An Introduction to the Enlightenment Period

Beginning in the late 17th century and concluding in the 18th century, the Enlightenment was a period of time where scientific, political, and philosophical advances attained more authority and influence than blind obedience and superstition. The ideas of the thinkers who established these advances set the basis for education, governmental balance, people’s rights, and even revolution.

Helen Oh explains.

Late 17th century portrait of John Locke. By Godfrey Kneller.

The Enlightenment produced many ideas regarding the way people should be governed, and these ideas were centered around the state of nature, the social contract between the people and the government, and the ability for citizens to revolt. John Locke, a philosopher whom I strongly agree with, believed in a representative democracy whose sole purpose was to uphold and protect the natural rights of the people. Compared to the ideas of other philosophers and thinkers, John Locke’s ideas of the state of nature, social contract, and revolution would create the most successful and legitimate government.

The state of nature was the description of human life before the establishment of a community, in which humans were bound only to the law of nature and respected the rights to life, liberty, and property of other humans. This freedom and equality was the basis of the state of nature, yet it also provided the ability for humans to abuse these rights and take away the rights of others without consequence. Therefore, John Locke and Thomas Hobbes both agreed that humans needed to escape this violent state of nature by forming a society, where humans would resign some of their freedoms in order to assure peace. However, these two thinkers disagreed on how this newly formed society should be run and how much power was given to the government.

Social Contract

In order to preserve the peace of society, a social contract was needed. The social contract was an agreement among society that set the boundaries for governmental control. Hobbes believed in an absolute monarchy, where the social contract was an agreement among only the citizens to give up their self-preservational rights to a sovereign ruler. However, Locke believed that the social contract should be an agreement among not only the people but also the government, making sure that the government acted only to protect and ensure the natural rights of the citizens. In Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, he says that a representative government that governed lightly was ideal: “When legislators try to gain or give someone else absolute power over their lives, liberties, and property of the people, they abuse the power which the people had put into their hands”. Found even in today’s governments, Locke’s ideas on balancing the power between people and government successfully ensures and protects the natural rights of the people.

One of Locke’s most controversial ideas at the time was his viewpoint on revolution against the government. Like many others, Hobbes believed that revolution against governmental authority was never justified. However, Locke explained that people reserved the right to revolt if the government’s purpose was no longer solely to reserve the natural rights of the people. This unpopular idea was supported by the fact that corrupt governments should not and do not deserve to stay in power. Therefore, Locke’s philosophies on the citizens’ ability to revolt are the most ideal for a legitimate government.

Conclusion

In conclusion, English philosopher John Locke’s ideas on the state of nature, the social contract between the people and the government, and the ability for the citizens to revolt are the closest to what I would deem the ideals on which a proper government should be established. These ideals were employed in acts like the American Revolution and documents like the Declaration of Independence, where Thomas Jefferson used Locke’s ideas on limiting governmental power and revolution. This proves that Locke’s ideas are not only applicable in theory but also to modem and even future societies.

What do you think of the Enlightenment? Let us know below.

The Modern Greek State: 1941–1949 – War & A New Divide

On March 25, 2021, the Modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece.

This series of articles on the history of modern Greece started when the country was celebrating the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence. Now, when fascist Italy invaded Greece in October 1940, the Greeks put aside the issues of clientelism and united delivered a formidable fight and resistance against the Axis. This did not last long though. The rise of the Communist party as a significant political factor supported by a strong military branch reshuffled the balance of power and led to yet another civil war and yet another socio-political schism. Thomas Papageorgiou explains

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here, part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here, part 3 on ‘glory days’ 1898-1913 here, and part 4 on ‘Greeks divided’ 1914-22 here, and part 5 on the issues of clientelism here.

Greek troops during the Italian Spring Offensive, March 1941.

I United against the Axis

The Italian Invasion of Greece was proven another significant failure for Mussolini. It was repulsed by the Greeks who immediately counterattacked. The Greek army demonstrated extraordinary skills in mountainous warfare and by the end of 1940 thanks to its heroic efforts the Italians were forced to retreat 50 km behind the Albanian borders along the entire length of the front. For several months 16 Greek divisions managed to nail in Albania 27 Italian ones. (Churchill, The Second World War (Vol. I), 2010, pp. 510, 513)

When the Germans came to the rescue at the beginning of April 1941, they offered overwhelming support to the Italians, whereas the British, estimating that the loss of Greece and the Balkans would not constitute a big loss, if Turkey remained neutral, were more reserved. (Churchill, The Second World War (Vol. I), 2010, pp. 544 - 545) Thus, on the 27th of April the axis forces were in Athens. The last stand took place on Crete which was invaded on the 20th of May 1941 by German paratroopers, who, after paying a very heavy death toll, took it by the end of the month. The king and the Greek government together with the British Expeditionary Force and the remnants of the Greek Army fled to Egypt.

II Occupation, resistance and first signs of division

Although their performance at the battlefield was questionable, the Italians were left with the control of most of the Greek territory. A chunk was also reserved for Bulgaria, that finally found exit to the Aegean through Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. The Germans retained Thessaloniki under their control though, together with the most strategically important areas in Central Macedonia, the Greco – Turkish border, several Aegean islands including most of Crete, the port of Piraeus and the capital Athens.

As we have seen, the Italian attack in October 1940 found Greece’s economy in a fragile state with the country relying heavily on imports to cover the needs of its people. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Now the invasion destroyed a significant amount of Greece’s infrastructure and the triple occupation put the external trade to a stop. Soon, especially the urban population, faced food shortages and by the end of 1941 starvation. During the tragic winter of 1941-42 approximately 300,000 people lost their lives. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 89 - 90) Overall, Greece paid one of the heaviest tolls among the allied forces losing 7 – 11 % of its 1939 population during the Second World War. (Wikipedia, 2023)

This situation pushed the Greeks towards struggle rather than passivity. They needed to resist in order to survive. The first resistance group under the name National Liberation Front (in Greek Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo - EAM) was created by the Communist Party in September 1941. Its military branch was the Greek People’s Liberation Army (in Greek Ellinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos - ELAS). This was not only the first, but also the biggest resistance group. Indeed, by 1944 ELAS numbered 50,000 fighters in the Athens – Piraeus area only, whereas estimations for EAM members reach up to 2,000,000 (total population 7,000,000). (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 91, 99) (Heneage, 2021, p. 188) The most important resistance groups with non-communist leadership were the National Republican Greek League (in Greek Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Sindesmos – EDES) and the National and Social Liberation (in Greek Ethniki Ke Kinoniki Apeleftherosi – EKKA). These did not have the size of EAM-ELAS though as the latter dominated most of the country whereas EDES’ bastion was restricted to Epirus and EKKA’s in the mountainous area of Parnassus in Boeotia. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 92 - 93)

For some time , the different resistance groups worked together and with the help of the Allies they managed to carry out formidable operations, like Operation Harling, which destroyed the heavily guarded Gorgopotamos viaduct in Central Greece in November 1942, stemming the flow of supplies through the Balkans to the German Afrika Korps. (Wikipedia, 2023) As a result, 9 divisions of the Axis powers were stuck in Greece to maintain some order, with questionable results, especially away from the main cities and transportation arteries, and that only after intense fighting. As a German report with the title ‘The political situation in Greece. July 1943’ put it:

‘90% of the Greeks today are unanimously aligned against the Axis powers and ready to go into open rebellion’. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 95 - 96)

The pressure the resistance groups exercised on the Axis forces and before that the army’s performance during the Italian invasion in October 1940 showed once again what the Greeks could do when standing united. In the following though, we will describe several open issues tackled by the Greek political establishment of the time in such a way that once again tore the Greeks apart.

As we have seen, before the war Greece was ruled by Metaxas’ dictatorship. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Metaxas died in January 1941, but the government that fled to Egypt together with the king, after Greece’s occupation by the Axis forces, appeared officially as a continuation of this dictatorship. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 97) Back home in Greece though, contrary to the anti-Communism sentiments of the government, EAM seemed to have the upper hand and ELAS could field thousands of guerrilla fighters. As the German report of 1943 mentioned above continues:

EAM and its militant organizations have borne the brunt of the resistance against the Axis. Most resistance groups belong to EAM. Politically, it is the leading force and because it is highly active and has a coordinated leadership, it represents the greatest danger to the occupation forces. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 96)

But how did the communists gain such an advantage in building the resistance? First, they were already experienced in building illegal networks of operation as they were outlawed by Metaxas’ dictatorship already before the war. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 91) Second, the remnants of the Greek Army, whose officers could have been the core of the resistance movement, escaped to Egypt with the king and the government. And it is further suggested that the latter (king and government) did not want to encourage resistance in occupied Greece! (Gerasis, 2013, pp. 90 - 91) We should not forget that Venizelos’ failed coup of 1935 gave the royalists the opportunity to purge the army from elements supporting unreigned democracy and restored the dynasty that was exited in 1924. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Now, the king and the government did not want to risk the return of the democrats under arms within the ranks of a resistance movement that could eventually hinter their return to Greece at the end of the war.

Although the King succumbed to the British pressure and abolished the dictatorship in February 1942 (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 97), the perceived threat for him and his entourage became more imminent when, in March 1944, EAM formed the Temporary Committee of National Liberation. The latter called for the formation of a government of national unity challenging the legitimacy of the exiled government in Egypt. The call was positively received by a significant amount of the Greek army serving under allied command in Africa. Their demand that the request be accepted by the government in Cairo was vigorously met with the help of the British and 20,000 service men were sent to concentration camps in Libya and Eritrea. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 105 - 110) It is difficult to assume that 50% of the Greek army in the Middle East had suddenly turned communist. It is more likely that these were the democratic elements of the army.        

At the same time, back home, in occupied Greece, the situation was also becoming more and more difficult and complicated. Italy had surrendered to the Allies already in September 1943. As the Italians were occupying most of Greece, this created a control gap. To fill this gap, Hitler replaced the Italians with troops transferred from the collapsing eastern front. These men, brutalized by their experiences fighting the Russians, brought with them a different kind of warfare. Fifty Greeks were to die for every German soldier killed, ten for every wounded German, with no distinction made between guilty and innocent. The massacres at Kommeno (Wikipedia, 2022), Kalavryta (Wikipedia, 2023) and Distomo (Wikipedia, 2023) are characteristic of this self-defeating approach, as the Greeks left their burning villages and joined the resistance in the mountains. This together with the weaponry of the 90,000 Italian soldiers that surrendered in Greece in 1943 made ELAS even stronger. (Heneage, 2021, pp. 190 - 191)

To make up for this loss Hitler’s reinforcements from the eastern front were not enough. Thus, the Germans turned for help to the … Greeks! The Security Battalions were set up to act against the resistance and maintain order in 1943 by the quisling government in Athens. Denounced at the time as ‘fascists’ and ‘collaborators’ these people, nevertheless, also included moderates who feared the communists’ post-war intentions and can surely have been no more ideologically attracted to the doctrines of Hitler than most of the ELAS fighters to the doctrines of communism. (Heneage, 2021, p. 194) (Beaton, 2021, p. 437) Indeed, considering that the Communist Party was getting no more than 5-6% of the votes in the national elections before the war (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023), it is natural to assume that most of the rank-and-file EAM-ELAS little knew or care about communism. After all, as we have seen, Greece was a country of smallholders who believed fervently in property ownership (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) and most of the people who joined EAM-ELAS did it following a message not about class struggle but national liberation. (Heneage, 2021, p. 188)  This way the Communists were able to impose their leadership but not their ideology on a significant part of the Greek people. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 95)

Thus, all sides were simply fighting to survive in a failed state and to preserve what they could of what they valued, when even the forces of occupation could barely keep order outside the major cities, and only by terrorizing the citizens with arbitrary arrests and mass executions. (Beaton, 2021, p. 437) Towards the end of the occupation then the Greeks had once more started to fight against each other with the resistance groups exchanging accusations for collaboration with the Security Battalions and the Germans. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 98) The assassination of EKKA’s leader Psaros by the communists in April 1944 was one of the most striking events of this time and indicative of what was about to follow. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 101)

Another part of the puzzle, and a very significant one, was the intentions of the Allies. After all, Greece was a defeated country and its future depended on the overall outcome of the war and the negotiations between the Great Powers of the time. And the decision was that Greece will remain under the sphere of influence of the Western Powers. It was taken during a meeting between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow in October 1944. The exchange of views was done using a rough sheet of paper [there is even talk about a napkin (Heneage, 2021, p. 193)] on which Churchill wrote who would get what. The British prime minister found the whole process, affecting the lives of millions of people, so cynical that he suggested to burn the sheet of paper at the end of the negotiation. But Stalin continued cynically and said: ‘No, you keep it’. (Churchill, The Second Worls War (Vol II), 2010, pp. 1154-1155) It has been suggested that the Soviets informed EAM about their intentions to give up Greece already before Churchill’s visit to Moscow. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 112 - 115)

III Liberation and … another civil war!

