, who were fighting the socialist regime of their country. The arms sales to Iran violated US policy of not negotiating with terrorists, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. The support for the Contras violated the 1984 Boland Amendment, which specifically prohibited all military aid to the Contras or other groups in Nicaragua.33 Moreover, the murky scheme involved an unholy host of money changers, drug dealers, arms dealers, and terrorists, amounting to what one writer has described as “American-sponsored organized crime.”34

The Independent Prosecutor on the case, Lawrence E. Walsh, ultimately indicted 14 individuals with criminal charges of whom 11 were convicted, including National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter, Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North, National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane, and Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams.35 Four counts of perjury and false statements were pending against Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger when he was pardoned in 1992 by President George H. W. Bush, who also pardoned Abrams and MacFarlane, among others. Walsh, a lifelong Republican, reportedly called Bush’s pardon of Weinberger, “one of the great cover-ups of American history at the highest levels of the executive branch.”36

Reagan pleaded ignorance of the Iran Contra scheme, while accepting responsibility for it. Although Reagan made multiple false statements regarding the activities in a televised speech to the nation,37 there was no evidence he knew they were false, and Walsh declined to indict him.38

And then there was Trump, who is now charged under one of his four indictments (from the state of Georgia) of running a “criminal enterprise” along with 17 co-defendants.

A Partisan Pattern?

Of the 19 total Republican presidencies, four, not including that of Trump, have each compiled a criminal record unparalleled by any other administration of any other party in US history. The outbreaks have been sporadic but persistent to this day. Yet, the question could be raised as to whether this record truly reveals a penchant for lawlessness specific to the GOP or simply a tendency endemic to all political parties. As the famous saying goes, “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

Over their history, the Democrats have surely demonstrated no blanket immunity to corruption. During the 1860s and 1870s, the era of the spoilsmen, the Tweed Ring of New York City, run by the notorious “Boss” Tweed of the Democratic party, was a nexus of corrupt rackets that dominated city politics and set a standard for “boss”-run “party machines” nationwide. The Democratic-run states of New York, Illinois, and New Jersey have long been known for systemic corruption. Former New York State Democratic Assembly Leader Sheldon Silver died a convict in 2022 after being found guilty of corruption in 2015, and Democratic Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey is currently facing bribery charges. Numerous other Democratic federal legislators have also been convicted of crimes in office.39 And the vast majority of Republican federal, executive branch office holders have been law abiding. The many Republicans who declared themselves ready to convict Nixon in his impeachment trial and forced his resignation demonstrated a courageous commitment to the law, as did those who testified for the January 6th Committee, and the two who served as committee members.

The Parties Compared

There is no comparison, however, between the criminal records of Democrats and Republicans in the presidency, the pinnacle of the US government, a fact supported by several media outlets using online data. Politifact, a nonpartisan website, found that there were 142 indictments against members of the past three Republican administrations (including Trump’s) versus just two under the past three Democratic presidents.40 The Huffington Post, a left-leaning news site, reported 91 criminal convictions connected to Republican presidencies versus only one under a Democrat since 1970.41 And the Daily Kos, another left-wing media site, tallied 120 indictments, 82 convictions, and 34 imprisonments for Republicans from the Nixon through the Obama administrations versus 4, 2, and 2, respectively, for the Democrats.42

What is next for the Republicans? If Trump is convicted, Republicans may or may not choose to move beyond him. The greater question for their party, and for US democracy, is whether the Republicans will leave behind or continue their heritage of criminal abuse of power at the highest levels of the US government, of which the Trump administration is but the latest chapter.

What do you think of the author’s argument? Let us know below.

References

1.     Calhoun CW (2017). The Presidency of Ulysses S. Grant. Lawrence, Kansas; University Press of Kansas. Page 12.

2.     Scandals of the Ulysses S. Grant Administration. Wikipedia. https://wiki2.org/en/Grant_administration_scandals.

3.     The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/liberal-republican-platform-1872.

4.     Rives T. Grant, Babcock, and the Whiskey Ring. Prologue Magazine. Fall 2000; 32(3): https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2000/fall/whiskey-ring-1.

5.     Longley R. The Whiskey Ring: bribery scandal of the 1870s. Thought Co. March 29, 2022. https://www.thoughtco.com/the-whiskey-ring-5220735.

6.     Chernow R (2017). Grant. New York; Penguin Press. p.837.

7.     Sumner C. Republicanism vs. Grantism. Speech in the Senate of the United States. May 31, 1872.

8.     Swinth K. The Square Deal. Theodore Roosevelt and the themes of progressive reform. The Gilder-Lehrman Institute of American History. https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/essays/square-deal-theodore-roosevelt-and-themes-progressive-reform.

9.     Wallenfeldt J. Return to normalcy. American campaign slogan. History and Society: Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/return-to-normalcy.

10.  Allen, FL (1931). Only yesterday. An informal history of the 1920s. New York; Harper Perennial, Modern Classics. p.129-30.

11.  Charles R. Forbes. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_R._Forbes.

12.  Allen, FL (1931). Only yesterday. An informal history of the 1920s. New York; Harper Perennial, Modern Classics. pp.130-1.

13.  Allen, FL (1931). Only yesterday. An informal history of the 1920s. New York; Harper Perennial, Modern Classics. pp.131-2.

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15.  Allen, FL (1931). Only yesterday. An informal history of the 1920s. New York; Harper Perennial, Modern Classics. pp.132-3.

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24.  Scandals of the Ronald Reagan Administration. Wikipedia.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scandals_of_the_Ronald_Reagan_administration.

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26.  Johnson H (1991). Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York, London; W.W Norton and Company. p. 184.

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28.  Johnson H (1991). Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York, London; W.W Norton and Company. pp. 172-3.

29.  Operation Ill Wind. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ill_Wind.

30.  Johnson H (1991). Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York, London; W.W Norton and Company. p. 183.

31.  Johnson H (1991). Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York, London; W.W Norton and Company. pp. 170-1.

32.  Johnson H (1991). Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York, London; W.W Norton and Company. pp. 184-5.

33.  Suri J. Reagan and the Iran-Contra affair. American Heritage. 2021. 66(2). https://www.americanheritage.com/reagan-and-iran-contra-affair.

34.  Suri J. Reagan and the Iran-Contra affair. American Heritage. 2021. 66(2). https://www.americanheritage.com/reagan-and-iran-contra-affair.

35.  Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters. Volume 1: Lawrence E. Walsh, Independent Counsel. August 4, 1993, Washington, D.C. United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm.

36.  Rosenberg P. Republicans, a history: how did the party of “law and order” become the party of crooks and crime. Salon. November 24, 2019.

37.  Johnson H (1991). Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York, London; W.W Norton and Company. pp. 296-7.

38.   Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs. Good Government Project, Brown University. https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/profile-reagan.php.

39.  List of American federal politicians convicted of crimes. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_American_federal_politicians_convicted_of_crimes.

40.  Kertscher T. Many more criminal indictments under Trump, Reagan, and Nixon than under Obama Clinton and Carter. Politifact; The Poynter Institute. January 9, 2020. https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/jan/09/facebook-posts/many-more-criminal-indictments-under-trump-reagan-/.

41.  Grossinger P. Republican presidencies have 91x the conviction rate of Democratic presidencies. HuffPost. December 22, 2017. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/republican-presidencies-have-91x-the-convictions-rate_b_5a3d5406e4b0df0de8b064e5.

42.  RoyalScribe. Updated: Comparing presidential administrations by felony arrests and convictions (as of 9/17/2018). Daily Kos. September 18, 2018. https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2018/9/18/1796668/-UPDATED-Comparing-Presidential-Administrations-by-felony-arrests-and-convictions-as-of-9-17-2018.

The Worst Union General? Major General Ambrose Burnside

Delving into the character of General Ambrose Burnside, the man whose facial hair lives on as “sideburns” in the vernacular, threatens to lose many readers from the start. Most Civil War enthusiasts would consider him a prime candidate to be named the worst Union general in the war and with some merit. And, no question, he made a series of wild miscalculations and poor judgments.

Lloyd Klein explains.

Ambrose Burnside, 1862 (on the left).

“All the world is a stage, but the play is badly cast.”

― Oscar Wilde

Burnside was actually a very talented man who was grossly miscast in the war. Baseball fans recognize that a pitcher who loses 20 games in a season must be thought of highly because a bad pitcher would never get the opportunity to keep losing; that may be a good analogy to keep in mind when reading about him. The commonly held view that he was always on hand to lose a battle will absolutely be demolished by this in-depth study, although some will not willingly part with that cherished myth.

His father had been a slave owner in South Carolina who freed his slaves and moved to Indiana. Ambrose graduated from West Point, served in garrison duty at the end of the Mexican War, served under Braxton Bragg in Nevada and California, and was the recipient of an Apache arrow through his neck in Las Vegas. He was promoted to first lieutenant and sent to duty in Rhode Island. There he resigned from the army, became commander of the state militia, got married, and went into business, with no expectation of seeing military service ever again. But you know, life can be funny sometimes; our destiny is often beyond our control.

Burnside relinquished his U.S. Army commission to fully dedicate himself to perfecting the Burnside carbine, a groundbreaking breech-loading firearm (as seen in the patent drawing). He ingeniously crafted a unique brass cartridge for this carbine, designed to hold both bullet and powder, with a notable absence of a primer. To load the weapon, users would open the breech block by manipulating the twin trigger guards, inserting the cartridge. Upon pulling the trigger, the hammer struck a separate percussion cap, creating a spark. A hole in the cartridge base ignited the black powder, with the conical cartridge expertly sealing the barrel-breech junction. Unlike many contemporary breech-loaders prone to gas leaks upon firing, Burnside's design triumphantly eliminated this issue.

President Buchanan's Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, entered into a substantial contract with the Burnside Arms Company to outfit a substantial portion of the Army, mainly cavalry, prompting Burnside to establish extensive manufacturing facilities. However, these plans were marred when allegations arose that Floyd accepted bribes to terminate the $100,000 contract with Burnside. This revolutionary concept took time for the military to grasp, and by the time its value was recognized, Burnside had already sold the patent. In 1857, the Burnside carbine triumphed in a competition at West Point, outclassing 17 other carbine designs. Nevertheless, government orders for these carbines were initially sparse. This changed with the outbreak of the Civil War, resulting in over 55,000 carbines being requisitioned for Union cavalrymen. It became the third most widely used carbine during the Civil War, surpassed only by the Sharps carbine and the Spencer carbine.

In 1858 he ran for Congress as a Democrat in Rhode Island and lost. Newly married and out of a job, he needed to find a way to support his young family. So, Burnside went west looking for a job, any job. And he was hired as the Treasurer of the Illinois Central Railroad. Anyone who doubts that the Goddess of History doesn’t have a mordant sense of humor will find this coincidence a bit much. So, consequently, his new boss became George B. McClellan, and in his position, he began working directly with its corporate attorney, one Abraham Lincoln.

The Start of the Civil War

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Burnside was a colonel in the Rhode Island Militia. He raised the 1st Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry Regiment and was appointed its colonel on May 2, 1861. Notably, two companies of this regiment were armed with Burnside carbines. In less than a month, he advanced to brigade leadership within the Department of Northeast Virginia. His performance during the First Battle of Bull Run in July was unremarkable, but he temporarily assumed division command in lieu of the wounded Brig. Gen. David Hunter.

And so suddenly, Ambrose Burnside, inventor, failed politician and businessman, Indian fighter, and fledgling railroad executive, found himself a brigadier general in the Army of the Potomac. Initially tasked with training troops in the nation's capital, his destiny took a sharp turn that autumn. Burnside was entrusted with leading three brigades within the North Carolina Expeditionary Force. Their mission: to seal the North Carolina coast to shipping as part of the naval blockade. Collaborating closely with maritime experts, Burnside orchestrated an impressive amphibious operation that indeed achieved an 80% closure of the coastline. His significant promotion to Major General on March 18, 1862, played a pivotal role in later events during the war. His brigades were officially amalgamated to form the IX Corps, and he earned recognition as one of the Union generals who contributed to Union victories.

1862

In a context where career professional soldiers ruthlessly vied for advancement, an extraordinary occurrence transpired after McClellan's Peninsula Campaign failure: Burnside was offered command of the Army of the Potomac.  He declined, citing his lack of experience in leading an army of that magnitude, resulting in John Pope assuming command. Still, the other generals looked up to him.  In the lead-up to the Second Battle of Manassas, a fellow Major General, Fitz-John Porter, repeatedly conveyed messages to Burnside, questioning Pope's competence. Burnside, concurring with Porter's assessments, forwarded them to higher-ranking authorities, a crucial factor in Porter's later court-martial, during which Burnside testified in his defense.

And after the debacle of Second Manassas, once again he was offered command, and once again, Burnside declined, citing his inexperience as the reason. He acknowledged his shortcomings as a military officer. President Lincoln pressured him on several occasions, but Burnside stood firm in his belief that he wasn't capable of leading such a sizable army, a belief ultimately vindicated by history. He repeatedly declined, saying, "I was not competent to command such a large army as this."

During the Battle of Antietam, Burnside assumed command of the Right Wing of the Army of the Potomac, overseeing the I Corps and his own IX Corps at the outset of the Maryland Campaign. However, McClellan separated these two corps during the battle, stationing them at opposite ends of the Union battle line and restoring Burnside's authority solely over the IX Corps. Burnside, implicitly refusing to relinquish his control, operated as if the corps commanders were first Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno (who was killed at South Mountain) and subsequently Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, directing orders through them to the corps.

At Antietam, the fact that Burnside delayed his attack on the Union left flank until the afternoon, particularly in the context of the stone bridge over Antietam Creek, the Rohrback Bridge now known as Burnside Bridge, likely influenced the battle's outcome. A cumbersome command arrangement contributed to Burnside's sluggishness in launching his attack and crossing the Rohrback, later Burnside's Bridge, positioned on the southern flank of the Union line. This delay allowed Confederate forces to reinforce and ultimately repulse the Union breakthrough. Sears suggested in Landscape Turned Red that the problem was that Burnside felt he was demoted and was piqued.  But its hard to imagine Burnside allowing a Union loss for that reason, and even harder to imagine that Lincoln would choose him to be the next Commander in Chief a month later if it were true.

