Republicans in the Presidency: Criminal Dealings?

Donald J. Trump is in court for a number of reasons currently, although he still remains favorite for the Republican nomination for the presidency. With that in mind, here Larry Deblinger looks at some of the criminal (or possibly criminal) dealings of some former Republican presidents.

Harding’s Gang? President Warren G. Harding’s first cabinet in 1921.

The Republican party of the United States is in flux as it seeks to forge its future with or without the leadership of former president Donald J. Trump. While Trump holds a commanding lead in the polls in the race for the 2024 GOP presidential nomination, he is also facing trial on four criminal indictments encompassing 91 separate charges. Republican politicians and rank-and file-voters must decide whether they will support Trump should he be both their party’s nominee and a convicted felon. Depending on the trial outcomes, it may be a stark choice of Trump or the law.

But the stakes of the present moment for the future of the Republican party, and, potentially, of American democracy, can only be fully appreciated in light of the GOP’s past. The history of the presidencies of the Republican party, which often brands itself “the party of law and order,” includes a long criminal record, spanning almost the entire existence of the party, of which the Trump administration, despite some unprecedented aspects of its law-breaking, is only the latest chapter. What Republicans decide today will help determine whether that heritage of lawlessness at the highest levels of national government, where a political party is expected to assemble its best and brightest and promote its core tenets, will continue to stain the character of the GOP.

Grant’s Invasion

The criminal record of Republican presidencies substantially begins a mere 15 years after the 1854 birth of the GOP, with the administration of Ulysses S. Grant (1869-1877). At this time, corruption in government was common since the so-called “spoils system,” as in “to the victor go the spoils,” held sway in American politics, determining government jobs, favors and funding through political patronage.1 But federal executive branch corruption erupted to unprecedented and shocking levels under Grant. The scandals, too numerous to detail in total, ran from bribery, fraud, and extortion to embezzlement and financial market manipulation and permeated the departments of the Treasury, Interior, Justice, War (now called Defense), the Navy, and the Postal Service, reaching to top cabinet officers and the vice-president.2

The malfeasance by the end of Grant’s first term was such that it helped trigger a breakaway faction of his party who called themselves the Liberal Republicans and opposed Grant’s 1872 re-election. Among other points of opposition to Grant, the Liberals charged that “The Civil Service of the Government has become a mere instrument of partisan tyranny and personal ambition, and an object of selfish greed. It is a scandal and reproach upon free institutions, and breeds a demoralization dangerous to the perpetuity of republican government.”3

The Whiskey Ring

The most extensive of the Grant administration scandals was the Whiskey Ring. Grant had sent an old friend whom he had appointed to the Treasury, General John McDonald, to head up federal tax revenue collection in Missouri, a hotbed of support for the Liberal Republicans. Once there, McDonald observed that whiskey distillers had been bribing federal revenue agents for years to allow them to underpay what they owed in taxes. Rather than curtail the illegality, McDonald and other Republican operatives got in on the action, forming the Whiskey Ring in conjunction with distillers, ostensibly to divert the unpaid tax money to a slush fund for Grant’s re-election in 1872 and other Republican campaigns.4 Storekeepers, treasury clerks, revenue agents and others in the whiskey chain were forced to cooperate, sometimes through impressment and blackmail.4 After the 1872 elections, the Whiskey Ring outgrew its original, perhaps specious political purposes to become a nationwide crime syndicate operated entirely for the enrichment of the conspirators. After it was uncovered and investigated by Grant’s Justice Department starting in 1875, 110 conspirators, including MacDonald, were convicted of crimes (e.g., defrauding the US Treasury) and over $3 million in stolen revenues were recovered.5  

Despite the scandals of his administration and opposition of the Liberals, Grant, the former top general of the Union army and Civil war hero, won re-election handily. Grant appeared to be unaware of the various corrupt activities in his administration, and urged prosecution of the malefactors when informed of them.6 But he was drawn into the Whiskey Ring scandal when his private secretary, Orville Babcock, was indicted and tried in criminal court for involvement in the scheme. Grant testified on behalf of Babcock, denying his guilt and defending his character, in a deposition taken at the White House. Owing largely to Grant’s testimony, Babcock was eventually acquitted, but was later accused of complicity in another corrupt scheme.4,5 For years afterwards, fairly or not, the term “Grantism” was synonymous with government corruption.7

Harding’s Gang

Following Grant, the Progressive era of the late nineteenth and early 20th century in the US promoted “good government” policies which helped to curb government corruption. Progressive Republicans such as Theodore Roosevelt played prominent roles in this movement.8 But Americans came to tire of Progressivism under the strident leadership and activism of the Democratic president Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), and in 1920, they voted a conservative Republican, Warren G. Harding, into the White House. Harding had run on the campaign theme of a “return to normalcy.”9 If by normalcy Harding meant a return to Republican officials criminally abusing the powers of the Federal government, he delivered in spades.

A handsome, statuesque, and genial man with a turbo-charged sex-drive, Harding had risen through the shady world of Ohio politics and brought his cronies from that milieu to the executive branch. Known as the Ohio gang, Harding’s associates generated a font of corruption.

The disclosures began in early 1923 at the Veteran’s Bureau  (now the Department of Veterans’ Affairs), leading to the resignation of the Director, Charles R. Forbes and the suicide of the General Counsel, Charles T. Cramer. Forbes was convicted in 1924 of conspiracy to defraud the government, involving the theft of more than $200 million in bureau funds, and sentenced to two years in prison.10,11

The odor of corruption led next to the office of the Alien Property Custodian, which adjudicated claims for properties confiscated from Germans during World War I. Congressional investigators the bureau to be a sump of bribery and graft. The Custodian, Thomas W. Miller, was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the government and imprisoned.12  Harding’s Attorney General, Harry Daugherty, a key member of the Ohio gang, was brought to trial on charges of involvement in the Alien Bureau schemes and was acquitted, although it was brought out that he had burned bank ledger sheets of his and other accounts to destroy evidence.13 Daugherty was also accused of running a bribery/protection racket for alcohol dealers trying to evade the Prohibition law then in effect but was never prosecuted.14 However, Daugherty’s secretary and close friend, Jess Smith, committed suicide under mysterious circumstances.15

Oil Money Bribes

The infamous Teapot Dome scandal, also occurring under the Harding administration, was named for a federal government reserve of oil-bearing land at Teapot Dome, Wyoming, intended for use by the US Navy and managed by the Interior Department. After a series of investigations and criminal trials revealing an intricate and scandalous web of corporate-government corruption, Interior Secretary Albert B. Fall was convicted and imprisoned for receiving bribes in return for leasing Teapot Dome and other federal oil reserves to private companies.16

The full extent of Harding’s knowledge of the corruption in his administration remains unknown, largely because he died suddenly while in office in 1923. In his classic 1931 history of the 1920s, “Only Yesterday,” Frederick Lewis Allen, author and Editor of Harper’s magazine, opined that “the Harding administration was responsible in its short two years and five months for more concentrated robbery and rascality than any other in the whole history of the Federal government.”17 