Now, with all these in mind, what could have, ideally, be done? The Communists should realize that their military superiority was becoming doubtful, in the long term, without Soviet support and with Greece left under the influence of the Western Allies. After all, most of the ELAS fighters were not actually communists. They should try, nevertheless, to capitalize on the fight they put up against the Axis as leaders of the most massive resistance movement and ‘cash out’, so to say, any positive appeal this might have to the people by getting more votes and seats in the parliament compared to the pre-war period. The king and the government, on the other hand, should play down the communist threat, especially after the decision of the Allies, and work for a smooth transition to the post-war period and for the recovery of Greece that suffered heavy human and material losses during the war. To this end, both parties should lay their guns down, when the Germans fled from Greece in October 1944, and stand united at the peace negotiations claiming effective support for their country.

Ideally yes. But what did really happen? The truth is that at the beginning the Communist Party made some concessions. Instead of using its military superiority to take Athens and the power, after the withdrawal of the Germans, it accepted to participate in a government of national unity under Georgios Papandreou, head of the exiled government in Cairo, and set ELAS under British command. The king’s fate and consequently the form of the state system (reigned or unreigned democracy) would once again be decided by referendum. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), p. 158)

Nevertheless, violent events between the opposing factions did not stop and the mutual suspicion remained obvious. Thus, when the government ordered the dissolution of the guerrilla groups, including ELAS, that were to be replaced by a national army, a crisis erupted. The problem was that the national army was to have the heavily armed Greek brigade, that fought under allied command and the exiled government brought with it, at its core. After the purge of its democratic elements in the Middle East we saw earlier though, this was fanatically pro-royal and the Communists demanded its dissolution as well. Papandreou denied. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 117) The Communists then left the government of national unity, withdrew ELAS from British command and organized a general strike and a large rally in Athens. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), p. 159)

The later took place on the 3rd of December 1944 and was drowned in blood when the security forces started firing against the crowd. It is not clear if the order came from the government, the British or if the Security Battalions, whose members at that time were laying low following the developments, were involved in the incident, but hundreds of the demonstrators lost their lives or were wounded. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 120 - 122) In response, the communists chose to resort also to violence and the crisis culminated to the Battle of Athens, that started after the rally and lasted for 33 days. The visit, in the midst of the fighting, of the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, in Athens was indicative of the latter’s determination to keep Greece under the sphere of influence of the western allies. (Churchill, The Second Worls War (Vol II), 2010, pp. 1172 - 1184) His interventions have actually been heavily criticised as triggering the devastating all out civil war that would shatter all hope for post war unity in Greece (Heneage, 2021, p. 197), and it is a fact, that with the help of the British forces that landed in Greece after the withdrawal of the Germans, the government was able to draw the Communists to sign in February 1945 the Agreement of Varkiza. The latter provided for the demobilisation and disarmament of ELAS, general amnesty for ‘political’, but not criminal, offenses, the holding of general elections and the referendum for the fate of the king. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), p. 161)

Nevertheless, as atrocities were carried out by both factions, during all this time, many issues remained open. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 133) Things were made worst by the participation in the Battle of Athens of many members of the quisling militias who collaborated with the Germans on the side of the government against the communists. This way, the battle acted as a legitimizer for these organizations, as it seemed to confirm the view that the quisling militias were nothing more than a means of dealing with the communist threat. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), p. 162) With the tolerance of the government these people infiltrated into the ranks of the security forces and continued to terrorize anyone who was or was perceived to be communist. After all, the fact that criminal offences could still be prosecuted even after the compromise reached at Varkiza offered a good pretence. This was also admitted by Nikolaos Plastiras that returned to Greece after 10 years in exile to replace Papandreou in the premiership, before the Varkiza truce. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 136) His Venizelist past (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) was hoped to work conciliatory for the warring factions. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 133) To no avail. According to EAM in the year between the Varkiza agreement and the elections set for March 1946 1,289 people were murdered, 6,671 were seriously wounded, 31,632 tortured and 84,931 arrested. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 137)

This political climate led the communists and a significant part of other left and centrist parties to abstain from the elections set for the 31st of March 1946. When they realized that this way they would lose any chance they had to co-shape the political establishment after the end of the war, they revised their position, but this was two days after the deadline for submitting nominations. Thus, they asked for the postponement of the elections, but prime minister Sofoulis, leading the fourth government formed after the replacement of Plastiras in April 1945 (Kostis, 2018, p. 296), declined. Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary in the Labour government of Clement Attlee, that replaced Churchill in the premiership in July 1945, is supposed to have exercised the influence ensured by the presence of the British army in Greece towards this direction. As a result, voters abstention reached 50%, but the elections gave legitimacy to the right-wing government and cemented the re-emergence of the royalists. Indeed, in the September 1946 referendum on the fate of king George, the system of government was confirmed as a reigned democracy with 68,9% of the votes. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 140-141)

The decision for abstention from the elections of the left and centrist parties and its exploitation from the parties of the right would prove to be a fatal error. The only option left was the extra-parliamentary opposition. Encouraged by the hardening of the Soviets’ attitude already during the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, where they stated their disagreement and protest against the ways of the British in Greece based on Stalin’s ‘old and vague authorization’ to Churchill (see above), and later, in January 1946, during the first session of the UN Security Council, where they demanded the withdrawal of the British forces from Greece, the Communist Party commissioned General Markos Vafiadis to set up the Democratic Army in the mountains in August 1946. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 143-145) Nevertheless, support was to come mainly from the neighbouring Communist countries, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, that pledged to fully support the operations of the Democratic Army, during a conference in the Slovenian city of Bled in August 1947. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), p. 163) Thus, in the summer of 1947, Greece was, yet again, engaged in an all-out civil war with incalculable consequences.

IV Fighting among themselves … almost

At the end of the First World War, Greece continued the fighting for another 4 years in an attempt to increase its territorial gains in Asia Minor. The undertaking resulted in the catastrophe of 1922. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2022) At the end of World War Two the modern Greek state had once more territorial gains (its last): the Dodecanese. On the 31st of March 1947, the British surrendered the islands to a Greek military commander although the law on the annexation of the Dodecanese to Greece was published in the Government Gazette on 9.1.1948 with retroactive effect from 28.10.1948. (Divani, 2010, pp. 683-685) Nevertheless, instead of focusing on the rebuilding of the country like most of the winners, and losers, of WWII, the Greeks, once more, continued the fighting. This time it was not about further territorial expansion. It was a fight for power among themselves.

Among themselves? Almost. As I commented before (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023), division invites foreign intervention. Indeed, after the Battle of Athens, Churchill’s remark was that at the time when 3,000,000 men on both sides fight in the western front and massive American forces line up in the Pacific against the Japanese, the Greek crisis might seem of minor importance. But the country is at the nerve center of power, law, and freedom of the Western world. Consequently, he wouldn’t back off easily from the deal he made with Stalin (see above). The problem was that the British Empire was on the retreat after WWII. It was not the British who were to conclude the mission in Greece. It would take the persistent efforts of the one who would soon constitute the united power of the English-speaking world: Uncle Sam. (Churchill, The Second Worls War (Vol II), 2010, p. 1184)

In March 1947 the USA adopted a diplomatic policy, under the ‘Truman Doctrine’, which stipulated that any threat from the Left to a non-communist country would be deterred even by force. The size of military and economic support to Greece thanks to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan (Wikipedia, 2023) was tremendous. Three hundred million dollars were granted by the US Congress in 1947 only and much more later. The effect of the American support on the army was huge. It reached 200,000 men including well trained mountain troops. It was equipped with modern weapons, artillery and fighting aircraft. A modern communications network was built. The airfields, roads, bridges, and ports that had fallen into disuse during the occupation were repaired. American military advisors were working together with the Greek General Staff for the planning of the operations against the Communists. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 151-152, 157)

The latter on the other hand were in a tough spot. As we have seen they were getting some support from the neighboring communist countries, but only against concessions in Macedonia, which made their cause very unpopular in the rural areas in the north, in view also of recent atrocities of the Bulgarians there during the occupation. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 159-160) Their networks in the cities were also gradually being neutralized by the police as the Communist Party was outlawed and thousands of its members were sent to exile. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 158) Additionally, for most of the Greeks 6 years of fighting was already enough. Recovery and financial stability were now the imperative. Any attempt for further unrest met their disapproval and dismay. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 148) Thus, the Democratic Army had soon problems in finding new conscripts. Eventually, 25% of the fighters in its ranks were women and the voluntary conscription was replaced by a forced one. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 155) This was followed by terror tactics like hostage taking. A striking case was that of young children at the age of 3 to 14 years and their expatriation to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 159) All these were exploited of course by the government propaganda.

Things got worse for the Communists because of internal disputes. In view of the problems in conscription, training, and equipment, Vafiadis resorted more to guerilla tactics, but the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikos Zachariadis, wanted to turn to more conventional ways of war. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 160) Vafiadis was finally replaced by the General Secretary in the leadership of the Democratic Army, but the decisive turn came in June 1948, when Yugoslavia’s leader Tito disagreed with Stalin and his country was expelled from the Cominform. (Wikipedia, 2023) Despite the fact that the Soviet Union offered little practical support during the war, it was the ‘mother’ to which communist hard-liners, and especially Zachariadis, had to obey. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 158-159) Thus, a year later, in July 1949, Tito closed the border and the Democratic Army lost access to the rear of Yugoslavia where it used to withdraw in times of danger in order to regroup and resupply. At the same time, the imminent threat of an invasion of the Greek army in Albania forced the Communist Party to declare a cease fire on the 16th of October 1949. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), p. 166) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 162) This is 5 years after the Germans left Athens in 1944.

V The aftermath: A new schism

At the end of the Second World War the magnitude of the disasters that Greece had suffered could only be compared with those of Yugoslavia, Poland, or the Soviet Union. From 1940 till 1944 550,000 people were killed (corresponds to 8% of the total population) and 34 % of the national wealth was lost. 401,500 houses were destroyed and the number of the homeless reached 1,200,000. 1,770 villages were set on fire, whereas the big ports, the railway lines, the locomotives, the telephone network, the civil airports, and the bridges were in ruins. 73% of the capacity of the merchant fleet and 94% of the capacity of the passenger fleet was sunk. 56% of the road network, 65% of privately owned vehicles, 66% of trucks and 80% of the buses was also lost. The number of horses was reduced by 60%, of small animals by 80% and 25% of forests was burned. By 1944 the production of cereals was down by 40%, of tobacco by 89%, and that of currant by 66%. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 134)

And yet, in front of all this devastation, the Greeks continued fighting a civil war for another 5 years! This brought more dead (40,000 according to official statistics, 158,000 according to unofficial calculations), hundreds of thousands of additional homeless and material damages comparable to that estimated at the end of 1944. Moreover, 80,000 to 100,000 Greeks branded as communists back home fled or were forcibly taken across the country’s northern border and would have to make new homes in eastern Europe’s communist countries. The largest such Greek community was established in the city of Tashkent in Uzbekistan. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 163) (Beaton, 2021, p. 438)

This ‘exodus’ was a manifestation of a new schism in the Greek society that was realized by 1949 and replaced that between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists (and of course others before that): the schism between ‘nationalists’ (ethnikofrones) and ‘communists’. In a nutshell, the nationalists stood on the winning side of the civil war and professed the defence of the ‘Greco-Christian’ tradition against the subversive dispositions of the loosing side, that is the ‘communists’. The distinction was rather blur (e.g. we saw – see above – that many ELAS members were not actually communists) and thus served for the prosecution of many whose political convictions did not suit the state at the time. Indeed,  postwar Greece was very far from being a liberal paradise (although neither was it, as we will see, Stalinist Russia). (Heneage, 2021, pp. 205-206) In fact, this schism, in a much milder form though, is carried to this day between the ‘conservative’ or ‘right-wing’ and the ‘progressive’ parties that continue to fail to collaborate even under severe conditions, like the current economic crisis, with devastating consequences for the country.

VI Conclusion: Who’s fault was it?

Greece is probably the only country in the world that does not have a celebration for the victory in the First World War whereas victory in the Second World War is (strangely) celebrated at the date that marked the entrance of the country to the deadliest conflict the world has ever seen and not that of its liberation and exit. The reason, obviously, is the fact that in both cases the Greeks continued the fighting undertaking a disastrous campaign in Asia Minor in the first case and engaging in a protracted civil war in the second. Nothing to celebrate then.

If we were to ask the question who’s fault was it that Greece fought yet another civil war, a popular narrative is that the war was the result of the pressure that the government, supported by the British, exercised on the communists in an attempt to eliminate their influence on the social and political life which was significantly increased as a result of their leading role in the resistance against the axis forces that occupied Greece.

Some of this narrative, implying that the Communist Party was in ‘self-defense’ was carefully presented in the previous sections. And caution is indeed necessary as there is also harsh criticism of the communist leadership’s stance at that time from former party members. There were indeed incomprehensible positions and decisions of the party like (i) the adoption of the slogan for an independent Macedonia and Thrace, particularly unpopular to the Greek general public, (ii) the compromise with the exiled government in Egypt and avoidance of taking the power by force, when ELAS had overwhelming military superiority at the end of the occupation in 1944, followed by (iii) a turn to military means at an unfavorable time, when the government and its army returned and established itself in the country, with the help of the British and later the Americans. These are interpreted as the implementation, by the internationalist leadership of the party, of the decisions and commands of the Soviet Union that were based on the latter’s conflicts, agreements and overall power play with the British and the Americans in the region and elsewhere. (Lazaridis, 2022 (8th Edition), pp. 21-22, 77-82, 84-86 ) In a nutshell, it is suggested that the communist leadership was working for the Soviet interests.