The real story is far more complicated. McClellan sent his engineer to position Burnside but did so incorrectly. Rodman’s small force has to move on its own to Snavely’s Ford, which was the best downstream ford; this was too far away at this point for an alternative route. The idea that the Union forces could have waded across the Antietam Creek was based on a post war remark by out old friend, Henry Kyd Douglas. It was picked up by historians over the 20th Century, including Catton, who used it to make Burnside appear incompetent. The best guess is that it was not true, that there was just one ford, and it was far from ideal for a cross-river crossing under fire. This very complicated story is told in these two links: https://www.historynet.com/sculpting-a-scapegoat-ambrose-burnside-at-antietam/ and https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/assault-on-burnsides-bridge-at-the-battle-of-antietam/In the afternoon, Burnside's corps advanced against the Confederate right. At this critical moment, Jackson's subordinate, Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill, arrived at the last minute from Harpers Ferry McClellan might have secured victory if Burnside had acted differently. The cumbersome command arrangement contributed to Burnside's sluggishness in launching his attack and crossing Burnside's Bridge, positioned on the southern flank of the Union line. This delay allowed Confederate forces to reinforce and ultimately repulse the Union breakthrough.

Burnside failed to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the area and failed to exploit numerous easily accessible fording sites beyond the reach of Confederate forces. Instead, his troops were repeatedly forced into assaulting the narrow bridge, under the threat of Confederate sharpshooters on elevated terrain. McClellan, growing impatient, sent couriers to urge Burnside forward, even ordering, "Tell him if it costs 10,000 men he must go now." Despite this, Burnside didn't receive reinforcements, and the battle ended with missed opportunities. He further increased the pressure by sending his inspector general to confront Burnside, who reacted indignantly: "McClellan appears to think I am not trying my best to carry this bridge; you are the third or fourth one who has been to me this morning with similar orders.” The IX Corps eventually broke through, but the delay allowed Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's Confederate division to come up from Harpers Ferry and repulse the Union breakthrough. McClellan refused Burnside's requests for reinforcements, and the battle ended. 

Astonishingly, Burnside was offered command once more, despite his poor performance at Antietam.

Fredericksburg

Lincoln issued the order to remove McClellan on November 5, 1862, and on November 7, 1862, he selected Burnside to take his place. Burnside reluctantly complied with this directive, the third such instance in 1862, partly due to the courier's message that if he declined, command would instead be given to Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, whom Burnside had an aversion to. It is instructive that he was offered this position and compelled to accept the third time given his own reluctance and, as history shows, his lack of preparation for the position.  The fact is, no one in the Union Army had ever been prepared for such a role, and he was as accomplished as anyone in senior leadership.

Burnside on taking command moved his army from near Culpepper to Falmouth within a few days, a pretty monumental achievement. His plan was to then make a direct attack on the Confederate capitol of Richmond, Virginia, avoiding Lee’s forces who were then in Culpepper. Burnside arrived in Falmouth by November 19, but the pontoons that he planned to use to cross the Rappahannock were delayed. He had ordered pontoon bridges from DC, but they were not delivered for weeks by the Quartermaster Department.  General Halleck acknowledged afterward that he had opposed the movement and had not hurried their supply. The loss of time allowed Lee to position Longstreet on Marye’s Heights.

The Assault on Marye's Heights resulted in a casualty rate estimated at 15-20% for Union troops, contributing to a total Union casualty count of 8,000. By comparison, Pickett’s charge had 6000 Confederate casualties of 12,500 engaged, or close to 50%. Malvern Hill had 8000-9000 casualties on both sides combined, or about 16-18%. Numbers aside, these figures tell us that attacks of entrenched or prepared positions in the Civil War were challenging, and the technology didn’t exist to overcome those odds.

It is so obvious to us, 160 years later, that this was a disastrous move. It wasn’t obvious to Burnside. Burnside’s decision to escalate the initial diversionary attack into a full-scale frontal assault on Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg was a costly and unsuccessful move. Why smart people make decisions that don’t work out can be perplexing, and General Burnside at Fredericksburg gives us a chance to see how external pressure and internal self-delusion impact our choices.

Several factors influenced Burnside's decision-making. There was a breakdown in communication and coordination among Union commanders. Burnside received reports of limited success in the diversionary attack on the Confederate right flank, leading him to believe that a more aggressive assault on Marye's Heights was needed to divert Confederate attention. Pressure to achieve a decisive victory and optimism may have clouded his judgment.

Burnside believed in his numerical advantage and hoped to dislodge the Confederate defenders through overwhelming force. Given the circumstances, Marye's Heights seemed the most promising target due to its proximity to the shelter of Fredericksburg and the less steep terrain. These factors, combined with the changing dynamics of the battlefield and the desire for a breakthrough, led Burnside to escalate what was originally intended as a diversionary attack into a full-scale frontal assault on Marye's Heights. I think none of the Civil War commanders understood that artillery had changed war a great deal and still believed that brute force attacks could overcome any defense; see Lee at Gettysburg, Grant at Cold Harbor. I also think Burnside was not a strategic genius and had exactly one plan in mind, and when it failed, he panicked.

Several of Burnside's subordinate commanders, including General William B. Franklin, expressed reservations about the frontal assault on Marye's Heights during the Battle of Fredericksburg. Franklin, in particular, was critical of the plan and argued against it. He believed that attacking Marye's Heights directly would result in high casualties and was unlikely to succeed. Hooker, Sumner, and several others told Burnside it was futile, but he continued to order piecemeal attacks.

The Battle of Fredericksburg is not a moment of shining glory for General Burnside. The battle and the subsequent ill-fated offensive led to Burnside's officers voicing vehement complaints to the White House and the War Department, citing his incompetence. Burnside attempted a Spring offensive, only to encounter hindrances stemming from poor planning and organization. The Spring Offensive was known as the Mud March. Although conceptually clever, it was highly impractical for January in Virginia. Burnside's plan was quite similar to Hooker's strategy in the Battle of Chancellorsville, aiming to outmaneuver Lee using the upriver fords on the Rappahannock. Burnside intended to execute this with his cavalry, which had thus far delivered lackluster performances in the war. However, heavy rains in January transformed the roads into impassable mud, forcing the plan's abandonment

After Fredericksburg

Burnside offered his resignation, but Lincoln declined, proposing that there might still be a role for him within the army. Consequently, Burnside was reinstated as the head of the IX Corps and dispatched to command a relatively inactive department, a quiet region with limited activity. Lincoln's rationale was that Burnside couldn't get into significant trouble there. However, he swiftly found himself embroiled in a major political controversy.

Burnside was assigned to the Department of the Ohio, which encompassed the states of Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, and Illinois. Burnside issued a series of orders in a region with divided loyalties and sentiments, seeking to suppress "the expression of public sentiments against the war or the Administration." General Order No. 38, in particular, declared that "any person found guilty of treason will be tried by a military tribunal and either imprisoned or banished to enemy lines." On May 1, 1863, Ohio Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham, a prominent opponent of the war, held a large public rally in Mount Vernon, Ohio in which he denounced President Lincoln as a "tyrant" who sought to abolish the Constitution and set up a dictatorship. Burnside had dispatched several agents to the rally who took down notes and brought back their "evidence" to the general, who then declared that it was sufficient grounds to arrest Vallandigham for treason. This led to the arrest and trial of Ohio Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham, a prominent war opponent, further fueling political discord. A military court tried him and found him guilty of violating General Order No. 38, despite his protests that he was simply expressing his opinions in public. Vallandigham was found guilty of violating General Order No. 38, and sentenced to imprisonment for the duration of the war. This turned him into a martyr by antiwar Democrats. Lincoln had to extricate the entire Republican administration from the fallout that Burnside had produced.

Lincoln and Grant faced a dilemma concerning Burnside, pondering whether he posed a greater hindrance as a general in the field or in political administration. Initially, he was dispatched to relieve Knoxville, a relatively manageable task since only 2,300 troops opposed him. However, it still necessitated the return of all three brigades from Knoxville to force the Cumberland Gap's surrender. The strategic intent of the Knoxville campaign was to prevent Burnside's reinforcement of the besieged Federal forces at Chattanooga. Longstreet’s movement forced Burnside back into the defensive works in Knoxville. Burnside effectively outmaneuvered Longstreet at the Battle of Campbell's Station and successfully reached safety in Knoxville, where he endured a brief siege until the Confederate defeat at the Battle of Fort Sanders outside the city. It should be noted that General Burnside, widely seen as incompetent by modern enthusiasts, defeated Longstreet, widely seen as stellar, in this one-against-one campaign. There were extenuating circumstances, such as favorable terrain and supply routes, of course; but that is history. Longstreet then began a siege but it wasn’t very effective. After the first week, Longstreet learned of Bragg’s defeat at Chattanooga. Longstreet realized that time was not on his side, so he ordered an assault a few days later, but it failed miserably. Then, General Longstreet, who had bested him at Marye's Heights, launched an attack, preventing disaster despite being besieged. Grant sent Sherman to assist, but Longstreet had already withdrawn to Virginia. Longstreet's siege ended when Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman led the Army of the Tennessee to Knoxville, entered the city, and relieved Burnside.  Longstreet withdrew his men and later rejoined Gen. Robert E. Lee’s command in Virginia.

Later, Grant, thinking he could better monitor Burnside in the east, brought him back to Virginia. Unfortunately, Burnside's performance at the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House and later at the Battle of the Crater was subpar.

During the Overland Campaign, Burnside's actions were less than stellar. At the Wilderness, timely attacks over three days could have secured victory, but Burnside failed to launch them. On the second day, had this union general moved rapidly when ordered (or even at all), AP Hill’s corps might have been destroyed. But once again, he was too slow to recognize the potential.

The blame for the Union's failure at the Battle of the Crater initially fell on Burnside, but it was later lifted. Burnside had been ordered to change the attacking troops at the last minute by Meade. General Ambrose Burnside was the corps leader of the Union assault. He was relieved of command for the final time for this failure. Brigadier General Edward Ferrero's division of black soldiers sustained very high casualties, perhaps because the Confederates refused to accept them as prisoners when they tried to surrender. He and  General James H. Ledlie were drinking rum throughout the battle in a bunker behind the lines. A division of United States Colored Troops under Ferrero trained to lead the assault. The plan was for one brigade to go left of the crater and the other to the right. A regiment from both brigades was to rush perpendicular to the crater. Then, the remaining force was to seize the Jerusalem Plank Road just 1,600 feet behind the line.

But the day before, Meade ordered Burnside not to use the black troops in the lead assault. Instead, Ledlie’s division was chosen but no one told them what to do once the explosion occurred. Meade did not let them charge because he thought if it failed then it would receive political backlash in the north and only prove Lincoln's message as false. He was aligning military goals with political ones. The USCT instead charged behind the lead troops. Tactically, Union troops entered the crater instead of going around it.  There, they were trapped in a hole with no support on the flanks. The ANV began shooting surrendering troops, perhaps due to racial animus. Ledlie was forced to resign by Meade and Grant.

Post-war Accomplishments

Burnside exhibited his intelligence and abilities in all of his positions after the war. He was elected Governor and later served as a US Senator from Rhode Island, chairing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He even attempted to mediate an end to the Franco-Prussian War.
It is remarkable that as accomplished as he was both before and after the war, his legacy among Civil War enthusiasts is so diminished. Grant remarked that Burnside was "unfitted" for army command, a sentiment shared even by Burnside himself. It should be recognized that Grant fired handfuls of generals during the war who did not live up to his standards, but he always kept Burnside around. Despite his affable personality and diverse talents, Burnside's Civil War decisions showcased his weakest contributions to history. However, astute historians recognize his deeper well of aptitude.

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The Building of America’s Trans-Continental Railroad

The Trans-Continental Railroad was built in the 19th century and helped to transform the American West. Here, Richard Bluttal looks at its history and how it was built.

The painting depicts the ceremony for the driving of the Last Spike at Promontory Summit, Utah, on May 10, 1869. This joined the rails of the Central Pacific Railroad and the Union Pacific Railroad. The painting in partly fictional as not all of those depicted were there.

The Anglo-American Convention of 1818 stipulated that the citizens of both the United States and Britain would have equal access to the Oregon Country—the lands north of Spanish California well into present-day Canada—until its final status was resolved.  But to claim the lush lands across the Rockies and the lucrative trade with China and East Asia the United States had to make good on that claim, whether through diplomacy or war. Some intrepid Americans had already made the trek, but the common view in the East was that the intervening lands were a “howling wilderness” populated by hostile Indians. The experts said that respectable women and families would never make it to, or live in, Oregon. Narcissa Prentiss Whitman (1808–1847) proved them wrong, traveling by wagon train. She sent letters and her journal entries to relatives that described the beauties of the West and offered reassurance that rivers were affordable, travel by wagon was practical, and the so-called hostiles were generally friendly. These letters were circulated among friends and widely published in eastern newspapers. A flood of American, men, women, and children soon headed west following the Oregon Trail, the superhighway of the early American West. By the mid-1850s some 400,000 had made the journey, with perhaps 30,000 perishing en route, primarily from disease.

Transportation

So, what was the modes of transportation in the United States during the early-mid 1800’s? Before the first transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869, people traveled across the American West mainly by stagecoach. While railroads were available in the East, travel through the West was a slow, laborious process. Of course, waterway travel could be accomplished on a flatboat or a canoe, and then came the Erie Canal in 1825 where travel was done by using mules or horses to pull the riverboats along the sides of the water.  Remember In the early 19th century, most roads were dreadful. They served local needs, allowing farmers to get produce to market. Americans who did travel long distances overland to settle the West rode on wagon trails, like the Oregon Trail, rather than well-defined roads. Still, a few major roads served as important transportation links. The first commercially successful steamboat was tested on the Hudson River in 1807. Steamboats were soon introduced on most navigable rivers, they allowed commerce and travel both upstream and down encouraging trade by lowering costs and saving time. By 1830, steamboats dominated American river transportation. Steam railroads began to appear in the United States around 1830 and dominated the continental transportation system by the 1850s.

The possibility of railroads connecting the Atlantic and Pacific coasts was discussed in Congress even before the treaty with England which settled the question of the Oregon boundary in 1846. Chief promoter of a transcontinental railroad was Asa Whitney, a New York merchant active in the China trade who was obsessed with the idea of a railroad to the Pacific. In January 1845 he petitioned Congress for a charter and grant of a sixty-mile strip through the public domain to help finance construction. Although Congress failed to sanction his plan, Whitney made the Pacific railroad one of the great public issues of the day. The acquisition of California following the Mexican War opened the way for other routes to the coast. The discovery of gold, the settlement of the frontier, and the success of the eastern railroads increased interest in building a railroad to the Pacific.