Nixon’s Criminal Cohort

It is sometimes forgotten that Richard M. Nixon set the tone for his administration (1969-74) well before the Watergate scandal with his choice for vice-president, Spiro T. Agnew, Governor of Maryland. Little-known outside of Maryland, Agnew was a tough, plain-spoken politician whom the Nixonites thought would be perfect for their campaign. It turned out that Agnew was a creature straight from the Grant-Harding school of politics as criminal enterprise. Agnew had not only run a bribery racket as County Executive and then Governor of Maryland, extorting public works contractors for kickbacks of government-appropriated funds, he continued receiving the payments—in envelopes stuffed with cash—as Vice-President of the US.18 Faced with criminal charges of extortion, bribery, graft, conflict of interest, and tax evasion, Agnew pleaded to the least embarrassing charge, tax evasion, in return for resigning his office and a $10,000 fine.19

The Watergate Scandal

Then there was Watergate. The infamous burglary of Democratic National Committee headquarters and cover-up, the latter personally engineered by Nixon and his White House staff, encompassed a vast scale of illegal activities and abuses of power. As in the Harding administration, the nation’s top legal official, Attorney General John Mitchell, was a key facilitator of illegality under Nixon. A century after Republican operatives under Grant used the Whiskey Ring to raise re-election campaign funds through intimidation and blackmail, Nixon re-election campaign officials also used an illegally derived slush fund, including campaign contributions from corporations, which were outlawed at the time, to finance the Watergate break in and other crimes and “dirty tricks,” laundering the money through banks in Mexico.20,21

Overall, 69 Nixon administration officials were indicted for crimes related to Watergate or other illegal activities and 48 were convicted, including Attorney General Mitchell.22 A grand jury was set to charge Nixon with bribery, conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and obstruction of a criminal investigation but prosecution was deterred by questions over whether a sitting president could be indicted.23 In any event, like his vice-president before him, Nixon resigned in disgrace.

Reagan Restores a Republican Tradition

After the brief period of atonement known as the Ford administration (1974-77), which was most notable for President Gerald Ford’s pardoning of Nixon, the Republicans were back at it with the presidency of Ronald W. Reagan (1981-89). Reagan bore curious echoes of Harding as a genial, handsome, somewhat inattentive man promising to restore a nostalgic era of simpler times in America. And like Harding, Reagan presided over a viral outbreak of corruption in the federal government of a magnitude unseen since the days of the Ohio gang.24 Abuses of office occurred at no less than 20 different federal departments and agencies, according to Pulitzer prize-winning Washington Post journalist and author Haynes Johnson.25

“By the end of his (Reagan’s) term 138 administration officials had been convicted, had been indicted, or had been the subject of official investigations for official misconduct and/or criminal violations. In terms of numbers of officials involved, the record of his administration was the worst ever,” wrote Johnson, in his 1991 history of the Reagan administration, “Sleepwalking Through History.”26  

Cascading Corruption

The Iran-Contra affair is the most famous of the Reagan-era scandals, but that episode could at least be portrayed as a principled, if illegal, attempt to fight the spread of socialism in Central America. Less noted is that the Reagan administration was rife with raw, greed-driven corruption, which by one estimate amounted to a total theft of $130billion in public funds.27 A prime example was the Wedtech case, involving a Defense Department contractor, which Johnson described as “the kind of political corruption that extended back to the Washington (DC) of Grant and Harding: influence peddling, government contracts, cash, bribes, kickbacks, fraud and conspiracy.”28 The subsequent “Operation Ill Wind” probe by the FBI, investigating further corruption in Defense Department procurement, resulted in 50 convictions, including those of high-ranking military officers and administration officials.29

And on it went, across the federal government in a veritable feeding frenzy from the department of Housing and Urban Development, where an estimated $8 billion in public funds were stolen,30 to the Environmental Protection Agency where the director resigned rather than cooperate with a Congressional investigation of political manipulation of department funds.31 As in the Harding and Nixon administrations, the nation’s top law enforcement officer came under scrutiny for alleged lawbreaking. Edwin Meese III, Reagan’s Attorney General starting in 1984, was the object of a 14-month special prosecutor and federal grand jury investigation of alleged criminal financial improprieties. Although Meese was acquitted, he became an object of ridicule at the Department of Justice where morale plummeted.32     

Government-Sponsored Organized Crime

The Iran-Contra scandal involved a secret scheme concocted by high-ranking officials at the CIA and the National Security Agency to sell arms to Iran and use the proceeds to fund the Contras of Nicaragua, who were fighting the socialist regime of their country. The arms sales to Iran violated US policy of not negotiating with terrorists, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. The support for the Contras violated the 1984 Boland Amendment, which specifically prohibited all military aid to the Contras or other groups in Nicaragua.33 Moreover, the murky scheme involved an unholy host of money changers, drug dealers, arms dealers, and terrorists, amounting to what one writer has described as “American-sponsored organized crime.”34

The Independent Prosecutor on the case, Lawrence E. Walsh, ultimately indicted 14 individuals with criminal charges of whom 11 were convicted, including National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter, Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North, National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane, and Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams.35 Four counts of perjury and false statements were pending against Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger when he was pardoned in 1992 by President George H. W. Bush, who also pardoned Abrams and MacFarlane, among others. Walsh, a lifelong Republican, reportedly called Bush’s pardon of Weinberger, “one of the great cover-ups of American history at the highest levels of the executive branch.”36

Reagan pleaded ignorance of the Iran Contra scheme, while accepting responsibility for it. Although Reagan made multiple false statements regarding the activities in a televised speech to the nation,37 there was no evidence he knew they were false, and Walsh declined to indict him.38

And then there was Trump, who is now charged under one of his four indictments (from the state of Georgia) of running a “criminal enterprise” along with 17 co-defendants.

A Partisan Pattern?

Of the 19 total Republican presidencies, four, not including that of Trump, have each compiled a criminal record unparalleled by any other administration of any other party in US history. The outbreaks have been sporadic but persistent to this day. Yet, the question could be raised as to whether this record truly reveals a penchant for lawlessness specific to the GOP or simply a tendency endemic to all political parties. As the famous saying goes, “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

Over their history, the Democrats have surely demonstrated no blanket immunity to corruption. During the 1860s and 1870s, the era of the spoilsmen, the Tweed Ring of New York City, run by the notorious “Boss” Tweed of the Democratic party, was a nexus of corrupt rackets that dominated city politics and set a standard for “boss”-run “party machines” nationwide. The Democratic-run states of New York, Illinois, and New Jersey have long been known for systemic corruption. Former New York State Democratic Assembly Leader Sheldon Silver died a convict in 2022 after being found guilty of corruption in 2015, and Democratic Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey is currently facing bribery charges. Numerous other Democratic federal legislators have also been convicted of crimes in office.39 And the vast majority of Republican federal, executive branch office holders have been law abiding. The many Republicans who declared themselves ready to convict Nixon in his impeachment trial and forced his resignation demonstrated a courageous commitment to the law, as did those who testified for the January 6th Committee, and the two who served as committee members.

