The Humanitarian Dimension of the 1898 American Occupation of Cuba

The United States went to war against Spain in 1898 to end Spanish colonial rule in Cuba. The United States remained as an occupying power after the expulsion of the Spanish. However, Paul Parobek discovered during his research that there was a humanitarian dimension to the American occupation of Cuba that is often overlooked in the scholarship.

An 1897 cartoon showing how the American people want help Cubans, but the US government not wanting to. Judge Magazine on February 2, 1897.

The United States has a long history of providing humanitarian relief to foreigners suffering from disasters. However, the humanitarian relief provided by the United States to Cuba following the War against Spain in 1898 is often overlooked even though Americans were well-aware of the suffering of the Cubans. American media regularly reported on the Spanish atrocities being committed in Cuba by the Spanish General Weyler who was given the name ‘The Butcher’ by American newspapers. William McKinley made the humanitarian situation in Cuba a prominent cornerstone of his campaign in 1896 and according to Irwin, President McKinley sought to avoid a war with Spain, but he also wanted to alleviate the suffering of the Cubans and “turned to humanitarian assistance” (Irwin, 2013, p. 26).The Spanish-Cuban conflict killed between 200,000 and 400,000 Cubans over the course of the two years from McKinley’s election in 1896 until the War against Spain in 1898 which President McKinley referred to in genocidal terms. Deaths were not just limited to the combatants. The elderly, disabled, women, and children were also affected which Senator Lodge referred to in a Senate speech as being “medieval and barbaric”. American troops immediately began an assessment of the situation in Cuba once the Spanish had been expelled. The devastation varied across the island. Provinces such as Havana were not as devastated while the rural provinces in the eastern part of Cuba were the most devastated. The provinces of Matanzas, Santa Clara, Santiago, and Puerto Principe were particularly devastated as that is where General Weyler initiated the reconcentrado policies. In one province, the United States had only four to six weeks’ worth of food to supply the inhabitants. In another province, the humanitarian plight was so severe that the United States had to prioritize the recipients with the elderly, disabled, women, and children receiving priority status.

Distribution

The American Army expedited the distribution of emergency food rations to the Cubans. Adjutant General H. C. Corbin first ordered the distribution of food rations in General Order Number 110 on 1 August 1898 by orders of the Secretary of War Elihu Root. This order primarily dealt with the commissary of the American troops, however, sections seven and eight specifically called for the distribution of food “to troops of the Cuban army, to Cuban destitutes, and to the prisoners of war” ('General Orders and Circulars: Adjudent General's Office,' 1898, p. 312). Food rations were distributed and their effects were documented in various reports. In one report by General Wilson, the period from 1 January to 30 June 1899 in the provinces of Santa Clara and Matanzas saw “I,930,130 Cuban rations were issued… (and) The number of destitute greatly diminished since last January, and now the distribution of rations is principally confined to hospitals and orphan asylums” (Wilson, 1899, p. 8 in report). In Havana when the orders were made, between 20,000 and 25,000 people, but these were reduced by degree” (Ludlow, 1899, p. 17 in report).

Food rations would later be provided by allocation of funds from the Bureau of Insular Affairs. A report from the Chief Commissary Officer Major A. l. Smith on 12 August 1899, from 11 April and 30 June 1899 saw a total of “1,081,870 pounds of food were transferred to the Cubans” (Smith, 1899, p. 12 in report). The total cost of these food supplies totalled $49,013.37. Males and the able-bodied were given the lowest priority. Those males who were given rations and regained their strength were then required to work to aid in the rebuilding of Cuba. The relief had to be rationed to make it last until. The relief that was provided did not substantially reduce the suffering. It was apparent that the United States military could not handle the humanitarian relief by itself in addition to its other responsibilities including restoring law and order, rebuilding the island’s infrastructure, and creating civil authorities.

Partnership

The United States partnered with various relief societies and Church groups in the private sector including the American Red Cross, The Central Cuban Relief Committee, The Women's National Relief Association, and the Hijas de Cuba (the Daughters of Cuba) were other prominent organizations that appealed to the American public for money, food, clothing, and medicine ('Relief for Starving Cubans,' 8 January 1898, p. 1). They were initially placed under the State Department to help provide relief to Cuba. These relief societies were highly successful as the American Consulate-General Fitzhugh Lee stated in a letter to William Day in Havana on 23 November 1897, about their success, writing “under charitable committees, a large number of them (mainly women and children former reconcenrados) have been gathered together in houses, and are now being fed and cared for by private subscriptions” (Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Relative to Affairs in Cuba, Ordered to be Printed April 13, 1898, 1898, p. 552). Leaders of the various relief societies such as Clara Barton made personal visits to Cuba to personally “distribute food and medical supplies to civilians and established orphan asylums” (Irwin, 2013, p. 26). In addition to prominent businessmen including Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie, Chase, and Sheeran often organized social gatherings with prominent organizations including  the Chamber of Commerce of New York City to raise money for relief efforts ('Relief for Cuban Sufferers,' 11 January 1898, p. 7).

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What Happened During the Assassination of President Abraham Lincoln?

Abraham Lincoln’s assassination on April 14, 1865 had significant consequences, particularly coming as it did shortly before the end of the U.S. Civil War. Here, Lloyd W Klein looks at the assassination and Lincoln’s killer, John Wilkes Booth.

A depiction of John Wilkes Booth when he was about to shoot President Abraham Lincoln.

The Assassination

The assassin silently opened the first door to the President’s theater box, fully aware that the bodyguard was not around. He barricaded the door behind him, using a stick that he wedged in between the door and the wall. He then looked through a small peephole he’d previously carved in the second door. The time was shortly after 10 PM. He waited for the particular line in the play he knew was received by the audience with loud laughing and noise, to be spoken by actor Harry Hawk (playing Asa Trenchard). When he heard the line, “Don’t know the manners of good society, eh? Well, I guess I know enough to turn you inside out, old gal; you sockdologizing old man-trap!” and heard the expected audience response, he opened the second door.  He silently moved forward and took one shot at the back of the President’s head, who was laughing. He dropped his derringer, then pulled a knife to fight off the officer accompanying Lincoln that night, who had grabbed his coat to restrain him.

Well aware of the layout of Ford’s Theater, having acted there numerous times, his escape route was to jump from the balcony where the box was located to the stage. When he jumped to the stage, Booth broke the fibula, the small bone in the bottom of his left leg. In his diary, Booth wrote that he said, “Sic semper” although eyewitnesses thought he said “Sic semper tyrannis” and others “The South is avenged”. Only the screams of the ladies from the box suggested this wasn’t a part of the play; the audience began to realize what had happened when the officer yelled, “Stop that man”.

Booth ran out to the alley from backstage, pursued by audience members, where his groom Joseph “Peanuts”  Burroughs was waiting outside, holding Booth’s horse. Booth struck Peanuts in the head with his knife, jumped onto his horse, and rode off.

Booth had gained entrance to the President’s box at the theater without any problem because the assigned bodyguard, John Parker, a Metropolitan Washington DC officer, was not where he was supposed to be: seated just outside in a passageway by the door. From where he sat, the bodyguard couldn’t see the stage, so after Lincoln and his guests settled in, he moved to the first gallery to enjoy the play. Later, he committed an even greater folly: at intermission, he joined the footman and coachman of Lincoln’s carriage for drinks in the Star Saloon next door to Ford’s Theatre. Booth was seated in the Star Saloon, drinking quite heavily. When Booth crept up to the door to Lincoln’s box, he knew there was no one on duty because he saw Parker drinking in the saloon.

Major Henry Rathbone attended the play at Ford’s Theater with the Lincolns and his fiancée, Clara Harris. He was invited only because General and Mrs. Grant turned down the invitation at a late hour. The general’s wife, however, had recently been the victim of Mary Todd Lincoln’s acid tongue and wanted no part of a night on the town with the First Lady. Grant had backed out citing the couple’s desire to travel to New Jersey to see their children. He attempted to stop the assassin but was seriously wounded by Booth, who slashed Rathbone’s left arm from his elbow to his shoulder.

All four of the people in that box would become tragic victims of that night. Major Rathbone married Clara—who also happened to be his stepsister—in 1867, but then he grew increasingly erratic and perhaps suffered from post-traumatic stress. Although they had 3 children, he was mentally anguished forever after by thoughts that he had not done enough to prevent the murder. Although appointed by President Arthur to be the Consul to Hanover, his mental health continued to decline. He threatened divorce frequently. He ultimately fatally shot and stabbed his wife and then stabbed himself five times. He was charged with murder but instead was declared insane and committed to a mental asylum for the remainder of his life. Mary Todd Lincoln, the fourth person present, was herself institutionalized in 1875.

The president had been mortally wounded; He was carried to a lodging house across the street from the theater. At about 7:22 the next morning, he died—the first U.S. president to be assassinated.

Seward

Another segment of the plot was to assassinate William Seward, the Secretary of State. Lewis Powell, a co-conspirator with John Wilkes Booth, forced his way into Seward’s house. Seward had been in a carriage accident 9 days previously, breaking his jaw. He was recuperating from a painful wound that prevented him from eating normally. The accident and Seward’s injuries were widely reported. Powell came to the door dressed well and claimed to be bringing pain medication that Seward’s doctor had prescribed. The servant answering the door was happy to take the medication but would not give the “messenger” entrance to the house. Powell pushed open the door and raced up the stairs to the bedroom, where he stabbed Seward several times before fleeing the scene. Seward was wearing a brace for his jaw injury that deflected the knife slashes. He also rolled over away from the killer and was only minimally injured in the chest and neck.  Besides Seward, 8 people were stabbed and one hit in the head; these included four of Seward's children, a bodyguard, and a messenger. His son Frederick was hit in the head by a pistol when the gun malfunctioned; he spent 2 months in a coma. That night and the next morning, Seward deduced that Lincoln had been murdered. Seward heard church bells tolling; although the people around him tried to deny it, fearing the effect of inflicting emotional pain, Seward said, “Lincoln is dead because if he were alive he would have been the first to come to see me.”

Who was Booth? What was he planning?

John Wilkes Booth was a famous actor, from a very prominent theatrical family. Many considered Booth’s father, Junius Brutus Booth, to be the finest Shakespearean actor of his generation, and Booth’s older brother, Edwin is commonly named among the greatest American actors of all time,  Booth grew up in Baltimore. He was called “the handsomest man in America” by at least one critic.

His interest in politics, and particularly his partiality to slavery, developed at a young age. The rest of his family could not abide his politics, as they were all Union men. Booth became involved with the Knights of the Golden Circle in Baltimore. During the war, he chose to remain in the North despite his political persuasions as there were more options for actors in northern cities.

His anti-Union sentiments were fully displayed on an October 1864 trip to Montreal, a city noted for its southern sympathy and a notorious outpost of Confederate agents. On October 18th he checked into St. Lawrence Hall, an old Hotel known as the Confederacy’s Canadian center. Witnesses would later claim to have seen Booth talking with known agents and openly expressing contempt for Lincoln.

There, money from some source changed hands; a bankbook with $ 455 and three certificates of exchange from The Ontario Bank dated October 27th was found in his possession when he was killed. It is believed that he had already developed a general plan for the kidnapping of Abraham Lincoln at that point. Booth was known to have been in Montreal that day. The origin of these funds remains uncertain, especially regarding whether someone high up in the Confederate government had financed the assassination (Klein).

A witness at the 1865 trial of Booth’s accomplices testified that Patrick C. Martin accompanied Booth to the Montreal branch of the Ontario Bank, where Booth made a deposit and took bills of exchange. Martin was a Baltimore liquor dealer who had established a Confederate Secret Service base in Montreal in the summer of 1862. He had arranged blockade running and financial services benefitting Confederate interests. It is known that Booth tried to arrange the transfer of his theatrical costumes to Jamaica by Martin

Martin gave Booth letters of introduction to two southern Maryland physicians, Dr. William Queen and Dr. Samuel Mudd. These operatives were to assist him in escaping. In November, 1864. Booth deposited $1,500 in the Cooke Bank in Washington. He spent these funds between January 7 and March 16, 1865, to assemble his team.

The Plot

Booth had visited Bryantown MD  in November and December 1864, allegedly to search for real estate investments. Bryantown is located 25 miles from Washington and about 5 miles from Dr. Mudd's farm. Of course, the real estate alibi was a cover; Booth's true purpose was to plan an escape route as part of the plan to kidnap Lincoln. Booth’s original idea was that the federal government would ransom Lincoln by releasing a large number of Confederate prisoners of war.

There, he met with Dr Mudd, an active participant in a confederate spy network. Booth met Mudd at St. Mary's Catholic Church in Bryantown during one of those visits, probably in November. Booth visited Mudd at his farm the next day and stayed there overnight. The following day, Booth purchased a horse from Mudd's neighbor and returned to Washington.

On December 23, 1864, Mudd traveled to Washington. There he met Booth again, where the two men, as well as John Surratt, Jr., and Louis J. Weichmann, had a conversation and drinks. They met first at Booth's hotel and later at Mudd's. According to a statement made by George Atzerodt taken while he was in federal custody on May 1, 1865, Mudd knew in advance about Booth's plans; Atzerodt was sure the doctor knew  because Booth had "sent (as he told me) liquors & provisions... about two weeks before the murder to Dr. Mudd's."

It has been suggested that Booth heard Lincoln speak at his second inaugural address. Some photos appear to show him in the crowd wearing a top hat but perhaps also without. No one knows for certain if this individual is Booth, or even if Booth was present that day.

On March 17, Booth and a group composed of  George Atzerodt, David Herold, and Lewis Powell, met in a Washington bar to plot the abduction of the president three days later. However, the president changed his plans, and the scheme was scuttled. General Robert E. Lee surrendered to the Union on April 9th at Appomattox Court House and the war was essentially over.

On the evening of April 11, the president stood on the White House balcony and delivered a speech outlining some of his ideas about reconstruction and bringing the defeated Confederate states back into the Union. Lincoln indicated a desire to give voting rights to some African Americans, such as those who had fought in the Union ranks during the war. He expressed a desire that the southern states would extend the vote to literate blacks, as well. Booth was in the small audience on the White House lawn listening. , “That means n____ citizenship,” he told Lewis Powell. “Now, by God, I’ll put him through. That is the last speech he will ever make.” Booth’s plot changed to murder at that moment. The conspirators altered their plan; the new plot was to kill Lincoln, Vice President Andrew Johnson, and Secretary of State William Seward on the same evening.

While visiting Ford's Theatre around noon to pick up his mail on April 14th, Booth learned that Lincoln and Grant were to visit the theater that evening for a performance of Our American Cousin. Booth had performed there several times, so he knew the theater's layout and was familiar to its staff. Recognizing this was a golden opportunity, Booth went to Mary Surratt's boarding house and asked her to deliver a package to her tavern in Surrattsville, Maryland. He also asked her to tell her tenant Louis J. Weichmann to ready the guns and ammunition that Booth had previously stored at the tavern.

The conspirators met for the final time at 8:45 pm. Booth assigned Powell to kill Secretary of State William H. Seward at his home, Atzerodt to kill Vice President Andrew Johnson at the Kirkwood Hotel, and Herold to guide Powell (who was unfamiliar with Washington) to the Seward house and then to a rendezvous with Booth in Maryland. Atzerodt backed out of his part to kill Johnson.

The Fibula Fracture

Many people believed that Booth broke his leg as a result of jumping from the presidential box onto the theatre stage from the impact of the jump to the stage, where he landed somewhat off balance. Some historians speculate that Booth may have broken his leg when the horse that he was riding, galloping away from the murder scene at a high rate of speed, tripped and fell on its left side. Perhaps his left leg was entangled in the flag that was draped in front.

Fibular fractures can be due to falls when landing incorrectly, but can also occur from a severely twisted ankle.The distance from the theatre box balcony to the stage floor today is approximately 12 feet. Some eyewitness accounts suggested that the original height was closer to 9 feet, and a sketch done soon after the assassination suggests the distance was 10 feet, 7 inches. The distance Booth jumped may never be accurately known since the theatre was renovated in 1866. The original box was completely demolished.

Fibular fractures are painful and often accompanied by ligament or tendon injuries. Swelling, tenderness, inability to bear weight, and numbness are common. This injury would be a serious impediment to one’s ability to walk without a limp or run normally.

Escape Route & Capture

After the assassination, Booth rode to Maryland with David Herold. The first place was Popes Creek on the Potomac River in southern Maryland, and then to the Surratt Tavern to pick up the weapons he had asked to be delivered there earlier. Finally, he went to the home of Dr. Mudd, who placed splints on Booth’s leg. It would have been impossible, as Mudd claimed, that he did not know this man, whom he had met on several occasions. Moreover, while Mudd may not have known about the assassination that night, he certainly did the next morning when he went into town; yet he told no one about his guests. Booth then left and they stayed at the home of Samuel Cox, and then in some woods on the north bank of the Potomac. There, Booth had access to newspapers and food. On April 22nd, they rowed across the river to Virginia, on the south side. They hid in a barn on Richard Garrett’s farm, as thousands of Union troops combed the area looking for them.