While sectional issues and disagreements were debated in the late 1850s, no decision was forthcoming from Congress on the Pacific railroad question. Theodore D. Judah, the engineer of the Sacramento Valley Railroad, became obsessed with the desire to build a transcontinental railroad. In 1860 he approached Leland Stanford, Collis P. Huntington, Mark Hopkins, and Charles Crocker, leading Sacramento merchants, and soon convinced them that building a transcontinental line would make them rich and famous. The prospect of tapping the wealth of the Nevada mining towns and forthcoming legislation for federal aid to railroads stimulated them to incorporate the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California. This line later merged with the Southern Pacific. It was through Judah's efforts and the support of Abraham Lincoln, who saw military benefits in the lines as well as the bonding of the Pacific Coast to the Union, that the Pacific Railroad finally became a reality.

The railroad

The Railroad Act of 1862 put government support behind the transcontinental railroad and helped create the Union Pacific Railroad, which subsequently joined with the Central Pacific Railroad Company. On May 10, 1869, Leland Stanford, president of the Central Pacific Railroad Company and Thomas Clark Durant, Union Pacific Railroad Company vice president, drove the last spike at Promontory, Utah, linking the eastern railroad system to California. In six years, more than 20,000 workers' Chinese, Irish, and others had laid down some 1,700 miles of track in the largest American civil-works project to that time.

The railroad opened for through traffic between Sacramento and Omaha on May 10, 1869, when CPRR President Stanford ceremonially tapped the gold "Last Spike" (later often referred to as the "Golden Spike") with a silver hammer at Promontory Summit. In the following six months, the last leg from Sacramento to San Francisco Bay was completed. The resulting coast-to-coast railroad connection revolutionized the settlement and economy of the American West. It brought the western states and territories into alignment with the northern Union states and made transporting passengers and goods coast-to-coast considerably quicker, safer and less expensive.

The first transcontinental rail passengers arrived at the Pacific Railroad's original western terminus at the Alameda Terminal on September 6, 1869, where they transferred to the steamer Alameda for transport across the Bay to San Francisco. The road's rail terminus was moved two months later to the Oakland Long Wharf, about a mile to the north, when its expansion was completed and opened for passengers on November 8, 1869. Service between San Francisco and Oakland Pier continued to be provided by ferry.

Native American impact

Although, by the 1860s, Native Americans had signed away the rights to much of their land in treaties with the federal government, they likely never imagined that a disruptive and massive system like the railroad would be constructed through their traditional hunting grounds. The construction of the Transcontinental Railroad had dire consequences for the native tribes of the Great Plains, forever altering the landscape and causing the disappearance of once-reliable wild game. The railroad was probably the single biggest contributor to the loss of the bison, which was particularly traumatic to the Plains tribes who depended on it for everything from meat for food to skins and fur for clothing, and more.

Tribes increasingly came into conflict with the railroad as they attempted to defend their diminishing resources. Additionally, the railroad brought white homesteaders who farmed the newly tamed land that had been the bison’s domain. Tribes of the Plains found themselves at cultural odds with the whites building the railroad and settlers claiming ownership over land that had previously never been owned. In response, Native Americans sabotaged the railroad and attacked white settlements supported by the line, in an attempt to reclaim the way of life that was being taken from them. Twice, Native Americans sabotaged the iron rails themselves. In August 1867 a Cheyenne raiding party decided they would attempt to derail a train. They tied a stick across the rails and succeeded in overturning a handcar, killing its crew of repairmen, with the exception of a man named William Thompson. If they were not taking aim at the railroad tracks and machinery, they would attack the workers and abscond with their livestock. Ultimately the tribes of the Plains were unsuccessful in preventing the loss of their territory and hunting resources. Their struggle serves as a poignant example of how the Transcontinental Railroad could simultaneously destroy one way of life as it ushered in another. 

We must address the forgotten Chinese workers who built the western leg of the railroad across the Sierra Nevada mountains, connecting the Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroad in 1869.

From 1863 and 1869, roughly 15,000 Chinese workers helped build the transcontinental railroad. They were paid less than American workers and lived in tents, while white workers were given accommodation in train cars. Chinese workers found some economic opportunity but also experienced hostility, racism, violence, and legal exclusion. Many came as single men; others left families behind. Despite laws restricting Chinese immigration, a few workers were able to send for wives and establish families and lasting communities in the United States. The majority of Chinese railroad workers came from the province of Guangdong in southern China. They were recruited through a vast network of small firms and labor contractors that supplied workers to railroad companies. After arriving in America, many migrants relied on labor contractors and ethnic associations, like the Chinese Six Companies in San Francisco, to find employment and to broker labor contracts with prospective employers.  

Workforce

Chinese workers made up most of the workforce between roughly seven hundred miles of train tracks between Sacramento, California and Promontory, Utah. During the 19th century, more than 2.5 million Chinese citizens left their country and were hired in 1864 after a labor shortage threatened the railroad’s completion.

Workers toiled six days a week, from dawn to dusk, under extreme weather conditions. To speed progress, a second shift of workers often labored at night by the light of lamps and bonfires. Workers using mostly muscle power graded the road, bored the tunnels, and laid the track they pushed along  the Central Pacific Railroad over the granite wall of the Sierra Nevada Mountains and across the arid west. The work was tiresome, as the railroad was built entirely by manual laborers who used to shovel twenty pounds of rock over four hundred times a day. They had to face dangerous work conditions – accidental explosions, snow and rock avalanches, which killed hundreds of workers, not to mention frigid weather. “All workers on the railroad were ‘other’,” said curator Peter Liebhold. “On the west, there were Chinese workers, out east were Irish and Mormon workers were in the center. All these groups are outside the classical American mainstream.”

The railroad company provided room and board to white workers, but Chinese workers had to find their own meals, which were often brought to them from local merchants. The Chinese workers were educated and organized; 3,000 laborers went on strike in 1867 to demand equal wages, as the white workers were paid double. “They were unsuccessful because they were out in the middle of nowhere,” said Liebhold. “The railroad stopped them from getting food. That’s one way it failed.” By paying laborers a low wage, they were able to skim millions from the construction and get rich.

The Transcontinental Railroad fundamentally changed the American West. As the United States pushed across North America, railroads connected and populated the growing nation. Railroads also sparked social, economic, environmental, and political change. For many, completing the Transcontinental Railroad symbolized achievement and national unity—yet it was built with mostly immigrant labor. Ironically building the Transcontinental Railroad presented both physical and monetary challenges. Even with huge government subsidies, the railroad companies had to raise millions of dollars to cover construction costs. Directors skimmed millions off the construction and became rich. Operating the enterprise was often less profitable.

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From Reconstruction to the Present: A Small Place in Downtown Atlanta

Much of historic research relies upon an analysis of broad events through a general historical context. We as historians tend to put emphasis upon significant events and people and explore as far as we can to try to contribute to larger scholarly debate. However, sometimes its best to start small in a place that does not necessarily look like it has much to offer as to uncover histories that largely remain forgotten or undervalued. Here, Roy Williams considers a place in downturn Atlanta from Reconstruction to the present.

An 1887 depiction of Atlanta from Harper’s Weekly.

In exploring the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block going back to the train tracks, the current buildings do not necessarily show easily distinguishable historic buildings. Currently the Marietta Carrier hotel building stands at 56 Marietta Street with the company Digital Realty operating a telecommunications business. Behind the Carrier Hotel at the 10 Forsyth address, a parking lot stands next to the train tracks. The only other building which has a connection to the block is the abandoned Atlanta Constitution building on 143 Alabama street. While this building is not on the block it serves as a connection to the block in exploring the history of the Atlanta Journal and Constitution as both companies occupied the block at one point. The current Marietta Carrier Hotel building has a plaque commemorating the first Georgia State Capitol which stood on the block from 1869 to 1889 and was razed in 1900. Out of relative significance, the story of the block begins with the first Georgia State Capitol.

To describe the block effectively, a chronological order is established throughout this paper spanning from the 1860s to the present. A general history of the area also stands as accompaniment in understanding how the block changed throughout the trajectory of history and how certain events affected changes at the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block. Certain aspects of the block’s history are emphasized over others to contribute original primary source research as well as out of pragmatism due to the relative lack of sources on some businesses that occupied the block that were not necessarily as historically significant. References and pictures are detailed in footnotes as well as the end of the paper in the bibliography and index.

After the destruction of Atlanta at the hands of Union forces during the Civil War the state capitol was moved to Atlanta from Milledgeville as the center of Georgia government. Multiple primary source documentation exists detailing this move as well as the process by which the building was updated to house the Georgia State Capitol. Prior to serving as the first Atlanta based Georgia state capitol the building was the Kimball Opera House which was constructed by the brothers Edwin Kimball and Hannibal Kimball and would be purchased by the State in 1870. From 1869 to 1889 the Kimball Opera House served as the state capitol and post office. An advertisement from 1870 details this showing the new state capitol with its characteristic clock tower announcing the building as Kimball’s Opera House serving as the Georgia State Capitol and Post Office.[1] Hannibal Kimball was an entrepreneur and had a significant impact as a wealthy businessman in moving the state capitol from Milledgeville to Atlanta. The 1889 History of Atlanta, Georgia, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers describes Kimball’s significant role stating that, “The first work of a public character in which he took a prominent part was in relation to the location of the state capitol at Atlanta. He saw the advantage to accrue to the city by its selection as the legislative center of the state, and he lent all his influence and power to further this end.”[2] The city purchased the building for 100,000 dollars after originally leasing it.[3]

To Atlanta

In 1877 the Georgia Constitutional Convention voted to permanently move the capital to Atlanta, and in 1879 acquired the City Hall tract, which in 1880 was finally transferred to the state of Georgia. The legislature in 1883 agreed upon a budget of one million dollars for the new state capitol. This budget required that all materials for the new capital be sourced from Georgia rather than out of state.[4] Details of the construction of the new capital as well as the Austell building are present in the account book of William B Miles. Listing the costs, profits, and materials for the construction of such buildings as the Georgia State Capitol Building; Inman Building; Austell Building; Fulton County Court House Annex; and the police station and stables. William B Miles pocketbook July 1888 entry lists the costs of constructing the new building at 539,810.33 dollars not including labor with a net gain of 188,510.43 dollars.[5] The one-million-dollar budget established in producing the new capital as it moved from the Kimball Opera House to its permanent location stands as beneficial when considering the construction of the Austell building and the Forsyth viaduct.

The Austell Building was designed by the architectural firm, Bruce and Morgan and completed in 1897. The building was Financed by William W. Austell, and the twelve-story office building cost $300,000 to build. It was located on Forsyth Street adjacent to the Western and Atlanta Railroad in downtown Atlanta, Georgia where the current 10 Forsyth parking lot stands.[6] William B Miles account book also lists details regarding the Austell building in 1888. Since the building was completed in 1897, this entry appears to be something of a punch list of detailing finishing costs regarding the building such as an entry detailing the cost of paying for an architect report at 771.00 dollars.[7]Intriguingly there is another entry regarding the cost of bridgeworks materials and labors which could potentially point to the Forsyth Street viaduct beside the Austell Building and Kimball Opera House. The 1888 February entry right after the Austell building entry regarding bridgeworks details the cost of stock materials for the bridge at 4715.80 and the supplies at 1522.62 dollars, certainly a far cry from the massive budget of the Georgia State Capitol.[8] Whether this bridge entry refers to the Forsyth Street Viaduct is difficult to say but its proximity to the Austell building entry gives reason to consider its possibility. A photo from 1907 displays this viaduct with the Austell building in the background after the Kimball Opera House/Georgia State capital were razed in 1900.[9]

The 1907 Sanborn Fire Maps show the Austell building once again describing it as a fireproof building with another building occupying the grounds where the Kimball Opera House once stood. The Sanborn Fire maps list a lodge hall and general hardware and machinery regarding this other location.[10] The 1919 Foote and Davies Company Atlanta birds eye view atlas shows the block as having the Austell building facing towards the Forsyth Viaduct but also shows the site where the Kimball Opera House/Georgia State capitol used to stand as being listed as a multi-story building titled transport.[11] The 1910 building lists the Forsyth Marietta intersection as containing the Austell Building and Georgia News Co at 10 Forsyth with 8 and 9 Forsyth remaining vacant. It also lists the Brown-Randolph building at 56 Marietta Street with rooms being occupied by businesses such as Dunbar and Sewell Brokers, Ajax Lumber, Southern Flour and Grain Company, General Adjusting Company, Georgia Farm Mortgage Co, and the Brown and Randolph law practice.[12]

In addition to the city directory, there is a court case detailing the construction of the building in 1917 by the Brown-Randolph Company who paid an architect, A. V. Gude, Jr. The supreme court case lists that, “On July 30, 1917, petitioner determined to erect an eight-story building on its property at the southwest corner of Marietta and Forsyth streets in the city of Atlanta, Ga., employing Brown as architect and the Gudes (then partners under the name of Gude & Co.) as contractor. The contractor, in a letter to the architect on June 28, 1917, stated that the building would cost $375,000, including the commissions of Gude & Co. Following said estimate, on July 30, 1917, petitioner entered into a written contract with the contractor relative to the construction of said building. Under the terms of the contract the building was to be erected complete in every detail and delivered to petitioner, free of all liens, at and for the sum of not to exceed $375,000.”[13] The building was completed in 1919 but not within the 10-month contract and the price of construction ran over the agreed upon $375,000 cost of construction. The judgement was ultimately found for the defendant. The 1920s Atlanta city directory[14] lists the Austell building as well with dozens of businesses at the 10 Forsyth address, however the Brown-Randolph building was now listed as the Transport building just as it had been listed in the 1919 Foot and Davies Atlanta birds eye view atlas.[15] Finally the 1940 directory shows the Atlanta Union station behind the Austell building as well as the Western Union Building where the current Marietta Carrier hotel stands at present.[16]

Atlanta Union Station

The Atlanta Union Station was built in 1930 in Atlanta between Spring Street and Forsyth Street. It succeeded the two previous Union Stations. The previous 1853 Union Station ran from 1853 to 1864 and was ultimately burned by General William Tecumseh Sherman’s forces in the Battle of Atlanta. The second Union Station was built on the same site as the first in 1871 and would operate from 1871 until 1930 when it was torn down for the 3rd Union Station to be built.