The Parties Compared

There is no comparison, however, between the criminal records of Democrats and Republicans in the presidency, the pinnacle of the US government, a fact supported by several media outlets using online data. Politifact, a nonpartisan website, found that there were 142 indictments against members of the past three Republican administrations (including Trump’s) versus just two under the past three Democratic presidents.40 The Huffington Post, a left-leaning news site, reported 91 criminal convictions connected to Republican presidencies versus only one under a Democrat since 1970.41 And the Daily Kos, another left-wing media site, tallied 120 indictments, 82 convictions, and 34 imprisonments for Republicans from the Nixon through the Obama administrations versus 4, 2, and 2, respectively, for the Democrats.42

What is next for the Republicans? If Trump is convicted, Republicans may or may not choose to move beyond him. The greater question for their party, and for US democracy, is whether the Republicans will leave behind or continue their heritage of criminal abuse of power at the highest levels of the US government, of which the Trump administration is but the latest chapter.

What do you think of the author’s argument? Let us know below.

References

1.     Calhoun CW (2017). The Presidency of Ulysses S. Grant. Lawrence, Kansas; University Press of Kansas. Page 12.

2.     Scandals of the Ulysses S. Grant Administration. Wikipedia. https://wiki2.org/en/Grant_administration_scandals.

3.     The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/liberal-republican-platform-1872.

4.     Rives T. Grant, Babcock, and the Whiskey Ring. Prologue Magazine. Fall 2000; 32(3): https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2000/fall/whiskey-ring-1.

5.     Longley R. The Whiskey Ring: bribery scandal of the 1870s. Thought Co. March 29, 2022. https://www.thoughtco.com/the-whiskey-ring-5220735.

6.     Chernow R (2017). Grant. New York; Penguin Press. p.837.

7.     Sumner C. Republicanism vs. Grantism. Speech in the Senate of the United States. May 31, 1872.

8.     Swinth K. The Square Deal. Theodore Roosevelt and the themes of progressive reform. The Gilder-Lehrman Institute of American History. https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/essays/square-deal-theodore-roosevelt-and-themes-progressive-reform.

9.     Wallenfeldt J. Return to normalcy. American campaign slogan. History and Society: Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/return-to-normalcy.

10.  Allen, FL (1931). Only yesterday. An informal history of the 1920s. New York; Harper Perennial, Modern Classics. p.129-30.

11.  Charles R. Forbes. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_R._Forbes.

12.  Allen, FL (1931). Only yesterday. An informal history of the 1920s. New York; Harper Perennial, Modern Classics. pp.130-1.

13.  Allen, FL (1931). Only yesterday. An informal history of the 1920s. New York; Harper Perennial, Modern Classics. pp.131-2.

14.  Allen, FL (1931). Only yesterday. An informal history of the 1920s. New York; Harper Perennial, Modern Classics. p.132.

15.  Allen, FL (1931). Only yesterday. An informal history of the 1920s. New York; Harper Perennial, Modern Classics. pp.132-3.

16.  Allen, FL (1931). Only yesterday. An informal history of the 1920s. New York; Harper Perennial, Modern Classics. pp.118-29.

17.  Allen, FL (1931). Only yesterday. An informal history of the 1920s. New York; Harper Perennial, Modern Classics. p.133.

18.  Yarvitz M, Maddow R (2020). Bag man. The wild crimes, audacious cover up and spectacular downfall of a brazen crook in the White House. New York; Crown. pp. 50-75.

19.  Yarvitz M, Maddow R (2020). Bag Man. The Wild Crimes, Audacious Cover Up and Spectacular Downfall of a Brazen Crook in the White House. New York; Crown. pp. 138-9.

20.  Genovese MA (1999). The Watergate Crisis. Westport, CT; Greenwood Press. pp.22-23.

21.  Emery F (1994). Watergate. New York; Random House, Inc. pp. 110-11, 124-5.

22.  Watergate Scandal. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watergate_scandal.

23.   Watkins E, Kaufman E. National archives release draft indictment of Richard Nixon amid Mueller probe. CNN.com. October 31, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/31/politics/richard-nixon-watergate-national-archives-mueller/index.html.

24.  Scandals of the Ronald Reagan Administration. Wikipedia.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scandals_of_the_Ronald_Reagan_administration.

25.  Johnson H (1991). Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York, London; W.W Norton and Company. p. 169.

26.  Johnson H (1991). Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York, London; W.W Norton and Company. p. 184.

27.  Suri J. Reagan and the Iran-Contra affair. American Heritage. 2021. 66(2). https://www.americanheritage.com/reagan-and-iran-contra-affair.

28.  Johnson H (1991). Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York, London; W.W Norton and Company. pp. 172-3.

29.  Operation Ill Wind. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ill_Wind.

30.  Johnson H (1991). Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York, London; W.W Norton and Company. p. 183.

31.  Johnson H (1991). Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York, London; W.W Norton and Company. pp. 170-1.

32.  Johnson H (1991). Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York, London; W.W Norton and Company. pp. 184-5.

33.  Suri J. Reagan and the Iran-Contra affair. American Heritage. 2021. 66(2). https://www.americanheritage.com/reagan-and-iran-contra-affair.

34.  Suri J. Reagan and the Iran-Contra affair. American Heritage. 2021. 66(2). https://www.americanheritage.com/reagan-and-iran-contra-affair.

35.  Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters. Volume 1: Lawrence E. Walsh, Independent Counsel. August 4, 1993, Washington, D.C. United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm.

36.  Rosenberg P. Republicans, a history: how did the party of “law and order” become the party of crooks and crime. Salon. November 24, 2019.

37.  Johnson H (1991). Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York, London; W.W Norton and Company. pp. 296-7.

38.   Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs. Good Government Project, Brown University. https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/profile-reagan.php.

39.  List of American federal politicians convicted of crimes. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_American_federal_politicians_convicted_of_crimes.

40.  Kertscher T. Many more criminal indictments under Trump, Reagan, and Nixon than under Obama Clinton and Carter. Politifact; The Poynter Institute. January 9, 2020. https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/jan/09/facebook-posts/many-more-criminal-indictments-under-trump-reagan-/.

41.  Grossinger P. Republican presidencies have 91x the conviction rate of Democratic presidencies. HuffPost. December 22, 2017. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/republican-presidencies-have-91x-the-convictions-rate_b_5a3d5406e4b0df0de8b064e5.

42.  RoyalScribe. Updated: Comparing presidential administrations by felony arrests and convictions (as of 9/17/2018). Daily Kos. September 18, 2018. https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2018/9/18/1796668/-UPDATED-Comparing-Presidential-Administrations-by-felony-arrests-and-convictions-as-of-9-17-2018.

The Worst Union General? Major General Ambrose Burnside

Delving into the character of General Ambrose Burnside, the man whose facial hair lives on as “sideburns” in the vernacular, threatens to lose many readers from the start. Most Civil War enthusiasts would consider him a prime candidate to be named the worst Union general in the war and with some merit. And, no question, he made a series of wild miscalculations and poor judgments.