The assassination of Abraham Lincoln initiated a massive search to find the killers Secretary of War Stanton sent a telegram to his man, Lafayette Curry Baker, head of the federal intelligence service, called the US Secret Service. Curry was in New York City when Stanton ordered him to come to DC immediately and help find the murderer. The identity of the assassin was well established, but he remained at large. Despite being In a city with thousands of troops at the war’s end, and hundreds of police, Stanton sent out the signal for this particular man to help find him. “Come here immediately and see if you can find the murderer of the President,” Stanton telegraphed him. He took the train the next day.

Within two days he had arrested Mary Surratt, Lewis Paine, George Atzerodt, and Edman Spangler. He also had the names of the fellow conspirators, John Wilkes Booth and David Herold. His investigation method wasn’t to search for anyone. Instead, he planted moles in the ranks of the investigators. From them, he learned that the prime suspects were traveling south through the eastern Maryland counties of Prince George and Charles. Thousands of troops and uncounted civilians were involved in the manhunt. Stanton had put out a reward of $100,000 (about $1.8 million in today’s dollars). Every motivated civilian, detective, policeman, and Union officer hoped to strike it rich.

He happened to be in the offices of the War Department when he learned that two men identified as the fugitives had been seen making the Potomac crossing into Virginia near Mathias Point on April 22nd. He knew a great deal about the routes used by Confederate couriers and spies that operated in the Northern Neck and made an educated guess as to where Booth and Herold might be. He summoned two assistants in his office spread out a map on a small table and pointed to Mathias Point on the Virginia side of the Potomac. “He’s right in there,” pointing to a circle he drew on the map. “I want you to go to this place, search the country thoroughly, and get Booth.”

He sent Lieutenant Edward P. Doherty and twenty-five men from the Sixteenth New York Cavalry to capture Booth in Virginia, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Everton Conger, an intelligence officer.  Several of his men knocked on doors, and asked about two men, one with a broken leg, for 12 hours. Finally, an ex-Confederate soldier named William S Jett was interrogated roughly. The man guided them and a cavalry squad to Richard H Garrett’s farm, where the cavalrymen discovered the fugitives in a tobacco barn on the morning of Wednesday, April 26, 1865.

Around 2:00 am the soldiers surrounded the barn, which was located about 60 miles south of Ford's Theatre near Port Royal, Virginia. Lieutenant Luther Baker yelled, "Surrender, or we'll fire the barn and smoke you out like rats! We'll give you five minutes more to make up your minds." Booth asked for time to decide. Finally, after some more give and take with the soldiers, Booth yelled, "Well, my brave boys, you can prepare a stretcher for me! I will never surrender!" After a short time, Booth said, "Oh, Captain, there's a man in here who wants to surrender awful bad." The barn door rattled, and David Herold's voice was heard saying he wanted to give up. Herold slowly came out and was slammed to the ground by the soldiers. He was hauled to a nearby tree and tied up with rope.

Still, Booth would not come out. Using straw and brush, Conger set the barn on fire. Booth was visible to the soldiers because the barn was full of cracks and knotholes. They could see him moving about the burning barn holding his carbine and crutch. At this moment, Corporal Boston Corbett shot Booth through the neck. Booth was paralyzed and barely alive. With difficulty, Booth was able to speak. He said, "Tell Mother I died for my country." A local doctor, Dr. Charles Urquhart, Jr., who had been a physician in nearby Port Royal since 1821, arrived on the scene and indicated the wound that had punctured Booth's spinal cord was fatal. Sometime around 7:00 A.M. Booth looked at his hands and moaned, "Useless! Useless!" Those were probably the last words Booth spoke before dying.

Booth was pronounced dead at 7:15 A.M. A search of his body turned up a pair of revolvers, a belt and holster, two knives, some cartridges, a file, a war map of the Southern States, a spur, a pipe, the Canadian bills of exchange, a compass with a leather case, a signal whistle, an almost burned up candle, pictures of five women - four actresses (Alice Grey, Helen Western, Effie Germon, and Fanny Brown) and his fiancée, Lucy Hale (the daughter of ex-Senator John P. Hale from New Hampshire), and an 1864 date book kept as a diary. These items found on his person still exist. They are owned by the National Park Service and held at the Ford’s Theater Museum. They have a long history in themselves.

Lt Col Conger brought Booth’s possessions back to Curry, who turned them over to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, who used them as trial evidence for the assassins' accomplices. Except for one thing: Booth’s diary. When it reappeared in 1867, it was missing 18 pages. No one knows who cut those out of the book, or why. Stanton claimed it was given to him like that. It might be that the missing pages in Booth’s diary told who Booth was working for, and the whole story of the plot; and may have incriminated very prominent people, such as Andrew Johnson, as part of the kidnapping scheme. Some have speculated that Stanton destroyed the pages because his own name appeared in it. Yet another theory is that the missing pages included the names of people who had financed the conspiracy; it later emerged that  Booth had received a large amount of money from a New York-based firm to which Stanton had connections.

The other conspirators were captured the day after the assassination outside Surratt’s boarding house, except for John Surratt, who fled to Canada. Powell was caught purely by accident, as he approached the boarding house not knowing Union troops were inside; he was missing his hat (found in the Seward home) and had blood stains on his clothes. On July 7, after a military court trial. George Atzerodt, Lewis Powell, David Herold, and John Surratt’s mother, Mary, were hanged in Washington. The execution of Mary Surratt is believed by some to have been a miscarriage of justice. Although there was proof of her involvement in the original abduction conspiracy, it is clear that her deeds were minor compared to those of the others who were executed. John was eventually tracked down in Egypt and brought back to trial, but with the help of clever lawyers, he won an acquittal in a civilian court.

On June 29, 1865, Mudd was found guilty with the others. The testimony of Louis J. Weichmann was crucial in obtaining the convictions. Mudd escaped the death penalty by one vote and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was later pardoned by President Andrew Johnson in 1869.

Some contemporary historians make a case that Dr Mudd should be exonerated. There is no definitive evidence to support that he knew that Lincoln was assassinated nor that Booth had committed a crime. There is evidence that he was involved in the kidnapping plot though. The key issue is that he lied about knowing Booth, and how much he knew about the plot, and delayed reporting Booth's presence. That made him guilty of conspiracy and being an accomplice, but saved him from the death penalty. Interestingly, others also knew about the kidnapping plot who weren't convicted of the murder. Legally his lack of planned involvement in the assassination mitigates any participation after the fact. Then there is his Hippocratic oath, which obligated him to treat Booth's leg, although not to maintain his anonymity. Moreover, although Weichmann tied the acquaintance of Booth to Mudd, he did not claim to know what they discussed.

Baker was promoted to Brigadier General and received all the publicity and the reward for the capture. But several years later he died under mysterious circumstances, further suggesting a conspiracy of profound intrigue.

Was the Booth capture a hoax?

Booth's remains were sewn up in a horse blanket and placed on a wide plank. An old market wagon was obtained nearby, and the body was placed in the wagon. The body was taken to Belle Plain. There it was hoisted up the side and swung upon the deck of a steamer named the John S. Ide and transported up the Potomac River to Alexandria where it was transferred to a government tugboat. The tugboat carried the remains to the Washington Navy Yard, and the corpse was placed aboard the monitor Montauk at 1:45 A.M. on Thursday, April 27. Once aboard the Montauk, Booth's remains were laid out on a rough carpenter's bench. The horse blanket was removed, and a tarpaulin was placed over the body.

Several witnesses were called to identify the body. A sketch that appeared in Harper's Weekly on May 13, 1865, shows the process. Several people who knew Booth personally are known to have identified the body. One of these people was Dr. John Frederick May. Sometime before the assassination, Dr. May had removed a large fibroid tumor from Booth's neck. Dr. May found a scar from his operation on the corpse's neck exactly where it should have been. Charles Dawson, the clerk at the National Hotel where Booth was staying, identified the initials "J.W.B" pricked in India ink on the corpse's hand. As a boy, Booth had his initials indelibly tattooed on the back of his left hand between his thumb and forefinger. Alexander Gardner, the well-known Washington photographer, was also among those who positively identified the remains, as were his assistant Timothy O’Sullivan, and Seaton Munroe, a prominent Washington attorney.

There were five witnesses to the post-mortem: Charles M. Collins, Charles Dawson, Seaton Munroe, John Frederick May, and William Wallach Crowninshield, Surgeon General Joseph K. Barnes, Dr. Joseph Janvier Woodward, and Dr. George Brainard Todd performed the autopsy aboard the Montauk. Booth’s third, fourth, and fifth cervical vertebrae, which were removed during his autopsy, are housed (not on public display) at the National Museum of Health and Medicine at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center. An additional fragment from Booth's autopsy (tissue possibly cleaned off the cervical vertebrae) is in a bottle in the Mütter Medical Museum of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia.

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Dr. Barnes wrote the following account of the autopsy to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton:

“Sir,

I have the honor to report that in compliance with your orders, assisted by Dr. Woodward, USA, I made at 2 PM this day, a postmortem examination of the body of J. Wilkes Booth, lying on board the Monitor Montauk off the Navy Yard.

The left leg and foot were encased in an appliance of splints and bandages, upon the removal of which, a fracture of the fibula (small bone of the leg) 3 inches above the ankle joint, accompanied by considerable ecchymosis, was discovered.”

The cause of death was a gunshot wound in the neck - the ball entering just behind the sterno-cleido muscle - 2 1/2 inches above the clavicle - passing through the bony bridge of fourth and fifth cervical vertebrae - severing the spinal chord (sic) and passing out through the body of the sterno-cleido of right side, 3 inches above the clavicle.

Paralysis of the entire body was immediate, and all the horrors of consciousness of suffering and death must have been present to the assassin during the two hours he lingered.”

****************************************************************************

Some have suggested that Booth actually was never captured and escaped to Texas, where many years later his “corpse” was a great sideshow hit. This photograph is searchable online, but it is complete nonsense: the Booth autopsy was well attended and documented.

The corpse was again positively identified in February of 1869 when Booth's remains were exhumed and released by the government to the Booth family. At that time an inquest was held at Harvey and Marr's Parlor in Washington. Booth's corpse was taken to Baltimore for burial and was positively identified by many people including John T. Ford, He ry Clay Ford, and Joseph Booth, John's brother.

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References

https://www.thevintagenews.com/2016/01/18/46415/

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/lincolns-missing-bodyguard-12932069/

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/john-wilkes-booth-shoots-abraham-lincoln

https://www.historynet.com/dr-samuel-a-mudd/

https://globalnews.ca/news/1611968/lincoln-assassin-john-wilkes-booths-canadian-connection/

https://lincolnconspirators.com/picture-galleries/found-on-booth/

https://lincolnconspirators.com/2012/05/31/booth-at-lincolns-second-inauguration/

https://www.onthisday.com/photos/john-wilkes-booth-at-lincolns-inauguration,

https://www.nps.gov/foth/learn/historyculture/faq-the-assassin.htm#:~:text=Many%20people%20believed%20that%20John%20Wilkes%20broke%20his,on%20something%20and%20fell%20on%20its%20left%20side.

https://www.fords.org/visit/historic-site/museum/

https://www.militaryimagesmagazine-digital.com/2022/06/05/scoundrel-the-rise-and-fall-of-union-spy-chief-lafayette-curry-baker/

American Brutus by Michael Kauffman On page 348 (first edition hardcover)

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/john-wilkes-booth-shoots-abraham-lincoln

https://columbialawreview.org/.../the-law-of-the-lincoln.../

https://www.rogerjnorton.com/Lincoln83.html

Further Reading

·      https://rogerjnorton.com/Lincoln40.html

·      Michael W Kauffman, American Brutus: John Wilkes Booth and the Lincoln Conspiracies. Random House, 2004

Two Forgotten Aspects of the U.S. Civil War

In the historical novel Rebel Falls, author Tim Wendel focuses on two often forgotten aspects of the US Civil War - how widespread the conflict actually was and the way women played an integral role. He explains more in this piece.

Tim’s book is available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Sarah Emma Edmonds (married name Seelye), a woman who who fought as a man during the US Civil War.

In schools and class textbooks, the Civil War is usually taught as strictly a southern struggle. Certainly, major battles like Vicksburg, Bull Run, the siege of Petersburg and others occurred below the Mason-Dixon line. But we forget that when major conflicts erupt, the struggle and damage can extend well beyond borders and the lines on a map.

Widespread

Few realize that the Civil War nearly ignited an international conflict because of the keen interest of Great Britain and other European powers. In the last months of the war, the South was desperate to ignite an incident that would draw England and other countries into the fray.

The Confederacy sent spies to the northern border with British Canada, from Halifax to Detroit. The most audacious of such plans was to seize the U.S.S. Michigan, the lone Union warship left on the Great Lakes in 1864. (Similar vessels were utilized to blockade the South.)

An unlikely pair – John Yates Beall and Bennet Burley – headed the rebel effort to capture the Michigan. Born in Jefferson County, West Virginia, Beall was a loyal Southerner and had studied law at the University of Virginia. Along the way, he appears to have crossed paths with John Wilkes Booth, who, of course, would later assassinate President Abraham Lincoln.

Burley was Beall’s partner in the so-called Northwest Conspiracy. From Glasgow, Scotland, Burley was a soldier of fortune -- joining the fight for the thrill of it. Unlike Beall, he would survive the war, escaping back to the United Kingdom and become a celebrated foreign correspondent for The Daily Telegraph in London.

(Beall and Burley are mentioned briefly in Doris Kearns Goodwin’s Team of Rivals and Carl Sandburg’s Abraham Lincoln: The War Years.)

And what would have happened if Beall and Burley had seized the iron-hulled Michigan, with its 30-pounder parrot rifle, half-dozen howitzers and additional firepower? They first planned to free Confederate prisoners on Johnson’s Island near Sandusky, Ohio. These POWs included more than 20 rebel generals.

From there, with no opposing warships in the region, it would have been easy to bombard Cleveland, Buffalo, and other targets along the southern shore of Lake Erie. All of this was planned to unfold shortly before the presidential election. Even though Lincoln handily regained office (212-21 in the electoral college), in the weeks before the vote a Republican victory was far from a foregone conclusion. The nation had been at war since spring of 1861, and many were tired of the long struggle. Lincoln and members of his cabinet feared that he might lose to challenger George McClellan due to war fatigue. This result could have led to the formation of a separate nation, the Confederate States of America.

The role of women

Though often overlooked, women played important roles on both sides of the Civil War, especially when it came to espionage. Elizabeth Van Lew was a member of Richmond high society and appeared to be a loyal Confederate. Yet she gathered information from the rebel capital and sent it across the lines to Ulysses Grant and the Union command by using her servants as couriers.

Actress Pauline Cushman was a Union spy and was in uniform by the end of the war. She was buried with full military honors at the Presidio National Cemetery in San Francisco in 1893. “Union Spy,” reads her simple gravestone.

In function and treachery, Rose O’Neal Greenhow was the mirror image of Richmond’s Van Lew. A longtime fixture in Washington, she was a staunch supporter of the Confederacy and stayed in D.C. when the war broke out, sending valuable information to the rebels. Confederate President Jefferson Davis credited information she supplied for the South winning the first Battle of Bull Run.

Then there’s Belle Boyd, nicknamed the “Cleopatra of the Secession.” She was arrested a half-dozen times for sending military secrets to the south. Eventually, Boyd was banished to Canada and became a well-known actress after the war.

While both sides forbade women from serving in the combat units, that didn’t stop many on both sides from joining combat units in disguise. According to the National Archives, for example, Sarah Edmonds Seelye (originally Sarah Emma Edmonds) served two years in the Second Michigan Infantry under the pseudonym Franklin Thompson. She eventually earned a military pension.

When we reach the fringes of public record, novels can sometimes lead us to a better understanding of what happened and what was at stake. When I began Rebel Falls, I decided I wanted my protagonist, the one who would seek to outwit the rebel spies Beall and Burley, to be a woman. This was partly because I needed a strong connection with the Seward Family. During the Civil War, Secretary of State William Seward was the most powerful man in the North after President Lincoln. Seward’s daughter, Fanny, was one of his closest confidants. So how to move inside that family circle? How about with a character named Rory Chase, a childhood friend of Fanny’s?

Rory is a composite of women who knew Fanny in Auburn, New York, where the family home still stands, as well as in Washington, where the Sewards were center stage during the war years.

Here again, the historical record can be a great starting point. After the war, Fanny Seward died of tuberculosis and was buried with other family members at Auburn’s Fort Hill Cemetery. Soon afterward family friend Olive Risley began to accompany Secretary Seward on his travels. To quell gossip (there was a 43-year difference in their ages), the politician eventually adopted her. A statue of Olive Risley Seward was erected near Capitol Hill in Washington in 1971. My goal with Rebel Falls was to have Rory Chase be emblematic of the resourceful, ambitious women who fought and spied for both sides during the Civil War.

Conclusion

Place and participants. Even with a conflict that has been written about as much as the war between the North and South, such important factors and characters can be overlooked. No wonder Ken Burns calls this clash “our most complicated of wars.”

In focusing upon what took place along our northern border and how women played a key role, I’ve not only tried to tell a forgotten story, but deliver a bit more clarity as well. Only by considering more factors of our nation’s history, hearing about all the factors of the Civil War, can we better understand what occurred and determine how best to move forward.

Tim Wendel is the author 16 books, most recently the novel ‘Rebel Falls’ (Three Hills/Cornell University Press):

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How did the US Cope with Empire After the Spanish-American War?