The Atlanta Union Station served the Georgia Railroad, Atlantic Coastline, and Louisville and Nashville line. The structure was designed and built by McDonald & Company of Atlanta, Georgia. The station would eventually be razed in the early 1970s. The Union Station can be seen circa 1935 with the Austell building in the background across the Forsyth Street Viaduct.[17] The Atlanta Union Station would stand in operation until 1971 when it was closed and demolished in 1972. The destruction of the 1930 station is shown in multiple archival photos from the Atlanta History Center, displaying the utter loss of architectural history and cultural continuity that are significant to the buildings constructed in the late 19th century and early 20th century.[18]  A 1949 map of downtown Atlanta by the publication Gay Atlanta recirculated by the Atlanta Time Machine shows the block including the Union Station, the Western Union building, the Lucy Wood Cafeteria, and the Atlanta Journal as residing on the block.[19] While there are less sources pertaining to the Lucy Wood Cafeteria, there remains a litany of resources documenting the Atlanta Journal’s tenure at 10 Forsyth Street. A 1950 picture of the block confirms this map’s details, displaying the Western Union building, Lucy Wood Cafeteria, and the Atlanta Journal.[20]

Western Union building

The history of the Western Union building has a brief intersection with Atlanta labor history as, in 1971 the United Telegraph Workers went out on strike against the Western Union Telegraph Company. A 1971 New York Times article details the demands of the workers, saying, “The telegraph workers have asked for a two‐year pact with 16 per cent wage increases each year, Mr. Hageman said. Workers now average $3.37 an hour. The company said its offer included 10 percent increases in each of the two years.”[21] E. L. Hageman, the union president authorized the strike once negotiations with the Western Union Telegraph Company collapsed. A June 1971 photograph shows two AFL-CIO workers participating in the Strike.[22] The AFL-CIO was formed in 1955 when the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations merged. A 1972 Atlanta Constitution article details how the strike left 450 Atlanta workers idle interviewing a soon to be retiring striking employee, James Maxwell who said, “You gotta do it, Itl be better in the end.”[23] The article also describes how the workers were not only picketing for better pay but also for a continued nationwide Western Union office presence of 1300 rather than the proposed cutback to 300 offices that was originally planned before the strike. While the strike was well intentioned in maintaining the livelihoods and economic liberty of Western Union employees in Atlanta and throughout the nation, the writing was on the wall for the telegraph industry. The expansion of the telephone at the expense of the telegraph in addition to the Western Union Telegraph Company’s aggressive diversification ultimately pointed towards the decline of the telegraph industry.[24]

The Atlanta Journal was founded on February 24, 1883, and the Atlanta Constitution was first published on June 16, 1868. Both newspapers bounced around multiple locations around the area ranging from Alabama street, Marietta, and different sides of Forsyth. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution were in direct competition with one another but ultimately in March 1950 became under common ownership. While under common ownership they would still work in competition until they were merged in 2001. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution worked with such journalists as Henry Grady who lobbied for the industrialization of the south during Reconstruction and coined the term “New South” in relation to this industrialization. As well as such figures as Margaret Mitchell, author of Gone with the Wind, and Ralph McGill an early voice for racial tolerance in the south.[25]

10 Forsyth Street

The Atlanta Journal would occupy 10 Forsyth Street from 1949 to 1972. The Atlanta Journal building sat in between the Austell building which was then called the Thrower building at that point, and the Western Union Building. The Atlanta Constitution would soon move into the same building as the Atlanta Journal. While both media companies were under the same ownership, they worked in direct competition. This combination of both companies under the same roof would inevitably lead to the combination of both the Atlanta Journal and Constitution into the AJC of present. When both companies moved to their next location at 72 Marietta Street, the building which had once stood beside the Austell building and housed the historic Atlanta Journal and Constitution would be demolished in 1973 leaving the Western Union or Marietta Carrier Hotel as the only building left standing. [26] The Atlanta Journal demolition can be seen in the archival photo provided in the Central Atlanta Progress, Inc Photographs collection which displays the building being gutted beneath the iconic “Covering Dixie Like the Dew” motto.[27] The only remnant of the days of the Atlanta Journal and Constitution on the block stands in the dilapidated building across the train tracks at 143 Alabama Street which house the Constitution from 1947 to 1953.

The development of the block from reconstruction to the present and the change in buildings serves as a cautionary tale when considering its trajectory from a historical preservation perspective. The only remnants of the history of the block stand in the current Marietta carrier hotel building with a plaque commemorating the Kimball Opera House and a statue of Henry Grady in the middle of Marietta Street. The reality that the Austell building, Atlanta Journal, and Union Station were all demolished in the 1970s follows a broader trend in urban planning which saw the destruction of many historic buildings throughout the nation. While the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 provided the framework to preserve certain buildings, the 1970s saw the destruction of many buildings for new development. The most frustrating aspect of this development on the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block stands in the reality that no new buildings were built after the destruction of the previous historic properties. The area around the railroad tracks is near the Atlanta downtown area known as the Gulch, in which development projects have been planned but have never come to fruition. Jeremiah McWilliams detailed in a 2012 article how revitalizing the area into a transit hub would ultimately be a net positive economically, stating, “The city and state have struggled for years to gain traction on a transit hub envisioned for the area residents known as the “Gulch.” The sunken tract of downtown, spread for acres around CNN Center, is crisscrossed with railroad tracks and parking lots. Late last year, the Georgia Department of Transportation signed a $12.2 million contract for a new master plan with a team of contractors experienced in large-scale developments.”[28] This funding has not made any discernible change on the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block bordering the Gulch.

The economic growth and development that ultimately led to the demolition of many historic Atlanta buildings led to conflict in managing the city’s urban planning. As stated by Michael Elliot, the population of Atlanta grew by over 25% over the 1980s and the office inventory of the central city increased by 50% in the central city. By this point the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block had lost all its historic buildings but the Maritta Carrier Hotel, however this growing opposition to development in the interest of historic preservation follows the larger trend in historical preservation in Atlanta in attempting to conserve what was left from the demolitions of the 1970s.[29]

Rather, Elliot describes how a new mediation process was initiated in attempting to soothe tensions between the forces of economic development and historic preservation. This mediation process required a 9-month negotiation in finding consensus regarding development and preservation of properties but most importantly established a new system for categorizing, designating, and protecting historic properties. Mayor Andrew Young while originally in opposition to historic preservation eventually relented and supported the concept arguing that it was in the public’s interest to preserve certain aspects of the city’s history.[30]

Changes

It is important to consider that while the properties that once stood at the Marietta, Forsyth, Farlie block can be argued to have historic merit especially the first Atlanta based Georgia State Capitol, the trajectory of history and historic identity is infinitely malleable and changing rapidly with each passing generation. The history of the Western Union building, and the Western Union telegraph Company may intersect with both economic and labor history but the nature of its waning importance economically and practically indicates why its story is not preserved or considered significant. Much like the rapid change from horse drawn carriages to automobiles over the course of the early 20thcentury, the decline of the telegraph and the rapid advancement of the telephone warrants that the story of the Western Union Building only exist as a relatively forgotten footnote in Atlanta history. Timothy J Crimmins utilizes the Walter Havinghurst quote, arguing, “The past is not the property of historians, it is a public possession. It belongs to anyone who is aware of it grows by being shared.”[31] This quote allows Crimmins to segway into the realm of public history describing the expansion of the field stemming for the NHPA of 1966 and the growing cooperation between historic preservation and urban planning. This quote also helps to understand that the fields of historic preservation and public history have an inherently more democratic role in establishing what is significant than individual historians. The reality that the story of the Western Union Building is not as prevalent as others shows directly that there is a popular consensus in determining what stands as significant to historic identity and therefore what should be preserved and studied.

Crimmins describes how Atlanta serves as a unique example in attempting to piece together the connection to the past through the present. Specifically, Crimmins says that the changes wrought by economic and technological advancements regarding Atlanta have left much of the heart of Atlanta with little remains in linking the present to the past. Crimmins states that, “The public history issue is one of devising a course of action which would permit citizens to identify the present configuration with that of the nineteenth century.”[32] This problem of reorienting and reconnecting the present area of downtown Atlanta with its historic identity remains a challenge.

In considering the challenges in piecing together historic identity from the remaining built environment of Atlanta, Elizabeth A. Lyon argues that the fields of history and historic preservation must work together in a more efficient manner. Lyons states that, “The problem, however, is not so much the removal of history from historic preservation, as others have observed. The problem is that we often lack the historical information needed to measure and evaluate the historical significance of archeological and structural properties.”[33] This argument points to the heart of the problem, that sometimes changes in the built environment necessitated by technological and economic changes move faster than historic research and preservation. With the example of the Marietta, Forsyth, Farlie block, the most historic property, the Kimball Opera house, and Georgia State Capitol had been razed in 1900, 66 years before the National Historic Preservation Act was passed and 6 years before the Antiquities Act was passed. The Atlanta Union Station, Austell building, and Atlanta Journal were all demolished in the 1970s as well. While it can be difficult to piece together the identity of the past through the present when considering the built environment and the buildings which were demolished along the way, the most important remaining action stands in preserving what is left.

Conclusion

The only remaining building, the Marietta Carrier Hotel currently occupied by Digital Realty may not be on the National Register of Historic Places, but its significance as a grounding point for all the buildings that have been on the same block makes it worthy of local historic preservation. Though the first Atlanta based Georgia State Capitol may have been razed 123 years ago, and all other buildings on the block have been demolished, the history of all the structures of the block can be reoriented through the preservation of the current building. Once again, this topic returns to the introspective nature of historic identity and preservation of this identity through the built environment. While the current state of the block may not seem to have historical significance on a surface level observation, the simple reality that the seat of Georgia’s government was moved to this location from Milledgeville set in motion significant changes that ultimately defined the history of Atlanta. While the structures that made this history cannot be replaced, the importance of reconnecting the present to the past in the Atlanta downtown area is still a worthy aspect of preservation.

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Bibliography

  "Telegraphers Call a Strike at Western Union Tonight." New York Times. May 31, 1971. https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/telegraphers-call-strike-at-western-union-tonight/docview/119326236/se-2.

  1972 September. Central Atlanta Progress. Inc. Photographs. VIS 139.21.01. Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

  Account Book 1885-1889. William B Miles Account Book. MSS236f. Folder 1. Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

AJCN005-041b. Atlanta Journal-Constitution Photographic Archives. Special Collections and Archives. Georgia State University Library, 1950. https://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/digital/collection/ajc/id/14049/ .

 Atlanta Georgia Government. "Georgia State Capitol.” Accessed October 1, 2023. https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-design/urban-design-commission/georgia-state-capitol.

    Atlanta. Map. Atlanta Georgia. Foote and Davies Company. 1919. From Library of Congress. Map Collections. https://www.loc.gov/item/75693190/. (Accessed September 28, 2023).

  Brown-Randolph Co. V Guide Et Al., No.2032. 106 S.E. 161,151 GA 281, Supreme Court of Georgia, 1921.

  City Directory. Atlanta Georgia. 1910.  https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12245934?ssrc=&backlabel=Return.

Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1920, 583-584, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12230775?ssrc=&backlabel=Return

Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1940, 837, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12164878?ssrc=&backlabel=Return

  Cleaton, J. D.. "Forsyth Street Viaduct, 1907." 1907. September 28, 2023. http://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/cdm/ref/collection/guidebook/id/141.

Corson, Pete. “Photos: Former Atlanta Constitution and Journal buildings.” The Atlanta Journal Constitution, June 14, 2018. https://www.ajc.com/news/local/photos-former-atlanta-constitution-and-journal-buildings/ndwtDtspsH27pLQvT3H98L/.

Crimmins, Timothy J. “The Past in the Present: An Agenda for Public History and Historic Preservation.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 63, no. 1 (1979): 53–59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40580077.

  Downs, Billy, Photographer. AFL-CIO United Telegraph Workers on Strike Against Western Union. 1971, Atlanta Journal Constitution. https://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/digital/collection/ajc/id/1270/rec/3.

  Elliott, Michael. “Reconceiving Historic Preservation in the Modern City: Conflict and Consensus Building in Atlanta.” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 16, no. 2 (1999): 149–63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43030496.

“Gay Atlanta Map of Downtown Atlanta.” Atlanta Time Machine. Accessed September 30, 2023. http://atlantatimemachine.com/.

Kimball Opera House. Atlanta History Photograph Collection. VIS 170.2583.001. Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

  Lyon, Elizabeth A. “Cultural and Environmental Resource Management: The Role of History in Historic Preservation.” The Public Historian 4, no. 4 (1982): 69–86. https://doi.org/10.2307/3377048.

  McWilliams, Jeremiah. “Study: ‘Gulch’ impact hefty.” The Atlanta Journal Constitution, Jan 29, 2012. https://www.ajc.com/news/study-gulch-impact-hefty/YNv4JB0YYk77PDSBbvg34L/.

  Miles, Richard. Western Union Strike Idles 450 in Georgia. The Atlanta Constitution. 1972. https://www.newspapers.com/article/118359555/the-atlanta-constitution/.

  Nonnenmacher, Tomas. “History of the U.S. Telegraph Industry”. EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. August 14, 2001. URL http://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-the-u-s-telegraph-industry/

  Perry, Chuck. "Atlanta Journal-Constitution." New Georgia Encyclopedia, last modified Sep 11, 2019. https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/arts-culture/atlanta-journal-constitution/

Reed, Wallace Putnam. History of Atlanta, Georgia, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers. Syracuse, NY: D. Mason & Co. 1889.

  Sanborn Map Company. "Insurance maps, Atlanta, Georgia, 1911 / published by the Sanborn Map Company." 1911. Accessed September 28, 2023. https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_sanb_atlanta-1911#item.

  Union Station. Floyd Jillson Photographs. VIS 71.72.25, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

  Union Station. Kenneth Rogers Photographs. VIS 88.625.05, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

  Unknown. "Austell Building." 1906. September 28, 2023. http://album.atlantahistorycenter.com/cdm/ref/collection/athpc/id/1242.

References

[1] Kimball Opera House, Atlanta History Photograph Collection, VIS 170.2583.001, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[2] Wallace Putnam Reed, History of Atlanta, Georgia, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers, (Syracuse, NY: D. Mason & Co., 1889), 163.

[3] Wallace Putnam Reed, History of Atlanta, Georgia, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers, (Syracuse, NY: D. Mason & Co., 1889), 165.

[4] "Georgia State Capitol”, Atlanta Georgia Government, Accessed October 1, 2023, https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-design/urban-design-commission/georgia-state-capitol.

[5] Account Book 1885-1889, William B Miles Account Book, MSS236f, Folder 1, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[6] Unknown. "Austell Building." 1906. September 28, 2023. http://album.atlantahistorycenter.com/cdm/ref/collection/athpc/id/1242.

[7] Account Book 1885-1889, William B Miles Account Book, MSS236f, Folder 1, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[8] Account Book 1885-1889, William B Miles Account Book, MSS236f, Folder 1, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[9] Cleaton, J. D.. "Forsyth Street Viaduct, 1907." 1907. September 28, 2023. http://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/cdm/ref/collection/guidebook/id/141 .

[10] Sanborn Map Company, "Insurance maps, Atlanta, Georgia, 1911 / published by the Sanborn Map Company", 1911, (Accessed September 28, 2023), https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_sanb_atlanta-1911#item .