Lloyd Klein explains.

Ambrose Burnside, 1862 (on the left).

“All the world is a stage, but the play is badly cast.”

― Oscar Wilde

Burnside was actually a very talented man who was grossly miscast in the war. Baseball fans recognize that a pitcher who loses 20 games in a season must be thought of highly because a bad pitcher would never get the opportunity to keep losing; that may be a good analogy to keep in mind when reading about him. The commonly held view that he was always on hand to lose a battle will absolutely be demolished by this in-depth study, although some will not willingly part with that cherished myth.

His father had been a slave owner in South Carolina who freed his slaves and moved to Indiana. Ambrose graduated from West Point, served in garrison duty at the end of the Mexican War, served under Braxton Bragg in Nevada and California, and was the recipient of an Apache arrow through his neck in Las Vegas. He was promoted to first lieutenant and sent to duty in Rhode Island. There he resigned from the army, became commander of the state militia, got married, and went into business, with no expectation of seeing military service ever again. But you know, life can be funny sometimes; our destiny is often beyond our control.

Burnside relinquished his U.S. Army commission to fully dedicate himself to perfecting the Burnside carbine, a groundbreaking breech-loading firearm (as seen in the patent drawing). He ingeniously crafted a unique brass cartridge for this carbine, designed to hold both bullet and powder, with a notable absence of a primer. To load the weapon, users would open the breech block by manipulating the twin trigger guards, inserting the cartridge. Upon pulling the trigger, the hammer struck a separate percussion cap, creating a spark. A hole in the cartridge base ignited the black powder, with the conical cartridge expertly sealing the barrel-breech junction. Unlike many contemporary breech-loaders prone to gas leaks upon firing, Burnside's design triumphantly eliminated this issue.

President Buchanan's Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, entered into a substantial contract with the Burnside Arms Company to outfit a substantial portion of the Army, mainly cavalry, prompting Burnside to establish extensive manufacturing facilities. However, these plans were marred when allegations arose that Floyd accepted bribes to terminate the $100,000 contract with Burnside. This revolutionary concept took time for the military to grasp, and by the time its value was recognized, Burnside had already sold the patent. In 1857, the Burnside carbine triumphed in a competition at West Point, outclassing 17 other carbine designs. Nevertheless, government orders for these carbines were initially sparse. This changed with the outbreak of the Civil War, resulting in over 55,000 carbines being requisitioned for Union cavalrymen. It became the third most widely used carbine during the Civil War, surpassed only by the Sharps carbine and the Spencer carbine.

In 1858 he ran for Congress as a Democrat in Rhode Island and lost. Newly married and out of a job, he needed to find a way to support his young family. So, Burnside went west looking for a job, any job. And he was hired as the Treasurer of the Illinois Central Railroad. Anyone who doubts that the Goddess of History doesn’t have a mordant sense of humor will find this coincidence a bit much. So, consequently, his new boss became George B. McClellan, and in his position, he began working directly with its corporate attorney, one Abraham Lincoln.

The Start of the Civil War

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Burnside was a colonel in the Rhode Island Militia. He raised the 1st Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry Regiment and was appointed its colonel on May 2, 1861. Notably, two companies of this regiment were armed with Burnside carbines. In less than a month, he advanced to brigade leadership within the Department of Northeast Virginia. His performance during the First Battle of Bull Run in July was unremarkable, but he temporarily assumed division command in lieu of the wounded Brig. Gen. David Hunter.

And so suddenly, Ambrose Burnside, inventor, failed politician and businessman, Indian fighter, and fledgling railroad executive, found himself a brigadier general in the Army of the Potomac. Initially tasked with training troops in the nation's capital, his destiny took a sharp turn that autumn. Burnside was entrusted with leading three brigades within the North Carolina Expeditionary Force. Their mission: to seal the North Carolina coast to shipping as part of the naval blockade. Collaborating closely with maritime experts, Burnside orchestrated an impressive amphibious operation that indeed achieved an 80% closure of the coastline. His significant promotion to Major General on March 18, 1862, played a pivotal role in later events during the war. His brigades were officially amalgamated to form the IX Corps, and he earned recognition as one of the Union generals who contributed to Union victories.

1862

In a context where career professional soldiers ruthlessly vied for advancement, an extraordinary occurrence transpired after McClellan's Peninsula Campaign failure: Burnside was offered command of the Army of the Potomac.  He declined, citing his lack of experience in leading an army of that magnitude, resulting in John Pope assuming command. Still, the other generals looked up to him.  In the lead-up to the Second Battle of Manassas, a fellow Major General, Fitz-John Porter, repeatedly conveyed messages to Burnside, questioning Pope's competence. Burnside, concurring with Porter's assessments, forwarded them to higher-ranking authorities, a crucial factor in Porter's later court-martial, during which Burnside testified in his defense.

And after the debacle of Second Manassas, once again he was offered command, and once again, Burnside declined, citing his inexperience as the reason. He acknowledged his shortcomings as a military officer. President Lincoln pressured him on several occasions, but Burnside stood firm in his belief that he wasn't capable of leading such a sizable army, a belief ultimately vindicated by history. He repeatedly declined, saying, "I was not competent to command such a large army as this."

During the Battle of Antietam, Burnside assumed command of the Right Wing of the Army of the Potomac, overseeing the I Corps and his own IX Corps at the outset of the Maryland Campaign. However, McClellan separated these two corps during the battle, stationing them at opposite ends of the Union battle line and restoring Burnside's authority solely over the IX Corps. Burnside, implicitly refusing to relinquish his control, operated as if the corps commanders were first Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno (who was killed at South Mountain) and subsequently Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, directing orders through them to the corps.

At Antietam, the fact that Burnside delayed his attack on the Union left flank until the afternoon, particularly in the context of the stone bridge over Antietam Creek, the Rohrback Bridge now known as Burnside Bridge, likely influenced the battle's outcome. A cumbersome command arrangement contributed to Burnside's sluggishness in launching his attack and crossing the Rohrback, later Burnside's Bridge, positioned on the southern flank of the Union line. This delay allowed Confederate forces to reinforce and ultimately repulse the Union breakthrough. Sears suggested in Landscape Turned Red that the problem was that Burnside felt he was demoted and was piqued.  But its hard to imagine Burnside allowing a Union loss for that reason, and even harder to imagine that Lincoln would choose him to be the next Commander in Chief a month later if it were true.

The real story is far more complicated. McClellan sent his engineer to position Burnside but did so incorrectly. Rodman’s small force has to move on its own to Snavely’s Ford, which was the best downstream ford; this was too far away at this point for an alternative route. The idea that the Union forces could have waded across the Antietam Creek was based on a post war remark by out old friend, Henry Kyd Douglas. It was picked up by historians over the 20th Century, including Catton, who used it to make Burnside appear incompetent. The best guess is that it was not true, that there was just one ford, and it was far from ideal for a cross-river crossing under fire. This very complicated story is told in these two links: https://www.historynet.com/sculpting-a-scapegoat-ambrose-burnside-at-antietam/ and https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/assault-on-burnsides-bridge-at-the-battle-of-antietam/In the afternoon, Burnside's corps advanced against the Confederate right. At this critical moment, Jackson's subordinate, Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill, arrived at the last minute from Harpers Ferry McClellan might have secured victory if Burnside had acted differently. The cumbersome command arrangement contributed to Burnside's sluggishness in launching his attack and crossing Burnside's Bridge, positioned on the southern flank of the Union line. This delay allowed Confederate forces to reinforce and ultimately repulse the Union breakthrough.