I believe that the developments that culminated to the civil war can be readily understood within the concept of clientelism, which was described in detail in the previous article of this series on the interwar period. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Once again two rival factions used their audiences (clients) to collide for power. Continuing the devastation of the Second World War they worked against the country’s recovery and had to resort to foreign support (intervention) to achieve their goals. The communists lost because they did not get the lavish support that the government enjoyed from the British and the Americans. Additionally, their real audience was much smaller whereas some of their positions made their cause even more unpopular to the public, as unpopular was already the continuation of the war by both factions, after the end of the Second World War. What needs to be stressed here is that clientelism is not something that is restricted internally in a state. When clientelism is in place the state itself becomes a client. The price of American largesse was that Greece effectively became a client state. (Heneage, 2021, p. 204) If the communists had won, Greece would correspondingly become a client state of the Soviets.

In fact, retrospectively thinking, if we were to find a positive element in the events of the period, this is undoubtedly the avoidance of the fate of Greece’s northern neighbors that ended up in the Soviet sphere of influence. On the contrary, Greece remained firmly connected to the West, it managed to benefit from the Marshall Plan and, after the civil war, it followed the amazing economic course of the Western European countries, finally achieving an unprecedented leap in economic development that put it far ahead of its Balkan neighbors. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), p. 170) More on this in the articles to follow.   

What do you think of the 1940s in the Modern Greek State? Let us know below.

References

Beaton, R. (2021). The Greeks, A global history. New York: Basic Books.

Churchill, W. S. (2010). The Second World War (Vol. I). Athens: Govostis (in Greek - The work is also available in English by Penguin Classics).

Churchill, W. S. (2010). The Second Worls War (Vol II). Athens: Govostis (in Greek - The work is also available in English by Penguin Classics).

Divani, L. (2010). The Territorial Completion of Greece (1830-1947), An Attempt at Local Lore. Athens: Kastaniotis (in Greek).

Gerasis, G. (2013). The Chronicle of a National Tragedy. Athens: Roes (in Greek).

Heneage, J. (2021). The shortest history of Greece. Exeter: Old Street Publishing ltd.

Kalyvas, N. S. (2020 (3rd Edition)). Catastrophies and Triumphs, The 7 cycles of modern Greek history. Athens: Papadopoulos (in Greek, in English under the title Modern Greece: What everyone needs to know by Oxford University Press).

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Lazaridis, T. (2022 (8th Edition)). Fortunately, We Were Defeated Comrades. Salonika: Epikentro (in Greek).

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2022, May 20). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2022/5/20/the-modern-greek-state-19141922-greeks-divided?rq=Papageorgiou#.Yw-AoxxBy3A

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2023, March 22). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2023/3/22/the-modern-greek-state-19231940-the-issues-of-clientelism#.ZDj9i_ZBy3A

Tsoucalas, C. (2020). The Greek Tragedy, From the liberation to the colonels. Athens: Patakis (in Greek, originally published in English by Penguin in 1969).

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massacre_of_Kommeno

Wikipedia. (2023). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties

Wikipedia. (2023). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Harling

Wikipedia. (2023). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalavryta_massacre

Wikipedia. (2023). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distomo_massacre

Wikipedia. (2023). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan

Wikipedia. (2023). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tito%E2%80%93Stalin_split

The 1936 Summer Olympic Games: Nazism on the World Stage

The Olympic games have been around since the time of the ancient Greeks, being a showcase of physical feats and sport prowess. After Germany won the bid for the Olympic games in 1931, the Nazis would unfortunately be able to use it to showcase the country’s technological and economic prowess to the world. In the process they would also set the precedent for all Olympic games to come.

Kyle Brett explains.

The torch relay for the Summer Olympic Games, 1936. Source: Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1976-116-08A / CC-BY-SA 3.0, available here.

Germany wins the Olympic bid

Germany originally won the Olympic bid to host the summer games in Berlin in 1908. This would not come to fruition as the advent of the first World War led to the games being canceled. Organizers of the event wanted to have the games continue to run during wartime like the ancient Greeks had done, but the brutality of the war made the games unfeasible. Thus the next Olympic games would be held in Antwerp, Belgium in 1920.

Germany, after the First World War, was broken, its economy was in tatters and its people left unhappy with their leadership. These problems were further exacerbated by the advent of the Wall street crash and the Great Depression. The 1924 Olympic games in Paris had even banned Germany from participating in the games, which followed the general public sentiment that people were not fond of Germany for their actions during the first World War. This would all change with Dr. Theadore Levalde and his lobbying for Berlin in the International Olympic committee.

The 1930 and 1931 meetings of the International Olympic committee saw much debate on which city would be the one to host the 1936 summer games. Levalde would spend much of these debates proposing Berlin as the host city and defending Germany in these meetings. Levalde was Germany’s Olympic representative since 1904 and was  a very well respected member of the International Olympic Committee community. That gave Germany a good chance to win the bid and host the Olympics. There was also a rising sentiment of utilizing the games to bring the world together. The past 20 years saw much division in the world, and the IOC sought to help right that with the Olympic games. At the end of the 1931 meeting 2 cities had to be chosen: Barcelona and Berlin. In the end it came down to an uncertainty surrounding the Republic of Spain and their ability to host the summer Olympics in Barcelona. This left Germany the winner and thus the 1936 bid for the Olympic games went to Germany and to the failing Weimar Republic.

A new Ideology rises to claim the Olympics

The Nazi party rose out of the failure of the Weimar Republic to capture the public's trust, thus the people of Germany yearned for a leader who would change the country for the better. To this end saw an ever growing support for the Nazi party and its very strong ideological values and economic solutions. This culminated in 1933 with the Nazi party seizing power from the Weimar Republic and becoming the leaders of Germany as well as the inheritors of the Olympic Games.

Originally Germany’s leader Adolf Hitler was apprehensive about the Olympic games as he saw no real need to host them or to participate in them. His opinion was swayed by the chief propagandist for the Nazi party Paul Joseph Goebbels. Goebbles convinced Hitler that the Olympics could be an opportunity to put Nazism and Germany’s achievements on the world stage, and thus construction of the Olympic stadium in Berlin began.  The Olympic games were to be a showcase of the success of Germany and how their new ideology was to be spread around the world.

Problems fueled by hate

The German government’s state sponsored anti-semitism was not unknown by many of the participating countries. It was originally decided that for the games that no Jewish athletes would be allowed to participate, however facing backlash that rule was lowered to appease the other countries that would be in the games. The 1935 Nuremberg Laws declared that all German Jews were no longer citizens of Germany and thus they were no longer allowed to participate in the games for the German team. These ideas of hate would not leave the games as many countries would sideline their Jewish athletes to appease the German hosts.

There was one problem with the games actually happening and that was the participation of the United States of America. The US would be the largest presence at the games and if they chose to stay out of the games many other countries might also back out. As for if they were to join, there were 2 people responsible for deciding if the US would participate in the games. Those 2 people were Avery Brundage and Jerimiah Mahoney. Avery was an Olympian himself as well as being a self made millionaire. He also saw what was happening in Germany and had no real problems with it, even aligning himself with Nazi values. Mahoney on the other hand would be the opposite, he was a judge who served on the supreme court and he was very staunchly anti-Nazi. His main point on his disdain for the Nazis was their anti-Christian stance on religion in society and that would drive his position against them.

Mahoney was against the games and Brundage was all for US participation, so in a bid to rally support for his position Brundage would travel to Berlin to make sure that the Jewish athletes were being treated fairly. His trip to Berlin, which was very controlled and deceptive, had shown no mistreatment of Jewish athletes by the Germans and had actually shown Germany to be a fair and equal place for all athletes. In reality Brundage was shepherded around by Hitler and taken to talk to actors. It also did not help that Brundage did not speak any German and would need a translator the entire trip. Nonetheless Brundage returned to the US and with his evidence was able to convince the organizers of American athletics that Germany was fit for the Olympics.

Olympic preparations

Germany began their preparations for the 1936 Olympics with the building of the Olympiastadion, a large neoclassical oval stadium that could house 100,000 spectators. This was only the start of Germany’s display of the opulence of the Third Reich.  They would do a tremendous amount of cleanup in Berlin for the upcoming games. One of the main things they would do is remove all forms of hate from the streets. They cleaned up all signs of anti-semitism and would replace them with either the swastika, or with the Olympic flag. This was in an effort to make Germany seem much more liberal than they were in reality. They would also set out to arrest and ship off all of the Romani people in the area around the venue to try to make the stadium seem more opulent and refined. Shops near the stadium were also told to lower the prices drastically in an effort to make the economy of Germany seem much better than it was. There was also a major campaign to repaint and fix up any buildings that were looking run down. This extended out of Berlin to any building along the train lines that lead to Berlin. All of these efforts culminated in a fresh and beautiful city perfect to host the Olympics.

Technology was another major point of focus for the Nazis and something they proudly displayed at the Olympic games. They built 6 large international transmitters so that the journalists could report back to their home countries about the games. They also put cameras in the stadium so that this could be the first ever televised Olympic games. On top of that they showed off other technological achievements like the Hindenburg which was a huge airship as well as various military technologies.

Let the Games begin

The 11th Olympiad began with an opening ceremony and with a new tradition that would become a staple of the modern Olympics. That tradition would be the Olympic flame and its journey from Olympia in Greece to the Olympic brazier. The tradition was treated as if it were an ancient tradition; however it was made up for the Olympics by the Nazis. It was followed by the entrance of Hitler and his entourage which was played up to show the extravagance of the German leadership. The marches of the 49 different countries would follow Hitler’s entrance, with each country showing off their flag and their teams. The opening ceremony continued with a flyover from the Hindenburg and with much more fanfare, really playing up the glory of the Third Reich. With that the games were underway and the first televised Olympics was on for the world to see.

Hitler made sure to provide the journalists and reporters with all the equipment they would need, along with nice living quarters to keep their opinions about Germany good and to keep their reports about the games in good spirits. The eyes of the world were on Germany as the games commenced. There were a few athletes that the public were eager to see like Jesse Owens from the US. The stands would be filled up for most of the games as people were eager to see this worldwide event in person.

The main goal of the Nazis in the Olympics was to show off the Aryan race and their superiority. When all was said and done, Germany led with the most gold medals and with the most medals overall. There were instances, such as Jesse Owens, a black athlete from the US, beating the German champion Luz Long in the long jump that may have hindered their aspirations. However when all was said and done the Germans came out of the Olympics the leaders of the world in athletic prowess, which ultimately was their goal.

The Olympics comes to a close

When the games came to a close and all of the spectators filtered out the hate and discrimination that surrounded the Nazi party before the Olympics had resumed. They returned to persecuting Jews and anyone who was Jewish through what the Nuremberg laws had dictated. Many Jewish families were invited back to Germany before and during the games in an attempt to show the liberalization efforts the Nazi party was trying to showcase. These families were persecuted along with every Jewish person under the Third Reich. The Olympics had generally been a pause for hate and discrimination, but once they had left Germany so too did the facade of a liberal society.

The 1936 summer Olympics was a major success for the Nazi party. They had turned the public perception of Germany from a hateful and downtrodden country, into a much more economically wealthy and liberalized society. They succeeded in showing their technological and economic prowess off to the world and painting the picture of a new and improved society.

What do you think of the 1936 summer Olympics? Let us know below.

Sources

Bachrach, Susan D. The nazi olympics: Berlin 1936. Little, Brown, 2000.

Walters, Guy. Berlin Games: How Hitler stole the Olympic Dream. London: John Murray, 2007.

George McClellan: Problematic U.S. Civil War Commander

Major General George McClellan was one of the central figures of the Civil War. He served as commander of the Department of Ohio, the Army of the Potomac, and was Commander-in-Chief of the Union Army for 5 months. Historically, his command decisions have been criticized and his personal qualities are examined minutely. He represents a paradox: a superbly prepared and highly intelligent man who, during his moment on the world stage, failed in almost every task he performed.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

George B. McClellan. Portrait by Mathew Brady.

Background

McClellan came from a wealthy, elite Philadelphia family.  His father was Dr George McClellan, a foremost surgeon of his day and the founder of Jefferson Medical College. A great grandfather was a brigadier general in the Revolutionary War. After attending the University of Pennsylvania for two years, he left to enroll at West Point, where he graduated second in his class at age 19 in 1846, losing the top spot because of weaker drawing skills. He was friends with aristocratic southerners including George Pickett, Cadmus Wilcox and AP Hill.

He was breveted a second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. During the Mexican War he served as an engineer building bridges for Winfield Scott’s army. He was frequently under fire and was breveted to first lieutenant and captain. Since his father was friends with General Scott, he received a coveted spot to perform reconnaissance for the general.