[11] Atlanta, Map, Atlanta Georgia, Foote and Davies Company, 1919, From Library of Congress, Map Collections, https://www.loc.gov/item/75693190/. (Accessed September 28, 2023).

[12] Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1910, 64, 116, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12245934?ssrc=&backlabel=Return.

[13] Brown-Randolph Co. V Guide Et Al., No.2032. 106 S.E. 161,151 GA 281, Supreme Court of Georgia, 1921.

[14] Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1920, 583-584, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12230775?ssrc=&backlabel=Return

[15]Atlanta, Map, Atlanta Georgia, Foote and Davies Company, 1919, From Library of Congress, Map Collections, https://www.loc.gov/item/75693190/. (Accessed September 28, 2023).

[16] Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1940, 837, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12164878?ssrc=&backlabel=Return

[17] Union Station, Kenneth Rogers Photographs, VIS 88.625.05, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[18] Union Station, Floyd Jillson Photographs, VIS 71.72.25, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[19] “Gay Atlanta Map of Downtown Atlanta”, Atlanta Time Machine, Accessed September 30, 2023, http://atlantatimemachine.com/ .

[20] AJCN005-041b, Atlanta Journal-Constitution Photographic Archives. Special Collections and Archives, Georgia State University Library, 1950, https://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/digital/collection/ajc/id/14049/ .

[21] "Telegraphers Call a Strike at Western Union Tonight." New York Times, May 31, 1971. https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/telegraphers-call-strike-at-western-union-tonight/docview/119326236/se-2.

[22] Billy Downs, AFL-CIO United Telegraph Workers on Strike Against Western Union, 1971, Atlanta Journal Constitution, https://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/digital/collection/ajc/id/1270/rec/3 .

[23] Richard Miles, Western Union Strike Idles 450 in Georgia, The Atlanta Constitution, 1972, https://www.newspapers.com/article/118359555/the-atlanta-constitution/

[24] Tomas Nonnenmacher, “History of the U.S. Telegraph Industry”. EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. August 14, 2001, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-the-u-s-telegraph-industry/.

[25] Chuck Perry, "Atlanta Journal-Constitution." New Georgia Encyclopedia, last modified Sep 11, 2019. https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/arts-culture/atlanta-journal-constitution/.

[26] Pete Corson, “Photos: Former Atlanta Constitution and Journal buildings”, The Atlanta Journal Constitution, June 14, 2018, https://www.ajc.com/news/local/photos-former-atlanta-constitution-and-journal-buildings/ndwtDtspsH27pLQvT3H98L/.

[27] 1972 September, Central Atlanta Progress, Inc. Photographs, VIS 139.21.01, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[28] Jeremiah McWilliams, “Study: ‘Gulch’ impact hefty”, The Atlanta Journal Constitution, Jan 29, 2012, https://www.ajc.com/news/study-gulch-impact-hefty/YNv4JB0YYk77PDSBbvg34L/.

[29]Michael Elliot, “Reconceiving Historic Preservation in the Modern City: Conflict and Consensus Building in Atlanta.” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 16, no. 2 (1999): 149–63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43030496.

[30]  Michael Elliot, “Reconceiving Historic Preservation in the Modern City: Conflict and Consensus Building in Atlanta.” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 16, no. 2 (1999): 149–63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43030496.

[31]Timothy J Crimmins, “The Past in the Present: An Agenda for Public History and Historic Preservation.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 63, no. 1 (1979): 53–59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40580077.

[32] Timothy J Crimmins, “The Past in the Present: An Agenda for Public History and Historic Preservation.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 63, no. 1 (1979): 53–59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40580077.

[33]Elizabeth A Lyon, “Cultural and Environmental Resource Management: The Role of History in Historic Preservation.” The Public Historian 4, no. 4 (1982): 69–86. https://doi.org/10.2307/3377048.

The Story of Napoleonic Duels

In the wake of the much anticipated November 2023 release of Ridley Scott’s Napoleon, this year is the 45th anniversary of Ridley Scott’s debut 1977 film, The Duellists. The Duellists was Scott’s first on-screen project capturing French military life during the Napoleonic Wars.

Michael Thomas Leibrandt looks at The Duellists.

François Fournier-Sarlovèze

The Duellists captures this era perfectly with gorgeous cinematic filming locations in the lush countryside of France as well as placing the viewer directly into French military traditions during the height of Napoleon Bonaparte’s time as Emperor of France.

Ridley Scott’s 45-year film career has been significant. With 41 Academy Award nominations and 9 wins, Scott also has an extensive television career, amassing ten primetime Emmy Awards. Scott’s most notable films include Alien, Thelma & Louise, and Gladiator.

Background

The basis for the film is a 1908 short story by Joseph Conrad entitled The Duel. It is believed that the basis for the Conrad piece was a 1858 account that was published in Harper’s Magazine. It is also very possible that Conrad was inspired by another Harper’s Magazine published account of a true story about a series of Napoleonic-era duels between two real life French officers, Pierre Dupont de l’Étang and François Louis Fournier-Sarlovèze.

Duels of honor date back to the time of antiquity. In France, duels were recorded many, many centuries back. The duel between Fournier-Sarloveze and Dupont de l’Etang lasted thirty years and according to legend ended with a showdown with pistols at the conclusion of which Fournier-Sarloveze had to promise to never again engage his nemesis.

Winner at the 1978 Cannes Film Festival, The Duellists is an epic tale of the military interpretation of upholding one’s honor while navigating the regulations around being a soldier during wartime. 

The story of these two rivals begins at the beginning of Emperor Napoleon’s rise to power around 1800 and extends until after his exile in. The cinematic tale takes the journey of Armand d’Hubert (3rd Hussars) and Gabriel Feraud (7th Hussars) as they endure Emperor Napoleon’s campaigns, military life in the French Army, as well as their contempt for each other.

Contrast

With both characters being different of temperament and background, D’Hubert is of noble birth and Feraud is not, adding to the intrigue of their parallel climb through the ranks of the French Army. During the nearly fifteen-year clash between the two rivals, Feraud and D’Hubert duel in the beautiful countryside of Augsburg, on horseback in the early morning midst of Lubeck, and even a confrontation during the French retreat from Moscow in 1812. As you might predict, it even ends with a climatic showdown.

Ridley Scott’s The Duellists is not only a visual marvel and a historical account of life in the French Hussars during Napoleon’s campaigns but also an exploration into two men’s interpretation of both the military and civilian code of honor.

Whether for its epic storyline, incredible scenery, or perfectly choreographed action scenes, The Duellists is worth seeing.

Especially if you find yourself in anticipation of Scott’s November release of Napoleon.

Now read about the three times Russia was invaded in history here.

Michael Thomas Leibrandt lives and works in Abington, Pennsylvania.

The Logistical Challenges of the Confederacy in the U.S. Civil War

Much of what happened on Civil War battlefields was determined by the economic and logistical foundations of the societies the armies represented. The military that a country puts on the battlefield is not a generic collection of soldiers but rather a direct reflection of the culture that creates it. War can be compared to an iceberg: the armies and battles are its visible and graphic “tip”, but what actually decides the outcome of the battles are the money and resources available to acquire the weapons and equipment needed to wage war effectively. The procurement and transportation of clothing, food and supplies were the decisive factors, but are typically relegated to footnotes, remaining submerged and invisible.

Here, Lloyd W Klein looks at the logistical challenges in the Confederacy through the Confederate Quartermaster and the Subsistence Corps.

Colonel Abraham Myers.

The Logistics Problems of the Confederacy

The Confederate government faced myriad interconnected problems that hindered its ability to adequately plan for and address the logistical challenges during the American Civil War. The combination of the Union blockade, limited industrial capacity, transportation issues, financial strain, diplomatic challenges, and internal divisions contributed to the Confederate government's difficulties in acquiring and sustaining critical resources during the Civil War. The combination of resource limitations, economic constraints, political factors, and the nature of the conflict itself made it difficult for the Confederate government to plan and address the logistical challenges in a comprehensive manner (see below).

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Origins of the Logistics Issues Faced by the Confederacy

Blockade: The Union Navy imposed a blockade on Southern ports, severely restricting the Confederacy's access to foreign trade and essential supplies. This blockade made it challenging for the Confederacy to import much-needed goods and resources.

Insufficient Industrial Capacity: The Confederate states had a smaller industrial base compared to the more industrialized Northern states. They relied heavily on agriculture, and their limited industrial capacity hindered their ability to produce weapons, ammunition, and other crucial supplies necessary for war.

Poor Rail. Transportation: The war disrupted transportation networks, making it difficult to move resources efficiently within the Confederate states and further complicated efforts to acquire and distribute resources efficiently.

Political Conflict between states and national government: The Confederate states prioritized their individual interests over the collective needs of the Confederacy, leading to internal divisions and challenges in coordinating resource allocation.

The Confederacy had fewer resources and a smaller industrial base compared to the Union. They struggled to match the Union's manufacturing capabilities and lacked the infrastructure to support large-scale production and transportation of weapons and supplies. Moreover, the Confederate government faced economic difficulties throughout the war, including inflation and a strained financial system. These constraints made it challenging to allocate sufficient funds for logistics, transportation infrastructure, and the procurement of necessary resources. The Union blockade severely restricted the Confederacy's ability to import weapons, ammunition, and other supplies from foreign sources. This created a significant reliance on domestic production, which was insufficient to meet the demands of the war.

The Confederate government was structured in its Constitution to be a federation of states without a strong national government, consistent with its founding philosophy based on states’ rights. It was comprised of individual states with varying priorities and interests. Coordination and cooperation among these states in terms of logistics and supply chain management were challenging. Additionally, disagreements and competing interests among political leaders impacted efficient planning and execution of logistics.

Impact of military strategy. The Confederate military leadership, including General Robert E. Lee, opted for offensive strategies and focused on battlefield victories. This emphasis on aggressive tactics sometimes overshadowed the need for comprehensive logistical planning, leading to inadequate preparations for sustaining operations. As an insurgency, a better strategy might have been to defend critical territories and cities, hoping to withstand a Union invasion. But a short war was envisioned and this was not politically a choice Jefferson Davis thought was feasible at the time.

Limited industrial and manufacturing sector. The new Confederate nation possessed insufficient production capacity for the trial ahead. The Confederacy had fewer factories, foundries, and manufacturing facilities compared to the industrialized North. Consequently, the Confederacy struggled to meet the demands for weapons, ammunition, uniforms, and other essential supplies. This scarcity hindered their ability to adequately equip and sustain their troops in the field.

The Confederacy relied heavily on imports to compensate for their domestic manufacturing limitations. However, the Union blockade disrupted their ability to import goods and materials, including weapons and vital supplies. The inability to access foreign sources of production and technology exacerbated the supply shortages faced by the Confederacy.

The limited industrial sector also affected the development of transportation infrastructure. The Confederacy had fewer railways, fewer navigable waterways, and fewer well-maintained roads compared to the Union. The lack of robust transportation systems made it challenging to move goods, weapons, and supplies efficiently to the front lines, resulting in delays and logistical difficulties.

The limited industrial and manufacturing sectors of the Confederacy meant there was a scarcity of raw materials, such as iron, coal, and other critical resources needed for production. This scarcity affected the ability to produce and maintain weapons, ammunition, and other necessary supplies, further straining logistical operations.

The Confederacy's industrial base was heavily agricultural, with limited diversification into other industries. This lack of diversification made it difficult to develop a robust manufacturing sector capable of meeting the varied demands of the war effort. The limited range of industrial capabilities constrained their ability to produce a wide array of equipment and supplies needed for the military.

Overall, the limited industrial and manufacturing sectors of the Confederacy had a profound impact on logistical operations. Supplying and equipping Confederate forces during the war was a serious problem for the entire 4 years but became worse as time wore on and critical ports and geographic areas came under Union control.

Scarcities of various essential war resources. The Confederacy struggled to produce enough firearms and ammunition to adequately equip its troops. Rifles, muskets, and other weapons were in high demand, but the limited manufacturing capabilities meant that many soldiers had to rely on outdated or inferior weapons. Ammunition shortages also occurred, limiting the firepower of Confederate forces.

The production of uniforms and clothing was insufficient to meet the needs of the Confederate Army. Soldiers often faced shortages of proper uniforms, resulting in a mix of civilian clothing, captured Union uniforms, and makeshift garments. This not only affected morale but also impacted the identification of friendly troops on the battlefield.

Adequate footwear was scarce among Confederate soldiers. Leather shortages and limited production capabilities led to soldiers marching and fighting with inadequate or worn-out shoes. This created significant discomfort, increased the risk of foot-related health issues, and impacted mobility on the battlefield.

The production of blankets and tents fell short of demand. Confederate soldiers often lacked sufficient protection from the elements, especially during harsh winter conditions. This further contributed to the hardships endured by troops in the field.

The Confederacy faced difficulties in procuring and producing medical supplies needed to treat wounded soldiers and to treat communicable diseases. Scarcities included items such as bandages, medicines, surgical instruments, and anesthetics. Medical personnel often had to improvise and rely on limited resources, resulting in compromised healthcare for the wounded.

The limited industrial capacity of the Confederacy affected the production of essential machinery and equipment needed for various sectors, such as manufacturing, mining, and transportation. This hindered the development and expansion of critical industries and further impacted the overall war effort.

The Sustainment Bureaucracy

Expecting only a brief war and anticipating merely a perfunctory Northern response, secessionist leaders had quietly planned to construct a sufficient military force for that limited mission. After preparing a political ideology that succeeded in establish secession, they planned for a single battle that would decide the question. They had amassed abundant weapons through subterfuge and capturing supplies at federal forts to last them for a year or two. In retrospect, it is apparent that the Confederate leaders had not expected to fight a long war and had not made contingency plans until secession actually forced a serious consideration.  The creation of military sustainment departments began on February 26, 1861, even before the authorization of an army on March 6 (1,2). A Bureau of Ordnance was created on April.27. The leaders of the Quartermaster, Subsistence and Ordinance Departments, Colonel Abraham Myers, Lieutenant-Colonel Lucius Northrop, and Major Josiah Gorgas had considerable influence on logistics organizations and operations for the Confederate armies. These three men were charged with the responsibility of harnessing the Southern economy to support the armies.

The Confederacy was a newly formed nation with a limited institutional framework and experience in managing large-scale logistics and warfare. The absence of a well-established bureaucracy and logistics system further hampered their ability to plan and execute effective supply chains. After Manassas, it became clear that food, additional armaments and clothes would be needed to carry on the war effort.  Financial means and mechanisms for their procurement became critical facets of war planning. As the duration of the war lengthened, inherent weaknesses in the Confederate economy began to show. The political and military leaders expected their land mass to be their defense, never thinking that the Union could build bridges and roads and repair railroads as fast as its cavalry could burn them. They expected cotton to be their financial strength, but never considered where armaments and supplies would come from or paid for, and never planned on the expense of a naval presence to counter a blockade of its ports.