Burnside failed to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the area and failed to exploit numerous easily accessible fording sites beyond the reach of Confederate forces. Instead, his troops were repeatedly forced into assaulting the narrow bridge, under the threat of Confederate sharpshooters on elevated terrain. McClellan, growing impatient, sent couriers to urge Burnside forward, even ordering, "Tell him if it costs 10,000 men he must go now." Despite this, Burnside didn't receive reinforcements, and the battle ended with missed opportunities. He further increased the pressure by sending his inspector general to confront Burnside, who reacted indignantly: "McClellan appears to think I am not trying my best to carry this bridge; you are the third or fourth one who has been to me this morning with similar orders.” The IX Corps eventually broke through, but the delay allowed Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's Confederate division to come up from Harpers Ferry and repulse the Union breakthrough. McClellan refused Burnside's requests for reinforcements, and the battle ended. 

Astonishingly, Burnside was offered command once more, despite his poor performance at Antietam.

Fredericksburg

Lincoln issued the order to remove McClellan on November 5, 1862, and on November 7, 1862, he selected Burnside to take his place. Burnside reluctantly complied with this directive, the third such instance in 1862, partly due to the courier's message that if he declined, command would instead be given to Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, whom Burnside had an aversion to. It is instructive that he was offered this position and compelled to accept the third time given his own reluctance and, as history shows, his lack of preparation for the position.  The fact is, no one in the Union Army had ever been prepared for such a role, and he was as accomplished as anyone in senior leadership.

Burnside on taking command moved his army from near Culpepper to Falmouth within a few days, a pretty monumental achievement. His plan was to then make a direct attack on the Confederate capitol of Richmond, Virginia, avoiding Lee’s forces who were then in Culpepper. Burnside arrived in Falmouth by November 19, but the pontoons that he planned to use to cross the Rappahannock were delayed. He had ordered pontoon bridges from DC, but they were not delivered for weeks by the Quartermaster Department.  General Halleck acknowledged afterward that he had opposed the movement and had not hurried their supply. The loss of time allowed Lee to position Longstreet on Marye’s Heights.

The Assault on Marye's Heights resulted in a casualty rate estimated at 15-20% for Union troops, contributing to a total Union casualty count of 8,000. By comparison, Pickett’s charge had 6000 Confederate casualties of 12,500 engaged, or close to 50%. Malvern Hill had 8000-9000 casualties on both sides combined, or about 16-18%. Numbers aside, these figures tell us that attacks of entrenched or prepared positions in the Civil War were challenging, and the technology didn’t exist to overcome those odds.

It is so obvious to us, 160 years later, that this was a disastrous move. It wasn’t obvious to Burnside. Burnside’s decision to escalate the initial diversionary attack into a full-scale frontal assault on Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg was a costly and unsuccessful move. Why smart people make decisions that don’t work out can be perplexing, and General Burnside at Fredericksburg gives us a chance to see how external pressure and internal self-delusion impact our choices.

Several factors influenced Burnside's decision-making. There was a breakdown in communication and coordination among Union commanders. Burnside received reports of limited success in the diversionary attack on the Confederate right flank, leading him to believe that a more aggressive assault on Marye's Heights was needed to divert Confederate attention. Pressure to achieve a decisive victory and optimism may have clouded his judgment.

Burnside believed in his numerical advantage and hoped to dislodge the Confederate defenders through overwhelming force. Given the circumstances, Marye's Heights seemed the most promising target due to its proximity to the shelter of Fredericksburg and the less steep terrain. These factors, combined with the changing dynamics of the battlefield and the desire for a breakthrough, led Burnside to escalate what was originally intended as a diversionary attack into a full-scale frontal assault on Marye's Heights. I think none of the Civil War commanders understood that artillery had changed war a great deal and still believed that brute force attacks could overcome any defense; see Lee at Gettysburg, Grant at Cold Harbor. I also think Burnside was not a strategic genius and had exactly one plan in mind, and when it failed, he panicked.

Several of Burnside's subordinate commanders, including General William B. Franklin, expressed reservations about the frontal assault on Marye's Heights during the Battle of Fredericksburg. Franklin, in particular, was critical of the plan and argued against it. He believed that attacking Marye's Heights directly would result in high casualties and was unlikely to succeed. Hooker, Sumner, and several others told Burnside it was futile, but he continued to order piecemeal attacks.

The Battle of Fredericksburg is not a moment of shining glory for General Burnside. The battle and the subsequent ill-fated offensive led to Burnside's officers voicing vehement complaints to the White House and the War Department, citing his incompetence. Burnside attempted a Spring offensive, only to encounter hindrances stemming from poor planning and organization. The Spring Offensive was known as the Mud March. Although conceptually clever, it was highly impractical for January in Virginia. Burnside's plan was quite similar to Hooker's strategy in the Battle of Chancellorsville, aiming to outmaneuver Lee using the upriver fords on the Rappahannock. Burnside intended to execute this with his cavalry, which had thus far delivered lackluster performances in the war. However, heavy rains in January transformed the roads into impassable mud, forcing the plan's abandonment

After Fredericksburg

Burnside offered his resignation, but Lincoln declined, proposing that there might still be a role for him within the army. Consequently, Burnside was reinstated as the head of the IX Corps and dispatched to command a relatively inactive department, a quiet region with limited activity. Lincoln's rationale was that Burnside couldn't get into significant trouble there. However, he swiftly found himself embroiled in a major political controversy.

Burnside was assigned to the Department of the Ohio, which encompassed the states of Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, and Illinois. Burnside issued a series of orders in a region with divided loyalties and sentiments, seeking to suppress "the expression of public sentiments against the war or the Administration." General Order No. 38, in particular, declared that "any person found guilty of treason will be tried by a military tribunal and either imprisoned or banished to enemy lines." On May 1, 1863, Ohio Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham, a prominent opponent of the war, held a large public rally in Mount Vernon, Ohio in which he denounced President Lincoln as a "tyrant" who sought to abolish the Constitution and set up a dictatorship. Burnside had dispatched several agents to the rally who took down notes and brought back their "evidence" to the general, who then declared that it was sufficient grounds to arrest Vallandigham for treason. This led to the arrest and trial of Ohio Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham, a prominent war opponent, further fueling political discord. A military court tried him and found him guilty of violating General Order No. 38, despite his protests that he was simply expressing his opinions in public. Vallandigham was found guilty of violating General Order No. 38, and sentenced to imprisonment for the duration of the war. This turned him into a martyr by antiwar Democrats. Lincoln had to extricate the entire Republican administration from the fallout that Burnside had produced.