The 1898 Spanish-American War led the loss of the last significant remnants of Spain’s empire, with the transfer of Cuba, cedes Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States. Here, Peter Deane considers the impact of the war and whether America was ready for an empire.

The last stand of the Spanish forces in Cuba. An 1898 depiction by Murat Halstead.

Four years ago we stood on the brink of war without the people knowing it and without preparation or effort at preparation…. I did all that could be done with honor to avert the war, but without avail…. It came. The result was signally favorable to American arms and in the highest degree honorable to the Government. It imposed upon us obligations from which we cannot escape and from which it would be dishonorable to seek escape.

--William McKinley, Second Inaugural Address (1901)

May 1, 1898, Manila Bay

“You may fire when ready, Gridley.” Commodore George Dewey said to firing officer Charles Gridley, quietly. In moments, nothing was quiet as the American fleet’s guns fired to devastating effect. The Spanish fleet was destroyed without a single American death. This would be widely celebrated back home–it was the first American fleet naval battle and had ended victoriously. The United States now had strategic, but by no means complete, control of the Philippines. Dewey ordered his men to seize Cavite, the port for Manila. Dewey had cut the cable from Hong Kong to Manila to isolate further the Spanish garrison in the city of Manila. He sent news of his victory back to Washington, which would take days to arrive formally. He also asked for 5,000 Army troops, enough to defeat the Spanish garrison and occupy the area. Then he settled down to wait. He had no instructions on what to do if he won.

Now what? 

The American Republic ante bellum

The United States in early 1898 was a large, prosperous nation. Its economy was growing rapidly and the nation was confident and optimistic. For the most part it was content to keep to itself. The only “overseas” possession of the U. S. was Alaska, on the same continent. The last foreign war had been fifty years before.

But for several years now, a group of influential men had formed a loose affiliation of those seeking to expand the U. S. beyond its continental boundaries. Their leader came to be Theodore Roosevelt. Manifest Destiny need not stop at the West coast. The U. S. could span the Pacific; trade and greater prosperity would follow. The U. S. could expand into the Caribbean too.

Their first goal was the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. Grover Cleveland, in line with popular opinion, would have none of this and refused to pursue it. He did commit to expansion of the U. S. Navy, such that it became comparable to Germany’s. When Republican William McKinley came to power in 1897, Roosevelt became Assistant Secretary of the Navy. From this position he acted to increase the size and readiness of the Navy. He later drafted secret orders that, in the event of war with Spain, Dewey and the Asiatic Squadron should proceed directly to the Philippines to engage the Spanish fleet. To satisfy the growing and influential expansionist wing of his party, McKinley signed the long-delayed treaty of annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, but the Senate would not consider it—in 1897–and he knew this.

McKinley liked to keep his options open. He has often been seen as unintelligent and indecisive. He listened more than he spoke. But when he decided, he was committed to it. As one aide said, “The President had his way as usual.” This applied in Congress too.

If the U. S. Navy was in fighting shape, the Army was in no state of readiness for war or expansion. (When the war began, Roosevelt would remark, “If the Army were one tenth as ready as the Navy, we would fix that whole business in six weeks.”) The U. S. Army consisted of 25,000 regulars scattered mostly in the interior of the country. With the Indian Wars over, it was underfunded and below what the Army Chief calculated to be the needed number, at least 38,000 regulars.

The War

The Spanish-American War, when it commenced in April 1898, was felt in Congress and by the public to be about the liberation of Cuba from Spanish tyranny. People North and South rallied to the flag; the nation was united behind the liberation of Cuba. McKinley had hoped a foreign war would bind the nation together. The Congress was united behind appropriation for the war. The Army hoped for 60,000 volunteers with two-year enlistments; McKinley called for and received funding for 125,000 plus 62,527 total regulars for the duration of the war. In May, to prepare for any eventuality, he called for and had funded 75,000 more volunteers. Now the U. S. had a Great Power-size army.

The tenfold increase in size overwhelmed the Army. Scandals about the amount and quality of food and supplies blossomed after the War. In April, the Army Chief complained he had not enough munitions “to last an army of 70,000 men in one hour’s serious battle.” The Army had essentially no infrastructure along the Eastern or Gulf coasts. Tampa, Florida was chosen as the staging area. Tens of thousands of new recruits converged there. Roosevelt: “...a welter of confusion…an almost inextricable tangle.” But by Summer they had enough trained and supplied soldiers for the Cuban campaign.

The Army created the Department of the Pacific, in which to put Pacific Ocean possessions. The Army gathered the first of 15,000 (thrice Dewey’s request) troops with much disorganization at the Presidio in San Francisco for transport to the Philippines. Thousands more were to come over the next few years.

Neither the Army nor the Navy had any ships to transport troops overseas. Suitable ships were therefore mostly purchased–103–and a few chartered, in a matter of weeks. These were added to the Navy. Munitions and supplies were shipped as well.

When the first contingent of troops sailed for Manila, they detoured along the way to seize Guam. This was done without casualty. The other Ladrones islands were left to Spain. Then they sailed on.

It was in June that the Hawaiian Islands were annexed. The treaty was suddenly approved–by acclamation. One reason this finally passed is that the Japanese Empire had indicated strong interest in acquiring the Islands, which had a large Japanese population.

Also that Summer, the Russian Empire upgraded its representative from minister to ambassador, the same rank as other Great Powers.

The Fate of the Philippines

In May, Dewey’s fleet in Manila Bay was visited by naval contingents from a number of Great Powers, to congratulate him on his victory. With the status of the Islands unclear and not under American control, others were interested. It was known that the Japanese Empire was interested in acquiring the islands. The German admiral went so far as to indicate that if the U. S. did not want the Philippines for a colony, then Germany would gladly step in. This infuriated Dewey and influenced McKinley toward annexation in his indecision about the future of the islands.

Hawaii, Guam and Puerto Rico were widely seen as strategic necessities. There was no real debate over their future status. McKinley said that the status of the Philippines would be decided by the peace treaty conference, in neutral Paris, France. But peace commissioners rely on their instructions for guidance. At first he issued no clear instructions. But as the months wore on, he sensed that popular opinion favored not only Cuban independence, but also American annexation of the entire Philippines. He instructed his commissioners accordingly and Spain had to acquiesce.

The peace treaty signed late that year aroused tremendous national debate. Was it right or even constitutional for the U. S. to have colonies? Men such as Grover Cleveland, Mark Twain and Charles Francis Adams Jr. opposed annexation. (“Men of a bygone era,” Roosevelt called them.) Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge were among those in favor. The debate, in public society and in Congress, was sometimes acrimonious. A narrow majority of senators approved the treaty in February 1899.

The one group without a voice in this debate were the Filipinos. They for years had staged an insurrection against Spanish rule with the goal of independence. Filipino insurgents and the U. S. Army were allied during the siege of Manila in August, but it quickly became apparent to the Filipinos that the U. S. had no intention of supporting full independence. The insurrection turned against the Americans. This quickly became a full-scale colonial war with upwards of 30,000 American troops involved at any given time at its peak. A total of 125,000 Americans would fight in the war over its course. It lasted officially until July 1902, but some hostilities continued for years after. The American public quickly grew tired of this war, and war in general (the first occasion in what became a pattern of popular response to war) but McKinley had chosen his course of action. However, the U. S. never again waged war for territorial empire.

In December 1898, McKinley issued a proclamation that America’s goal in the Philippines was “benevolent assimilation”. This did nothing to satisfy the insurrectos who wanted no part of it. The policy was sometimes carried out at gunpoint. The American combination of benevolent ideals supported by military force, as a tenet of American foreign policy, appeared for the first time in the Spanish-American and Philippine wars, but not the last. 

The Constitution and the Flag

The Philippines all this time were under military rule, i.e., martial law. Was this constitutional? McKinley felt it was. The Constitution did not apply to a conquered colony, he felt.

Other new territories had to be governed as well. Puerto Rico easily accepted American suzerainty. One of the island’s economic mainstays was sugar cane. McKinley felt, logically (if the Constitution does follow the flag) that the tariff walls against Puerto Rican sugar should be lifted. (Never mind that this was a contradiction to his Philippine policies.) America had no tariffs against itself. The sugar lobby disagreed, and in the ensuing debate it would be decided by Congress that the Constitution does not follow the flag. Puerto Rican Sugar duties were reduced by 75%, so McKinley substantially won the immediate question.

In 1901, the Constitutional question would come to the U. S. Supreme Court. The verdict: The Constitution need not follow the flag.

McKinley’s second Annual Message (State of the Union) in December 1898 was to great extent a catalog of American accomplishments–and adaptations to empire and global power. He called for the standing, regular army to be increased to 100,000 regulars “will be none too many to meet the necessities” of the U. S. now. This shocked many, to confront the fact of America’s new role in the world. In early 1899 he called for a mainland-Hawaii-Guam-Manila cable. As usual, on both questions, he got his way.

1900

The Chinese Empire was disintegrating. Great Powers swooped in to claim coastal cities and inland spheres of influence as their own. This process not only made a mockery of China’s territorial integrity but also threatened to shut out American goods from the Chinese market.

In March, Secretary of State John Hay addressed correspondence to each of the relevant powers regarding an “open door” policy towards China. Nations seeking trade and opportunities in China were to be treated equally by all others; Chinese sovereignty was to be respected (at least in name). Some of the responses were vague, but Hay proclaimed the triumph of his policy, and the other powers played along. Thus was born the famous “Open Door” policy.

Even three years before, the U. S. would have had no say in how the Great Powers dealt with China. Now that the U. S. was a Pacific power, it had a seat at the big power table.

The Open Door was severely tested a few months later. During the Boxer Rebellion, the great power (U. S. included) diplomatic enclave in Beijing was besieged. To lift the siege and fight the Boxers, the Eight Power Alliance—all the great powers—was formed and their combined force marched on Beijing. The main force consisted of 18,000 troops under one central command. The U. S. contributed 3,400 troops from the Philippines. All eight nations participated in successfully lifting the siege.

Three years before, the U. S. would again have been a spectator, with no troops to send and no way to send them. Having troops in the nearby Philippines made U. S. participation possible. American unilateral action was not always going to be adequate to address global issues, they learned. So for the first time since George Washington’s Farewell Address, with its warnings against foreign alliances, the U. S. was acting in concert—in an Alliance—with other Great Powers. All saw the U. S. for the power it was. Afterwards, the Open Door survived as the other powers sought reparations from China, but not annexed territory.

McKinley realized the global and political significance of events. He was now responsible for Americans globally. And so he acted by joining the Alliance and committing troops. McKinley considered seeking Congressional approval for this, but was assured by his Secretaries of War and the Navy that this was not necessary, legally or militarily. He had adequate troops in Asia already. This was the first time a President had committed American troops to battle outside the contiguous U. S. without the permission of Congress. Some in Congress objected but it was done. This set the powerful precedent Presidents to come would use.

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The Battle of Gettysburg - Part 2: July 1, Day 1

The Battle of Gettysburg has been described as a “meeting engagement”, meaning that the battle there was an accident, which was unplanned by the command on either side.  That the largest battle of the war originated from a desire for the acquisition of shoes for the Confederate troops seems preposterous, yet Maj Gen Henry Heth himself reported it that way in his official report on the campaign. But this isn’t the complete story: Lee had ordered his widely scattered army, which spanned from Chambersburg to Harrisburg, to converge at Cashtown & Gettysburg when he was informed by a spy on the evening of June 29th that Hooker had been replaced by Meade and that Meade was moving toward him. Cashtown is located at the eastern base of South Mountain, about 8 miles from Gettysburg, and was selected as being close to his wagon-based supply line.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

If you missed it, part1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here.

John Buford, a Unionist who played a major role on day 1 at the Battle of Gettysburg.

Generals Heth & Pettigrew Move

We don’t know what Lee thought of Hill sending 2 of his 3 divisions into Gettysburg on July 1, a reconnaissance in force; he never said, but it seems inconsistent with his desire to ”not bring on a general engagement” until all of his troops were up. Lee knew he was outnumbered, and what he wanted ideally was to find an isolated Union army group to attack. But neither Buford nor Pettigrew was much surprised to find the other there in force on July 1. After all, they had seen and skirmished on June 30. If this was a meeting engagement from the standpoint of the army commanders, it was only because of a lack of communication with those who were there. Buford clearly understood: he knew the meaning of what he had seen the day before, and had informed his superior, Major General John F. Reynolds.

On the morning of July 1, Heth’s division marched down the Chambersburg Pike. If he and Pettigrew thought there might be Union troops on the road to town, their line of march wasn’t appropriate: there were no cavalry vedettes or other skirmishers in front. The troops were deployed in columns when they should have been deployed in line. While this kept the movement faster initially, it caused Pettigrew to continually redeploy his men into line to fight the Buford’s men on the flanks of his column. The front of the line was Pegram’s artillery, followed by Brig Gens Archer and Davis’ infantry brigades. This was another error since they were not the optimal front line to be deployed in an emergency. Moreover,  Archer’s brigade had sustained heavy casualties at Chancellorsville and was undersized, and Davis was the least experienced brigade in Hill’s Corps.

The first contact was with Union vedettes. Then they reached dismounted cavalry from the brigade commanded by Col William Gamble. At about 7:30 am, 3 miles outside of town near the McPherson barn, the first shots of the battle were fired. The First Shot Marker at the Wisler House is placed on the corner of Chambersburg Pike and Knoxlyn Road. Lt. Marcellus Jones fired the shot with a borrowed Sharps carbine.

Although this has been celebrated as the first shot for decades, it’s not exactly true. A union corporal is known to have been shot and killed in a skirmish earlier that morning. Corporal Cyrus James of the 9th New York Cavalry was killed on vidette duty at daybreak on the Hunterstown Road – east of the town. This is the exact opposite direction of the actual attack. He was killed in a skirmish with the Virginia 14th Cavalry. We know the time of 4:30 am for a fact since his horse dragged his body back into the town, creating a commotion.

John L. Burns, age 69, was the Constable of Gettysburg. After being arrested by General Early in his first pass through town he was released and then arrested by Confederate stragglers. At daybreak on July 1, he stopped the horse dragging Corporal James’s body in the street. Angered at the kerfuffle brewing in his quiet town, he volunteered to General Buford to fight at McPhersons Woods with the Iron Brigade. He received wounds in the arm, leg, and minor chest wounds after falling in with the 24th Michigan. He escaped capture by hiding his weapon and telling the Confederates he had been caught in the crossfire. He later became a national hero.

Buford

General Buford resisted the approach of two Confederate infantry brigades on the Chambersburg Pike until the nearest Union infantry, Reynolds' I Corps, began to arrive. His light cavalry held off more than twice their number of veteran Confederate infantry for 5 hours. In the morning alone, his two dismounted cavalry brigades held off two divisions of Hill’s Corps for 3 hours. Buford’s tactical strategy defined a covering force action, in which space is traded for time. Buford traded 3 ridges for the time for Reynolds and the First Corps to come up.

Having only enough strength to post one man per yard of ground, Buford instructed one of his brigades, under Colonel William Gamble, to dismount to impede the advance of A.P. Hill’s Confederate III Corps along the road from Cashtown. He deployed all 6 guns of Calef's battery (battery A, 2nd US) of Tidball's battalion. The guns were 3" ordinance rifles. Besides being prepared and in excellent defensive position, Buford’s men had weapons that gave his men an advantage: breech-loading carbines, which allowed a 2-3 times faster fire than muzzle-loaded rifles, although sometimes it is incorrectly stated they had multi-shot repeating carbines, they did not, as these only became available that Fall.

Reynolds rode out ahead of the 1st Division, met with Buford about 9 am, and then accompanied some of his soldiers, probably from Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade, into the fighting at Herbst's Woods.

Reynolds

General John Reynolds was the Union commander on the morning of July 1. President Lincoln had offered Reynolds command of the Union Army before Meade, but he had insisted on no political oversight if he accepted the position, which was rejected. Nevertheless, Meade respected and trusted him greatly, making him Left Wing Commander; which as fate would have it, is exactly where General Lee was congregating.

The Pipe Creek Circular was dated July 1, written early that morning well before the battle began. In it, Meade ordered his forces to start pulling back to this line to await Lee’s expected advance once Lee is found and begins his attack. George Meade had no intention of fighting in Pennsylvania on the eve of battle. That much is beyond dispute. On the morning of July 1, Pipe Creek was The Plan rather than a contingency. Meade intended to rest his forces where they were on July 1.

The night before the battle, both Reynolds and General OO Howard had received myriad reports by scouts, residents, and of course Buford the night before. Reynolds informed Meade at around midnight, whose headquarters was in Taneytown MD, of Hill massing apparently at Cashtown. Early in the morning of July 1, they received a response from Meade, giving them orders to advance to Gettysburg, and telling them that Longstreet was located around Chambersburg and Ewell near Carlisle. These were highly accurate intelligence reports, but they seemed to conflict with the Pipe Creek Circular. Whether or not Reynolds ever received that order isn’t known, nor do we understand how either general understood the two orders, one to advance and one to fall back simultaneously. Meade had given Reynolds, the man he had full confidence in, independence to do what he thought warranted. Reynolds commanded the 1st Corps and, as a wing commander, also had operational control of the 11th and 3rd Corps.