The Quartermaster Department

The Confederate Congress created the position of Quartermaster-General on February 26, 1861. The Secretary of War was allowed to appoint one colonel and six majors to serve as Quartermasters (3, 4).  Abraham Myers served as the first Quartermaster General for the Confederate States of America during the Civil War. Myers was responsible for managing and supplying the Confederate Army with various provisions, including food, clothing, and equipment. The role of the Quartermaster General was crucial in maintaining the logistics and efficiency of the Confederate military operations. Myers played a significant part in ensuring that the Confederate forces were adequately equipped and provisioned throughout the war.

The Confederate Quartermaster Department was responsible for procuring, transporting, and distributing essential supplies to the troops, including food, clothing, equipment, and ammunition.

Overseeing the supply of an army is a complicated job: besides weapons and armaments procurement, the responsibilities also included uniforms, horses, wagons, and railroad cars; and finding the money and resources to acquire these supplies.  It also entails transportation of the materials to the location of the army, constructing supply depots near enough the front to be effective but not where it could be captured, and coordinating production with need. The quartermaster department is responsible for creating a supply network for the army; in particular, the procurement, maintenance, and transportation of military materiel, facilities, and personnel. It is the functional bridge between economics and tactical operations. To operate optimally, the logistical network must connect the combat forces with the strengths and capabilities of the society it defends. It does not simply create itself and it is not merely an administrative task; it is an enterprise in itself that requires using technological and economic resources to overcome an enemy and sustains the military forces by supporting its warfighting readiness (5).

Myers had a very difficult if not impossible situation to accomplish these goals. The Confederacy faced severe resource limitations, including shortages of essential supplies such as food, clothing, and equipment. Additionally, the Union blockade hindered the Confederacy's ability to import necessary goods from overseas.

His pre-war experience in southern forts and his contacts in those positions were especially valuable in getting started. Myers sent agents into the domestic market, contracting with local manufacturers and paying competitive rates. The department bought cotton, woolen cloth, and leather goods.  He also established shops for making clothing, shoes, tents, wagons, and other equipment, and purchased livestock at market prices for as long as possible.  During the first few months the South had sufficient supplies to cobble together a supply chain (6,7).

But the South lacked the manufacturing infrastructure required to produce and build the required huge quantities of food, equipment, shoes, and clothing.  Settling in for what would be a long war they had not planned for, the supply deficits developed into a crisis as the financial weakness of the country led to runaway inflation. The CSA government had to create a supply chain that would bring its armies the supplies needed to allow it to continue the war. Creating a new country with a new financial system, revamping its rail system, and developing its industrial capacity would have posed inconceivable and perhaps impossible problems for a state government dominated system in peacetime. Trying to accomplish these tasks while being invaded by a much larger, more resource rich country bordering its most critical strategic areas was likely beyond anyone’s capacity.

Myers was a highly experienced quartermaster officer who was widely admired for competence, integrity and efficiency (8). Myers' efforts to fulfill the needs of the armies brought praise from some and condemnation from others. He immediately began advertising for tents and other camp equipment from southern vendors (9).  As president of the military board, Myers helped design the first Confederate Army uniform. (10) Blankets, shoes and wool remained scarce. Quartermaster depots were created around the South in large cities (11). Supplying uniforms in bulk in 1861 was a huge problem (12). He estimated in 1861 that he needed 1,600,000 pairs of shoes for the first year, but he could only locate 300,000 (13). He also estimated that he would need hundreds of thousands of blankets, socks, and shirts, and almost no industry was present in the South to procure them. They would have to be imported from Europe and brought through the blockade.

It was not enough to purchase these items; they had to be transported to the armies. He devised a system of supply depots; Richmond and Nashville would be the main depots for the two armies, with multiple satellite storage areas closer to the front (14). The railroads were the primary means of transporting these items, as there was minimal merchant marine activity with the blockade and overland wagon routes were slow and subject to military attack.

Despite a very large service, he was restricted by a lack of funds, inflation, and poor railroads, over which he had no control. His department was criticized among its generals because the South could not obtain supplies to outfit the Army. His inability to provide shoes and uniforms was an especially serious problem.  He set goals and controls on southern manufacturing throughout the war. By commandeering more than half the South's produced goods for the military, the quartermaster general, in a counterintuitive drift toward socialism, appropriated hundreds of mills and controlled the flow of southern factory commodities, especially salt (15).

Some criticisms of Myers and the Confederate quartermaster department include inefficiency, inadequate coordination, and difficulties in providing timely and sufficient supplies to the army. These issues were partially attributed to the limited resources and the overall logistical challenges faced by the Confederacy. The CSA lacked nearly all manufactured products and had little capacity to make them. The Quartermaster Department proved to be unable to properly equip and clothe the Confederate soldiers. Myers consistently failed to anticipate the operational requirements of the army (16). As a result, Lee was often at a logistical disadvantage. The significant constraints and limitations that Myers and the Confederate quartermaster department operated under made the task of supplying the Confederate army extremely challenging. Despite these challenges, Myers and his department managed to provide some level of support to the Confederate forces throughout the conflict. Overall, assessing Myers' performance as a quartermaster general requires considering the extraordinary circumstances of the Confederacy during the war.

Subsistence Department

Lt Col Isaac M. St. John Northrop served as the Commissary General and Subsistence Director of the Confederate States Army. He was responsible for procurement and transportation of food to soldiers in the field. Northrop's tenure as Subsistence Director was marked by significant challenges due to resource shortages, logistical difficulties, and the impact of the Union blockade on the Confederate food supply. These challenges resulted in widespread food shortages and inadequate rations for Confederate soldiers throughout the war.

Critics of Northrop argue that he was inefficient, lacked effective management skills, and failed to adequately address the logistical and supply issues facing the Confederate army. There were allegations of corruption, favoritism, and mismanagement within the commissary department, which contributed to the inadequate provisioning of soldiers. Moreover, Northrop had a frustrating tendency to deny support by creating unnecessary administrative hurdles and red tape (17).

His performance in a capacity for which he was completely unprepared was abysmal.  The supply of food, shoes, clothing, and other materials has been termed inexcusably inadequate (18) Confederate soldiers were frequently obliged to make do inadequate rations, and to forage amongst their own countrymen. While the stuff of legend and a sign of intrepidness, it’s no way to fight a war – on one’s own territory. It is incomprehensible that commissaries in Vicksburg and Virginia were unable to stockpile provisions in military zones located in friendly territory (19).

Ordinance

In contrast, Josiah Gorgas served with distinction as the Chief of Ordnance for the Confederate States Army. He was responsible for overseeing the procurement, production, and distribution of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies for the Confederate forces. Gorgas is generally regarded as a highly competent and effective ordnance officer. Under his leadership, the Confederate Ordnance Department faced numerous challenges, including limited resources, inadequate industrial infrastructure, and the Union blockade. Despite these challenges, Gorgas worked to establish and expand Confederate arms factories, streamline production processes, and improve the efficiency of supply chains.

His primary function was to create an armaments supply system: the acquisition and distribution of armaments and ammunition in the Confederate army. The new country possessed almost no industry capable of providing arms and ammunition: ante bellum ordnance-making factories were mostly located in the North. Furthermore, existing supplies of weapons had been seized by Confederate state militias, and their state governments resisted sharing them. Gorgas recognized that only a limited amount of money was available to spend on arms and ammunition.

The limited production capacity due to the absence of manufacturing industries constrained the ability to mass-produce firearms. The scarcity of raw materials, particularly iron and steel, also posed a significant challenge for firearm production. The Confederacy lacked the technological expertise and infrastructure necessary for the efficient production of advanced firearms. They lagged behind the North in terms of machinery, precision manufacturing techniques, and skilled labor. This limited their ability to produce modern and sophisticated firearms.

Consequently, the Confederacy relied on imports to supplement their domestic firearm production. The Confederacy faced difficulties in accessing these resources from abroad due to the Union blockade. As the war progressed, the Union blockade efficacy increased, disrupting the ability to import finished firearms or components from abroad.

To compensate for these limitations, the Confederacy resorted to various measures. They converted existing weapons, such as hunting rifles or smoothbore muskets, into serviceable firearms. They also sought to repair and reuse captured Union weapons. Additionally, they established government-owned and private armories to manufacture firearms, although these facilities were often limited in output and faced resource shortages.

Gorgas implemented measures to increase domestic production of firearms, ammunition, and artillery, making the Confederacy less reliant on imported arms. He also made efforts to repair and refurbish captured Union weapons to supplement Confederate armament. Gorgas emphasized the importance of quality control and strived to ensure that Confederate forces were supplied with functional and reliable weapons.

Gorgas constructed systems to scavenge arms from battlefields, import arms and essential manufacturing supplies from Europe, and build an industrial complex to manufacture what the army required. He was responsible for ensuring that artillery tubes and rifles were delivered through the blockade. He established armories to store the materials so when needed, they could be transported easily to the front lines (20,21). Gorgas created a system that supplied all the powder and artillery for the Confederacy, despite labor shortages. (22) Although the Confederate armies often lacked basic food and clothing, they were rarely without necessary ammunition.

Faced with the problem that the Confederacy had few facilities for weapons manufacture and no plants to produce gunpowder, Gorgas demonstrated brilliant administrative skill in building these capabilities. Gorgas, as Chief of Ordnance for the Confederate States Army, implemented several measures regarding weapon procurement during the American Civil War. Gorgas recognized the need to increase weapon production to meet the demands of the war. He established new armories and expanded existing ones to boost manufacturing capacity. He sought assistance from private companies to fulfill the Confederacy's weapon needs. He entered into contracts with private arms manufacturers to produce firearms, artillery, and other military equipment. He recognized the necessity of captured Union weapons and directed efforts to refurbish and reuse them. This practice helped supplement the Confederate Army's weapon inventory. Since the Confederacy had limited domestic manufacturing capabilities, Gorgas focused on importing weapons from abroad. He coordinated efforts to procure arms from Europe, primarily from countries such as Britain and France.

Gorgas and his team faced immense logistical challenges in transporting weapons.
Gorgas prioritized the allocation of available resources to meet the most pressing weapon needs. He assessed the demands of various theaters of war and distributed weapons accordingly, based on strategic requirements. He relied heavily on the existing railway networks to transport weapons and ammunition. Railways were crucial in moving large quantities of arms from manufacturing centers to distribution points closer to the front lines.

Other methods of transporting arms were necessary given the state of the railroads in the South. When feasible, Gorgas utilized rivers for transportation. Riverboats and steamers were employed to move weapons and supplies along navigable waterways, providing an alternative to overland transportation. Overland transportation via wagon trains played a significant role in moving weapons and supplies to the front lines. Wagons, pulled by horses or mules, were used to transport arms overland from distribution depots to the troops in the field.

By 1863, the South had several factories producing modern weapons. Despite the inferior southern rail system and southern governors who hoarded supplies in their own states, Gorgas almost single-handedly assured that the troops on the front line had sufficient weapons and ammunition to carry on. Gorgas performed an outstanding service in developing businesses to produce weaponry and transporting it to the front. Rifles and ammunition continued to be in abundance even when supplies of food and other materials had vanished (23,24).

Logistics Network

The procurement and transport of military materiel into the Confederacy was a dismal logistical failure. At first, it was borderline in its efficacy; but as ports were closed, key mining and farming territories lost, and supply depots captured, the network became increasingly unable to supply the needs of its armies in the field.

Cost of Supply

The Confederate government faced severe financial constraints throughout the war. The limited funds available hindered the procurement and distribution of supplies, and often resulted in inadequate provisioning for the troops.

Inefficiencies and corruption. The Confederate quartermaster department encountered issues with inefficiencies, mismanagement, and corruption. Supply routes were not always optimized, and there were instances of fraud and misappropriation of resources, leading to further logistical challenges. Perhaps even more problematic than limited resources was the “pervasive ineffectiveness that characterized every aspect of Confederate administrative life, especially its logistical and supply arrangements” (25).

Inflationary spiral. Understanding the problems that confronted these officers requires a comprehension of the costs of Confederate supply and how the Confederate inflationary spiral altered the war. As a comparison, the US dollar has experienced on average a 2.18% inflation rate per year since 1860. Hence, $1 in 1860 is roughly equivalent to $32.43 in 2023 dollars. (26). The inflationary spiral of the Confederate dollar during the four years of the war increased its costs exponentially: every 6 months, the value of the Confederate dollar decreased in value so much that costs were almost incomparable to the previous time frame. The total expenditures of the CSA government, nearly all of which were for the War Department, increased from $70 million in November 1861 to $329 million in August 1862. That is a dizzying figure to contemplate in retrospect, and impossible to imagine what it was like for Myers, whose job it was to administrate and develop budgets for his department a year in advance.  One example is that the $199 million allocated for the war budget for 1862 had run out by September (27). It’s impossible to operate a functional war machine with inflation at that unsustainable rate. 

A significant escalation of the problem can be ascribed to a single event of marked importance. On April 29, 1862, Commander David Farragut captured the South’s largest port city, New Orleans. (28)  The fall of New Orleans was a powerful financial disadvantage. For a nation composed of rebellious states to wage war, it must have capital with which to pay for war supplies: weapons, armaments, horses, food, clothing, soldiers’ salaries, etc.

Impact on Subsistence Administration. The resulting budgetary pressure had consequences all along the administrative path. In 1862, Myers saw his estimated budget cut from roughly $27 million/month to $19 million.  He informed the cabinet that at that time, the current actual expenditure was $24.5 million/month, and with inflation would clearly become much higher. Myers lobbied the Congress for more appropriations to keep the war effort on track. The CSA Congress then passed a supplementary expenditure of $127 million to pay for just the 3 months of December 1862 to February 1863 (29).

In response to these absurd cost rises, even more Treasury notes were issued on March 3,1863. In total over $517 million in notes were issued that year alone, reflecting the tripling of costs in just one year.  These would further worsen the inflationary spiral.

Centralization of Manufacturing

With the onset of the war, the Confederate War Department centralized control over the nation’s industries. This was surprising given that the CSA was designed as a state-controlled government with limited federal powers. The Quartermaster and Ordnance Bureaus organized the production and distribution of war materiel.  In time, many of the Confederacy’s large-scale manufacturers – textile mills, foundries, and machine shops – worked under contract with the Ordnance and Quartermaster Bureaus. The salt industry was entirely operated by the CSA government in what has been termed “salt socialism” (30). A government formed on the principles of state primacy and not a central government was finding it necessary to institute federal control of industry.