Lincoln and Grant faced a dilemma concerning Burnside, pondering whether he posed a greater hindrance as a general in the field or in political administration. Initially, he was dispatched to relieve Knoxville, a relatively manageable task since only 2,300 troops opposed him. However, it still necessitated the return of all three brigades from Knoxville to force the Cumberland Gap's surrender. The strategic intent of the Knoxville campaign was to prevent Burnside's reinforcement of the besieged Federal forces at Chattanooga. Longstreet’s movement forced Burnside back into the defensive works in Knoxville. Burnside effectively outmaneuvered Longstreet at the Battle of Campbell's Station and successfully reached safety in Knoxville, where he endured a brief siege until the Confederate defeat at the Battle of Fort Sanders outside the city. It should be noted that General Burnside, widely seen as incompetent by modern enthusiasts, defeated Longstreet, widely seen as stellar, in this one-against-one campaign. There were extenuating circumstances, such as favorable terrain and supply routes, of course; but that is history. Longstreet then began a siege but it wasn’t very effective. After the first week, Longstreet learned of Bragg’s defeat at Chattanooga. Longstreet realized that time was not on his side, so he ordered an assault a few days later, but it failed miserably. Then, General Longstreet, who had bested him at Marye's Heights, launched an attack, preventing disaster despite being besieged. Grant sent Sherman to assist, but Longstreet had already withdrawn to Virginia. Longstreet's siege ended when Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman led the Army of the Tennessee to Knoxville, entered the city, and relieved Burnside.  Longstreet withdrew his men and later rejoined Gen. Robert E. Lee’s command in Virginia.

Later, Grant, thinking he could better monitor Burnside in the east, brought him back to Virginia. Unfortunately, Burnside's performance at the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House and later at the Battle of the Crater was subpar.

During the Overland Campaign, Burnside's actions were less than stellar. At the Wilderness, timely attacks over three days could have secured victory, but Burnside failed to launch them. On the second day, had this union general moved rapidly when ordered (or even at all), AP Hill’s corps might have been destroyed. But once again, he was too slow to recognize the potential.

The blame for the Union's failure at the Battle of the Crater initially fell on Burnside, but it was later lifted. Burnside had been ordered to change the attacking troops at the last minute by Meade. General Ambrose Burnside was the corps leader of the Union assault. He was relieved of command for the final time for this failure. Brigadier General Edward Ferrero's division of black soldiers sustained very high casualties, perhaps because the Confederates refused to accept them as prisoners when they tried to surrender. He and  General James H. Ledlie were drinking rum throughout the battle in a bunker behind the lines. A division of United States Colored Troops under Ferrero trained to lead the assault. The plan was for one brigade to go left of the crater and the other to the right. A regiment from both brigades was to rush perpendicular to the crater. Then, the remaining force was to seize the Jerusalem Plank Road just 1,600 feet behind the line.

But the day before, Meade ordered Burnside not to use the black troops in the lead assault. Instead, Ledlie’s division was chosen but no one told them what to do once the explosion occurred. Meade did not let them charge because he thought if it failed then it would receive political backlash in the north and only prove Lincoln's message as false. He was aligning military goals with political ones. The USCT instead charged behind the lead troops. Tactically, Union troops entered the crater instead of going around it.  There, they were trapped in a hole with no support on the flanks. The ANV began shooting surrendering troops, perhaps due to racial animus. Ledlie was forced to resign by Meade and Grant.

Post-war Accomplishments

Burnside exhibited his intelligence and abilities in all of his positions after the war. He was elected Governor and later served as a US Senator from Rhode Island, chairing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He even attempted to mediate an end to the Franco-Prussian War.
It is remarkable that as accomplished as he was both before and after the war, his legacy among Civil War enthusiasts is so diminished. Grant remarked that Burnside was "unfitted" for army command, a sentiment shared even by Burnside himself. It should be recognized that Grant fired handfuls of generals during the war who did not live up to his standards, but he always kept Burnside around. Despite his affable personality and diverse talents, Burnside's Civil War decisions showcased his weakest contributions to history. However, astute historians recognize his deeper well of aptitude.

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The Building of America’s Trans-Continental Railroad

The Trans-Continental Railroad was built in the 19th century and helped to transform the American West. Here, Richard Bluttal looks at its history and how it was built.

The painting depicts the ceremony for the driving of the Last Spike at Promontory Summit, Utah, on May 10, 1869. This joined the rails of the Central Pacific Railroad and the Union Pacific Railroad. The painting in partly fictional as not all of those depicted were there.

The Anglo-American Convention of 1818 stipulated that the citizens of both the United States and Britain would have equal access to the Oregon Country—the lands north of Spanish California well into present-day Canada—until its final status was resolved.  But to claim the lush lands across the Rockies and the lucrative trade with China and East Asia the United States had to make good on that claim, whether through diplomacy or war. Some intrepid Americans had already made the trek, but the common view in the East was that the intervening lands were a “howling wilderness” populated by hostile Indians. The experts said that respectable women and families would never make it to, or live in, Oregon. Narcissa Prentiss Whitman (1808–1847) proved them wrong, traveling by wagon train. She sent letters and her journal entries to relatives that described the beauties of the West and offered reassurance that rivers were affordable, travel by wagon was practical, and the so-called hostiles were generally friendly. These letters were circulated among friends and widely published in eastern newspapers. A flood of American, men, women, and children soon headed west following the Oregon Trail, the superhighway of the early American West. By the mid-1850s some 400,000 had made the journey, with perhaps 30,000 perishing en route, primarily from disease.

Transportation

So, what was the modes of transportation in the United States during the early-mid 1800’s? Before the first transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869, people traveled across the American West mainly by stagecoach. While railroads were available in the East, travel through the West was a slow, laborious process. Of course, waterway travel could be accomplished on a flatboat or a canoe, and then came the Erie Canal in 1825 where travel was done by using mules or horses to pull the riverboats along the sides of the water.  Remember In the early 19th century, most roads were dreadful. They served local needs, allowing farmers to get produce to market. Americans who did travel long distances overland to settle the West rode on wagon trails, like the Oregon Trail, rather than well-defined roads. Still, a few major roads served as important transportation links. The first commercially successful steamboat was tested on the Hudson River in 1807. Steamboats were soon introduced on most navigable rivers, they allowed commerce and travel both upstream and down encouraging trade by lowering costs and saving time. By 1830, steamboats dominated American river transportation. Steam railroads began to appear in the United States around 1830 and dominated the continental transportation system by the 1850s.

The possibility of railroads connecting the Atlantic and Pacific coasts was discussed in Congress even before the treaty with England which settled the question of the Oregon boundary in 1846. Chief promoter of a transcontinental railroad was Asa Whitney, a New York merchant active in the China trade who was obsessed with the idea of a railroad to the Pacific. In January 1845 he petitioned Congress for a charter and grant of a sixty-mile strip through the public domain to help finance construction. Although Congress failed to sanction his plan, Whitney made the Pacific railroad one of the great public issues of the day. The acquisition of California following the Mexican War opened the way for other routes to the coast. The discovery of gold, the settlement of the frontier, and the success of the eastern railroads increased interest in building a railroad to the Pacific.