He returned to West Point as an engineering instructor after the war. He was given charge of various engineering projects. He was also sent on a secret mission to Santo Domingo by the Secretary of State to scout its military preparedness. In 1852 he helped to translate a manual on bayonet tactics from French. In 1853, he participated in land surveys to scout a transcontinental railroad route. The route he advised through the Cascade Mountains, Yakima Pass, was known to be impassable during the winter snow. The Governor of Washington territory, himself a top of the class graduate of West Point and a mathematics whiz, had made his own survey. He knew that McClellan hadn’t studied the situation carefully. Time has shown that he missed three greatly superior passes in the near vicinity, which were eventually used for railroads and interstate highways.

He was then appointed By Secretary of War Jefferson Davis as captain of the new First Cavalry Regiment, one of two that would be the proving grounds for the Civil War. Because he spoke French fluently, he was sent to be an observer during the Crimean War. There he conferred with military leaders and the royal families on both sides. He observed the siege of Sebastopol first-hand. His report was hailed for its brilliance. McClellan's observations and insights from the Crimean War played a role in shaping his views on military organization, logistics, and the importance of proper training. He was particularly impressed by the Allied forces' well-organized supply lines, medical services, and use of siege warfare. However, he totally missed the significance of how rifled weapons had changed military strategy, an error that would have substantial repercussions in the conflict ahead. McClellan wrote a cavalry manual and designed a saddle, called the McClellan saddle, which is still in use for ceremonies. This was a promising young man with a great future.

But the fact is, promotion in the small pre-war army was very slow, and McClellan was an ambitious man. At age 31, he resigned to become Chief Engineer of Illinois Central Railroad, a position with a huge increase in salary. There he would be promoted to Vice President and work with an obscure railroad lawyer named Abraham Lincoln.

McClellan was, frankly, bored with railroad management. He served as chief engineer and vice president of the Illinois Central Railroad, and then became president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad in 1860. McClellan supported the presidential campaign of Stephen A. Douglas in the 1860 election. He also married Mary Ellen Marcy, a woman who had fielded 8 prior proposals, rejecting 7 of them, including a prior one from McClellan; the man she had accepted was not liked by her family, so he withdrew. Finally McClellan asked again, and they were married in New York City in May 1860.

Start of the Civil War & Rapid Promotion

The firing at Fort Sumter changed the trajectory of a lot of people’s lives. For McClellan, it was transformative: he found himself a highly regarded and sought after authority on large scale war and tactics, having written two volumes on the subject. He was wanted by the Governors of 3 states to lead their militias, and he settled on Ohio. He was commissioned a major general in the regular army on Amy 14, 1861, outranking everyone except Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, the general-in-chief. McClellan's rapid promotion was partly due to his acquaintance with Salmon P. Chase, Treasury Secretary and former Ohio governor and senator. Once again, political connections moved him rapidly to the top.

After losing First Manassas, Lincoln needed a military leader who could win battles. McClellan had several victories in western Virginia including Rich Mountain and Cheat Mountain, and was being hailed as the “Young Napoleon” and “Napoleon of the Present War” in the press. But the fact is, McClellan’s actions there showed a number of disturbing features that in retrospect were prescient. McClellan failed to attack at Cheat Mountain several times despite action being underway. Colonel Rosecrans was promised reinforcements but McClellan didn’t send them, forcing him to achieve victory on his own; McClellan’s report gave him no credit.  Another subordinate was warned to follow cautiously but then criticized in the report for moving slowly.

Positive Attributes

There can be no doubt that he was a fabulous administrator and logistician. He excelled in organizing and training the Union Army at the start of the war, preparing them for the battles ahead. His meticulous attention to detail and emphasis on discipline contributed to a well-structured and efficient force. Additionally, he implemented effective supply and transportation systems to support his troops. His skills in these administrative tasks were superb and are appropriately admired by all.

Criticisms as Commander in Chief

Throughout his tenure as a commander, McClellan consistently exhibited a tendency to overestimate the strength of his opponents and to be overly cautious in his decision-making, often erring on the side of preserving his own forces rather than aggressively engaging the enemy. McClellan was reluctant to begin his offensives, routinely delayed attacking, demanded an impossible number of reinforcements even though his army greatly outnumbered the enemy, displayed insubordination to the President and civilian leaders, allowed the enemy to escape repeatedly, and retreated several times despite not having lost a battle. He had an inability to create original or innovative ideas, despite being tremendously smart and a quick study. His cautious approach to battle and reluctance to take decisive offensive actions limited his overall success as a military leader.

Over-Cautiousness

Several instances highlight McClellan's consistent pattern of over-cautiousness, which led to missed opportunities and strategic setbacks:

• Peninsula Campaign: McClellan's Peninsula Campaign was marked by his excessive caution. Despite having a numerical advantage over Confederate General Robert E. Lee, McClellan moved slowly and hesitated to press his advantage, allowing Lee to consolidate his forces and ultimately repel McClellan's advances.

• Seven Days' Battles: During the Seven Days' Battles, McClellan's caution led him to withdraw his forces in the face of Lee's attacks, despite having numerical superiority. This retreat allowed Lee to successfully defend Richmond and avoid being decisively defeated.

• Maryland Campaign: After discovering Special Order #191, McClellan has been criticized traditionally as moving slowly. Even though McClellan had gained intelligence indicating that Lee's forces were divided, he still proceeded cautiously. However, recent scholarship has questioned the accuracy of this conclusion.

• Battle of Antietam: This battle became the single bloodiest day in American history, and McClellan's failure to exploit his opportunities to defeat Lee's army decisively was attributed to his caution.

• Following the Battle of Antietam, McClellan was slow to pursue Lee's retreating army, allowing them to escape across the Potomac River into Confederate territory. His hesitation to pursue and engage the enemy hindered the Union's success in taking advantage of its tactical success.

Repeated Inflated Estimates of Enemy Strength

McClellan’s propensity to inflate enemy troop numbers occurred so routinely that it’s beyond possibility that it wasn’t intentional, and perhaps psychologically motivated.

The pattern of inflating enemy troop numbers was a recurring theme that marked McClellan's career. McClellan doubled the number of troops he had defeated at Rich Mountain, making his victory appear spectacular. He tripled the number of actual troops facing him across the Potomac, leading to a crisis sense and elevation to commander in chief. In the Peninsula Campaign, the process reached its zenith: hyper-inflate the numbers of the enemy, lament about what was necessary to win, when it was impossible to provide that number to reluctantly proceed anyway, and blame superiors if victory wasn’t achieved.

Procrastination

McClellan’s fatal flaw as general was that he was viewed as a procrastinator. His continual delays and refusal to move against the Confederates allowed them to call in reinforcements and win key battles with less than half the manpower.  McClellan had a long history of delaying attacks. Maybe he thought that he had to plan in great detail before launching them. But these delays were never beneficial and never justifiable. His delay to initiate the battle at Antietam cost him a decisive victory and ultimately led to his dismissal.

He was an excellent administrative general, but as a tactician he was incapable of taking chances, and war is all about chances. Strategically he really wasn’t bad: Peninsula was an interesting idea but he did not follow through tactically. He wanted to cross the James, as Grant would do 2 years later, but was denied. He had a great advantage at Antietam and won, but he failed to pursue the enemy. He might have been incapable of responding creatively to the real time exigencies of battle.  He could not creatively adjust his plan. Thus, at Antietam, when his plan of assault did not unfold like a predetermined Napoleonic success, he was unable to develop any new concepts on the spot to adapt to the changed circumstances.

It is also possible that there were cynical benefits to General McClellan's exaggerated reports of the enemy's size. By consistently overestimating the enemy's strength, McClellan could have positioned himself as the savior of the Union, creating a narrative that he was the only one capable of defending against such a formidable foe. This could have enhanced his political stature and potentially garnered more support from certain factions. McClellan's tendency to exaggerate the enemy's strength could have provided him with a convenient excuse for his reluctance to engage in battle or take more aggressive actions. This allowed him to avoid the risks associated with decisive battles, while placing the blame on the perceived overwhelming enemy forces .And, by portraying the enemy as stronger than they actually were, McClellan might have been able to secure additional resources, troops, and supplies for his own forces. This could have allowed him to build up a larger and more well-equipped army, potentially boosting his own reputation in the process. Finally, the exaggerated reports could have been a way for McClellan to deflect blame for any failures or setbacks onto the supposedly formidable enemy forces. By doing so, he could have avoided taking responsibility for any missteps in his own strategy or decision-making.

Psychological Profile

Psychological profiling of historical figure is fraught with hazard. Nevertheless, historians have found McClellan to be an excellent subject for this kind of analysis. McClellan has been portrayed as “… proud, sensitive, overwrought, tentative, quick to exult and to despair”. He was a competent administrator and engineer who had no skill at winning battles. McClellan's actions and exaggerations might have been influenced not only by strategic considerations but also by his own ambitions and self-preservation. His reluctance to engage in battle can be attributed in part to his fear of failure. His job was to lead, he was supposed to be a great leader, but he was afraid to be wrong. McClellan was more concerned with not losing than with winning. In his mind, as the fate of the Union rested on his shoulders, he could not allow a defeat.

Stephen Sears wrote: “There is indeed ample evidence that the terrible stresses of commanding men in battle, especially the beloved men of his beloved Army of the Potomac, left his moral courage in tatters. Under the pressure of his ultimate soldier's responsibility, the will to command deserted him. Glendale and Malvern Hill found him at the peak of his anguish during the Seven Days, and he fled those fields to escape the responsibility. At Antietam, where there was nowhere for him to flee to, he fell into a paralysis of indecision.”

A fragile ego covered by conceit was reflected in many of his letters to his wife.

He had to build himself up because in fact he lacked self-confidence. McClellan often suggested that divine intervention had chosen him to save the Union. McClellan frequently thanked God for allowing him to be the deliverer of the nation. His letters to Ellen Marcy, his wife, have been widely quoted in this regard (see Table). Many of the letters were intentionally destroyed or burned in a fire after the war, and there is a great deal of speculation as to exactly why the ones that remained still exist. Allan Nevins wrote, "Students of history must always be grateful McClellan so frankly exposed his own weaknesses” in his memoirs.

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Some well-known quotes from his letters to his wife:

“I find myself in a new and strange position here: President, cabinet, Gen. Scott, and all deferring to me. By some strange operation of magic I seem to have become the power of the land … I almost think that were I to win some small success now I could become Dictator. . . . But nothing of that kind would please me. Therefore I won't be Dictator. Admirable self denial!”

“Half a dozen of the oldest made the remark . . . ‘Why how young you look — yet an old soldier!! ... It seems to strike everybody that I am very young. . . . Who would have thought when we were married that I should so soon be called upon to save my country?”

“The President is no more than a well-meaning baboon. I went to the White House directly after tea, where I found "The Original Gorilla", about as intelligent as ever. What a specimen to be at the head of our affairs now.”

““It may be that at some distant day I too shall totter away from” Washington, “a worn out old soldier. . . . Should I ever become vainglorious & ambitious remind me of that spectacle.”

“I ought to take good care of these men. I believe they love me from the bottom of their hearts. I can see it in their faces when I pass among them.”

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Doris Kearns Goodwin wrote that a review of his personal correspondence during the war, especially with his wife, reveals “a tendency for self-aggrandizement and unwarranted self-congratulation.” McClellan thought of himself as the only man who could save the union, and was willing to sacrifice anything and anyone—mentors, colleagues, his own men—to further his ambition.  In that sense, George McClellan's memoirs and letters provide some indications of his personality and mindset, and a narcissistic tendency is suggested. But drawing definitive conclusions about his psychological condition, such as labeling him as a narcissist, solely based on these sources can be misleading.

In contradistinction, Lincoln had failed in life before; he made himself a success by hard work and careful thought, and wasn’t afraid of risk. McClellan had been handed everything, had always come out on top, and was afraid to fail. In war, as in much of life, fortune favors the bold. McClellan’s fear of failure and routine promotions on the basis of political connections would be his downfall.

Relationship with President Lincoln

The personal and professional conflict between General McClellan and President Lincoln that manifest in 1862, and continued into the election of 1864, is one of the fascinating subthemes of Lincoln’s presidency. Lincoln and General McClellan didn’t like one another and didn’t get along well. McClellan believed he had a superior education and family background; Lincoln knew he was being looked down upon, but with his superior emotional quotient, he knew that what was important was getting victories, and if this man could, then he would put up with him.

They originally met before the war: Lincoln was an attorney for the Illinois railroad and the two spent time together between cases. He saw Lincoln as socially inferior and intellectually not nearly on his level. He found the country stories Lincoln told to be below him.

Once the war began, Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan clashed repeatedly. McClellan constantly ignored Lincoln’s orders, and did not share his plans with anyone including the president. McClellan let it be known that he had contempt for Lincoln. He called him the ‘original gorilla’ in public. On November 13, 1861, Lincoln Seward and Hay stopped at McClellan’s home to visit with him. McClellan was out, so the trio waited for his return. After an hour, McClellan came in and was told by a porter that the guests were waiting. McClellan headed for his room without a word, and only after Lincoln waited another half-hour was the group informed of McClellan’s retirement to bed.

Historian William C. Davis wrote that in 1861, “believing what the press and an admiring circle of sycophants on his staff and high command said about him, Little Mac bristled at being subordinate to the civil authority, and especially to Lincoln, of whom he almost instantly developed a condescending and patronizing opinion. He not only regarded the president as his intellectual and social inferior, but also passed on that attitude to those around him – or even fostered it.”