Moreover, by 1862 shortages of supplies and equipment, in addition to inflated prices in the domestic markets, led to the conferring of impressment powers on Myers in addition to the Commissary Department (31). While this somewhat alleviated the supply issues, it became demoralizing for the public.  The central government was now empowered to seize the products of its citizens and pay them what it could, not what it was worth.

Cost of Transportation. The transportation of supplies at a cost-efficient price was one of the Confederacies biggest difficulties. The southern railroad system failed to transmit sufficient supplies to the armies, and many supplies were kept in storage because they couldn’t get to the soldiers. By February 1862, horses and men were not receiving sufficient rations. The Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac RR was not carrying food and forage because the prices able to be charged for these items were small and there was no centralized control. Eastern North Carolina had abundant stores of corn, bacon and grain but the route necessary to carry these items to the front was byzantine: The Wilmington and Weldon RR was a single-track road, connecting with the Richmond line, but this connection was in terrible condition and there was no cooperation between the lines. In a confederation system without centralized government authority, private ownership of railroads continued to run on profit not patriotism. Despite these inefficiencies, Myers opposed central government control or the building of its own trains, believing that would only increase the inefficiencies. Later in 1863, he worked with Secretary of War Seddon and President Davis to put pressure on the rail owners to expedite shipments despite lower profit margins (32).

And in 1862, the level of rail efficiency was at its peak: it declined from there. As the war continued, the rail system became even less adequate. The tracks began to deteriorate. The metal composition of the Southern rails was of relatively soft iron, frequently fractured or wear after continued use, requiring high maintenance. In the mid- 19thcentury, Northern foundries began to produce more durable iron products such as steel but the southern foundries did not switch to the more difficult to manufacture material. Steel must be smelted from iron ore, in which impurities (e.g., carbon, nitrogen silicon) are removed and alloying elements (e.g., manganese, nickel, chromium) are added. Consequently, the infrastructure of southern track crumbled throughout the war, with limited resources for their repair. Myers complained that the locomotives were breaking down and had no replacement parts. (33)

Conclusion

The skills of a society to identify, purchase and convey the goods and supplies necessary to maintain an army in working order is a window into the health of that society and transcends mere administrative planning.  How the needs of the Confederate armies in the field were determined, acquired, transported and distributed is a central but often overlooked piece of the Civil War narrative. How they fared is a vital part of the story of the Confederacy.

What do you think of the Confederacy’s logistical challenges during the U.S. Civil War? Let us know below.

Now, read Lloyd’s article on the Battle of Fort Sumter and the beginning of the U.S. Civil War here.

References

1.     Woodruff JD. The Impact of Logistics on General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. Accessed at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1083715.pdf 6/23/23.

2.     Goff, Richard D. Confederate Supply. Pranava Books.1969, pages 6-7.

3.     Wilson HS. Confederate Industry: Manufacturers and Quartermasters in the Civil War. University Press of Mississippi, 2002, pages 15-25. https://epdf.pub/confederate-industry-manufacturers-and-quartermasters-in-the-civil-war.html  

4.     The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Vol. I, 495. (Hereafter: OR). https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/001/0495

5.     Wissler, John E. Logistics: The Lifeblood of Military Power. Heritage.org. https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2019-essays/logistics-the-lifeblood-military-power

6.     Goff op cit pages 15-

7.     The Twiggs-Myers Family. Fix Bayonets Blog. (hereafter: Fix) https://fixbayonetsusmc.blog/2019/03/29/the-twiggs-myers-family-part-iii/

8.     Goff op cit pages 33-35.

9.     Goff op cit pages 15-16.

10.  Goff op cit page 16

11.  Goff op cit page 16

12.  Goff op cit page 33

13.  Goff op cit page 34

14.  Goff op cit page 35

15.  Lonn, Ella. Salt as a Factor in the Confederacy. New York, W. Neale, 1933 and

Davis, William C. Look Away: A History of Confederate States of America. The Free Press, New York, 2002, Chapter 10.

16.  Wilson op cit page 4

17.  Vandiver F. Ploughshares into Swords: Josiah Gorgas and Confederate Ordnance. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1952, 165.

18.  Wiley, Bell I. (1968). The Road to Appomattox. New York City: Atheneum Books. 31.

19.  Hess, Earl J. Civil War Supply and Strategy. Louisiana State University Press, 2020. Page 84

20.  McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom.  Oxford University Press, 2003. page 318.

21.  Klein LW. How the Confederacy got their Weapons – Fueling the Confederate War Machine. The Civil War Center. Accessed 6/23/23. https://thecivilwarcenter.wpcomstaging.com/2022/06/06/how-the-confederacy-got-their-weapons-fueling-the-confederate-war-machine/

22.  Goff op cit 246

23.  Klein LW. How did the Confederacy Fund its War Effort in the U.S. Civil War? History is Now Magazine.http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2023/6/5/how-did-the-confederacy-fund-its-war-effort-in-the-us-civil-war Accessed 6/23/23.

24.  Josiah Gorgas. https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/us-history-biographies/josiah-gorgas  Accessed 6/23/23.

25.  Hess op cit 361.

26.  Consumer Price Index Calculator. https://www.in2013dollars.com/

27.  Goff op cit page 90

28.  Ferguson, Niall. The Ascent Of Money. A Financial History of the World. 10th Anniversary Edition. Penguin, New York, 2009. And Edwin C Bearrs. The Seizure of the Forts and Public Property in Louisiana.  Louisiana History (2:401‑409, Autumn 1961) 

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/America/United_States/Louisiana/_Texts/LH/2/4/Seizure_of_the_Forts*.html

29.  Goff op cit pages 90-91 & 47-49

30.  Davis op cit chapter 10

31.  Goff op cit pages 41-2

32.  Goff op cit pages 107 & 40

33.  Davis op cit 307

Ulysses Grant versus Robert Lee: US Civil War Generals

On April 6, 1865 Union forces managed to capture a considerable chunk of Lee’s army at the Battle of Sailor’s Creek. And by April 8, Union cavalry had cut off Lee’s further retreat to the west. Grant wrote Lee with a summons to surrender. The Confederate general demurred for as long as there seemed a chance to break out and continue the retreat. But when one key subordinate assured him that the situation was hopeless, Lee said sadly, “Then there is nothing left me but to go and see General Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths.”

Richard Bluttal tells us about the US Civil War generals.

A reproduction of a Thomas Nast painting showing the surrender of General Lee to General Grant at Appomattox Court House in Virginia on April 9, 1865.

On that day in April 1865, Lee arrived at the McLean house about one o'clock and took a seat in the parlor. A half hour later, the sound of horses on the stage road signaled the approach of General Grant. Entering the house Grant greeted Lee  in the center of the room. The generals presented a contrasting appearance, Lee in a new uniform and Grant in his mud-spattered field uniform. Grant, who remembered meeting Lee once during the Mexican War, asked the Confederate general if he recalled their meeting. Lee replied that he did, and the two conversed in a very cordial manner, for approximately 25 minutes. The subject had not yet gotten around to surrender until finally Lee, feeling the anguish of defeat, brought Grant's attention to it. Grant, who later confessed to being embarrassed at having to ask for the surrender from Lee, said simply that the terms would be just as he had outlined them in a previous letter. Aside from Grant and Lee, only Lt. Colonel Marshall and perhaps a half dozen of Grant’s staff officers were present for most of the meeting. Approximately a dozen other Union officers entered the room.

briefly, including Captain Robert Todd Lincoln. Few besides Grant left detailed accounts of what transpired and while some accounts disagree on the details, there are many key consistencies.

Terms

The heart of the terms was that Confederates would be paroled after surrendering their weapons and other military property. If surrendered soldiers did not take up arms again, the United States government would not prosecute them. Grant also allowed Confederate officers to keep their mounts and side arms. Although Lee agreed to the terms, he asked if his men could keep their horses and mules in the

cavalry and artillery. The Confederate army provided weapons and military property, but the men provided their own mounts. Grant indicated he would not amend the terms but would issue a separate order allowing that to happen. Lee said he thought that would have a happy effect on his men. By 3:00p.m., the formal copies of the letters indicating the terms and acceptance of the surrender were signed and exchanged, and General Lee left the McLean House to return to his camp. Horace Porter, one of Grant’s staff officers recorded that Lee paused at the top of the stairs and energetically “smote” his hands together three times. Grant and his staff followed him and removed their hats as a respectful, farewell gesture which Lee returned in kind before riding down the stage road.

The Start

This war opened with a clash between half-armed farmers and half-trained soldiers. From the beginning materials and industry were complete in  the North and throughout the war were lacking in the South. The South did not have the type of industrial advancement as the North. If was lacking in methods of transportation such as railroads. The Northern soldier was compelled to fight in his enemy’s country, but he was compelled to devastate it as well as conquer it.

The story of Grant and Lee is a very complex one. You are talking about two of the greatest generals in our history who had so much in common as education and training but there were differences in terms of character and military tactician.  

The author Bruce Caton explains it best in his article Grant and Lee: A Study in Contrasts. “The most obvious difference was in terms of early childhood. Lee was tidewater Virginia, and in his background were family, culture, and tradition. . . the age of chivalry transplanted to a New World which was making its own legends and its own myths. He embodied a way of life that had come down through the age of knighthood and the English country squire. Lee stood for the feeling that it was somehow of advantage to human society to have a pronounced inequality in the social structure. There should be a leisure class, backed by ownership of land; in turn, society itself should be keyed to the land as the chief source of wealth and influence. It would bring forth (according to this ideal) a class of men with a strong sense of obligation to the community; men who lived not to gain advantage for themselves, but to meet the solemn obligations which had been laid on them by the very fact that they were privileged. He was Virginian all the way.

Grant, the son of a tanner on the Western frontier, was everything Lee was not. He had come up the hard way and embodied nothing in particular except the eternal toughness and sinewy fiber of the men who grew up beyond the mountains. He was one of a body of men who owed reverence and obeisance to no one, who were self-reliant to a fault, who cared hardly anything for the past but who had a sharp eye for the future.

Contrast

And that, perhaps, is where the contrast between Grant and Lee becomes most striking. The Virginia aristocrat, inevitably, saw himself in relation to his own region. He lived in a static society which could endure almost anything except change. Instinctively, his first loyalty would go to the locality in which that society existed. He would fight to the limit of endurance to defend it, because in defending it he was defending everything that gave his own life its deepest meaning. The Westerner, on the other hand, would fight with an equal tenacity for the broader concept of society. He fought so because everything he lived by was tied to growth, expansion, and a constantly widening horizon. What he lived by would survive or fall with the nation itself. He could not possibly stand by unmoved in the face of an attempt to destroy the Union. He would combat it with everything he had, because he could only see it as an effort to cut the ground out from under his feet.”

They both graduated from West Point, Lee earlier due to age. At the age of 18, Robert leaves for the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, which had earned one demerit. Robert E. Lee graduates second in his class from West Point. While at the military academy, Lee is one of six students in his graduating class to never receive a demerit. His classmates note his drive for perfection and focused, secluded personality with the nickname "Marble Model." As one of the top cadets, Lee is able to choose the branch of service for his first assignment and elects to work for the Army’s Engineer Corps. Lee, second in his West Point class, an engineering officer, a career military officer, truly was a great general. As a tactician, he was head and shoulders above Grant.  Good defensively, Lee was even better on the offensive. He was bold and decisive, a calculating gambler. Can anyone who has studied the Battle of Chancellorsville deny it? Splitting his army on several occasions, he surprised his opponents and won the day. Lee was a master of the holding attack; a tactic George Marshall would later instill as the only tactic taught at the Army War College prior to World War II. Lee  fought in the Mexican American War (1846-1848) as one of General Winfield Scott’s chief aides. He was instrumental in several American victories through his personal reconnaissance as a staff officer, which allowed him to discover routes that the Mexicans hadn’t defended because they thought it was impossible to pass through the terrain.General Scott later wrote that Lee was “the very best soldier I ever saw in the field”.

In 1839, seventeen-year-old Hiram Ulysses Grant received an appointment to the United States Military Academy at West Point. It changed the course of his life—and his name. Grant always disliked his first name and was commonly known by his middle name. He wanted to swap his first and middle names when he entered the Academy. However, Congressman Thomas Hamer had submitted Grant’s application to West Point under the name “Ulysses S. Grant.” Hamer knew the boy as Ulysses and, at a loss for his middle name, chose “S” because Grant’s mother’s maiden name was Simpson. Later on, as result of military victors in the West, the USG becomes unconditional surrender Grant.

West Point

Grant’s experiences at West Point and as a young officer provided both formal and incidental preparation for his later career and gave him insights into future Civil War comrades and foes. Grant, for his part, was a keen observer of human nature who believed that attending West Point at “the right time”—he encountered more than 50 future Civil War generals there—together with his experiences in Mexico, proved “of great advantage.” In addition to teaching “practical lessons,” the Mexican War introduced him to “older officers, who became conspicuous in the rebellion.” More important and what developed into a major military strategy was his proficiency in being a quartermaster, one whose prime responsibility is managing supply trains and transportation  in a hostile environment, this became essential during the Civil War.

Surviving drawings and paintings from Grant’s West Point years show early signs of what the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz called a “special gift” common to successful painters and generals alike: namely, a remarkable visual memory. After Grant studied a map, his staff officer Horace Porter recalled, “it seemed to become photographed indelibly upon his brain.” Besides having an incredible gift of memory, he also excelled in horsemanship. Grant experienced combat for the first time on May 8, 1846, at the Battle of Palto Alto during the Mexican American War. Grant served as regimental quartermaster, but yearned for a combat role; when finally allowed, he led a charge at the Battle of Resaca de la Palma. . He demonstrated his equestrian ability at the Battle of Monterrey  by volunteering to carry a dispatch past snipers, where he hung off the side of his horse, keeping the animal between him and the enemy. 

Historians increasingly have pointed to the importance of Grant's experience as an assistant quartermaster during the war. Although he was initially averse to the position, it prepared Grant in understanding military supply routes, transportation systems, and logistics, particularly with regard to "provisioning a large, mobile army operating in hostile territory," according to biographer Ronald White. Grant came to recognize how wars could be won or lost by crucial factors that lay beyond the tactical battlefield. Serving as assistant quartermaster made Grant a complete soldier, and learning how to supply an entire army gave Grant the training to sustain large armies. This experience as a quartermaster will later benefit him In the Civil War.