Buford is known to have pointed out Cemetery Ridge to Reynolds, the heights at the south part of town, as the best position ultimately for the Union defense. Reynolds ordered him to resist as long as possible to keep the Rebels out of the town. He then sent word to his Corps to hurry.  He sent couriers to Meade and his commanders about what was going on. We do know that the courier he sent to Meade, Captain Weld, did tell Meade that a stout defense was underway.

Reynolds had three options: Deploy into a defensive position near Emmitsburg, occupy the high ground south and southeast of Gettysburg, or occupy the ridges west of the town. Reynolds decided to place his corps on the march and ordered the other two corps to Gettysburg. Another possibility is that Reynolds was organizing a fighting retreat, the correct terminology being covering force action/advance guard operation, consistent with Meade’s Pipe Creek Circular.

Abner Doubleday

After Reynolds’ death, Major General Abner Doubleday, the ranking officer on the field, assumed command of the Union defenses at 10:50 am. Doubleday was at the front as division commander of the second infantry division on the field. For the next 5 hours, he defended the ridges west of Gettysburg as increasing numbers of Confederate soldiers appeared, eventually outnumbering him by about 16,000 to 9,500. The 1st Corps arrived in time to take over the fight from Buford and hold Confederate forces west of Gettysburg until late afternoon.

Reynolds’ death and Doubleday’s decision to make a stand west of Gettysburg scuttled Meade’s plan. It is entirely unknown if Reynolds had told him his orders; if he was aware that he was supposed to fight a covering action, he certainly never tried. If a planned withdrawal was the plan, it wasn’t communicated to Buford nor Doubleday, nor did they have any experience in undertaking this kind of maneuver. Gettysburg might have been simply the product of what transpired on the field and no one actually ordered it.

But where was the plan lost? Did Reynolds not convey to Doubleday the overall plan to move as a covering force action or was Doubleday unable to make this happen, or did he simply change the plan on the fly? We don’t know exactly what Reynolds thought Meade had ordered. Doubleday was quoted after the war as saying, ”It was General Reynolds’s intention to dispute the enemy’s advance, falling back, however, in case of a serious attack, to the ground already chosen at Emmitsburg” That, of course, was precisely what Meade instructed Reynolds to do.  

As infantry reinforcements arrived under Reynolds from the I Corps, Confederate assaults down the Chambersburg Pike were repulsed. The periodic arrival of Hill’s divisions on the Cashtown Pike, and then later on that morning on the more northerly Mummasburg Road required Buford and Doubleday to increasingly extend the Union line as Confederate infantry arrived. As Union troops entered from the south, they had to be routed to the constantly moving front. The roads go through town, so they needed to cross fields to bypass it and get to the place they were needed.

Fighting took place on both the north and south sides of Chambersburg Pike.  The intense fighting occurred on McPherson Ridge. North of the Pike, an unfinished railroad bed created three sections of depressed ground. To the south, fighting centered on Willoughby Run and Herbst or McPherson Woods. The main forces engaged were Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade opposed by brigades of James J Archer and Jefferson R Davis. Three of Cutler's regiments were positioned north of the Pike and two to the south. The Iron Brigade directly opposed Archer. The Union infantry forces were commanded by Maj Gen James J Wadsworth.

For a few hours, Confederate regiments entered the battlefield from the west and northwest, as Union troops arrived from the south and then moved west to the sound of the guns. Because of the roads and distances involved, there was a temporary advantage in number of troops for the Confederates. Fresh troops were sent to battle as they arrived, to face other troops that also just arrived. The arrival of Confederate units was dictated by the position that morning. Hill’s 2nd corps, under Heth and Rodes, were on the western roads, and they arrived in the morning from Chambersburg.

The Railroad Cut

The engagement at the railroad cut, an incomplete railway excavation near the McPherson farmhouse, witnessed a series of brutal assaults and counterattacks. Although lacking actual railroad tracks, the cut provided a deep entrenchment that was utilized by both Union and Confederate forces. The Union Army stationed multiple units near the site to fend off the Confederate attacks, managing to hold their ground until the Confederates, with superior numbers, eventually forced them to retreat.

During a crucial moment around 10 am, the Confederates, overwhelming the Union defenders, flanked their right side and launched an attack. Three regiments strategically positioned themselves at the railroad cut, with one half of the brigade utilizing the cut as a trench while the other half remained at the northern edge. In response, Union forces, led by division commander James Wadsworth, organized a counterattack that exploited the terrain advantage provided by the depression of the cut. This tactic allowed the Union troops to flank the Confederate positions and secure a significant number of Confederate prisoners

A lull in the fighting ensued as both sides awaited reinforcements. Maj Gen OO Howard arrived before his XI Corps did, and assumed command from behind the town of Gettysburg. He communicated with Maj Gen James Slocum of XII Corps and Maj Gen Daniel Sickles of III Corps  to come to the field immediately.

In the afternoon, Ewell’s Corps appeared on Oak Ridge from the north, beginning a massive assault. With Rodes’ division attacking from Oak Hill, the Union lines were under heavy pressure. The CSA 3rd Corps, under Early and Gordon, came from the north and arrived later in the afternoon from Carlisle. This sequence provided a clockwise en echelon pattern that was unintentional but devastating, as the Union Corps were further away in Maryland that morning.

On June 28, Ewell's corps, consisting of three divisions, was strategically positioned at Carlisle and York, Pennsylvania. However, upon receiving orders to concentrate in the Cashtown-Gettysburg area, Rodes made the decision to move his division south from Carlisle, while another division led by Jubal Early marched southwest from York. Simultaneously, Edward Johnson's division was sent back down the Cumberland Valley towards Chambersburg under Ewell's command.

In the early afternoon, the Union XI Corps arrived under General Howard, who deployed his men to the right of the already existing line. The Union position was shaped in a semicircle from west to north of the town

Iverson

Brigadier General Alfred Iverson’s brigade fell victim to a well-executed ambush around 2:30 pm, resulting in devastating losses. The lack of skirmishers screening their advance left the Confederates vulnerable to the Union army positioned behind a stone wall at Oak Ridge. The sudden attack caught Iverson’s men off guard, leading to over 900 casualties out of the 1,384 soldiers in his brigade.

The aftermath of the ambush saw the Union forces counterattacking and flanking the Confederate position, leading to further surrenders and retreats. The communication breakdown within the Confederate ranks, exacerbated by the linear landmark of the field, contributed to the disastrous outcome. Iverson’s ineffective leadership, compounded by personal issues such as alcoholism, further worsened the situation, ultimately resulting in his reassignment and leaving a bitter legacy among the survivors of his regiment.

Rodes

When Rodes' division reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on July 1, they could hear the sounds of intense fighting between Harry Heth's division of A.P. Hill's corps and the Union's 1st Corps. Believing that he was positioned on the right flank of the Union forces, Rodes deployed his division on Oak Ridge after marching south. At this critical juncture, Rodes faced a crucial decision. He could either wait for the army to fully concentrate, as per Lee's instructions, or take the initiative and launch an attack.

Despite the significant impact of Rodes' Division on the outcome of the battle, his contributions are often overlooked. The losses suffered by his division, despite being fully engaged only on the first day of the battle, were among the highest of all Confederate divisions. Ramseur was held in reserve. Rodes’s Division suffered the second-highest losses of all Confederate divisions.

Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes played a pivotal role in the initial day of the battle, with his division being a key factor in the success of the Confederate forces. The aggressive attack launched by Rodes' troops on the Union's I Corps resulted in the pushing back of Union forces, compelling them to retreat through Gettysburg and towards Cemetery Hill. Rodes strategically positioned his division at the junction of the Union First and Eleventh Corps, preventing their link-up on Oak Hill and enveloping the Union right flank.

Despite Lee's directive to avoid a general engagement, Rodes, in agreement with Ewell, decided to ignore this order and launch an assault. Following the initial unsuccessful attack, Rodes persisted and led a second assault. These actions resulted in Early's division joining the battle and forced Hill's corps to deploy an additional division. While the Confederate forces did eventually achieve victory, it was not without consequences. The premature commitment of four divisions from Lee's army in a disjointed manner hindered Lee's ability to effectively utilize the full strength of his forces.

After the failure of the first assault, Rodes proceeded with a second attack, which ultimately led to Early's Division entering the fray and the subsequent deployment of another division from Hill's Corps. Although the Confederate forces were successful in the end, the premature involvement of four divisions from Lee's army in a fragmented deployment prevented Lee from fully harnessing the power of his forces.

Howard and Hancock

General Howard arrived 2 hours before his divisions did. Searching for a place to observe the battle, he found Cemetery Hill and recognized it as being the best place to fight a defense, just as Reynolds and Buford had. He tried to find a place to observe in town but could not. When he was informed of Reynold’s death, he became the senior officer on the battlefield. As 11th Corps arrived, starting around 12:30 pm, he gathered them on top of the hill. He observed and was informed of Rodes’s arrival on Oak Ridge and then Ewell’s arrival further west. He rode through the town of Gettysburg with Barlow, then met with General Wadsworth and General Doubleday behind the lines. He then returned to Cemetery Hill.

Operationally, Buford, Reynolds, and Doubleday thought the high ground south of town was a good place for defense and worth fighting for. It’s controversial whether Reynolds made an actual decision when he arrived at the scene and agreed with Buford that this was an excellent place to make a defensive stand. OO Howard suggested that it was his decision, and was credited with delaying the Confederates long enough to ensure the rest of the federal army was concentrated on the heights south of the town. Howard did leave a reserve division and artillery on Cemetery Hill and used this area to collect those retreating from the front line. Others give Hancock credit for that choice. Convinced of the strength of this position, Hancock expressed his belief to Howard, stating, "I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw." With Howard's agreement, Hancock solidified the decision, declaring, "Very well, sir, I select this as the battle-field." Although Howard received Congressional commendation for his actions, Hancock did not receive similar recognition.  It may be that no one actively chose Cemetery Hill at this stage of the conflict, but its obvious merits were plain to all.

When Meade learned of Reynold’s death, he immediately sent for Hancock. Unable to leave his army at that moment and undecided about the course of action regarding Pipe Creek, Meade entrusted Hancock with written orders to assume command, despite his junior rank compared to Howard. Hancock arrived at Cemetery Hill at approximately 4:30 pm. Hancock urged Meade to swiftly bring the entire army to the strategic position on Cemetery Hill. Additionally, Hancock decided to gather the scattered soldiers from various battles around the town and relocate them to the elevated hills south of Gettysburg, with the existing cemetery at its center. Hancock positioned his artillery there, enabling them to target the north over Culps Hill or the west over Cemetery Ridge.

During this critical juncture, Doubleday was in retreat, prompting a meeting between him and Hancock on the field. Recognizing the importance of the situation, Hancock ordered Wadsworth to position his troops at the base of Culp's Hill. This maneuver proved crucial and probably saved the field that day.

Barlow’s Knoll

The arrival of Ewell’s Corps from the north changed the entire dynamic of the battle to that point. To the east, the threat to Doles’ position had been reduced by the appearance of Early’s division. He had arrived at about 3 p.m. but paused for half an hour so that his infantrymen could catch their breath after their hard march to the field. Early then charged out of the northeast, sending the brigades led by Brig. Gens. John B. Gordon, Isaac E. Avery, and Harry T. Hays against the Union line.

Upon the arrival of Gordon's division on the far right, only Barlow's division stood as a barrier against an attack. Recognizing the imminent danger posed by the arrival of Ewell's 3rd Corps from the north, which threatened the Union's right flank, General Francis Barlow decided to advance his division of the 11th Corps to a knoll along the Harrisburg Road. At the time, the area now known as Barlow's Knoll was called Blucher's Knoll.  The Confederate brigades led by Gordon and Doles converged, overpowering Barlow's forces. Outnumbered by Gordon's division, Barlow and his men were unable to maintain their position, which was positioned as a vulnerable salient. Barlow was severely wounded and taken prisoner. Howard’s XI Corps were overwhelmed and forced to fall back As the Union line collapsed, XI Corps retreated back through town and assumed a defensive position on Cemetery Hill.

As Rodes launched a renewed assault from the north and Dorsey Pender attacked from the west, the Union line crumbled. The road system played a significant role in determining the outcome, favoring the Confederates who ultimately emerged victorious as Union troops retreated through the town in a disorganized manner. Subsequently, Union troops hastily withdrew through the town's streets.

Ultimately, of course, the Union lines were overrun as 2 Confederate corps arrived in just a few hours. Doubleday fought an outstanding controlled retreat back to the new lines on Cemetery Ridge. General Howard told Meade that his line had collapsed and it was Doubleday’s fault, because his line faltered first. This incorrect report led to his removal from command and ultimately, in his leaving active service.

Ewell Advances

At about 4:30 p.m., the Confederate superiority in numbers of Ewell’s Corp began to tell, and although Union fire opened gaping holes in their ranks, Hill’s men finally pushed the Federal I Corps off Seminary Ridge. With the Yankees in full retreat, both Rodes and Early called a halt to their pursuit, following the instructions issued by Ewell at the onset of the battle per Lee’s order.

With the collapse of the Union lines on Seminary Ridge and north of the town, the troops of XI Corps fell back on Cemetery Hill, where a 2000-man brigade and a battery of 6 guns were stationed to protect the retreat. Wadsworth’s division raced to Culps Hill to defend the right flank, and other reinforcements were also arriving. 500 troops from the 7th Indiana came forward, and Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum’s XII Corps arrived. The 1stDivision, led by Brig. Gen. Thomas Ruger began filing into position behind Cemetery Hill at about 4:30 p.m. Brigadier General John W. Geary’s 2nd Division reached Gettysburg at 5 pm. These 8,000 fresh troops brought the Union strength to about 20,000 soldiers mixed with the XI Corps. In addition to the reinforcements, the Federals had most of their artillery pieces, which they had salvaged during their retreat. Almost 40 guns had joined Smith’s six guns, and the entire array was emplaced, unlimbered, and ready to fire, atop Cemetery Hill.

Ewell, of course, saw the enemy digging in on Cemetery Hill. Although he no doubt suspected that the Union soldiers would be impossible to dislodge, he knew that sooner or later he would have to charge the heights.

Culp’s Hill & the “If Practicable” Order

Ewell's failure to take Culp's Hill /Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 is often considered one of the great missed opportunities of the battle. Ewell had to decide about whether to make an attack. Rodes’ Division had already incurred heavy casualties and two brigades of Early’s Division had been sent east to block a rumored enemy force on the York Pike, and Maj. Gen. “Allegheny” Johnson’s Division was still marching toward Gettysburg.

Ewell insisted that Lee must approve an attack and Hill had to provide reinforcements. When he asked A.P. Hill for assistance, Hill contended that his divisions were not capable of further offensive action that day, leaving Ewell with only two brigades of Early’s Division for an attack on Cemetery Hill, where the Federals had already established a strong defensive position. James Power Smith, an aide who had spent the afternoon with Lee and had just now come to Gettysburg (without bringing any orders from Lee to Ewell), was dispatched back to Lee with those two requests. Colonel Walter Taylor delivered the message. According to his post-war recollection, Lee was told of Ewell’s movements by Major G. Campbell Brown of Ewell’s staff. He then instructed Brown:

‘To quote Lee’s own words, “General Ewell was…instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army…” ‘

From Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee’s Lieutenant’s: A Study in Command, One volume abridgment by Stephen W Sears, Scribner, New York 1998 p.571.

Smith returned, where he found Ewell and gave him Lee’s instructions. Ewell saw at once that his new orders were paradoxical. He could not drive the enemy from the heights without reinforcements. The force at hand, 4,000 men, was no match for the large group of Federals, backed by cannons, atop Cemetery Hill. To attack would bring disaster to his corps. And even if Ewell mounted the suicidal assault, how could he assure Lee that reopening the battle would not bring on a general engagement? Consequently, Ewell dropped his plan for a direct charge against Cemetery Hill.

What did Lee Expect?

Lee did not directly order Ewell to mount a charge against Cemetery Hill. Had Lee wanted to deny the enemy the heights, he could have given a peremptory order for Maj. Gen. Richard Anderson’s division, just now arriving and ready to fight, ahead to Cemetery Hill. After Barlow was defeated at the base of Culp’s Hill and XI Corps retreated through the town, Ewell was given discretionary orders to take the hill. He did not immediately try, and when later he sent Johnson’s Division, they ran into the Union line digging in.

Ewell felt, correctly by reports of those who were there, that his men were exhausted and disorganized. Most military students of the battle have concluded that Ewell made the right call under the circumstances. He was a professional soldier who had to make a split-second decision in the heat of the moment. The failed probing attack at 7 pm at dusk suggests that any opportunity, if it ever existed, was fleeing. The question will always remain if the Union was as well dug in at 5 pm.

Ewell had at least 6 rational reasons not to make the attack:  a) His men had been through a huge firefight after marching many hours and were fatigued. b) Assaulting the hill through the streets of Gettysburg was not an easy task since the narrow passageways prevented massing the troops for an attack. c) Lee’s ambiguous order resonates through history. Any dispassionate reading of that phrase in the context of battle is more confusing than anything else. And it should be noted that Early himself was reluctant at that moment. d) Ewell requested assistance from AP Hill, who declined due to the condition of his corps, which had taken the brunt of the first day. e) There was intelligence that Union troops were approaching from the east on the Hanover Road. This was the vanguard of the XII Corps under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. If those troops had arrived at the wrong time, Ewell's flank would have been turned. f) This was Ewell’s first Corps command. He was hesitant given these issues. Ewell was never the same after the loss of his leg and marriage.