Famously, President Lincoln came to visit General McClellan on October 3rd. As you can see from the photo by Alexander Gardner, the temperature of the meeting was frosty.  Abraham Lincoln spent four days travelling over the field, just two weeks after the guns fell silent. He met with McClellan, trying to prod his young Napoleon into action, met with other generals, and with thousands of wounded soldiers, Including both Union and Confederate. His trip was well-documented, and the photos of his visit are among the most famous of the entire war.

Lincoln expected McClellan to pursue Lee and engage him in a decisive battle as soon as possible. Although the Union outnumbered the Confederate army by almost three to one, McClellan did not move his army for over a month. McClellan overestimated the size of Lee’s force, suggesting that 100,000 troops were in his command, when he likely had just more than half that number. McClellan also noted that his requisitions for supplies had not been filled. Although traditionally these complaints are dismissed as a manufactured excuse, substantial documentation suggests that McClellan had a genuine supply crisis.

It may be that top Lincoln administration officials ruined his reputation intentionally for political reasons. Knowing that he was popular with the troops and a Democrat, they could see where 1864 was leading. That is not to say that McClellan wasn’t slow at times, but it may have been exaggerated in retrospect when he became Lincoln’s opponent.

What were McClellan’s political opinions about slavery, defeating the South, and his post bellum vision?

McClellan’s view on how the war should be prosecuted differed significantly from Mr. Lincoln’s views. McClellan was a Democrat. He was anti-emancipation. He made clear also his opposition to abolition or seizure of slaves as a war tactic, which put him at odds with the executive branch and some of his subordinates. He had a set of political beliefs almost completely at odds with the Republican Party, the party in power. Most of the officers in the United States Army were Democrats. The army was a conservative institution and many of these officers didn’t agree with the vision for the United States that many of the Republicans had, especially the radical Republicans in Congress, who even departed more radically from Lincoln.

What McClellan wanted to do was to restore the Union to what it had been. He was very happy with that Union. And that was not going to be possible during the war once it had gone past a certain point. McClellan was very clear about what kind of war he wanted. He wanted to beat the Rebels just enough to persuade them to come back under the Union. He didn’t want to slaughter their armies. He didn’t want to overturn their civilization, and he wanted to keep emancipation out of the picture.

McClellan had different views about race and southern aristocracy then we do today and that Lincoln had then: but he was not a traitor, and he did want to win the war, not lose it. McClellan emphasized the fact that he previously led the Union military effort in the War and that he was and remained committed to "the restoration of the Union in all its integrity" and that the massive sacrifices that the Union endured should not be in vain.

As he wrote to one influential Northern Democratic friend, and I’m quoting him here, “Help me to dodge the n____. I’m fighting to preserve the integrity of the Union.” That’s McClellan’s take on the war. He was not fighting to free the slaves, and he was not alone. McClellan almost never spoke of African Americans, and when he did it was always in disparaging terms. McClellan was a quiet racist, one who wanted to ensure that the Civil War ended soon so that the question of black emancipation would not become the leading element.

Now, it must be emphasized that up to that stage of the war, Lincoln was also highlighting union and not slavery. He downplayed emancipation because he thought it would alienate the border states, and he wanted to make sure that they stayed in line. After Antietam, Lincoln thought the North was ready for emancipation, but McClellan never changed his attitude.

Quotes from President Lincoln’s Letters to General McClellan

“After you left, I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington, and Manassas Junction … My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of Army Corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected– It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell– … I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Mannassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was not satisfied…”

“There is a curious mystery about the number of the troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War, a statement, taken as he said, from your own returns, making 108.000 then with you, and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85.000, when all en route to you shall have reached you– How can the discrepancy of 23.000 be accounted for?” (April 7, 1862)

“And, once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow– I am powerless to help this– You will do me the justice to remember that I always insisted, that going down the Bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty — that we would find the same enemy, and the same, or equal, intrenchments, at either place– The country will not fail to note — is now noting — that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy, is but the story of Manassas repeated–“

“You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?” (October 13, 1862)

“Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is “to operate upon the enemy’s communications as much as possible without exposing your own.” You seem to act as if this applies against you, but can not apply in your favor.”

“I have just read your despatch about sore tongued and fatiegued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigue anything?”

************************************************************************

The 1864 Presidential election

By the summer of 1864, the Civil War had gone on for over three years. Over 250,000 Union soldiers had been killed, with many more injured permanently. Victory was not yet in sight. Democrats knew that many of the policies of Lincoln  were not popular, including many of those we take today as the reason for the conflict, such as emancipation, the military draft, the use of black troops, and violations of civil liberties. Democrats further suggested that the Republicans were advocating in favor of miscegenation and trying to destroy the traditional race relations. They believed they could win, and famously, Lincoln thought that too.

But then the Democratic Party blundered. The convention adopted proposals by Copperheads like Clement  Vallandigham calling for a cease fire and a negotiated settlement to the war; but then they selected George McClellan as their candidate. His central argument was that he could win the war sooner and with fewer casualties than Lincoln & Grant. He did not run on a platform of surrender, as is often alleged.

To get the nomination, McClellan had to defeat his opponents Horatio Seymour, New York Governor, and Thomas Seymour, Connecticut governor. Both were real “peace” candidates. Once he was nominated McClellan repudiated the Democratic Party platform. As a result, whatever message intended to be sent to separate their views from Lincoln was garbled. McClellan’s campaign floundered as his repudiation of the peace plank in the Democratic platform provoked discord.

As late as August 23, Lincoln considered it “exceedingly probable” that he would not be reelected. He thought the copperheads would force McClellan into accepting a negotiated settlement, so he made his Cabinet secretly promise to cooperate with McClellan if he won the election to win the war by the time that McClellan will be inaugurated.

Many civil war histories suggest that the victories at Atlanta and the Overland Campaign changed public opinion from the summer of 1864, and surely they did. But a good part of the reason Lincoln was re-elected was that the Democratic Party self-destructed in the campaign.

History books gloss over the closeness of the popular vote. They cite that Lincoln received over 90% of the total electoral votes (212 versus 21 for McClellan). But a 10% margin is relatively close under the circumstances. McClellan ran against Abraham Lincoln, a sitting president, our greatest president, as the war was being won; and garnered 45% of the popular vote. Not only isn’t that pretty under the circumstances of voting against a sitting president in a war (the US has NEVER done this), but the Democratic Party of the 19th century was a fundamentally southern party.  In other words, McClellan got 9/20 votes in a population that was northern, running on a platform of stopping the war and reversing emancipation. Moreover, McClellan won 48% of the total vote in a bloc of states stretching from Connecticut to Illinois (Lincoln's home state); Lincoln underperformed in 1864 relative to 1860 in several crucial U.S. states (such as New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana); and that the Republicans lost the Governorship in his (McClellan's) home state of New Jersey.

What do you think of George McClellan? Let us know below.

Now, read Lloyd’s article on the Battle of Fort Sumter and the beginning of the U.S. Civil War here.

References

• https://www.historynet.com/george-mcclellan/#:~:text=He%20graduated%20second%20in%20his,through%20often%20rugged%2C%20inhospitable%20terrain.

• https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-rocky-relationship-between-abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2088&context=etd#:~:text=McClellan%20loved%20his%20troops%20and%20they%2C%20in%20turn%2C,of%20the%20relationships%20he%20developed%20while%20in%20command

• https://www.historynet.com/mcclellans-war-winning-strategy/

• https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/civil-war-gen-george-mcclellan-deemed-a-savior-then-a-failure/2011/09/21/gIQAfpF6SL_story.html

• https://www.wondriumdaily.com/american-civil-war-the-fault-lines-in-the-lincoln-mcclellan-relationship/   

• https://www.abrahamlincolnsclassroom.org/abraham-lincolns-contemporaries/abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-rocky-relationship-between-abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. ISBN 0-306-80913-3.

• Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-X.

• Bonekemper, Edward H. McClellan and failure. McFarland & Co, 2007

• Waugh, John C. Lincoln and McClellan: The Troubled Partnership Between a President and His General. Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2010

• Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Team of Rivals, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.

Book Review: World Systems Analysis by Emmanuel Wallerstein

We don’t usually do book reviews on the site, but we made an exception for regular contributor Roy Williams. Here, he reviews World Systems Analysis by Emmanuel Wallerstein.

Book available: Amazon US | Amazon UK

The core-periphery model. Source: Mirkyton, available here.

World Systems Analysis provides a general yet significant analysis of the interactions of global market capitalism. Wallerstein divides the world into 3 different categories of economic output and exchange, the core, periphery, and semi periphery. This division essentially describes the western world and certain westernized countries as existing within the core of economic output, with countries like Brazil and India taking the place of the semi-periphery and the rest of the developing world within the peripheral sphere of economic output. This model is coupled with Wallerstein’s analysis of the unequal exchange involved in capitalism which keeps certain nations within the core and others in the periphery and semi-periphery.

Wallerstein asserts that this world system had its origins in 16th century Europe as the western world began to conquer and colonize new territory and bring the process of capitalism to the larger world. Through the process of colonialism, the beginning of a global system of capitalist interaction began. Wallerstein also describes the monumental change of the French Revolution which brought about the normalization and institution of liberalism as a political ideology associated with the global world system. However, Wallerstein also asserts that the global system of capitalism was thrown into crisis with the world revolution of 1968. This leads to Wallerstein’s final chapter and larger argument for the eventual dissolution of the world system and its potential replacement with a new system.

World Systems Analysis provides a general yet beneficial analysis of the world system of capitalism in unifying fields such as history, sociology, and economics. The problems of World Systems analysis rests in its inherent eurocentrism which discounts the reality that the system of European hegemony was built upon the empires of Asia and the Middle East during the 13th and 14th centuries. Janet Abu-Lughod provides a detailed criticism of Wallerstein’s Eurocentric assertions in Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 by describing the world system which preceded European hegemony and the world system we recognize today.

The other problem of Wallerstein’s World Systems Analysis rests in its final argument that capitalism and the global order are in crisis and therefore on the brink of replacement. Capitalism is always in a state of crisis as it constantly evolves. Products and commodities are constantly shifting from the core to the periphery and nations constantly move on the pendulum of development. Wallerstein’s final argument while moving to a degree, is not necessarily based in reality. The importance of World Systems Analysis is not in its direct accuracy or prophetic notions of a changing future but in its understanding of the movement of capitalism and the understanding of global economic and political interactions. This book stands as a great opening to a global dialectic but it does not necessarily present the final or most compelling word on analyzing the world system.

Book available: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Please let us know your thoughts below if you’ve read the book.

Bibliography

Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. World-Systems Analysis An Introduction. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004.

Abu-Lughod, Janet L. Before European Hegemony The World System A.D. 1250-1350. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

The 1565 Massacre at Matanzas Inlet, Florida

Overlooking the popular seaside city of Saint Augustine, Florida is the Castillo de San Marcos, an imposing 17th century fortress constructed by early Spanish Colonials to project power and defend their settlements in Florida and surrounding environs. The role of the fortress had transitioned from that of a military stronghold to a delightful tourist attraction, enticing a multitude of tourists from around the world each year to visit. Not far from Castillo de San Marcos stand in scenic solitude a rather underwhelming fortified watchtower called Fort Matanzas. This peculiar structure was built near the site of one of early North America’s most grisly massacres, indicated by the name of the watchtower and inlet Matanzas, meaning massacre or slaughter in Spanish. It was here on this panoramic beach in September of 1565 that close to 250 French Protestants or Huguenots were slain per the orders of Admiral Pedro Menendez de Aviles, acting on behalf of his Sovereign Philip the Second of Spain. At this time Europe was plagued by a multitude of religious wars and conflicts stemming from the inception of the Protestant Reformation. The turmoil would spill out of Europe and manifest itself in the New World leading to dire consequences.

Brian Hughes explains.

A depiction of the massacre.

Following the Protestant Reformation in 1517 Europe swiftly spiraled into religious conflict in which unparalleled levels of violence, destruction, and horrors would not be replicated or surpassed until the Napoleonic and World Wars of later centuries. The impetus for religious reform is beyond the scope of this article but the results gnawed at the very foundational socio-political foundations of Europe and would persist for centuries. Certain regions were more embroiled in conflict than others, particularly the states of Central and Western Europe such as the Holy Roman Empire, France and Spain.

Coinciding with these horrific events was the further discovery and exploration of North and South America following the successful exploits of Christopher Columbus decades before. Shortly thereafter Europeans began to exploit these lands and transform them into new geopolitical fronts. The Spanish, staunch Catholics who spearheaded the initial discoveries quickly achieved dominance and gained the most influence in the whole of the Caribbean region as they established settlements and military outposts on islands such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and a large Peninsula which jutted from the north which the Spanish named La Florida. But the Spanish would not be the only Europeans with ambitions of overseas Empire.

French presence

A small band of French colonists led by Jean Ribault and Rene de Laudonniere established a settlement at the mouth of the St. Johns River which the French named the River of May near the present-day city of Jacksonville. There they hastily constructed a small fort naming it Fort Caroline after the French Monarch King Charles IX. Most of the French Colonists were Huguenots an influential Protestant minority who fled their native France as a means to escape religious persecution, not entirely dissimilar reasons in which the Pilgrims fled England decades later.