While sectional issues and disagreements were debated in the late 1850s, no decision was forthcoming from Congress on the Pacific railroad question. Theodore D. Judah, the engineer of the Sacramento Valley Railroad, became obsessed with the desire to build a transcontinental railroad. In 1860 he approached Leland Stanford, Collis P. Huntington, Mark Hopkins, and Charles Crocker, leading Sacramento merchants, and soon convinced them that building a transcontinental line would make them rich and famous. The prospect of tapping the wealth of the Nevada mining towns and forthcoming legislation for federal aid to railroads stimulated them to incorporate the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California. This line later merged with the Southern Pacific. It was through Judah's efforts and the support of Abraham Lincoln, who saw military benefits in the lines as well as the bonding of the Pacific Coast to the Union, that the Pacific Railroad finally became a reality.

The railroad

The Railroad Act of 1862 put government support behind the transcontinental railroad and helped create the Union Pacific Railroad, which subsequently joined with the Central Pacific Railroad Company. On May 10, 1869, Leland Stanford, president of the Central Pacific Railroad Company and Thomas Clark Durant, Union Pacific Railroad Company vice president, drove the last spike at Promontory, Utah, linking the eastern railroad system to California. In six years, more than 20,000 workers' Chinese, Irish, and others had laid down some 1,700 miles of track in the largest American civil-works project to that time.

The railroad opened for through traffic between Sacramento and Omaha on May 10, 1869, when CPRR President Stanford ceremonially tapped the gold "Last Spike" (later often referred to as the "Golden Spike") with a silver hammer at Promontory Summit. In the following six months, the last leg from Sacramento to San Francisco Bay was completed. The resulting coast-to-coast railroad connection revolutionized the settlement and economy of the American West. It brought the western states and territories into alignment with the northern Union states and made transporting passengers and goods coast-to-coast considerably quicker, safer and less expensive.

The first transcontinental rail passengers arrived at the Pacific Railroad's original western terminus at the Alameda Terminal on September 6, 1869, where they transferred to the steamer Alameda for transport across the Bay to San Francisco. The road's rail terminus was moved two months later to the Oakland Long Wharf, about a mile to the north, when its expansion was completed and opened for passengers on November 8, 1869. Service between San Francisco and Oakland Pier continued to be provided by ferry.

Native American impact

Although, by the 1860s, Native Americans had signed away the rights to much of their land in treaties with the federal government, they likely never imagined that a disruptive and massive system like the railroad would be constructed through their traditional hunting grounds. The construction of the Transcontinental Railroad had dire consequences for the native tribes of the Great Plains, forever altering the landscape and causing the disappearance of once-reliable wild game. The railroad was probably the single biggest contributor to the loss of the bison, which was particularly traumatic to the Plains tribes who depended on it for everything from meat for food to skins and fur for clothing, and more.

Tribes increasingly came into conflict with the railroad as they attempted to defend their diminishing resources. Additionally, the railroad brought white homesteaders who farmed the newly tamed land that had been the bison’s domain. Tribes of the Plains found themselves at cultural odds with the whites building the railroad and settlers claiming ownership over land that had previously never been owned. In response, Native Americans sabotaged the railroad and attacked white settlements supported by the line, in an attempt to reclaim the way of life that was being taken from them. Twice, Native Americans sabotaged the iron rails themselves. In August 1867 a Cheyenne raiding party decided they would attempt to derail a train. They tied a stick across the rails and succeeded in overturning a handcar, killing its crew of repairmen, with the exception of a man named William Thompson. If they were not taking aim at the railroad tracks and machinery, they would attack the workers and abscond with their livestock. Ultimately the tribes of the Plains were unsuccessful in preventing the loss of their territory and hunting resources. Their struggle serves as a poignant example of how the Transcontinental Railroad could simultaneously destroy one way of life as it ushered in another. 

We must address the forgotten Chinese workers who built the western leg of the railroad across the Sierra Nevada mountains, connecting the Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroad in 1869.

From 1863 and 1869, roughly 15,000 Chinese workers helped build the transcontinental railroad. They were paid less than American workers and lived in tents, while white workers were given accommodation in train cars. Chinese workers found some economic opportunity but also experienced hostility, racism, violence, and legal exclusion. Many came as single men; others left families behind. Despite laws restricting Chinese immigration, a few workers were able to send for wives and establish families and lasting communities in the United States. The majority of Chinese railroad workers came from the province of Guangdong in southern China. They were recruited through a vast network of small firms and labor contractors that supplied workers to railroad companies. After arriving in America, many migrants relied on labor contractors and ethnic associations, like the Chinese Six Companies in San Francisco, to find employment and to broker labor contracts with prospective employers.  

Workforce

Chinese workers made up most of the workforce between roughly seven hundred miles of train tracks between Sacramento, California and Promontory, Utah. During the 19th century, more than 2.5 million Chinese citizens left their country and were hired in 1864 after a labor shortage threatened the railroad’s completion.

Workers toiled six days a week, from dawn to dusk, under extreme weather conditions. To speed progress, a second shift of workers often labored at night by the light of lamps and bonfires. Workers using mostly muscle power graded the road, bored the tunnels, and laid the track they pushed along  the Central Pacific Railroad over the granite wall of the Sierra Nevada Mountains and across the arid west. The work was tiresome, as the railroad was built entirely by manual laborers who used to shovel twenty pounds of rock over four hundred times a day. They had to face dangerous work conditions – accidental explosions, snow and rock avalanches, which killed hundreds of workers, not to mention frigid weather. “All workers on the railroad were ‘other’,” said curator Peter Liebhold. “On the west, there were Chinese workers, out east were Irish and Mormon workers were in the center. All these groups are outside the classical American mainstream.”

The railroad company provided room and board to white workers, but Chinese workers had to find their own meals, which were often brought to them from local merchants. The Chinese workers were educated and organized; 3,000 laborers went on strike in 1867 to demand equal wages, as the white workers were paid double. “They were unsuccessful because they were out in the middle of nowhere,” said Liebhold. “The railroad stopped them from getting food. That’s one way it failed.” By paying laborers a low wage, they were able to skim millions from the construction and get rich.

The Transcontinental Railroad fundamentally changed the American West. As the United States pushed across North America, railroads connected and populated the growing nation. Railroads also sparked social, economic, environmental, and political change. For many, completing the Transcontinental Railroad symbolized achievement and national unity—yet it was built with mostly immigrant labor. Ironically building the Transcontinental Railroad presented both physical and monetary challenges. Even with huge government subsidies, the railroad companies had to raise millions of dollars to cover construction costs. Directors skimmed millions off the construction and became rich. Operating the enterprise was often less profitable.