Ewell did not get that message until after his forces were heavily committed, noting in his report “that by the time this message reached me….It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up.” In fact, at that moment, although victorious, his corps had suffered approximately 3,000 casualties, leaving him with about 8,000 men under arms. The charge into Gettysburg had also left Ewell’s two divisions badly disorganized, and thousands of prisoners had to be rounded up and secured. The third division, under Edward Johnson, was rushing to the scene, but no one knew when it would arrive.

On the hill at that hour and shortly afterward was the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, part of Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth's division, linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge. The XII Corps in George Greene’s brigade of John Geary’s division would soon arrive.

When Ewell’s third division, under Maj. Gen.Edward "Allegheny" Johnson, arrived on the battlefield, Johnson was ordered to take the hill if he had not already done so. Johnson did not take Culp's Hill. He sent a small party to reconnoiter, and they encountered the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, part of Wadsworth's division, which had been in the rear guarding the corps trains and was now linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge. Johnson's party was taken by surprise and almost taken prisoner before fleeing. Culps Hill at 7 pm when the reconnaissance occurred was far from empty. Was it empty at 5 pm? No but less well defended; still, who would Ewell have attacked with? After the war, Gordon said in his memoirs he was ready, but he’d seen significant action. Gordon’s brigades were scattered and 2 miles from where an attack could be made. And the 11th Corps troops on Cemetery Hill under Howard were well positioned to defend Culp’s hill, more so than Ewell was positioned to take it.

Ewell, after assessing the situation and considering various factors such as the approaching darkness, the strength of the Union defenses on Culp's Hill, and the absence of clear orders from Lee to attack, decided against launching an immediate assault. Instead, he chose to consolidate his positions.

Casualties

About one quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one third of Lee's army (27,000) were engaged. Union casualties were almost 9,000; Confederate slightly over 6,000. In itself, Day #1 of Gettysburg would rank among the top 25 battles of the war, even though most of both armies hadn’t even arrived yet.

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References

•    James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.

•    Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volume 2. Random House, 1963.

•    Harry W Pfanz, Gettysburg – The First Day. The University of North Carolina, 2010.

·      Harry W Pfanz, Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill. The University of North Carolina, 1993.

•    Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.

•    Stephen Sears, Gettysburg. Mariner Books, 2004.

•    Eric J Wittenberg, The Devils to Pay: John Buford at Gettysburg. Savas-Beattie, 2014.

• Mackowski, Chris, and Kristopher D. White. "Second Guessing Dick Ewell: Why Didn't the Confederate General Take Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863?" Civil War Times, August 2010.

• Petruzzi, J. David, and Steven Stanley. The Complete Gettysburg Guide. New York: Savas Beatie, 2009.

·      https://gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/confederate-headquarters/rodes-division/

·      https://gettysburgcompiler.org/tag/alfred-iverson/  

·      https://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen-richard-ewell-lose-the-battle-of-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/20-fateful-decisions-at-gettysburg/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=hnt-hnn-theme

·      https://thecivilwarcenter.org/2023/07/04/general-lees-if-practicable-order-to-general-ewell-on-july-1-at-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen-richard-ewell-lose-the-battle-of-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/richard-ewell-at-gettysburg/#:~:text=On%20the%20first%20day%20of%20the%20Battle%20of,new%20Federal%20position%20on%20Cemetery%20Hill%20%E2%80%9Cif%20practicable.%E2%80%9D

·      https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/general-ewells-dilemma/

·      https://padresteve.com/2014/06/03/gettysburg-day-one-lees-vague-discretionary-orders-and-lack-of-control/

Captured by the Comanche in the American West in the 1830s: The Story of Cynthia Ann Parker

In the year 1833 the Parker family moved to Texas, the beneficiaries of large acres of free land, given in the hope that they would establish a settlement in country that at the time was still in contestation between the Mexican government and the United States. They built a fort and homes in what was then one of the most sparsely occupied areas in the state, on the edge of Native American territory. At the time Texas was at the edge of America, and skirmishes were frequent, in particular raids from the feared warrior society of the Comanches. The Comanche were struggling not only with white settlers but many other bands of Native American who had been displaced and forced onto the Plains by rapid American expansion. Their way of life was under threat and they retaliated. Despite this the Parkers, unfortunately, overestimated their safety.

Erin Bienvenu explains the story of the capture of Cynthia Ann Parker.

Cynthia Ann Parker and daughter, Topsannah (Prairie Flower). Image taken around 1861.

Fort Parker Massacre

The morning of May 19, 1836 began normally enough for the extended Parker family. They were busy working on their farms and getting their families ready for another day. Cynthia Ann, nearly nine years old, the oldest child of Silas and Lucinda, was with her mother and three siblings. Inexplicably, despite the dangers of the Texas frontier, the large gate of the fort had been left open.

The morning was soon interrupted by a large group of Comanches who appeared bearing a white flag and professing peace. The Parker men suspected their motives but Benjamin Parker, Cynthia Ann’s Uncle, bravely went out to speak with them. He hoped he could give the women and children enough time to hide in the surrounding woods but he was quickly killed and the Comanches descended on the fort and surrounding farms.

At the end of what became known as the Fort Parker Massacre, five men were dead, including Silas, and the Comanche had taken five hostages: Cynthia Ann, her younger brother John, their cousin Rachel Plummer, her son James, and their Aunt Elizabeth Kellogg. For the captives the days and nights that followed were horrific, they were repeatedly beaten, starved, and the older women raped.

Eventually, after several days of hard riding, the captives were separated and sent to different bands. As fertility rates were low amongst the Comanche, due to their nomadic life style which required almost daily riding, captive children were often adopted by families who had lost a child. This is what happened to Cynthia Ann.

Her childhood then began anew as she was immersed in Comanche culture, taught such practicalities as how to sew buckskin and gather firewood, and how to speak the language. She would also have learnt about the tribe’s customs, religious beliefs, and been raised in preparation for marriage and motherhood.

Life with the Comanche

In 1842 John and James were ransomed back to their families and a few years later Cynthia Ann was discovered by Leonard Williams, a Native American agent. She was said to have ‘wept incessantly’ and tried to hide from Williams, though he offered a substantial ransom for her return. However, the Comanche refused to give her up.

In the years that followed more ransoms were offered but all were refused, often by Cynthia Ann herself. She was now married to a warrior who had participated in her capture, Peta Nocona, and they had three children. She also had a new name, Naduah, which meant ‘someone found.’ She was completely integrated into Comanche life and even her brother John could not persuade her to return. She had already been separated from one family, and she would not be taken from another.

Cynthia Ann and her family were constantly on the move, it was a hard life and she was in charge of most of the work. One of her main tasks was to prepare the buffalo hunted by her husband. Not one part of the huge animal was wasted and Cynthia Ann became a skilled tanner. It was dirty, time-consuming work, but she also found joy in the lives of her children - two boys, Quanah and Peanuts (so named because of her fond memories of eating the nuts during her childhood at the Fort) and daughter, Topsannah (Prairie Flower). Her husband was also a skilled warrior and the family was considered to be quite wealthy in Comanche society.

Return to the Parker Family

In 1860 in retaliation for Peta Nocona’s constant raids on white settlements, his tribe were attacked by a group of Texas Rangers led by Captain Lawrence Sullivan Ross.

Cynthia Ann attempted to flee on horseback but was stopped by Ross who, to his great surprise, realised she was a white woman. He declared that Peta Nocona had been killed during the battle and Cynthia Ann had wept over his body, though their son Quanah was to claim his father had died at a later date.

The rangers took Cynthia Ann and her young daughter to Fort Cooper, though she made repeated attempts to escape. Once again, she found herself violently taken from all she knew, her family and her home, forced to assimilate to a culture and language she had largely forgotten. Despite speaking in a mixture of Comanche and Spanish she did recall the massacre at Fort Parker, and her birth name, responding when called ‘Cynthia Ann.’

She was treated as a curiosity by all who saw her and at one stage, under the ‘care’ of her Uncle Isaac was even put on display so that the citizens of Texas could come and stare at her. She tried repeatedly to run away from Isaac’s home. He, and her wider family, could not understand her longing to return to her Comanche life. They expected her to immediately accept the way of life she had left aged nine, to re-adopt their language, dress and religion, but Cynthia Ann would not comply. Consequently, she was treated by her family, and the wider community, as a woman who did not know her right mind.

Eventually she was sent to live with her brother Silas Jr, but her situation did not improve. Around this time a photograph was taken of Cynthia Ann, in which she is nursing Topsannah with her hair cut short, a symbol of Comanche mourning. She was grieving not only her husband, but her two sons, who she believed were lost on the prairie. When Silas joined the Confederate army Cynthia Ann was sent to live with a different set of relatives, this time her sister, Orlena. Here, life was a little better. There were more sympathetic people to speak with and she earned a reputation as a hard worker and expert tanner. She remained, however, largely unhappy and would frequently lament the loss of her sons, often cutting herself in the traditional Comanche way of expressing grief. The Parker’s promised her that when the Civil War ended, they would take her to find her sons, but as time wore on, she began to realise their promises were empty.

Then in about 1864 Topsannah died from pneumonia and a grief-stricken Cynthia Ann lost all hope. It is believed she died of complications probably bought on by self-starvation around 1870.

Conclusion

Cynthia Ann left no written account of her life, or her feelings about her experiences, what little we do know about her was told through the eyes of those that briefly encountered her, but who often had their own agendas when it came to telling her story. Her son Quanah, regarded as the last of the great Comanche Chiefs, remembered her as “a good woman” who he “always cherished.” Hers was a life between two worlds and, as it was for many people in the early history of the American West, one marked by frontier violence and tragic misunderstanding.

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References

https://archive.org/details/rachelplummernar00park/page/16/mode/2up?q=cyntha

https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4492&context=etd

https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth85556/m1/2/zoom/?q=cynthia%20ann%20parker&resolution=2.565054159331353&lat=3373.065552681177&lon=3245.6007365528353

https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth583180/m1/14/zoom/?q=%22cynthia%20ann%20parker%22~1&resolution=2.1904496702355107&lat=3009.330046382758&lon=3003.1985262518583

Exley, Jo Ella Powell (2001), Frontier Blood: The Saga of the Parker Family. Texas A&M University Press

Frankel, Glenn (2013), The Searchers: The Making of an American Legend. New York: Bloomsbury

Gwynne, S.C. (2011), Empire of the Summer Moon: Quanah Parker and the Rise and Fall of the Comanche Tribe. London: Constable

Michno, Gregory & Susan (2007), A Fate Worse Than Death: Indian Captives in the West, 1830-1835. Idaho: Caxton Press

The Battle of Gettysburg - Part I: General Lee’s Advance to Pennsylvania

In late May 1863, the Confederacy was facing a challenging situation. Despite General Robert E Lee's success in defeating the Union forces in almost every major battle, the war's progress remained stagnant along the Rappahannock River. The Confederacy had not made significant gains despite the intense fighting. On the other hand, the Western Theater had experienced substantial territorial losses, particularly in Louisiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee. The fall of Vicksburg and western Mississippi seemed imminent. It was evident that a dramatic shift was necessary to alter the course of the war while maintaining the people's confidence in the government and military. The war had already surpassed the South's expectations in terms of duration, and resources were depleting rapidly.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Confederate troops battling Union forces in the first day at the Battle of Gettysburg. On the left background is the Railroad Cut; on the right is the Lutheran Seminary. In the background is Gettysburg.

The Rationale

Recognizing the urgency of the situation, President Davis invited General Lee to Richmond for a three-day meeting with his cabinet on May 26. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss their plans and devise a strategy to turn the tide of the war. It is crucial to understand the significance of the Battle of Gettysburg within the broader context of the war. It was seen as a final attempt to secure victory on the battlefield. General Lee aimed to provoke a large-scale battle that could potentially be decisive. The intention was to divert attention from the Western Theater and instigate a battle in the East that could alter the war's trajectory. Building on his previous victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, Lee proposed taking the war into Northern territory. While General Grant was closing in on Vicksburg, there were discussions about detaching General Longstreet's corps and sending them to assist General Pemberton. However, it was increasingly apparent that Vicksburg was already lost. Lee suggested the alternative: retain Longstreet in his army and launch an invasion of Pennsylvania, hoping to achieve a breakthrough.

There were two main objectives in mind for this operation. Firstly, it aimed to remove the war from central Virginia during the summer months. Additionally, the hope was to secure a victory in a battle north of the Mason-Dixon Line, which would potentially lead to the recognition of the Confederacy by France and Britain. Another crucial objective was to provide the Army of Northern Virginia with essential resources such as food, forage, horses, and other supplies from the fertile farmlands of Pennsylvania. This was necessary as the Quartermaster and Subsistence Departments were struggling to meet the increasing demand due to the blockade's significant impact. Alongside these objectives, there were several other goals to be achieved. These included diverting the Union Army of the Potomac away from the Rappahannock River line, disrupting any offensive plans General Joseph Hooker may have had, driving Union occupation forces out of Winchester and the lower Shenandoah Valley, drawing Union forces away from other theaters, and ultimately dealing a decisive blow to Northern morale.

Lee's unwavering confidence in his army led him to believe that if he could secure advantageous terrain, the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) would triumph over the Army of the Potomac (AoP). This perception fueled his hope that such a victory would compel the war-weary North to seek peace, potentially serving as a decisive military maneuver to showcase the Southern will for independence to Great Britain and France.

However, Lee's strategic approach was marred by a series of misconceptions regarding the state of morale in the North, which ultimately shaped his flawed strategy and resulted in miscalculations. One of these misinterpretations was his misunderstanding of Northern sentiment, as he mistakenly believed that the general public in the North was fatigued by the ongoing conflict. Consequently, he failed to grasp the unwavering determination of the Lincoln Administration to persevere in the face of adversity. This misjudgment of the North's resolve played a significant role in shaping Lee's flawed assumptions and strategic decisions.

Reorganization

Following Chancellorsville and the mortal wounding of Stonewall Jackson, General Lee undertook a significant reorganization of his forces. To strengthen his army, Lee decided to create three Corps instead of the previous two. As part of this restructuring, he promoted AP Hill to command the newly formed 3rd Corps, while Richard Ewell assumed leadership of the 2nd Corps. James Longstreet remained in charge of the 1st Corps.

Before the Battle of Gettysburg, Lee's army had suffered significant losses in terms of both brigade and regimental commanders. Out of the 28 brigades that participated in the Chancellorsville campaign, a staggering nine of them lost their commanders during the battle. Furthermore, three of these brigades experienced the loss of multiple commanders. Additionally, the ANV lost 64 out of its 130 regimental commanders. Consequently, many of Lee's brigades entered the Gettysburg campaign with inexperienced unit commanders, which would have a noticeable impact on the outcome of the battle.

As part of the reorganization efforts, Lee made a crucial decision to disband the army's reserve artillery and redistribute its batteries to the infantry corps. This adjustment allowed each corps to have five artillery battalions at its disposal, granting them the flexibility to assign these battalions to the infantry divisions or retain them under the command of the corps. Although this change in the command structure may have appeared insignificant at first glance, it would prove to have significant implications on July 3rd, during the Battle of Gettysburg.

Was the ANV Designed for a Northern Invasion?

Lee's Army was not designed to leave the confines of Virginia due to several factors. Firstly, Lee had limited intelligence operations compared to his Union counterparts. Instead of having a dedicated intelligence service like the Bureau of Military Intelligence, Lee relied on three main sources for information: the civilians of Virginia, Stuart's Cavalry, and his staff. However, when Lee moved north, he left behind his most valuable intelligence source - the civilians of Virginia. These civilians not only provided crucial information but also aided in the communication and navigation of local roads and geography. This decision may have been influenced by the fact that Lee heavily relied on his cavalry for intelligence and did not trust information from other sources. This deficit in intelligence gathering put Lee at a significant disadvantage. The CSA had very few covert operatives in the north. Lee primarily used individual undercover agents to provide intelligence, usually assigned to one of his subordinate generals, most famously Henry Harrison. Lee depended strongly on his cavalry and never trusted actual intelligence from other sources.

Lee may have overlooked the political landscape of the areas he intended to invade. While there were a significant number of KGC operatives and Copperheads in Baltimore, western Maryland, and southern Pennsylvania, these regions were predominantly pro-Union. This meant that Lee would face strong opposition and limited support from the local population in these areas. Overlooking this factor could have further contributed to the challenges Lee encountered when attempting to expand his operations beyond Virginia.

Another limitation was that his staff was too small to plan and coordinate a foray into enemy territory. Lee had a very small staff to manage his corps movements, so when he needed them to regroup, it took several days.  These 6 men comprised all of Lee’s staff

·      Chief of Staff, Inspector General: Col. Robert H. Chilton

·      Chief of Artillery: Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton

·      Aide de Camp, Asst. Adjutant General: Lt. Col. Walter H. Taylor

·      Aide de Camp, Asst. Military Secretary: Maj. Charles Marshall

·      Aide de camp, Asst. Inspector General: Maj. Charles S. Venable

·      Engineer Officer: Capt. Samuel R. Johnston

This would repeatedly be a limitation: his command and control at critical moments was inadequate, and he lacked sufficient staff to maintain communications with corps leaders.