The French presence to the north was troublesome to the Spanish as not only was Florida land claimed by Spain, but the majority of the French colonists were Huguenots, sworn enemies of the devout Catholics of Spain. This did not sit well with King of Spain, Philip the Second. Philip dispatched Admiral Pedro Menéndez de Aviles to establish a permanent settlement in Florida and simultaneously root the French interlopers out. Menendez departed span with 800 soldiers, sailors, artisans, and would be colonists, successfully reaching Florida in August of 1565. Landing first near Cape Canaveral Menendez turned northward finding good anchorage and deciding to make landfall. The Spanish would christen their new settlement “San Augustine” which remains to this day the oldest continuously inhabited city in the United States.

The French understood the vulnerability of their situation and Florida. Admiral of France and Huguenot leader Gaspard de Coligny ordered French Admiral Jean Ribault with 600 personnel to defend the fledgling fort. Ribault was able to catch up with Menendez off the coast of Florida and a brief, but inconclusive naval engagement followed. The French fleet withdrew allowing Menendez valuable time to regroup.

Bad luck would soon befall the French squadron as a hurricane swept the French fleet away from the coast granting valuable time for Menendez and his retinue.

Spanish attack

Menendez then led his body of troops overland to attack Fort Caroline. To this day the terrain of Florida, although flat, can be some of the most difficult to traverse. The Spaniards, burdened by cumbersome armor, gear, and weapons trudged through swamps, impenetrable forests all in the midst of the tropical heat of late summer in Florida. Much of these hardships were compounded by the fact that the same hurricane which swept Ribault's fleet away lingered to pour torrential rains upon the Spanish column.

In spite of these difficulties the Spaniards successfully reached Fort Caroline confirming Menendez’s suspicions that the fort was virtually undefended. The Spanish then launched a successful surprise attack capturing the fort and its surrounding outposts much to the shock and horror of the unsuspecting French colonists. The Spanish killed and captured the majority of the Huguenots who comprised mostly of artisans and various other laborers. Of the 240 occupants 132 were slain. Menendez decided to spare most of the woman and children from the initial slaughter as the Spanish quickly consolidated their position knowing that Ribault was still somewhere off the coast.

Miraculously, Ribault survived the hurricane and subsequent shipwreck along with a handful of his men. They began their trek northward hoping still to arrive at Fort Caroline in time. Menendez received word of this via local indigenous tribes and quickly gathered most of his men and marched south back towards Saint Augustine to intercept the Ribault and other French survivors.

Menendez successfully enveloped Ribault on the inlet that would soon bear the name of what was to occur. The Huguenot prisoners were given one final meal before being bound and brutally massacred on the beach. Only 16 prisoners would be spared, a mix of professed Catholics and artisans necessary for the survival of the new settlement.

The Religious Wars of Europe would only escalate and worsen over the coming decades, with the pendulums of power shifting for both Catholics and Protestants alike. But on a desolate inlet on the East Coast of Florida Huguenot ambitions of overseas Empire would perish forever.

What do you think of the 1565 Massacre at Matanzas Inlet? Let us know below.

Winston Churchill’s Anti-Appeasement Views in the 1930s

British politician Winston Churchill was famously against the appeasement of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis in the 1930s. However, a public who still remembered World War One, were not altogether sympathetic towards these arguments. Here, Bilal Junejo looks at this period.

Winston Churchill and Neville Chamberlain in 1935.

“Appeasement” refers to “the response of British foreign policy makers in the 1930s to the rise of the dictator powers, especially Nazi Germany … it is seen as a policy of making one-sided concessions, often at the expense of third parties and with nothing offered in return except promises of better behaviour in the future, in a vain attempt to satisfy the aspirations of the aggressor states (Dutton, 2007).”

Appeasement arose as “an attempt to adjust the balance between the victorious and vanquished powers of the peace settlement of 1919 by concessions based on the widely held feeling that the terms of that peace had been unacceptably harsh (Dutton, 2007).” It would also be helpful to remember what is meant linguistically by the word “appease” — “to pacify or placate someone by acceding to their demands”, as per the Oxford English Dictionary. The meaning implies the presence of a choice for the appeaser. One does not “accede” to a demand when one does not have a choice in resisting it — one simply acquiesces therein! Since the application of the word “appeasement” to British foreign policy in the 1930s implies that there was nothing inevitable about that policy — that it could have been different, had its makers so chosen — we must consider the reasoning which was propounded at the time (i.e. without the benefit of hindsight) in favour of that policy, if we are to be at all able to determine just how realistic, in the sense of being practicable, were the arguments which Churchill put forward against it.

The doctrine of collective security, which was laid down in Article 16 of the League of Nations’ Covenant, stipulated that the League must present a united front in the face of unprovoked aggression against any member. However, “the basic premise of collective security was that all nations would view every threat to security in the same way and be prepared to run the same risks in resisting it (Kissinger, 1994, page 52).” In an organisation which boasted 60 different members from around the world at its greatest extent in the mid-thirties, this was never likely to be the case, least of all after the Great Depression’s advent in 1929, when the economic woes of Great Britain, one of the League’s principal ‘policemen’, not only precluded the imposition of meaningful economic sanctions by her upon an aggressor, but also necessitated the reduction of expenditure upon defence to the barest minimum required for national and imperial security. The League was only as strong as the collective will of its members, and since collective security, by definition, did not envisage unilateral action by a member, the stage was set for Great Britain, already riddled with moral doubts as to the peace settlement of 1919 and weakened by the Depression, to embark upon appeasement.

Japan - 1930s

First came Japan, in 1931. Then Italy, in 1935. Churchill, however, was selective in his opposition to appeasement. Whilst he adamantly opposed any manner of compromise with Hitler’s Germany to the last, he exuded no similar sentiment when Mussolini invaded Abyssinia, “[remaining] out of the country during the autumn of 1935 so as to avoid having to pronounce for or against Italy (Taylor, 1964, page 123).” Even after Mussolini’s assault upon Albania in April 1939, Churchill was able to say that the invasion was “not necessarily a final test … [since it appeared], like so many other episodes at these times, in an ambiguous guise (The Daily Telegraph, 13 April 1939, page 14).” In believing that Italy should be appeased, so as to retain her crucial goodwill in dealing firmly with Germany, Churchill was not alone, his views finding harmonious echoes in the thinking of men such as Robert Vansittart, who was permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office from 1930-8. Churchill had two reasons for singling out Germany — her inherent economic and military strength, and the advent of Adolf Hitler.

Hitler’s rise

Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933. In October, Germany walked out of not only the otiose Disarmament Conference, but also the League of Nations, of which she had been a member since 1926! That she was able to do so with complete impunity was in itself a harbinger of what was to come — from the Anglo-German naval agreement of June 1935, to the Munich agreement of September 1938. In an early speech which, significantly, he delivered to his constituents at a fête in Theydon Bois, Essex — almost as though he were testing the mood of the people before he delivered the same remarks in the House of Commons and committed himself more palpably to the cause of anti-appeasement — Churchill warned that “at present Germany is only partly armed and most of her fury is turned upon herself. But already her smaller neighbours … feel a deep disquietude. There is grave reason to believe that Germany is arming herself … I have always opposed … all this foolish talk of placing [Germany] upon some kind of [military] equality with France … Britain’s hour of weakness is Europe’s hour of danger. I look to the League of Nations to rally the forces which make for the peace of the civilised world and not in any way to weaken them (The Times, 14 August 1933, page 12).” In other words, Germany could not be treated as an equal without resurrecting the military imbalance which had haunted Europe since 1871. There was no need for Great Britain either to ignore her own rearmament or to appease Germany by tolerating hers, least of all at the expense of France. Churchill’s principal apprehension was that a rearmed Germany would attack in the west — a fear which the British Government did not come to share until after the Nazi-Soviet Pact’s conclusion in August 1939, which explains why they reacted in the manner that they did to the subsequent invasion of Poland. But the fact remains that after remilitarising the Rhineland in March 1936, Hitler only moved eastwards. Would he have turned westwards after dismantling Poland, an Anglo-French ally, with Soviet help? In retrospect, Operation Barbarossa makes that seem somewhat unlikely.

If, as the appeasers believed, Hitler’s advent was only the culmination of German resentment at the invidious Treaty of Versailles, then the sooner that settlement was dismantled in favour of a more congenial one, the sooner would the wind be taken out of the Nazi sail, and stability return to Europe. But there was also the risk that alleviation of that resentment during the existence of the Nazi regime could actually fortify its national appeal. As a contemporary would eventually put it, “three main factors have militated against the growth of active opposition to the regime. In order of importance they are the success of German foreign policy, the absence of any apparent alternative to Hitlerism, and the success of the Government in combating unemployment (The Times, 2 January 1939, page 15).” As it was a catch-22 situation, Churchill saw no merit in strengthening a brutal regime with needless concessions, and was correct in fearing that appeasement would only send the wrong signal to Hitler.

Foresight

Churchill’s foresight, however, was not commonly appreciated. “It was partly Churchill’s extremely dangerous time on the Afghan-Pakistan border in 1896 and 1897, and in the Sudan in 1898, which had brought him up close to militant Islamic fundamentalism, that allowed him to spot the fanatical nature of Nazism that so many of his fellow politicians missed in the 1930s (Roberts, 2020, page 56).” As late as 1938, Anthony Eden, who had already resigned as Foreign Secretary over diplomatic differences with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, was arguing that “a settlement of the Sudeten German problem by conciliation is of the utmost urgency in view of the growing realisation of the far-reaching consequences of any resort to a decision by armed force in Central Europe (The Times, 12 September 1938, page 13)” — a settlement which was decried by Churchill as “a total and unmitigated defeat” on the floor of the House on 5 October 1938. The fact was that the appeasers not only believed that Nazi Germany would help counter what they considered was a bigger threat from Soviet Russia, but also remembered the horrors of the Great War — too vividly to recognise the import of caving in to Nazi bellicosity.

Conclusion

To conclude, acting upon Churchill’s counsel, the realism of which depended entirely upon the goals of its recipient, would have required rapid rearmament. Rearmament presupposed economic stability, which was already precarious at the time. But if the Government still believed, even in an era of Jarrow Marchers and an increasingly turbulent empire, that preserving a country which only (re)appeared on the map when both Germany and Russia were down and out in 1919 was vital to their own interests, then, with hindsight, it can be reasonably said that they should have issued an ultimatum when an infant regime committed its first act of overt “aggression” in March 1936 (Taylor, 1964, page 134). It might have averted another world war.

What do you think of Winston Churchill’s anti-appeasement in the 1930s? Let us know below.

Bibliography

Dutton, D. (2007) Proponents and critics of appeasement. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography [Online]. Available at: https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-95646?rskey=aCl7MO&result=1 [Accessed on 22.11.22]

Kissinger, H. (1994) Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.

Roberts, A. (2020) Leadership in War. Penguin Books.

Taylor, A. (1964) The Origins of the Second World War. Penguin Books.

The Times

The Daily Telegraph

The Early History of U.S. Presidential Campaigns

Since the founding of the nation, this United States has had a president in office. This fact has not changed over the years, but the campaign leading up to the election has. In the country’s formative years, it was practically unheard of for a presidential candidate to actively campaign for office. However, over the years this changed. Richard Bluttal explains.

American photographer Mathew Brady, 1875.

In the early years of presidential campaigns, it was up to local supporters to organize campaign events and speak on their behalf. Parades, rallies, and stump speeches by surrogates were followed on Election Day by voter drives in taverns and on the streets. Partisan newspapers were another part of the mix aligning themselves with a particular party and openly slanting news coverage to favor allies and excoriate enemies. Commercial publishers quickly realized they could make money by printing and selling broadsides, cards, and prints depicting the candidates of all parties.

In American presidential campaigns from 1789 through the 1820s, Presidential candidates thought it was undignified to campaign. Political parties were embryonic and in flux – nothing like the organizational powerhouses they are today. Before the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 there was no mass electorate. In most states, legislatures, not citizens, chose presidential electors. Enslaved people, free women, and free propertyless men – constituting most of the adult population at the time – were denied the vote. Throughout this period, however, both an electorate and campaign machinery began to develop.

From 1800 onward presidential campaign songs and songbooks filled the air at rallies, parades, and debates. A watershed moment in campaign music history occurred during the 1840 campaign of General William Henry Harrison against incumbent President Martin van Buren. “Tippecanoe and Tyler Too” was the official song supporting Harrison and his running mate, John Tyler. Harrison had defeated American Indians at the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811 and helped defeat the British in 1812. Like almost every other campaign song in every presidential campaign going forward, this song was a contrafactum: a popular preexisting tune matched to new lyrics. Set to the tune of Yankee Doodle, the chorus declared “Old Zack Taylor! Keep Him up! / Honest, Rough and Ready! / We’ve a voucher in his life / He’s good as he is steady.”

By the early 1830s, cheap newspapers, known as the “penny press,” allied themselves with political parties, and a growing network of roads, canals and railroads began to carry political information nationwide.