After his victory at Donelson, Grant never failed to base his strategy upon supply, more than often than not the latter strategy upon supplies Lee based his upon search, after supplies and consequently suffered chronically from a shortage of supplies and a dispersion of forces. In the object of the campaign Grant eclipsed Lee, not only because his army was stronger, but because it was better organized and supplied.

From his training and time spent at West Point a number of  characteristics were greatly enforced such the ability to develop lucid orders, even in the heat of battle.  General Meade’s chief of staff commented that “there is one striking feature of Grant’s orders; no matter how hurriedly he may write them on the field, no one ever has the slightest doubt as to their meaning or even has to read them over a second time to understand them.” His study of maps and creating artwork at West Point was extremely useful. James McPherson attributes to Grant a “topographical memory.” He “could remember every feature of the terrain over which he traveled and find his way over it again; he could also look at a map and visualize the features of terrain he had never seen. . . . Grant could see in his mind the disposition of troops over thousands of square miles, visualize their relationship to roads and terrain, and know how and where to move them to take advantage of topography.” His perseverance was that of history, in 1864–65, Grant demonstrated his perseverance as he carried out his campaign of adhesion against Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, achieving all his goals within a year.  Grant was a simple man who dealt with the facts as he found them. While his contemporaries saw the war in all its complexities and too often took counsel of their fears, from Belmont to Appomattox Grant saw the main chance, stuck to it, and thus led his armies to victory.” When President Lincoln brought Grant east from his triumphs at Vicksburg and Chattanooga to confront Lee, Grant refused to back off, waging a bloody war of attrition which last exactly a year. His focus, early in the war was to defeat, capture or destroy opposing armies, not simply occupying geographic positions, was critical to his success.

War tactics

Grant had no fear of using all the resources that were available to him. Remember the North always enjoyed a substantial edge in manpower and almost every manufacturing category, He recognition and deployment of these resources stands as one of his achievements. Grant was decisive. Colonel James F. Rusling of the quartermaster general’s staff recalled that in the winter of 1863–64, a quartermaster officer approached Grant for approval of millions of dollars of expenditures for the coming Atlanta campaign, and Grant approved the expenditure after briefly examining the papers involved. Questioning Grant’s swift decision, the officer asked him if he was sure he was right. Grant replied, “No, I am not, but in war, anything is better than indecision. We must decide. If I am wrong, we shall soon find out and can do the other thing. But not to decide wastes both time and money and may ruin everything.”

Grant has gone down to history as a bludgeon general, a general who eschewed maneuver and who with head down, seeing red, charged his enemy again and again like a bull: indeed an extraordinary conclusion, for no general, not excepting Lee, and few generals in any other war, made greater use of maneuver in the winning of his campaigns, if not of his battles. Without fear of contradiction, it may be said that Grant’s object was consistent; strategically it was to threaten his enemy’s base of operations.’ Lee acted on the spur of the moment and never once brought fruition, because he acted so impulsively as to  be unprepared to take full advantage of them.  The Seven Days campaign ended in the disaster of Malvern Hill, the Second Manassas campaign in that of Antietam and the Chancellorsville campaign led to Gettysburg.

War was very simple to him, you have a job to do, you go out and do it to your fullest. One of his biographers said of him “His success was the success of sheer common sense-----which is almost the same thing as generalship—and of American Democracy. “  Here is a man who is not only capable but self-reliant, and  its self-reliance which nearly always wins over a superior, because it relieves him of onus of a work which he himself can not control.  His honesty and modesty towards himself endowed him with wisdom; he could discover his own mistakes and was never stampeded by his success. Grant’s outlook was simpler and consequently more all-embracing. He sees the war as a whole far more completely than so than even Lee saw it.  He is the preeminent grant-strategist, while Lee is the preeminently the field strategical. His orders are simple , direct and unmistakable. Lee’s more often than not are vague and frequently verbal.

He relied on his staff for detail not ideas, which was his job. He was able to bear in mind a clear picture of the topography of the country he operated in. This would enable him to work out a strategic problem mentally with more certainty than could one who does not have this ability.  When others were at their wits ends Grant was perfectly calm and collected.  With the Vicksburg campaign, in the time that a plan was essential General McPherson offered him a glass of liquor, Grants response. “Mac, you know your whiskey won’t help me to think; give me a dozen of the best cigars  you can find…. I think by the time I have finished them I shall have this job pretty nearly planned. “

As  Bruce Catton later goes on saying, “Each man had, to begin with, the great virtue of utter tenacity and fidelity. Grant fought his way down the Mississippi Valley in spite of acute personal discouragement and profound military handicaps. Lee hung on in the trenches at Petersburg after hoping itself had died. In each man there was an indomitable quality. . . . the born fighter's refusal to give up as long as he can still remain on his feet and lift his two fists. Daring and resourcefulness they had, too, the ability to think faster and move faster than the enemy. These were the qualities which gave Lee the dazzling campaigns of Second Manassas and Chancellorsville and won Vicksburg for Grant.”

Grant was a mass of contradictions: loved order and yet could find no place in an orderly world. He hated war, and yet found his place there above all his fellows. He went to West Point not to be a soldier but because he was determined to escape the life of a tanner, and West Point did that for him. He never failed to look at every problem from the simplest point of view, and to answer it in the simplest possible manner. He has said he watched the progress of the Army of the Potomac ever since it was organized and has been greatly interested in reading the accounts of the splendid fighting it has done. This is very illuminating for a few generals who had to face his problems would have troubled to find the time to examine those of others hundreds of miles away.  

Flaws

Grant also had his flaws. As a tactician, he was horrible. He seemed to know only one tactic – the frontal assault. Time and time again, he threw troops at entrenched positions, only to suffer incredible casualties. At Vicksburg, he attacked strong fortifications and suffered accordingly. Did he learn to try other methods? No. At Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor he did it again on an even grander scale, suffering even grander casualties. Grant seems to be one of those Civil War generals, of whom there are quite a few, who did not understand the changes the rifled musket forced on tactics. Frontal assaults no longer worked, but many a general seemed to think if only another division were thrown in, the result would be different. 

Grant’s modesty, lucid orders, topographical memory, full use of his staff, perseverance, full use of Union resources, minimizing support personnel, full use of assigned generals, decisiveness, moral courage, political common sense, focus on enemy armies, maneuverability, and intelligent aggressiveness all combined to make him the best general of the Civil War and to demolish the myth of “Grant the Butcher.” Grant was one of the greatest generals in American history.

Lee

On April 18, 1861, as rising star in the U.S. Military, Lee is called to a meeting with Francis Blair, a close associate of Abraham Lincoln. Blair offers Lee command of the Union Army, but Lee declines the offer, unwilling to fight against his home state of Virginia. Lee next seeks the advice of his former commander and Director of the War Department, Winfield Scott. Lee explains his divided loyalties to Scott, but his superior refuses to allow him to "sit out" the war.  On  April 20, 1861 After days of deliberation, Lee resigns from the United States Army. He states in a letter to his Union-supporting sister, Anne Marshall, that "with all of my devotion to the Union and the feeling of loyalty and duty of an American citizens, I have not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home." Just two days later, the governor of Virginia assigns Lee to command the Virginia forces for the Confederate Army.  This is perhaps where the contrast between Lee and Grant is so striking. As historian Bruce Catton says, “the Virginia aristocrat, inevitably, saw himself in relation to his own region. His first loyalty would go to the locality in which that society existed. On other hand the Westerner would fight with an equal tenacity for the broader concept of society, “ or for his country. Lee was a Virginian first and a Confederate second. This trait was harmful, even though he was not the commander-in-chief, due to his crucial role as Jefferson Davis’s primary military advisor throughout the war.

As Catton states, “So Grant and Lee were in complete contrast, representing two diametrically opposed elements in American life. Grant was the modern man emerging; beyond him, ready to come on the stage, was the great age of steel and machinery, of crowded cities and a restless burgeoning vitality. Lee might have ridden down from the old age of chivalry, lance in hand, silken banner fluttering over his head. Each man was the perfect champion of his cause, drawing both his strengths and his weaknesses from the people he led. Yet it was not all contrast, after all. Different as they were--in background, in personality, in underlying aspiration--these two great soldiers had much in common. Under everything else, they were marvelous fighters. Furthermore, their fighting qualities were really very much alike.” Despite his lack of manpower and material, Lee’s military genius was the principal factor in keeping the Confederacy alive. He was a legend in his own lifetime. In May 1862 Stonewall Jackson wrote, “Lee is the only man I know whom I would follow blindfold. “ His soldiers, to whom he was either ‘Uncle Robert’ or ‘Marse Robert’ idolized him.

For another difference, Lee was not a good quartermaster. The Army of Northern Virginia was always poorly equipped. Much of its equipment and supplies were taken from the Army of the Potomac after their numerous victories, but there was never enough. Not all of this blame can be laid at the feet of Lee, though. The Confederacy was woefully short of the industry needed to supply its armies, and the Northern blockade prevented adequate supplies from being imported as the war dragged on. Some may lay additional fault on the South’s lack of railroads to deliver supplies. Virginia, however, did not suffer from this lack. Finally, northern Virginia was fought over so much that it simply could not feed the army. Lee was also determined to include Europe in his war with the North. On April 7, 1865 he said to General Pendleton; “ I have never believed we could, against the gigantic combination   of our subjugation, make good in the long run our independence unless foreign powers should directly or indirectly, assist us.”

Strategist?

Another major difference, was Lee as a strategist. In a word, he was not. His concern was northern Virginia and nothing else. Throughout the war, he resisted attempts by Jefferson Davis to draw forces from the Army of Northern Virginia to reinforce the western armies. Lee was obsessed with the operations in Virginia and urged that additional reinforcements be brought to the Old Dominion from the West, where Confederates defended ten times the area in which Lee operated.  Only once did it happen, when Longstreet went west and fought at Chattanooga, but not without Lee’s efforts to stop it. He also opposed attempts to make him commander in chief of Southern forces until it was too late for it to be of any benefit. Lee’s Civil War strategy concentrated all the resources he could obtain and retain almost exclusively in the eastern theater of operations. His approach overlooked the strength of the Confederacy in its size and lack of communications, which required the Union to conquer and occupy it. He often refused requests by President Jefferson Davis to comply with requests to send critical reinforcements to the West. Lee was obsessed with Virginia and the moral aspects of the war. His one and only grand strategy was to terrify Washington. This would have been a perfectly sound object had his army been well trained and provided with a grand siege train, which was greatly limited in materials and funding.  Only once did Lee agree to send a portion of his army west. He delayed for two weeks from Virginia which caused many of them to arrive only after the Battle of Chickamauga and without their artillery.

Additionally, and most importantly, Lee failed to realize that the Confederacy’s best hope of survival was to hold out. Since the South had a lack of fighting men compared to the North, its best hope was to keep casualties to a minimum, to live to fight another day. Lee’s offensive tactics ensured the Army of Northern Virginia sustained greater casualties than it could afford. Had he fought defensively most of the time, Lee would have saved soldiers who could fight again, perhaps outlasting the North’s will to win. That Lee though loyal to Virginia, was at heart disloyal to the Confederacy is absurd. To him the base of the Confederacy was but the base of Virginia because the only form of attack he really understood was the moral offensive, and Virginia enabled him to carry this out.

While the North was compelled through force of circumstances to develop its resources the South, relaying on Europe for its munitions of war, failed to do so, with the result, that more and more did Southern policy develop into a political game of chance.

Conclusion of the war

Lee was successful only at winning battles. He never had a conception of how to take battlefield victories and turn them into victory in war, unlike U.S. Grant and W. T. Sherman, who both came to realize that individual battles were themselves meaningless — what mattered was winning the war. In this area Grant, in particular, completely out-classed Lee. Sherman proved better at achieving goals without the waste of battle — but battle was what graduates of the U.S. Military Academy had been trained to think was how wars were won.

Lee ceased being “successful” (except at not-losing) when Grant was put in charge of all Union armies because Grant, unlike Lee, had a conceptual strategy and (some) subordinates he could trust to execute it out of his sight. But the decisive theatre of war was not Virginia, even though this is where nearly all the focus of study on the U.S. Civil War stands. The Western Theatre contributed far more to the collapse of the Confederacy first by splitting the Confederacy in two, logistically and economically, and then destroying Southern morale via Sherman’s destruction of the Confederate back yard — all of it effectively unopposed, because Sherman was a master of achieving his ends without uselessly killing his men in meaningless battles.

In the words of the General who defeated him, the legend of Lee as a “great general”, is much overrated and a product of the lovers of the “lost cause”. His use of Napoleonic tactics caused Lee to lose more men than all of his other generals combined. Lee himself said that even in victory that he never did anything that would “last longer than the battle that occurred that day.” His blunders at Gettysburg cost him that battle and was the beginning of the end for his army of northern Virginia. “It is all my fault”, Lee said to the men of what was left of Pickett’s division after he sent them to their slaughter.

Lee rejoins his family in Richmond, where Mary has been living since 1861. That summer they will move to the country in Derwent, Virginia.In a letter to Jefferson Davis, Lee blames the loss of the war on the moral condition of his men. He believes that the troops had been getting letters from home indicating that they no longer supported the war, leading the soldiers to lack aggressiveness and the grit necessary to win battles.

The Lee family moves to Lexington, Virginia, where Lee assumes the role of President of Washington College. Lee overhauls the curriculum, requires weekly progress reports for all of the students, and encourages the females in his family to attend church services in the hopes that "if the ladies would patronize it that the students would be more interested in going." The college has since changed its name to Washington and Lee University. 
Lee assembles notes, letters and data in an effort to defend his actions and his Army of Northern Virginia, but never writes. Lee discusses the failures of Gettysburg in conversations with his peers at Washington College, attributing the loss to his commanders J.E.B. Stuart and Richard Ewell.
Lee is summoned to give testimony to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. In his testimony, Lee expresses his concern over the social and political structure of the country and his doubts that African Americans should have civil rights. Above all, he expresses a desire to be left alone.

After suffering a severe stroke on October 12, 1870 Lee dies in the company of his family. Lee's coffin is paraded through the small town of Lexington, Virginia. The procession, filled with former Confederate soldiers, Washington College students and state politicians, makes its way past the Virginia Military Institute for a small service.

Grant became a national hero, and the Republicans nominated him for president in 1868. A primary focus of Grant’s administration was Reconstruction, and he worked to reconcile the North and South while also attempting to protect the civil rights of newly freed black slaves. While Grant was personally honest, some of his associates were corrupt and his administration was tarnished by various scandals. After retiring, Grant invested in a brokerage firm that went bankrupt, costing him his life savings. He spent his final days penning his memoir which was published the year he died and proved a critical and financial success.

What do you think of Grant and Lee? Let us know below.

Now read Richard’s article on the role of baseball in the US Civil War here.