Lee faced significant logistical challenges during the Pennsylvania Campaign due to his lack of adequate supply support. Unlike the Union forces, who had the advantage of utilizing railroads and rivers for transportation, Lee had to rely on a primitive system. With no railroads or rivers available to him, Lee's only option was to transport his supplies over land using horse and mule-drawn wagons. This resulted in a lengthy and vulnerable supply line, which posed a major hindrance to his operations.

One of the key issues that Lee encountered was the dependency on a long supply line that relied on horse and mule-drawn wagons. This meant that his forces had to cover a significant distance to transport essential provisions and equipment. The reliance on such a method of transportation not only slowed down the movement of supplies but also made them susceptible to attacks and disruptions along the way.

Lee's forces suffered from a shortage of long-range artillery ammunition, which severely limited their ability to sustain multiple attacks during the campaign. This deficiency became evident during Pickett's charge, where the lack of sufficient ammunition hindered their offensive capabilities. Lee also lacked the availability of pontoons over the Potomac River, which provided a crucial emergency crossing point. This would become evident in his retreat after the battle.

Lee’s heavy reliance on horse and mule-drawn wagons led to a lengthy and vulnerable supply line, insufficient long-range artillery ammunition, challenges in transporting captured goods, and limited emergency crossing options. These logistical challenges significantly impacted Lee's ability to sustain his offensive campaign and ultimately contributed to his setbacks in the Pennsylvania Campaign.

Lee faced significant logistical challenges in transporting supplies to Gettysburg and Harrisburg. The route spanned 125 miles from Winchester, and even more to Harrisburg, requiring wagons pulled by either four horses or six mules. These wagons had a carrying capacity of 2000-2500 pounds but moved at a slow pace of about 3 miles per hour, which could be further reduced by unfavorable road conditions. The animals themselves had substantial needs, with mules requiring 9 pounds of grain, 10 pounds of fodder, and 12 gallons of water daily, while horses needed 14 pounds of grain, 14 pounds of fodder, and 10 gallons of water. Additionally, the animals required horseshoes, which required manpower to apply. The waste disposal issue was also daunting, with each animal producing 10 pounds of manure and 2 gallons of urine daily. Failing to properly care for the animals would result in decreased efficiency, as they would move more slowly and carry less until they eventually broke down, rendering the army immobile. The sheer size of Lee's trains, stretching for dozens of miles, further complicated matters as infantry and artillery had to share the same roads as the wagons, leading to traffic congestion and delays. The meticulous administration of the order of march was necessary to prevent pile-ups at crossroads, requiring significant labor. Overall, these logistical challenges posed a nightmare for Lee, impacting the timing of Longstreet's arrival on the field, the availability of weapons and armaments, the organization of the three corps in battle, and the retreat after the battle.

General Lee relied on an incomplete map during the Battle of Gettysburg, as he did not possess a detailed map of the town itself. The map he had was a product of the efforts of Jedediah Hotchkiss, a topographical engineer, who had been tasked with creating a small-scale map of the region encompassing northern Virginia, central Maryland, and south-central Pennsylvania. Due to the vast scope of the project and limited time, Hotchkiss had to rely on Pennsylvania county maps to complete the map. He meticulously penciled a grid on a heavy watercolor paper and transcribed the map onto this grid, resulting in a visually appealing yet incomplete representation of the area.

The map used by General Lee was crafted on cream-colored paper and featured red pencil lines to denote roadways, blue markings for rivers and streams, and black ink for the names of towns, mills, blacksmith shops, and major topographical features. The attention to detail extended to including the names of every rural resident in impeccable handwriting. However, despite its aesthetic appeal, the map lacked crucial information such as mild declivities, small hillocks, woods, road surfaces, and fording sites. Additionally, it failed to depict the now-famous landmarks of the battle, including Seminary Ridge, Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill, and Little Round Top.

The absence of comprehensive maps placed the ANV at a significant disadvantage, particularly when a thorough understanding of the local geography was crucial. These omissions had consequences during the battle. On July 1, two regiments from Confederate Brigadier General Joseph R. Davis's brigade were lost when his soldiers unexpectedly jumped into an unmapped twenty-foot-deep railroad cut and were subsequently captured by Colonel Rufus R. Dawes's 6th Wisconsin Regiment. On July 2, as Lee strategized to encircle Meade's left flank, his engineer, Captain Samuel R. Johnston, claimed to have ridden to Little Round Top and found it unoccupied. However, the area was teeming with Union troops. Likely, Johnston had mistakenly identified Warfield Ridge or Houck's Ridge as being vacant. Furthermore, when Johnston was tasked with guiding Hood's and McLaws's divisions to the southern end of the battlefield in preparation for an early afternoon assault on the Union left, he had to retrace his steps and march in the opposite direction due to his lack of a map and his misunderstanding of the area's topographical features. Lastly, the map itself did not accurately depict the Round Tops, nor did it adequately represent the undulating and wooded regions east of the Emmitsburg Road, including the terrain surrounding Weikert's and Trestle's farms, Rose's Woods, the Wheat Field, and the valley between Houck's Ridge and Little Round Top.

The Invasion Begins

On June 3rd, the ANV initiated their departure from Fredericksburg, marking the beginning of their movement. The initial phase of their march led them to Culpeper Court House, to advance further to the Shenandoah Valley while being shielded by the cavalry division under the command of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart. However, the Union cavalry, led by Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton detected Stuart's concentration. Believing that Stuart was planning a raid towards Washington from his right flank, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, the commander of the AoP, instructed Pleasonton to cross the Rappahannock River and eliminate the Confederate cavalry.

The Battle of Brandy Station

Taking place on the 9th of June, 1863, the Battle of Brandy Station emerged as the largest cavalry engagement of the Civil War. In a surprise attack at dawn, Pleasonton launched columns across the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford and Kelly's Ford. Following the successful crossing at Beverly Ford, the Union troopers launched an assault on Stuart's camp near a rail station known as Brandy Station on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. The Confederate forces swiftly regrouped, and the Union troops encountered fierce resistance at St. James Church and the Richard Cunningham farm. Simultaneously, the Union cavalry divided, with one division advancing towards Brandy Station and the other heading to Stevensburg. The arrival of Union cavalry at Brandy Station posed a threat to Stuart's rear position, prompting him to skillfully maneuver his brigades. The ensuing clash between the two sides occurred in mounted combat on a lengthy, undulating ridge named Fleetwood Hill, situated near the station. Meanwhile, Pleasonton's forces at Stevensburg faced obstacles from Confederate horsemen and were unable to penetrate Stuart's defenses. After enduring fourteen hours of intense fighting, Pleasonton ultimately withdrew from the field.

The Union suffered a total of 907 casualties, including 69 killed, 352 wounded, and 486 missing or captured, out of approximately 11,000 troops. The Confederates had 523 casualties out of about 9,500 troops. Consequently, the battle can be considered inconclusive. Union forces withdrew without discovering Lee's infantry camped near Culpeper, which was the mission assigned to Stuart. Nevertheless, Hooker deduced that if Stuart had ventured that far north, Lee must be planning a further northward movement into Maryland. Consequently, Hooker promptly initiated the movement of the AoP across the Potomac River, well before Stuart commenced his ride around the Union Army. Therefore, many argue that it was a strategic victory for the Union. Stuart, however, contended that the battle constituted a tactical victory for the Confederates since they had fewer casualties, held the field at the end of the day, and successfully repelled Pleasonton's attack. Nevertheless, General Stuart suffered a significant blow to his reputation in the Court of Public Opinion. He fell victim to two surprise attacks, which the cavalry was expected to prevent. The Southern press generally expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome, and subordinate officers criticized Pleasonton for not aggressively defeating Stuart. Although Hooker had ordered Pleasonton to "disperse and destroy" the Confederate cavalry near Culpeper, Pleasonton justified his actions by claiming that he had only been instructed to conduct a "reconnaissance in force toward Culpeper." Consequently, Pleasonton did not gain much reputationally from this battle. It is worth noting that this battle marked the end of the Confederate cavalry's dominance in the Eastern theater of the war. From this point onward, the Federal cavalry grew stronger and more confident. Therefore, from this perspective, it can be considered a limited operational victory for the Union.

The Early Stages of the Campaign

To maintain the illusion that he was still at Marye's Heights in Fredericksburg, Lee had to ensure that Hooker remained unaware of his northward movement. To achieve this, Lee left AP Hill behind and protect Richmond, effectively holding back Sedgwick and the VI Corps. Although Hooker was aware that Lee was on the move, he lacked precise information regarding its route and destination.

Lee's strategic position was precarious, as his forces were dangerously spread out. On June 12th, the Confederate army extended over a vast expanse of 70 land miles, with no direct roads connecting its wings. If Hooker had been privy to Lee's position on that day, the Confederate general would have been highly vulnerable. However, Stuart, the Confederate cavalry commander, skillfully concealed this vulnerability. A series of battles with Union cavalry prevented them from ascertaining the location and strength of Lee's army, thus obscuring its direction and ultimate objective:

Battle of Winchester (Second Battle of Winchester) (June 13–15, 1863): This battle occurred in Winchester, Virginia, which was a strategic town in the Shenandoah Valley. Confederate General Richard Ewell's forces defeated Union General Robert Milroy's garrison, securing control of the area.

Battle of Aldie (June 17, 1863): The Battle of Aldie was part of the wider cavalry engagements known as the Battle of Middleburg, which occurred as part of the Gettysburg campaign. Union and Confederate cavalry clashed in fierce fighting as they vied for control of key positions.

Battle of Middleburg (June 17–19, 1863): The Battle of Middleburg took place near the town of Middleburg, Virginia. It involved both mounted and dismounted actions between Union and Confederate cavalry forces.

Although the movement north is often portrayed as a display of Lee’s cunning while Hooker was deceived, both sides were screened from the other. Both sides were effectively screened from each other. Moreover, it was widely known that Lee intended to invade, prompting Hooker to make numerous attempts to locate the ANV. Maj Gen Sharpe of the BMI had early on suggested that Lee would move in a northwesterly direction, a prediction that proved to be accurate. In light of this information, Hooker dispatched several cavalry patrols in search of Lee. On June 5, Brig Gen John Buford reported Confederate cavalry presence in Culpepper, which led to Sharpe's one error in intelligence assessment, suggesting that the northward movement might only be a cavalry raid. Despite the efforts of brigades led by Gregg, Munford, and Duffie to locate Lee, the Rebel cavalry remained elusive. It is important to acknowledge that Hooker did what he could, but his cavalry ultimately failed to outmaneuver Stuart. With this phase of the campaign concluded Lee was now prepared to cross the Potomac River and proceed into Maryland.

JEB Stuart gets lost

One of the most controversial aspects of the Gettysburg Campaign was Jeb Stuart’s absence after crossing the Potomac until July 2nd. His absence had significant consequences, as it left Lee without crucial cavalry reconnaissance and intelligence. The lack of information regarding the Union Army's strength, positions, and intentions greatly impacted Lee's decision-making process and contributed to the uncertainties he faced in the initial stages of the battle. Many historians speculate that if Stuart had effectively screened the front of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee would not have been caught off guard by the proximity of the AoP, and the Battle of Gettysburg might have unfolded differently. Stuart's desire to redeem himself after the surprise attack at Brandy Station and his eagerness to outmaneuver the Union army led him to attempt to circumnavigate the enemy once again. However, his plans were hindered by encounters with Union troops, forcing him to deviate from his intended path and ultimately leaving him unable to effectively screen General Ewell's right flank.

The orders given by Lee to Stuart on June 22 have sparked controversy ever since. Stuart, upon separating from the main force on June 23, was granted permission by Lee to ride around the Union army unhindered, cross the Potomac River, and provide cover for the right flank of Ewell's Corps as it marched north. However, Stuart's movement on June 25 was met with opposition from the Union 2nd Corps near Haymarket, Virginia, preventing him from advancing northward. Despite this setback, Stuart decided to press on. His original intention was to circumvent the Union army by starting from its rear, but to his surprise, the Union army shifted northward, turning his position into its eastern flank. Encountering more Union troops near Fairfax Court House, Stuart was forced to move further eastward and could not turn north until reaching Rowser's Ford on the Potomac River. As a result, Stuart found himself positioned to the east of the Union army, unable to effectively screen Ewell's right flank.

Stuart had taken his three most capable cavalry brigades, leaving the remaining two brigades without strong leadership. Approximately 5000 cavalry troops were left behind with Lee, and the commander of this force was aware that Hooker had crossed the Potomac River between June 25 and 27. However, this crucial information was not relayed to Generals Longstreet and Lee, leaving them without reliable reconnaissance. Stuart did send a dispatch to General Lee on June 27, informing him of Hooker's crossing, but it never reached him. A copy of the dispatch did reach Richmond, but no one there took the initiative to confirm this information with the Commanding General.

Lee specifically instructed Stuart to move northward, protect the Confederate army's right flank, and maintain communication with Lee's forces. It was crucial for Stuart to keep the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) informed about the movements and activities of the Union Army, as well as act as a screen to prevent the Union forces from gathering intelligence on Lee's army. Lee emphasized the importance of timely and accurate information, and he also wanted Stuart to leave enough cavalry behind to cover the mountain passes in the army's rear and protect Ewell's advance with the rest of his force. However, beyond these instructions, Stuart had considerable discretion in how he accomplished these objectives.

Stuart's interpretation of the orders differed from Lee's intentions due to his ambitions and the allure of bypassing the AoP. Instead of maintaining close contact with Lee's army, Stuart embarked on an extensive raid around the Union forces. Lee had specifically directed Stuart to safeguard the mountain passes with a portion of his force while the ANV was still positioned south of the Potomac River. Subsequently, Stuart was supposed to cross the river with the remaining troops and protect the right flank of Ewell's Second Corps. However, Stuart opted for an alternative route, choosing to lead his three best brigades between the AoP and Washington. He proceeded northward through Rockville to Westminster and eventually into Pennsylvania, to seize supplies and cause disruption near the enemy capital. Instead of taking a more direct path north near the Blue Ridge Mountains, Stuart decided to reach Ewell's flank by taking his three best brigades, namely those commanded by Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton, Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, and Col. John R. Chambliss (who replaced the injured Brig. Gen. W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee), between the Union army and Washington. This strategic choice was made in the hopes of capturing supplies along the way and creating chaos near the enemy capital.

Furthermore, despite Stuart's direct orders for Brigadier General Beverly Robertson to join Lee's forces when General Hooker advanced, Robertson displayed a lackadaisical approach to his duties. Instead, Robertson focused on guarding the mountain gaps and the baggage train, ultimately failing to arrive at the battle. The brigades that Stuart left behind included Imboden's Valley brigade, which was temporarily attached to the army and more accustomed to partisan activities, as well as the two "regular" brigades of Robertson and Jones. Robertson was regarded as the outcast of the ANV's cavalry command, having previously been dismissed, while Jones, although competent, earned the nickname "Grumble" due to his difficult nature. Lee did not place as much trust in these brigades or their commanders compared to Stuart and the three brigades he chose to accompany him.

Stuart and his three brigades at 1 a.m. on June 25. Unfortunately for Stuart's plan, the Union army's movement to defend Washington and Baltimore was underway, so his proposed route was blocked by columns of Federal infantry, forcing him to veer farther to the east than either he or General Lee had anticipated. This prevented Stuart from linking up with Ewell as ordered and deprived Lee of the use of his prime cavalry force, the "eyes, and ears" of the army while advancing into unfamiliar enemy territory.

Stuart's decision to seize a wagon train at Rockville, Maryland on June 28, 1863, was motivated by various factors. Stuart believed that capturing the wagon train would provide the Confederate army with valuable supplies and provisions, such as food, ammunition, and other resources necessary for their operations. Additionally, Stuart may have seen this as an opportunity to disrupt the Union's supply lines, causing panic and confusion among their forces. By inflicting damage and depriving the enemy of vital supplies, Stuart aimed to weaken the Union's logistical capabilities and potentially hinder their ability to respond effectively. Moreover, capturing such a significant wagon train could have boosted Confederate morale and showcased Stuart's cavalry as a formidable force. It could have been a way for Stuart to demonstrate his effectiveness as a commander and restore his reputation, which had been tarnished by earlier criticisms in southern newspapers. However, it is important to note that Stuart's decision to prioritize capturing the wagon train over gathering critical intelligence on the Union army's movements further delayed his reunion with General Robert E. Lee's forces. Although this train would have posed a logistical hindrance to Stuart's advance, he interpreted Lee's orders as emphasizing the importance of acquiring supplies. This interpretation aligns with Lee's campaign objectives and goals, justifying Stuart's actions.

Part of the reason for Stuart’s tardiness was that he was caught up in the rear and flank of the Union army.  From the time he crossed the Potomac to arriving at Gettysburg required nearly 8 days of non-stop marching for over 200 miles and fighting nearly every day.  Stuart engaged in 4 skirmishes and 3 actual battles trying to make his way to find Ewell. Skirmishes included Thoroughfare Gap June 25, Fairfax Courthouse June 27, Rockville June 28, and Westminster June 29; Battles at Hanover June 30, Hunterstown July 2, and Carlisle July 2. Few accounts of Stuart’s ride note that he faced genuine challenges and required astute tactics to ensure the preservation of his command.