1830s

The Democratic Party’s first association with the donkey came about during the 1828 campaign of Democrat Andrew Jackson. Running on a populist platform (by the people, for the people) and using a slogan of “Let the People Rule,” Jackson’s opponents referred to him as a jackass (donkey). Much to their chagrin, Jackson incorporated the jackass into his campaign posters. During Jackson’s presidency the donkey was used to symbolize his stubbornness by his opponents.

By the election of 1860, parades, banners and music were part of the political landscape, as were newspapers that openly supported political parties. Advances in printing technology by the mid-19th century allowed Americans to express their political sympathies through their choice of cigars and stationery. Cigar box labels in 1860 included images of Republican presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln and his democratic opponent, Stephen A. Douglas. For those who might have heard of “Honest Old Abe” and the “Little Giant” but had never seen their likenesses in print, the cigar box label introduced the candidates’ faces to the public. In early March 1860, Abraham Lincoln spoke in Hartford, Connecticut, against the spread of slavery and for the right of workers to strike. Five store clerks, who had started a Republican group called the Wide Awakes, decided to join a parade for Lincoln, who delighted in the torchlight escort back to his hotel provided for him after his speech. Over the ensuing weeks, the Lincoln campaign made plans to develop Wide Awakes throughout the country and to use them to spearhead large voter registration drives, since they knew that new voters and young voters tend to embrace new and young parties.

Members of the Wide Awakes were described by the New York Times as "young men of character and energy, earnest in their Republican convictions and enthusiastic in prosecuting the canvass on which we have entered." In Chicago, on October 3, 1860, 10,000 Wide Awakes marched in a three-mile procession.

Mathew Brady

Mathew Brady was one of the earliest American photographers and the owner of a successful photography studio. He photographed celebrities, presidents, and, most famously, scenes of his country’s Civil War. From 1860 to 1864. Those picturing President Lincoln—in particular a portrait taken on February 27, 1860, after the speech at The Cooper Union, in New York City, which launched his presidential campaign—sold widely. A number of acclaimed historians believe that his portrait of Lincoln that went nation wide was greatly instrumental in Lincoln being elected President.

Political buttons touting presidential candidates increased in popularity during the 19th century. Metal campaign buttons were available in 1860, but the election of 1896 saw the first use of the mass-produced, pin-backed, metal buttons. These became ubiquitous and collectible in 20th-century presidential campaigns and remain so today.

The earliest connection of the elephant to the Republican Party was an illustration in an 1864 Abraham Lincoln presidential campaign newspaper, Father Abraham. It showed an elephant holding a banner and celebrating Union victories. During the Civil War, “seeing the elephant” was slang for engaging in combat so the elephant was a logical choice to represent successful battles.

Thomas Nast, his cartoons, and those by his predecessors and contemporaries, were published in mass market magazines—as well as in newspapers and as separate, sheet prints are credited with widely influencing voters at a time when most would never see or hear their White House candidate in person. Instead, the public read campaign materials, attended barbecues, picnics, parades, mass meetings, and rallies. Campaign songs written about candidates fit right into a culture where singing was popular. Many of these early voter solicitation activities are still staples of presidential campaigns today in one form or another. From the 18th through the 19th centuries, these political cartoons were a popular form of political protest and often depicted rival politicians in satirical or unflattering ways and of course are still in use today.

Gilded Age

The Gilded Age (c.1877-1900) presidential elections split between Democrats and Republicans along mostly sectional lines – a legacy of the Civil War. The imagery on Grant’s poster linking him and his running mate to “common man” themes hearkens back to an earlier era as did his decision not to refrain from actively campaigning. Noting that only presidential candidates who had taken to the trail had lost, he declared: “I am no public speaker and I don’t want to be beaten.” The tradition continued with Grover Cleveland in 1888 whose front-porch talks with visitors were published in newspapers and brochures. Smear campaigns persisted through the 19th century. In 1884, supporters of Republican Party candidate James Blaine coined a jingle that alluded to an illegitimate child that his opponent Grover Cleveland had allegedly fathered:

Ma, Ma, where's my Pa?

Gone to the White House,

Ha, ha, ha!

Cleveland's party responded with a tune of their own:

Blaine, Blaine, James G. Blaine,

The Continental Liar from the State of Maine!

Presidential campaigns, however, soon started to shift. Instead of remaining silent, candidates began to give speeches, often referred to as “stump speeches.” William McKinley gave a variant on this during the 1896 campaign when he delivered a speech on his front porch. This became the centerpiece of his so-called “front-porch campaign,” and he continued to deliver speeches from his home. His opponent, William Jennings Bryan, chose instead to conduct a “whistle-stop campaign,” traveling the country by railroad and giving speeches at various train stops.

This 1896 campaign is probably the most famous campaign in U.S. history. It is remembered for Bryan's precedent-shattering speaking tour as well as for the carefully orchestrated and impressive front-porch campaign of William McKinley. An estimated 5 million Americans across 27 states heard one of the 600 passionate and substantive speeches Bryan crave during the campaign. McKinley stayed home but still managed to speak to 750,000 people in the 300 or so speeches he gave. Neither Bryan nor McKinley shied away from issues, the former focusing almost exclusively on free silver while the latter preferred to harp on the virtues of the protective tariff.

McKinley’s 1896 poster shows him as the champion of American capitalism, upholding the gold standard and linking prosperity and American power. Bryan wanted the U.S. on a silver standard which he believed would help workmen and farmers hurt by the depression. Bryan’s famous “Cross of Gold” speech, brilliantly delivered at the Democratic convention on July 9, 1896, secured him the nomination. His vivid language still resonates today.

Conclusion

It used to be considered ill-mannered for presidential candidates to openly campaign for themselves. Times have changed. Presidential campaigns are now billion-dollar operations that involve attack ads, social media strategy, and lots of stump speeches.

What do you think of early U.S. presidential campaigns? Let us know below.

Now read Richard’s article on the role of baseball in the US Civil War here.

How did Junior Military Officers Push Japan Into World War 2?

Of all of the ways in which Japan’s military was the most dysfunctional fighting force in modern history, Gekokujō was surely the strangest. Its origin is murky. All one Japanese encyclopedia could say was that; “since the medieval period, (mid-12th–14th centuries) writers have used the term to describe a variety of situations in which established authority was being challenged from below.”

Here, Daniel McEwen looks at Gekokujō and three key events in the 1930s that led Japan into war.

Japanese soldiers during the 1931 Mukden Incident.

Gekokujō: [translation; "the lower rules the higher" or "the low overcomes the high"]; someone of a lower position overthrowing someone of a higher position using military or political might.

Japan was an isolated nation of subsistence farmers and fishermen when Portuguese traders landed on its shores in 1540. Although initially welcomed, over the next century, these first Europeans wore out their welcome and were expelled by the shogunate in 1639 who then sealed their country off from the West for two hundred years! Then in the 1850’s, it was the Americans who forced Japan at gunpoint to throw open its doors to the world. The incoming rush of capital and technology transformed it into an industrial and military powerhouse. However, the accompanying influx of foreigners, government corruption, social unrest and widespread poverty left many feeling their country had sold it’s soul to the West. This head-on collision between Western modernity and Confucian tradition culminated in the 1930’s, with three “incidents” of Gekokujō that pushed Japan further down the path to Pearl Harbour.

1] The Mukden Incident [1931]

The most prestigious unit of the Japanese army, the Kwantung Army was the military muscle behind Japanese colonial expansion into Manchuria [present day Korea], China and Mongolia. Its field commanders often went rogue, violating orders from Army HQ in Tokyo without consequences. Most fatefully, in September of 1931, a group of its renegade officers staged-managed the bombing of a Japanese railway station in Mukden [present day Shenyang, China] which it then used as the excuse for occupying all of the Manchurian peninsula – despite specific orders to the contrary from Tokyo!

It is an act without equal among WW2’s combatant nations: rogue officers taking their country to war. A war they could not win. The Russians, also seeking power and influence in the western Pacific, took the occupation as a direct threat and attacked. Skilled only in massacring unarmed civilians, the Kwantung Army would fight several costly, losing battles with Joseph Stalin’s highly-mechanized battalions throughout the 1930’s before being routed decisively in 1939. Six years later, on August 8th, 1945 Red Army tanks stormed back into Manchuria, delivering a final stinging defeat to the Kwantung Army before the A-bombs ended the war.

It is telling that when their army’s treachery at Mukden was publicly revealed in 1933, rather than withdraw from the peninsula, Japan’s political leaders chose to withdraw from the League of Nations, officially endorsing the Kwantung Army’s insubordination. Many contend that the Mukden Incident was indeed the opening shot of WW2.

2] The May 15th Incident [1932]

In an act of cold-blooded treason, eleven young naval officers invaded the home of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi and assassinated him before police could stop them. To a man, the eleven were followers of the Kōdōha or Imperial Way Faction, a cabal of influential military officers who envisioned a return to a pre-Westernized Japan in which a military dictatorship dedicated to aggressive expansion would purge the country of the corrupt elites in both government and industry who it blamed for all of Japan’s many ills. But it’s what happened at the officers’ public trial that proved so fateful. Incredibly, a  nation that should have been appalled by the death of their PM instead fell in love with his assassins! The officers’ eloquence in spinning the murder as an act of patriotism aimed at reforming a corrupt government, swayed public opinion in their favour. The court was deluged with over 100,000 petitions demanding clemency and caved in, handing out light sentences that would see the killers serve only a few years behind bars. Critics argue that this leniency weakened Japan’s democracy and made the third incident inevitable.

3] The February 26th Incident [1936]

Emboldened by the navy officers’ success, young army officers launched their attempt to violently purge the government of any and all opponents of Kōdōha. Calling themselves The Righteous Army, some 1,500 young officers and cadets fanned out across the city. Armed to the teeth and carrying Death Lists, they roamed the streets of Tokyo for three days, fighting running gun government troops, storming public buildings, often shooting it out with bodyguards to get at the people on their lists. British news correspondent Hugh Byas described it as "government by assassination".

Several government dignitaries including two former Prime Ministers were gunned down but the coup was too poorly executed and the government too well prepared. Eventually cornered by loyal Imperial soldiers, the rebels surrendered. This time there would be no public trials. All 1,500 were convicted by secret court martials and punished with prison terms and demotions. Only the 17 ringleaders were executed. Kōdōha was dead as a movement and yet surprisingly, its presence would be felt in the next election in that voters elected a more war-like government! Young officers would have one last shot at changing their country’s history.

Despite the American’s use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan’s War Council remained deadlocked on the issue of surrender. Enter Emperor Hirohito who had originally supported the Council’s imperialist ambitions, but now was aghast at the horrific destruction wrought by the A-bombs. He urged the Council to stop the insanity and grudgingly, the hard-liners agreed that he would record a surrender statement admitting only to the “futility of further resistance”, to be broadcast to the country. But a squad of young officers got wind of the plan and occupied the recording studio in an 11th hour attempt to prevent the broadcast. In this too they failed and on August 15th, Hirohito’s voice was heard by his subjects for the first time. They rejoiced that the war was over.

Was Gekokujō ever anything more than thuggery wrapped in a flag, domestic terrorism on     steroids, fascism disguised as patriotism? Too much blood had been spilled, too much pain inflicted to find anything enobling in the “challenge from below” those young officers presented their country.

What do you think of Gekokujō? Let us know below.

You can contact Daniel at danielcmcewen@gmail.com

The Battle of Fort Sumter & the Beginning of the US Civil War

The firing on Fort Sumter was the immediate action that started the Civil War. Once the Confederates under PGT Beauregard fired on US Federal property, a line had been crossed and a rebellion had begun. At issue was whether federal property in a state that seceded was now property of the new government.

Charleston SC was the most important port on the Southeast coast. The harbor was defended by three federal forts: Sumter; Castle Pinckney, one mile off the city’s Battery; and heavily armed Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan’s Island.

Here, Lloyd W Klein looks at the beginning of the U.S. Civil War.

The attack on Fort Sumter by the Confederacy.

The Construction and Deed to the Fort

The island in Charleston harbor on which Fort Sumter is built was originally just a sand bar. In 1827, engineers performed measurements of the depths and concluded that it was a suitable location for a fort. Construction began in 1829. Seventy thousand tons of granite was transported from New England to build up an essentially artificial island. By 1834, a timber foundation that was several feet beneath the water had been laid. The fort was built in the center of the channel to dominate the entrance to the harbor. Along with the shore batteries at Forts Moultrie, Wagner, and Gregg, the idea was to cover the harbor from invaders. The brick fort was designed to be five-sided, 170 to 190 feet long, with walls five feet thick, standing 50 feet over the low tide mark, and to house 650 men and 135 guns in three tiers of gun emplacements. The majority of the gun emplacements faced out to sea, to cover the entrance to the harbor (not facing the city). Construction dragged on because of title issues, and then problems arose with funding such a large and technically challenging project. Unpleasant weather and disease made it worse. The exterior was finished but the interior and armaments were never completed. On December 17, 1836, South Carolina officially ceded all "right, title and, claim" to the site of Fort Sumter to the United States Government. For these reasons, at the time of the bombardment, not only was this a federal fort, but also it was legally land ceded by the state of South Carolina.

Fort Sumter was covered by a separate cession of land to the United States by the state of South Carolina, and covered in this resolution, passed by the South Carolina legislature in December of 1836.

Reports and Resolutions of the General assembly, Page 115, here: https://www.carolana.com/SC/Legislators/Documents/Reports_and_Resolutions_of_the_General_Assembly_of_South_Carolina_1836.pdf

This resolution was made in response to a private SC citizen claiming ownership, which was denied. There can be no clearer statement that Fort Sumter had been ceded to the US Government by the state of SC.

https://studycivilwar.wordpress.com/2013/04/14/who-owned-fort-sumter/comment-page-1/#comments

In 1805, a prior land resolution of the SC legislature turning over all of the forts in the harbor to the US Government was made. Sumter did not exist at that time, so arguably it didn’t apply, although the language would be inclusive. It can be found on pages 501-502 here: https://books.google.com/books?id=S7E4AAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

South Carolina had freely ceded property in Charleston Harbor to the federal Government in 1805, upon the express condition that "the United States... within three years... repair the fortifications now existing thereon or build such other forts or fortifications as may be deemed most expedient by the Executive of the United States on the same, and keep a garrison or garrisons therein." Failure to comply with this condition on the part of the Government would render "this grant or cession... void and of no effect." Hence, continued development was a condition, which did occur in spurts.

The Crisis Begins

On December 26, 1860, only six days after South Carolina seceded from the Union, Major Robert Anderson abandoned the indefensible Fort Moultrie, spiking its large guns, burning its gun carriages, and taking its smaller cannon with him. He secretly relocated companies E and H (127 men, 13 of them musicians) of the 1st U.S. Artillery to Fort Sumter on his own initiative, without orders from his superiors, because it could not be defended from a land invasion. The fort was still only partially built and fewer than half of the cannons that should have been available were in place.

In a letter delivered January 31, 1861, South Carolina Governor Francis W Pickens demanded that President Buchanan surrender Fort Sumter because "I regard that possession is not consistent with the dignity or safety of the State of South Carolina." Over the next few months repeated calls for the evacuation of Fort Sumter from the government of South Carolina were ignored.

In February 1861 South Carolina's Attorney General, Isaac Hayne sent a letter to the U.S. Secretary of War, John Holt about their intent to take possession of Fort Sumter and wished to negotiate monetary compensation threatening that if the United States refused to vacate, then force would be used to seize it. Holt responded that the United States' interest in Sumter is not that of a proprietor but that of a sovereign which "has absolute jurisdiction over the fort and the soil on which it stands. This jurisdiction consists in the authority to 'exercise exclusive legislation' over the property referred to. and said "the President is, however, relieved from the necessity of further pursuing this inquiry by the fact that, whatever may be the claim of South Carolina to this fort, he has no constitutional power to cede or surrender it. The property of the United States has been acquired by force of public law, and can only be disposed of under the same solemn sanctions. The President, as the head of the executive branch of the Government only, can no more sell and transfer Fort Sumter to South Carolina than he can sell and convey the Capitol of the United States to Maryland, or to any other State or individual seeking to possess it."

Realizing that the garrison at Fort Sumter was undermanned and undersupplied, General Winfield Scott, the General-in-Chief of the US Army, sent the Star of the West to reinforce Anderson. On January 9, 1861, several weeks after South Carolina had seceded from the United States but before other states had done so to form the Confederacy, Star of the West arrived at Charleston Harbor to resupply troops and supplies to the garrison at Fort Sumter. The ship was fired upon by cadets from the Citadel Academy and was hit three times. Although Star of the West suffered no major damage, her captain, John McGowan, considered it to be too dangerous to continue and left the harbor. The mission was abandoned, and Star of the West headed for her home port of New York Harbor.  Even this minimal attempt at strengthening the fort was resisted (Mc266).  President Buchanan had been lukewarm about defending Charleston harbor in the first place and had seriously considered succumbing to southern popular opinion and ordering the defenders back to the indefensible Fort Moultrie.  He had only agreed to this single ship expedition after a cabinet shake-up bringing hardliners Edwin Stanton and Jeremiah Black to his advisory group. Yet in response to this attack on a federal ship, which might itself have triggered the war, he did nothing.

Over the next few months, Jefferson Davis was named president of the Confederacy and Abraham Lincoln inaugurated as US president. Confederate Brigadier General P. G. T. Beauregard was sent to lead the Confederate forces in Charleston, where his command included several thousand state militia and a few dozen seacoast guns and mortars. Davis sent commissioners to Washington to negotiate transfer of the fort. Anderson prepared the fort for battle as best as possible: remarkably, of the 60 guns placed in the fort, only 6 were capable of being turned around to face the town.

Lincoln searched for a political solution for the next 6 weeks. Most of his cabinet, including Scott, advised that he pull the troops out of Fort Sumter because it was indefensible. William Seward, Secretary of State, Simon P. Cameron, Secretary of War, and Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy favored withdrawal. Supporting the fort would require a military force comprised of both army and navy units way beyond what existed. But Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury and Montgomery Blair, the Postmaster General, argued that surrender would diminish morale and would lead to official recognition of the Confederacy. Only Blair opposed the withdrawal firmly because it would convince the rebels that the US administration lacked determination and firmness, would dishearten the Southern Unionists and push the foreign countries to recognize the Confederacy de facto. Moreover, the northern media called on Lincoln to make good his inaugural promise to defend federal property. Lincoln concluded that if the Union troops evacuated Fort Sumter, secession would be a fait accompli.

Lincoln was aware that a large - scale attempt to supply Fort Sumter by firing warships would result in the North as aggressor. It would unite the South and make Lincoln accountable for breaking out a war. Blair provided a person who would find a solution to the problem: Gustavus V. Fox. Fox suggested to supply Fort Sumter via some motorized barges while the US warships, off shore, would intervene only the Confederate guns would fire on the barges. Thus, he sent supplies only, while the warships would be ready to intervene if the Confederate guns had fired on the flotilla. If the Confederates had fired on the unarmed motorized barges hauling supplies only, they would be accountable for having attacked a humanitarian relief mission. At a cabinet meeting on March 28, 1861, the decision was made to send a small flotilla of vessels loaded with supplies. Realizing that Anderson's command would run out of food by April 15, 1861, President Lincoln ordered a fleet of ships, under the command of Gustavus V. Fox, to attempt entry into Charleston Harbor and supply Fort Sumter. It was plainly recognized that this small group of ships could not enter the harbor by surprise and would not be able to reach the fort unless the South Carolina batteries allowed their unfettered passage.  (https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2011/march/sumter-conundrum). Lincoln told Pickens the ships were on their way for re-supply.

Pickens contacted Robert Toombs, the CSA Secretary of State, Robert Toombs, who advised Davis that he was being set up by Lincoln and tricked into starting the war. Nevertheless, a Confederate cabinet meeting on April 9 endorsed Davis’s order to Beauregard to reduce the fort before its arrival. Fearing that a lack of action would revive Southern Unionism, Davis decided the Federal presence had to go, that is, Brigadier General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard was authorized to use the force to surrender Fort Sumter. Retrospectively, Davis would have been wise to have taken Toombs’ advice.  As a fort built to keep out ships, it served no purpose at that moment other than to allow Lincoln to use it as bait to trick the Confederates into starting the war, handing Lincoln reason/pretext and to claim the Confederates fired first.  But Davis  in fact wanted war; it was the only possible way to convince the ambivalent Upper South and border states to secede and join the CSA. Davis had considered attacking Fort Pickens instead, but Braxton Bragg correctly objected because Pickens would have been tough to attack by amphibious warfare and, unlike Sumter, had a secure sea lifeline.

On April 6, 1861, the first ships began to set sail for their rendezvous off the Charleston Bar. The ships assigned were the steam sloops-of-war USS Pawnee and USS Powhatan, transporting motorized launches and about 300 sailors; the USS Pocahontas, Revenue Cutter USRC Harriet Lane, and the steamer Baltic transporting about 200 troops, composed of companies C and D of the 2nd U.S. Artillery; and three hired tugboats with added protection against small arms fire to be used to tow troop and supply barges directly to Fort Sumter. However, the Pocahontas never did make it due to multiple countermanding orders. The first to arrive was Harriet Lane, on the evening of April 11, 1861.

Events Leading to the Bombardment

Also on April 11, Beauregard sent three officers to demand the surrender of the fort: Senator/Colonel James Chesnut, Jr., Captain Stephen D. Lee (later general), and Lieutenant A. R. Chisolm. Anderson declined, and the aides returned to report to Beauregard. After Beauregard had consulted the Confederate Secretary of War, Leroy Walker, he sent the aides back to the fort and authorized Chesnut to decide whether the fort should be taken by force. Anderson, stalling for time, waited until 3 AM April 12 to tell them he would not leave the fort. They then returned to Fort Johnson where Chesnut ordered the firing to begin. So it was that on April 12, 1861 at 4:30 AM, the Civil War began when Confederate batteries opened on the fort. Although Edmund Ruffin, the noted Virginian agronomist and secessionist, claimed that he fired the first shot on Fort Sumter, and did, in fact, fire a signal shot, Lieutenant Henry S. Farley, commanding a battery of two 10-inch siege mortars on James Island actually fired the first shot at 4:30 a.m. No attempt was made by the Union to return the fire for more than two hours because there were no fuses for their explosive shells, which means that they could not explode. Only solid iron balls could be used. At about 7:00 a.m., Captain Abner Doubleday, the fort's second in command, was given the honor of firing the Union's first shot, in defense of the fort. Although he did not invent baseball as the Mills Commission erroneously concluded, in every other way, his life was eventful and fulfilling.

During the bombardment, according to the diary of Mary Chesnut, the Senator’s wife, and other accounts, Charleston residents along what is now known as The Battery, sat on balconies drinking salutes to the start of the hostilities.

The bombardment lasted for 34 hours. The Union return fire was intentionally slow to conserve its ammunition.  The next morning, the fort was surrendered. During the attack, the Union colors fell. Lt. Norman J. Hall risked his life to put them back up, burning off his eyebrows permanently. A Confederate soldier bled to death having been wounded by a misfiring cannon. One Union soldier died and another was mortally wounded during the 47th shot of a 100-shot salute, given after the surrender. For this reason, the salute was shortened to 50 shots.

PGT Beauregard

PGT Beauregard was the perfect combination of military engineer and charismatic Southern leader needed at that time and place.  It is highly suggestive that a man of Beauregard’s accomplishments was there at Charleston – before a war had started. Its also interesting that the South Carolina militia had been called out and that they had cannonballs with fuses but the US Army in the fort did not. These and other factors demonstrate that the new CSA was prepared for a battle. The South Carolina Militia had been in position for months. They were there when Citadel cadets fired on the Star of the West on January 9, 1861. They were on duty the previous December when Anderson abandoned Fort Moultrie for Sumter.

Beauregard was the first Confederate general officer, appointed a brigadier general in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States on March 1, 1861.  His brother in law, James Slidell, was instrumental in convincing Davis to make this appointment. To me, the idea that the Union escalated violence to provoke the war is odd considering that the CSA had created an army at least 6 weeks before firing on Sumter. After the Mexican War, during which he contributed at least as much as Captain Robert E Lee did in terms of reconnaissance and strategy, his positions involved engineering in ports so he was the perfect man for this mission. He had recently been named superintendent of West Point January 23 1861, but these orders were revoked by the Federal Government 5 days later when Louisiana seceded. He returned to New Orleans with the hopes of being named commander of the Louisiana state army. On July 21, he was promoted to full general in the Confederate Army, one of only seven appointed to that rank; his date of rank made him the fifth most senior general, behind Samuel Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, and Joseph E. Johnston. Beauregard was honored in the South for its first victory. He was ordered to direct the troops at Bull Run.

Anderson had been Beauregard’s artillery instructor at West Point in 1837, and Beauregard was serving as superintendent there until secession. Anderson told Washington that Beauregard would guarantee that South Carolina's actions be exercised with "skill and sound judgment." Beauregard wrote to the Confederate government that Anderson was a "most gallant officer". He sent several cases of fine brandy and whiskey and boxes of cigars to Anderson and his officers at Sumter, but Anderson ordered that the gifts be returned.

Aftermath

The state legislature appointed Braxton Bragg on February 20, 1861.Bragg had been a colonel in the Louisiana militia. Aware that Beauregard might resent him, Bragg offered him the rank of colonel. Instead Beauregard enrolled as a private in the "Orleans Guards", a battalion of French Creole aristocrats. At the same time, he communicated with Slidell and the newly chosen President Davis, angling for a senior position in the new Confederate States Army. Rumors that Beauregard would be placed in charge of the entire Army infuriated Bragg.  Their personal animosity was one of the subthemes of the western theater for the next 4 years.

Anderson’s valor and commitment to duty was recognized in the Union.  The Fort Sumter Flag became a popular patriotic symbol after Major Anderson returned North with it. The flag is still displayed in the fort's museum. The Star of the West took all the garrison members to New York City. There they were welcomed and honored with a parade on Broadway.

What do you think of the events at Fort Sumter? Let us know below.

Now, if you missed it, read Lloyd’s piece on how the Confederacy funded its war effort here.