On June 30, General Jubal Early, who would later blame other Confederate generals for the loss at Gettysburg, including Stuart, heard the sounds of battle at Hanover. Despite being aware that Stuart was supposed to be locating him, Early made no effort to ascertain the identity of the combatants. Remarkably, Early was within a mere 5 miles of the battle, and had he made contact, Stuart could have arrived at Gettysburg on July 1.

The Plan of Invasion

The ANV traversed the Blue Ridge Mountains and advanced north through the Shenandoah Valley, capturing the Union garrison at Winchester, in the Second Battle of Winchester, June 13–15, 1863. After crossing the Potomac at Falling Waters, Lee made the strategic decision to divide his forces during their march northward to maintain secrecy regarding their exact location and to sow confusion among the occupied areas. Lee aimed to demonstrate to the people of the North that he held the advantage in the conflict. Additionally, the division of forces was necessary for the procurement of supplies and helped to prevent traffic congestion. It also hinted at Lee's intention to engage in open battle rather than launching a direct assault on a fort or initiating a siege of a city. However, the chosen western route seems indirect if Lee's ultimate goal was to target Baltimore, Washington, or Philadelphia. It is often suggested that Harrisburg was his intended objective, but if so, he was planning on its capture with just one corps. Ewell had swiftly advanced northward towards Harrisburg, while Longstreet remained concealed behind South Mountain until their exit at Cashtown.

However, the AoP was in pursuit and had reached Frederick, Maryland, before Lee realized his opponent had crossed the Potomac. General Hooker had to anticipate a potential attack on Washington or Baltimore. He took measures to defend these crucial locations by mobilizing as many troops as possible. In the absence of concrete information, Hooker made the prudent decision to concentrate his forces and secure the roads leading to the capital to thwart any potential assault. Given the circumstances, Hooker's decision to remain centrally located was the correct course of action.

Meade takes over

After Chancellorsville, calls for Hooker to be replaced were widespread. With Lee on the move, somewhere, and realizing that a major battle was soon to take place, a decision had to be made by Lincoln and Stanton. Darius Couch, as second in command, would have been the obvious choice to replace Hooker, and Lincoln offered him the position. Couch instead resigned his post to create the Department of the Susquehanna, where he brilliantly held off General Gordon with the militia at Sporting Hill on June 30. He recommended Meade instead.

Following Couch's refusal, President Lincoln held a private meeting with Major General John Reynolds on June 2, during which he reportedly inquired about Reynolds' willingness to assume command of the Army of the Potomac. Reynolds, however, expressed his readiness to accept the position only if he could operate independently and free from the political influences that had plagued previous commanders. Understandably, Lincoln could not agree to such a condition, leading to an impasse in their discussion.

The lack of confidence in General Hooker expressed by his senior officers, as well as by General-in-chief Henry Halleck, further exacerbated the situation. Hooker suggested the evacuation of Harper's Ferry and the consolidation of his forces, but his demand to regain control of the garrison or else resign provided Secretary of War Stanton and President Lincoln with the perfect opportunity to accept his resignation. In a moment of impulse, Hooker tendered his resignation, which was promptly accepted. Subsequently, when General Meade assumed command, he immediately made the same request and was granted the authority over the garrison.

Stanton dispatched a civilian engineer, Herman Haupt, his chief of railroads, to oversee the management of the railroads, including the civilian lines. This individual possessed extensive knowledge of the area and coincidentally owned a house in Gettysburg.. On June 30, he informed General Halleck that the Confederates were planning to gather near that vicinity. On July 1, he strategically utilized a single-track line and organized the operation of 5 or 6 10-car trains, one after another, to swiftly transport goods from Baltimore to Westminster. He also instructed Meade's quartermasters to have troops prepared to unload the cargo upon arrival and promptly send the trains back. To ensure effective communication in the absence of functioning telegraph lines, he established a communication line resembling a pony express system that followed the tracks. By July 3, this well-coordinated operation had successfully transported 1500 tons of cargo to the battlefield and returned 2000 wounded soldiers to hospitals in Baltimore. Notably, when President Lincoln delivered his address in November, he traveled by train from Baltimore to Gettysburg on the same line.

Henry Thomas Harrison

On the evening of June 28th, Lee was informed by a spy that Hooker had been replaced by Meade and that Meade was moving toward him. The spy, a diminutive actor who worked with General Longstreet, was known to provide highly accurate information. General Lee had to swiftly adapt his strategies. Recognizing that Meade was a cautious and meticulous commander who was unlikely to make any major errors, Lee needed to devise a more careful plan. The immediate priority was to ensure the concentration of his widely dispersed army, which extended from Chambersburg to Harrisburg. The initial step in this process was to gather his army in a centralized location. Consequently, Lee directed his troops to converge around the crossroads towns of Cashtown and Gettysburg.

Pipe Creek Circular

Meanwhile, Meade decided that his best course of action was to stop looking for Lee and instead let Lee look for him. On June 30, Meade relocated his headquarters to Taneytown, MD, and issued two orders. The first order, known as the Pipe Creek Circular, outlined the construction of a defensive perimeter, while the second order directed a general advance toward Gettysburg starting on July 1. Gettysburg was located between 5 to 25 miles away from each of Meade's seven infantry corps. The Pipe Creek Line served as a defensive barrier to protect against potential attacks on Baltimore and Washington D.C. It also acted as a reserve line in case a retreat from Gettysburg became necessary for the Union forces.

The Pipe Creek Line was positioned just north of Westminster, Maryland, and held strategic importance for the AoP.: the Western Maryland Railroad had its terminus in Westminster, making it the primary supply line for the army in the region, including Gettysburg. Safeguarding this crucial supply route was of utmost importance. The Pipe Creek Line followed Parr Ridge, a significant ridge that stretched from Manchester in the east to Middleburg in the west, running on an east/west axis. Except for some lower ground near Middleburg, the entire position was situated on high ground that was easily defensible. It was believed that this strong position would be nearly impregnable unless Lee could successfully flank it.

The Day Before. Brig Gen John Buford arrived in Gettysburg on the morning of June 30, accompanied by 2 cavalry brigades and approximately 3000 soldiers. Upon his arrival, he was informed by residents that Confederate soldiers were in the vicinity. One of AP Hill's brigades, led by Brig Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew, ventured towards Gettysburg. According to the memoirs of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, Pettigrew's division commander, Pettigrew was sent to search for supplies, particularly shoes, in the town. With a brigade of 2700 men, Pettigrew conducted a scouting movement. During this movement, he encountered a physician named Dr John O'Neal, who was on a house call. After inspecting O'Neal's medical equipment, Pettigrew inquired about the presence of Union troops, to which O'Neal responded negatively. However, as they approached the town, Pettigrew spotted what he believed to be Union cavalry in the distance. He did not bring on an engagement, as he had been ordered, and returned to Generals Heth and Hill to report.

Confederate Response: When Pettigrew told Hill and Heth about what he had seen, neither general believed that there was a substantial Federal force in or near the town, suspecting that it had been only Pennsylvania militia. It is perplexing to consider why neither General Heth nor General Hill placed trust in Pettigrew's observations. One possible explanation is that both Heth and Hill were relatively new to their positions and had reputations for impulsive decision-making. In terms of practical experience, Heth did not possess significantly more than Pettigrew.

Furthermore, Pettigrew's background as a non-West Pointer from a wealthy family, coupled with his lack of military experience before the war, may have contributed to the skepticism towards his report. Additionally, the fact that Pettigrew's men were freshly outfitted with new uniforms and rifles, and his staff consisted of fellow aristocrats, may have given the impression that they were inexperienced and unfamiliar with the realities of battle. Consequently, Hill may have discounted Pettigrew's interpretation due to these factors, leading to a failure to take his report seriously.

Union Response: In contradistinction, Buford had also spotted Pettigrew’s men. He recognized that he was facing a sizeable force of rebels because they had moved without vedettes as a screen. Buford's identification of a significant enemy presence in the area was taken seriously by his superior, Gen Reynolds. Buford was the ideal individual in the ideal location at the opportune moment. He had attended West Point, was acquainted with many of the generals as school friends, had served in the US First Dragoons, had commanded infantry, and had recently led his cavalry division at Brandy Station and Upperville. His military expertise was highly regarded; Buford and Reynolds had trust and confidence in each other, and their shared experiences at Second Manassas had demonstrated the consequences of disregarding accurate reports from a subordinate. Therefore, when Buford requested close support, Reynolds promptly initiated the advance. The outcome of battles hinges on such intricate details; these specifics determine the victor and the vanquished.

Recognizing that the Confederate movement was originating from the northwest, Buford strategically positioned his men along the roads in this vicinity. Anticipating that any engagement involving his division would serve as a delaying tactic, he dismounted his troopers and stationed them on the low ridges to the north and northwest of the town, aiming to buy time for the army to arrive and secure the advantageous positions to defend McPherson and Seminary Ridges.

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References

·      James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988; and

·      https://www.historynet.com/conquer-peace-lees-goals-gettysburg-campaign/

·      https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/workspace/handleMediaPlayer?qvq=&trs=&mi=&lunaMediaId=RUMSEY~8~1~26945~1100244

·      https://www.historynet.com/were-maps-lees-real-enemy-at-gettysburg/

·      Eric J Wittenberg and J David Petruzzi, Plenty of Blame to Go Around. SavasBeattie, 2006.

·      Harry W Pfanz, Gettysburg – The First Day. The University of North Carolina, 2010.

·      Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.

·      Kent Masterson Brown, Meade at Gettysburg. A Study in Command. University of North     Carolina, 2021.

·      Lloyd W Klein, https://www.rebellionresearch.com/why-did-lee-want-gettysburg-2?fbclid=IwAR3BX-K30era80r4YbpIK7akPaYj4JauC3XoaHZYFtvj8lTQzuQ3v1rfD5c&fs=e&s=cl ;

·      https://www.rebellionresearch.com/what-were-robert-e-lees-goals-for-invading-pennsylvania-in-1863?fbclid=IwAR02kXsGHSKe992kDLtyFQy41v5igLfai3YrNN6Fb8v9SDFPDJxywT9zKZ0 ; and

·      https://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2023/8/24/logistics-challenges-of-the-army-of-northern-virginia-in-the-gettysburg-campaign

·      John B Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War. Louisiana State University Press, 1993.

·      Scott L Mingus and Eric J Wittenberg, If We Are Striking for Pennsylvania.Vol1. SavasBeattie 2022.

The industrial Revolution and Society Today

The Industrial Revolution was the passport to the future. Innovation propelled our economies, technology, and transportation further than ever. Britain, the first country to enter the Industrial revolution, set the tone for how capitalism would affect societies, economies, and the environment across the world. Unfortunately, as innovation and efficiency progressed, working conditions did not. Julius Olavarria explains.

A hurrier and two thrusters moving coal. From the 1853 book The White Slaves of England by J. Cobden.

During the Industrial revolution, there were many examples of maltreatment. One example is a hurrier, “A hurrier, also sometimes called a coal drawer or coal thruster, was a child or woman employed by a collier to transport the coal that they had mined.” 

Coal mine managers strapped women and children to carts, like animals, and made them crawl through mine shafts for 12-hour shifts. These mines were incredibly hot, reaching over 100 degrees Fahrenheit (38C) at times - workers never saw sunlight or breaks and had to hunch over for the entire workday. Jobs like these are textbook examples of the horrid conditions brought by the Industrial Revolution, especially for women and children working in factories or mines.

Jobs like these continued for a long time. For almost 80 years in the 18th and 19th centuries, women and children were subject to the worst of the worst. Generations would go by without much progress. Young lungs were filled with pollution leading to unhealthy lives and untimely deaths. Lives were like the unceasing, monotonous rhythms of the industrial machines. Hurriers saw no light at the end of their social tunnels - or in this case, mineshafts.

Factory Act of 1833

The Factory Act of 1833 set age requirements for child labor. The British House of Commons declared that “children under the age of 9” could not work any longer. Individuals aged 10 through 17 were subject to more restrictions, working fewer hours and in better conditions. This seemed like a win in the social books but was not popular in the slightest.

Sure, setting age requirements to work is great. In what world should a 4-year-old work in a coal mine? Children should be outside, exploring, learning, and having fun. They deserve a childhood just like everyone deserves a childhood. Setting age requirements for work is the first step towards getting them out of factories and into a normal life, right?

In fact, it is wrong.

In a normal working family, the children have to work because they have to. Believe it or not, children aren’t great left to their own devices. Usually, the wife of the family would look after the children during their new-born years, but for working families that wasn’t always possible: the wife needs to work, and if the wife works the child works too. Children, with this in mind, would work starting at ages 3 or 4.

It’s a sad reality. The family is so poor they can’t afford to hire a nanny or watch over their children. (And yes, nannies existed back then - interestingly enough they can be dated back as early as 800 B.C!)

Working children

I digress. Because the working families needed their children to work, the Factory Act of 1833 received a lot of pushback. Women were forced to stay at home or the families were forced to hire nannies. Some families were driven to the depths of poverty - a majority of the family’s wage earners were forced to stay at home.

Then, the Coal Mines Act of 1842 came along - the second act on the way to reform. This prohibited children under the age of 10, who could fit in the tiny mineshafts, from working there. Women were also prohibited as part of this act: major protests came as a result.

It is important to note that social critiques reported on the conditions of the Industrial Revolution. These authors, writers, and early muckrakers convinced the British parliament to set restrictions for women and children. They believed that they could improve conditions for the country by improving the conditions for workers.

Protests from women and children who were limited to work erupted - a paradoxical outcome. These women and children should be grateful: they don’t have to work in these horrible conditions, right?

Wrong.

Losing money

The women and children lost their earnings. The government stepped in and took their money. Now their families would be driven to even greater poverty - there’s no way to escape their social position besides picking up the most brutal of jobs. They were denied even that - they’re angry.

Reformers and parliament quickly realized the need for a solution for women and children. Women and children needed better lives but also needed to be productive. Women needed to make money while children needed a childhood. Possibly the most reasonable and ingenious solution to these problems was education - compulsory elementary education funded by the state.

Acts up until 1870 provided education for the children of poor families, while women took the role of teaching. Women who originally had lost their jobs in the mines could work in schools funded by the government. Children who originally had lost their jobs could be cared for by teachers at school, learning in the process. Families could get back on track because of the new system of education.

So this, finally, is the interesting reason why more women are schoolteachers. It all started in the Industrial Revolution- the innovation, factories, and working conditions then the critiques, acts, and protests all led up to the eventual creation of elementary education. Education acted as both an escape and outlet for women while giving children the childhood they deserved. To think this had historical roots doesn’t sound so crazy now, does it?

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Julius writes at: juliusolavarria.com.

The Victorian-era Volunteer Rifle Corps

The British volunteer rifle corps were formed on May 12, 1859 by Secretary of State for War Jonathan Peel, as a response to public fears of a French invasion or Britain. Italian, Felice Orsini  attempted to use a bomb made by the Birmingham Arms Company to blow up Napoleon III, Napoleon Bonaparte’s great Nephew, in Paris on January 14, 1858 . Despite recent alliances and diplomatic efforts, the French still felt the British were responsible due to the fact that an English city manufactured the bomb and consequently threatened invasions. Due to escalations on both sides, war seemed imminent.

Here, Charis Gambon explains how the volunteer rifle corps were set-up in response.

Jonathan Peel in the 1860s.

With the regular British Army largely fighting abroad a reserve was needed to become the first defence in the UK, with the aim of slowing the French invading force down in order to provide the regular army with enough time to return and take over, should the issue ever arise. Volunteer corps were to be raised under the provisions of the Volunteer Act 1804 which was last used during the Napoleonic Era.  The statistics from Ian F.W Beckett demonstrate the size of the volunteer force in England, Wales, and Scotland. These percentages were calculated based on number of volunteers per 100 people in the total population.  In 1861 the total for England was 0.629%, in Wales 0.655%, and in Scotland 1.119%.  Overall, there were 161,239 enrolled members within the volunteer force in 1861.

Each county of the country possessed at least one volunteer rifle corps, with many units possessing several at the peak of the movement. These corps were only to be formed on the recommendation of the county’s lord-lieutenant. Officers of the movement gained their commission from the lord-lieutenant, many of which had served in the regular army during the Crimea War.

Costs

Members had to attend eight days drill and exercise in four months, or 24 days within a year in order to be a part of a rifle volunteer corps. Additionally members were to provide their own arms and equipment, but as stated by Ian F. W. Beckett they did receive a 30% discount on ammunition from the government. However, this was not as generous as it may seem as the government were the only source for the ammunition. There was also a cost to join the volunteer rifle corps which was set at between 5s and £1.15s.6d. Enfield rifles with bayonet and scabbard cost £4.10s, with trousers and jacket costing the same.

The volunteer rifle corps were largely filled with middle class men, due to the fact that they could afford to purchase their uniform, Enfield rifle and ammunition. Additionally, the middle class were less likely to be in the regular army and consequently sought to make the volunteer movement their version of a men’s club.  The men were often seen as ‘playing soldiers’ by the regular army.  The social aspect of the volunteer movement was immense too. Typically men would take their family with them as volunteers would set up a camp for a week. The camps were seen as an opportunity to show off their wives and finery. Volunteer units would also meet up with other units for rifle competitions, with the biggest competition of the year being held at Wimbledon in London.

Shooting

To be classed as proficient and allowed to be a part of the volunteer rifle corps a volunteer was required to be able to shoot at a distance of 700 yards. This distance would also gain the volunteer a one star badge. To gain two stars a volunteer would have to be able to accurately shoot 900 yards and to gain three stars a volunteer would need to be accurate to 1,200 yards. The best shot in the unit earned himself a special badge that had crossed rifles on it - this signified that he was the most accurate shot.

The volunteers were initially mocked in sources such as PUNCH magazine, and were detested by the regulars, who felt they made a mockery of the military. As a result of this, units wore mostly grey uniforms (70%), the next most popular colour was green, emulating the rifle corps of the regular army (20%), and an assortment wore other colours; however only a few units wore red, and only briefly before being pushed away from this by the regulars. There was actually an approved uniform created by the war office for volunteer riflemen to wear, but no units opted to wear this uniform. Volunteer rifle units could create their own uniforms which they would then submit to the Lord- Lieutenant of the land for approval.  The ability to create uniforms led to a wide variety of uniforms being worn by corps across the country.  There were also generic cap badges and buttons created for all units to wear but similarly to the uniform each unit opted to create their own instead.

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US Civil War – The Confederate General Edward Kirby Smith

General Edmund Kirby Smith was a remarkable man who also was perhaps the Confederacy’s most successful general, even including Robert E. Lee. Because he was transferred to the Trans-Mississippi in 1863, most history narratives tend to lose track of him at that point, discounting the fact that he was the de facto ruler of that part of the country for 2 years. Lloyd W Klein explains.

General Edmund Kirby Smith, circa 1862.

Background

Smith was born in St Augustine, Florida. His parents were from Connecticut.  At the time of his birth, his parents were residing on the frontier, a region that was previously under Spanish control but had recently been acquired by the United States. Smith's father, Joseph Lee Smith, was appointed as a Superior Court judge in the newly acquired Florida Territory, while his grandfather, Ephraim Kirby, had served as an officer under the esteemed George Washington.

Despite his family's non-military background, Smith's parents insisted that he attend West Point, following his sister's marriage to a graduate from the artillery service in Florida. He followed his older brother in enrolling at West Point where Smith earned a respectable

25th ranking within his class of 41 cadets. However, it was not only military pursuits that captivated Smith's interests. Throughout his life, he harbored a profound fascination for botany and eventually became a highly accomplished botanist. His dedication to this field led to the creation of remarkable collections, which he later donated to renowned institutions such as Harvard, the Smithsonian, and UNC.

Smith's military career flourished during the Mexican War, where he actively participated in significant battles and eventually rose to the rank of captain. Subsequently, he was assigned to combat the Comanche, where he ascended to the rank of major. Smith's military progress continued as he became a captain in the Second US Cavalry, a position bestowed upon him by Secretary of War Jefferson Davis. Serving under the command of notable leaders such as Albert Sidney Johnston and Robert E. Lee, Smith found himself among a select group of officers from the 2nd Cavalry who achieved the esteemed rank of full general, alongside Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, and John Bell Hood. Notably, from 1855 until the conclusion of the Civil War, Smith's valet was Alexander Darnes, a 15-year-old enslaved individual of mixed race who belonged to Smith's family.

The War Begins

Smith was in Texas with the 2nd Cavalry when the war started.  On January 31, 1861, Smith was promoted to major and became commander of Camp Colorado. When secessionists began the seizure of Federal property, Smith initially refused to surrender his post to Colonel Henry E. McCulloch's Texas Militia forces but then changed his mind.

With secession, he resigned from the US Army and entered the Confederate Army as a lieutenant colonel, He served as General Joseph Johnston's chief of staff at Harper's Ferry as Confederate troops organized in the Shenandoah Valley. On June 17, 1861, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general and placed in command of the 4th brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah. He led this brigade at First Manassas, where he was wounded in action in the head and neck. While recuperating he served as a commander of a Florida department, then promoted to major general and division commander in the ANV.

Although his wound at First Manassas was described as “serious”, In August 1861, Smith met Cassie Selden. While recovering from being wounded he still found time for wooing. The couple married on September 24.

Command of East Tennessee

After recovering from his wound and entering into marriage, he was dispatched to the western region to assume command of the Army of East Tennessee. On October 11, 1861, Smith was promoted to the rank of major general and took command from General Felix Zollicoffer in the District of East Tennessee. Smith's time in Tennessee was met with controversy as he adopted a strict approach, implementing martial law and suspending habeas corpus. Numerous individuals suspected of being Unionists were imprisoned or expelled, leading to a surge in anti-Confederate sentiment.

In August 1862, Smith's army, consisting of 6,500 soldiers, advanced through eastern Kentucky in support of General Braxton Bragg's invading Army of Mississippi. The objective of Bragg and Smith was to bolster pro-Confederate political factions in the Union-controlled border state and recruit new soldiers. While Bragg led his forces northward from Tennessee, Smith directed his troops towards Richmond, Kentucky, targeting the railroad hub in Lexington and the state capital in Frankfort. By August 28th, the Confederate advance, spearheaded by division commander General Patrick R. Cleburne, approached Richmond, Kentucky. Smith's Army of East Tennessee numbered 19,000, while Bragg's Army of Tennessee consisted of 35,000.

On August 29, 1862, a portion of Smith's army encountered an equally sized contingent of Nelson's forces, estimated to be between 6,000 and 7,000 troops. The Battle of Richmond ensued for two days, culminating on August 30, and resulted in a resounding victory for the Confederates. There were at least 5,000 Union casualties versus 750 Confederate losses. Also, substantial territory was surrendered, including the cities of Lexington, Richmond, and Frankfort, the state capital. When Smith subsequently seized control of Frankfort on September 2, it was the only state capital under Federal control to fall throughout the entire war. Out of the 6,800 Union soldiers engaged in the battle, approximately 4,000 were captured, while the remaining either fled towards Lexington or perished or sustained injuries on the battlefield. Additional losses were incurred during the battle, including the capture of Brigadier General Mahlon D. Manson and the injury of Nelson, who suffered a neck wound.

Promotion to Command of the Trans-Mississippi & Perryville

Smith was promoted to the newly established rank of lieutenant-general on October 9, 1862. He took command of the 3rd Corps, Army of Tennessee. Subsequently, on January 14, 1863, Smith was transferred to lead the Trans-Mississippi Department; this department included Arkansas, Missouri, Texas, western Louisiana, Arizona Territory, and the Indian Territory. Smith was given the responsibility of leading the Confederate forces in the Trans-Mississippi Theater, which encompassed the western Confederate states. In this position, he successfully maintained Confederate control over the region for 2 years. Throughout the remainder of the war, he remained stationed west of the Mississippi River, with a portion of his time spent in Shreveport, Louisiana. By October, Buell's army had received reinforcements and had become strong enough to become the aggressor. Smith and Bragg, however, were unprepared for Buell's advance and had not yet combined their armies.

Bragg recognized the importance of controlling Kentucky for the defense of the Western theater. This realization was influenced by Kirby Smith, who believed that launching an offensive action could have significant implications for the war. Bragg relocated his 30,000 troops to Chattanooga to join forces with Smith. They met on July 31 and decided to divide their army. Two of Bragg's brigades would join Smith in marching into Kentucky, with the intention that if Buell pursued Smith, Bragg would move north to attack Buell's rear. Additionally, Bragg sent his cavalry, led by John Hunt Morgan, north into Ohio. It was expected that Grant would remain in his position, focusing on the pursuit of Vicksburg. Smith believed that this plan would alleviate supply issues and divert the Union armies from their intended movements. Furthermore, an invasion of Kentucky would pose a threat to Indiana and western Ohio, to establish the Ohio River as the Confederates' northern border.

The plan to invade Kentucky was ambitious but carried significant risks. It relied on flawless coordination between two armies that lacked a unified command structure. Bragg, despite pressure from President Davis to proceed with the invasion, began to have doubts almost immediately. Smith, foreseeing the challenges, quickly abandoned the agreement, realizing that embarking on a solo venture in Kentucky would be highly precarious. The successful execution of the military operation required a high level of coordination between two armies that lacked a unified command structure. Despite initial enthusiasm and pressure from President Davis to seize control of Kentucky, General Bragg soon began to have doubts about the feasibility of the mission. Meanwhile, General Smith, driven by personal ambition, reneged on the agreement and deceived Bragg about his true intentions. He cunningly requested additional troops under the guise of an expedition to Cumberland Gap, only to later reveal his plan to bypass it entirely. This left Bragg in a difficult position, unable to compel Smith to adhere to their original strategy, and forced to redirect his focus toward Lexington instead of Nashville.

The turning point of the campaign came on October 7, 1862, when one corps of General Buell's army confronted General Bragg's forces near Perryville, Kentucky. Despite the Confederates' hard-fought victory in the Battle of Perryville, the arrival of the majority of Buell's army by the end of the day nullified their gains. Faced with the prospect of losing everything they had fought for, Bragg made the controversial decision to withdraw during the cover of night, much to the dismay of his subordinate officers, including General Smith, who had advised Bragg to capitalize on their success and continue the fight. As a result, Bragg's army ultimately retreated from Kentucky, leaving the state under Union control for the remainder of the war.

As forces under Grant tightened their grip on the Mississippi River, Smith attempted to change the trajectory of the war. However, his department never had more than 30,000 men, and they were stationed over an immense area.  Consequently, Smith found it challenging to concentrate his forces effectively to challenge Grant or the formidable U.S. Navy on the river. Despite facing criticism for not coming to the defense of Vicksburg, particularly as Grant's momentum grew, Smith's hands were tied by the constraints of his resources. Ultimately, Vicksburg fell under Union control, further solidifying their hold on the Mississippi River.

Following the Union forces' capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Smith found himself cut off from Richmond, resulting in his isolation from the rest of the Confederacy. Despite this, Smith established his authority over a semi-autonomous region, effectively governing an area that operated almost independently. Throughout the remainder of the war, Smith faced the daunting task of governing the district and waging war with minimal support and limited communication with the Confederate government.  in Virginia, Despite these obstacles, Smith persisted in his efforts to reclaim Vicksburg from the Union, albeit from the western side of the Mississippi, but his endeavors proved unsuccessful.

Smith's interest in this region stemmed largely from the influence of Arkansans and Missourians in the Confederate Congress, who played a significant role in securing his appointment. Consequently, Smith's semi-autonomous Confederate region became derisively referred to as "Kirby Smithdom." This term reflected the perception that Smith held a considerable degree of authority and control within his designated territory, separate from the central Confederate command.

Being cut off from the main Confederate army, one might assume that Smith's forces would suffer from starvation and lack of military supplies. However, the reality was quite different. The territory under Smith's control was remarkably well-supplied, as the Union army would discover in 1864. This unexpected abundance of resources further bolstered Smith's position and allowed him to sustain his troops and continue his resistance against the Union forces.

Red River Campaign

The Red River expedition, a military operation conducted by the Union during the American Civil War, involved approximately 30,000 federal troops led by Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks. This campaign aimed to secure the key Confederate supply depot in Shreveport and disrupt the Confederacy's supply lines by controlling the Red River and its surrounding region. The plan was devised by Major-General Henry W. Halleck as a diversion from Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant's strategy to encircle the main Confederate armies by utilizing Banks's Army of the Gulf to capture Mobile. However, the expedition ultimately failed due to poor planning and mismanagement, unable to achieve any of its objectives.

In March 1864, Union forces, comprising both army and navy components, embarked on a march into Louisiana along the Red River. They encountered logistical challenges caused by the low water levels on the river, necessitating the construction of dams and the removal of obstacles to enable their gunboats to proceed. As the Union forces advanced, they faced resistance from Confederate troops in a series of engagements, including the Battles of Mansfield on April 8, 1864, and Pleasant Hill on April 9, 1864. These battles ended in Confederate victories, compelling the Union forces to retreat. The situation worsened for the Union troops as the water levels of the Red River continued to decrease, making it increasingly difficult for their gunboats to navigate. Moreover, they found themselves isolated and susceptible to Confederate attacks.

Despite being significantly outnumbered, General Smith skillfully orchestrated the defeat of both Union advances. On April 8, Confederate troops under the command of Major General Richard Taylor successfully repelled Union General Nathaniel Banks's Red River Campaign. Recognizing their perilous situation, Union forces retreated from the Red River in late April 1864. Throughout their withdrawal, they encountered constant harassment and attacks from Confederate forces. By the time May 1864 rolled around, it was clear that the Red River Campaign had come to an end. The Union forces regrouped in Alexandria, Louisiana, and abandoned their original objective of capturing Shreveport.

Price’s Campaign

Later that year Smith went on the offensive. Major General Sterling Price's Army of Missouri, consisting of twelve thousand soldiers, was sent on an ill-advised and disastrous raid into Missouri. The objective of this raid was to capture St. Louis. It is worth noting that Price himself was a former governor of the state. Price's request for additional troops was denied, leaving him with only twelve thousand cavalry soldiers for the expedition when he wanted, and needed, many more. Price’s raid was initially conceived as a full invasion of Missouri with three goals: divert attention from the river to cross troops into the western theater for defense of Mobile and Atlanta, affect the 1864 election, and lure Missouri into leaving the Union. As commander of the Confederate Missouri state troops at the outbreak of war and field commander of the army in Arkansas, Price was the natural choice.

On August 28, 1864, Price's Raid commenced as he departed from Camden, Arkansas. It became evident that Price had not adequately planned his expedition, as the events that unfolded over the next three months proved to be disastrous. Engaging in a series of battles, Price's forces suffered heavy losses, and by the end of the raid, only six thousand survivors remained as they limped back into Arkansas. This outcome highlighted the poor execution and planning of Price's campaign, ultimately leading to its failure and further solidifying its place in history as a significant Confederate defeat.

Throughout the Civil War, Smith had the advantage of easier access to supplies compared to other Confederate areas due to Galveston TX remaining an open port. The Trans-Mississippi region was a major supplier of food crops so that was never an issue. John Magruder was able to reopen the port at Galveston so arms could come in through the blockade. This also allowed for a smooth flow of resources and provisions, ensuring that Smith's forces were adequately equipped. Additionally, the states of Arkansas, Texas, and Missouri, where Smith operated, were known for their agricultural productivity. These states were able to produce an abundance of food, further supporting Smith's troops and contributing to their overall sustenance during the war.

Remainder of the War

For the remainder of the war, the hostilities that occurred west of the Mississippi River were characterized by skirmishes and guerrilla raids. Smith, who had effectively defended his territory known as Smithdom, was situated away from the main action. On the Union side, General Thomas had a remarkable record of winning battles he commanded, while Kirby Smith held a similar distinction for the Confederates. Despite the ongoing clashes, the war in the West gradually came to a close.

By April 1865, the surrender of Confederate Generals Robert E. Lee and Joseph Johnston marked the effective end of the war in the Eastern theater. However, Smith's forces continued to hold out for approximately one more month. Eventually, on May 26, 1865, Smith relinquished his command to General Edward R. S. Canby at Baton Rouge, Louisiana. This surrender signaled the defeat of Smith's command, making it the final major Confederate force to concede at the end of the Civil War. Following his surrender, Smith made his way to Galveston, Texas before eventually fleeing to both Mexico and Cuba. However, he eventually returned to Lynchburg, Virginia to sign an oath of amnesty on November 14, 1865.

After the conclusion of the war, Smith briefly took on the role of managing the Accident Insurance Company in Louisville, Kentucky in 1866. Subsequently, he served as the president of the Pacific and Atlantic Telegraph Company for two years. In 1868, Smith established a school in New Castle, Kentucky, but unfortunately, it was destroyed by fire the following year. Undeterred, in 1870, Smith and his fellow Confederate General Bushrod Johnson were appointed as co-chancellors of the University of Nashville. Additionally, they jointly oversaw the management of the Montgomery Bell Academy, a preparatory school for boys. In 1875, Smith accepted a position as a professor of mathematics and botany at the University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee, where he remained a faculty member until his passing.

Kirby Smith passed away in Sewanee on March 28, 1893, and was laid to rest on the campus of the University of the South. Notably, he held the distinction of being the last full general of the Confederacy to pass away.

At one time, a statue of Smith held a prominent position of honor. In 1922, the state of Florida erected a statue of General Smith as one of the two statues representing Florida in the National Statuary Hall Collection at the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C. However, in 2018, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed legislation to replace Smith's statue with one honoring African-American civil rights activist and educator Mary McLeod Bethune. The statue was subsequently removed in 2021, with plans to send it to St. Augustine, Smith's birthplace. However, the residents of St. Augustine declined to accept the statue. Another Florida county initially agreed to house the statue, but faced opposition from mayors and public figures, leading to a re-vote that resulted in a 4-1 decision against accepting the statue. As a result, the statue is currently being stored temporarily at the Museum of Florida History, away from public display, as no suitable exhibition space has been found.

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References

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/e-kirby-smith

·       https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/edmund-kirby-smith-rebel-lord-of-the-trans-mississippi/

·       https://www.thoughtco.com/general-edmund-kirby-smith-2360303

·       https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/edmund-kirby-smith-9253/

·       Davis, William C. (1999), The American Frontier: Pioneers, Settlers, & Cowboys, 1800–1899, Norman: University of Oklahoma Pres.

·       Prushankin, Jeffery S. (2005), A Crisis in Confederate Command: Edmund Kirby Smith, Richard Taylor and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press

·       https://www.ohiocivilwarcentral.com/edmund-kirby-smith

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/richmond

·       http://battleofperryville.com/