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From Reconstruction to the Present: A Small Place in Downtown Atlanta

Much of historic research relies upon an analysis of broad events through a general historical context. We as historians tend to put emphasis upon significant events and people and explore as far as we can to try to contribute to larger scholarly debate. However, sometimes its best to start small in a place that does not necessarily look like it has much to offer as to uncover histories that largely remain forgotten or undervalued. Here, Roy Williams considers a place in downturn Atlanta from Reconstruction to the present.

An 1887 depiction of Atlanta from Harper’s Weekly.

In exploring the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block going back to the train tracks, the current buildings do not necessarily show easily distinguishable historic buildings. Currently the Marietta Carrier hotel building stands at 56 Marietta Street with the company Digital Realty operating a telecommunications business. Behind the Carrier Hotel at the 10 Forsyth address, a parking lot stands next to the train tracks. The only other building which has a connection to the block is the abandoned Atlanta Constitution building on 143 Alabama street. While this building is not on the block it serves as a connection to the block in exploring the history of the Atlanta Journal and Constitution as both companies occupied the block at one point. The current Marietta Carrier Hotel building has a plaque commemorating the first Georgia State Capitol which stood on the block from 1869 to 1889 and was razed in 1900. Out of relative significance, the story of the block begins with the first Georgia State Capitol.

To describe the block effectively, a chronological order is established throughout this paper spanning from the 1860s to the present. A general history of the area also stands as accompaniment in understanding how the block changed throughout the trajectory of history and how certain events affected changes at the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block. Certain aspects of the block’s history are emphasized over others to contribute original primary source research as well as out of pragmatism due to the relative lack of sources on some businesses that occupied the block that were not necessarily as historically significant. References and pictures are detailed in footnotes as well as the end of the paper in the bibliography and index.

After the destruction of Atlanta at the hands of Union forces during the Civil War the state capitol was moved to Atlanta from Milledgeville as the center of Georgia government. Multiple primary source documentation exists detailing this move as well as the process by which the building was updated to house the Georgia State Capitol. Prior to serving as the first Atlanta based Georgia state capitol the building was the Kimball Opera House which was constructed by the brothers Edwin Kimball and Hannibal Kimball and would be purchased by the State in 1870. From 1869 to 1889 the Kimball Opera House served as the state capitol and post office. An advertisement from 1870 details this showing the new state capitol with its characteristic clock tower announcing the building as Kimball’s Opera House serving as the Georgia State Capitol and Post Office.[1] Hannibal Kimball was an entrepreneur and had a significant impact as a wealthy businessman in moving the state capitol from Milledgeville to Atlanta. The 1889 History of Atlanta, Georgia, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers describes Kimball’s significant role stating that, “The first work of a public character in which he took a prominent part was in relation to the location of the state capitol at Atlanta. He saw the advantage to accrue to the city by its selection as the legislative center of the state, and he lent all his influence and power to further this end.”[2] The city purchased the building for 100,000 dollars after originally leasing it.[3]

To Atlanta

In 1877 the Georgia Constitutional Convention voted to permanently move the capital to Atlanta, and in 1879 acquired the City Hall tract, which in 1880 was finally transferred to the state of Georgia. The legislature in 1883 agreed upon a budget of one million dollars for the new state capitol. This budget required that all materials for the new capital be sourced from Georgia rather than out of state.[4] Details of the construction of the new capital as well as the Austell building are present in the account book of William B Miles. Listing the costs, profits, and materials for the construction of such buildings as the Georgia State Capitol Building; Inman Building; Austell Building; Fulton County Court House Annex; and the police station and stables. William B Miles pocketbook July 1888 entry lists the costs of constructing the new building at 539,810.33 dollars not including labor with a net gain of 188,510.43 dollars.[5] The one-million-dollar budget established in producing the new capital as it moved from the Kimball Opera House to its permanent location stands as beneficial when considering the construction of the Austell building and the Forsyth viaduct.

The Austell Building was designed by the architectural firm, Bruce and Morgan and completed in 1897. The building was Financed by William W. Austell, and the twelve-story office building cost $300,000 to build. It was located on Forsyth Street adjacent to the Western and Atlanta Railroad in downtown Atlanta, Georgia where the current 10 Forsyth parking lot stands.[6] William B Miles account book also lists details regarding the Austell building in 1888. Since the building was completed in 1897, this entry appears to be something of a punch list of detailing finishing costs regarding the building such as an entry detailing the cost of paying for an architect report at 771.00 dollars.[7]Intriguingly there is another entry regarding the cost of bridgeworks materials and labors which could potentially point to the Forsyth Street viaduct beside the Austell Building and Kimball Opera House. The 1888 February entry right after the Austell building entry regarding bridgeworks details the cost of stock materials for the bridge at 4715.80 and the supplies at 1522.62 dollars, certainly a far cry from the massive budget of the Georgia State Capitol.[8] Whether this bridge entry refers to the Forsyth Street Viaduct is difficult to say but its proximity to the Austell building entry gives reason to consider its possibility. A photo from 1907 displays this viaduct with the Austell building in the background after the Kimball Opera House/Georgia State capital were razed in 1900.[9]

The 1907 Sanborn Fire Maps show the Austell building once again describing it as a fireproof building with another building occupying the grounds where the Kimball Opera House once stood. The Sanborn Fire maps list a lodge hall and general hardware and machinery regarding this other location.[10] The 1919 Foote and Davies Company Atlanta birds eye view atlas shows the block as having the Austell building facing towards the Forsyth Viaduct but also shows the site where the Kimball Opera House/Georgia State capitol used to stand as being listed as a multi-story building titled transport.[11] The 1910 building lists the Forsyth Marietta intersection as containing the Austell Building and Georgia News Co at 10 Forsyth with 8 and 9 Forsyth remaining vacant. It also lists the Brown-Randolph building at 56 Marietta Street with rooms being occupied by businesses such as Dunbar and Sewell Brokers, Ajax Lumber, Southern Flour and Grain Company, General Adjusting Company, Georgia Farm Mortgage Co, and the Brown and Randolph law practice.[12]

In addition to the city directory, there is a court case detailing the construction of the building in 1917 by the Brown-Randolph Company who paid an architect, A. V. Gude, Jr. The supreme court case lists that, “On July 30, 1917, petitioner determined to erect an eight-story building on its property at the southwest corner of Marietta and Forsyth streets in the city of Atlanta, Ga., employing Brown as architect and the Gudes (then partners under the name of Gude & Co.) as contractor. The contractor, in a letter to the architect on June 28, 1917, stated that the building would cost $375,000, including the commissions of Gude & Co. Following said estimate, on July 30, 1917, petitioner entered into a written contract with the contractor relative to the construction of said building. Under the terms of the contract the building was to be erected complete in every detail and delivered to petitioner, free of all liens, at and for the sum of not to exceed $375,000.”[13] The building was completed in 1919 but not within the 10-month contract and the price of construction ran over the agreed upon $375,000 cost of construction. The judgement was ultimately found for the defendant. The 1920s Atlanta city directory[14] lists the Austell building as well with dozens of businesses at the 10 Forsyth address, however the Brown-Randolph building was now listed as the Transport building just as it had been listed in the 1919 Foot and Davies Atlanta birds eye view atlas.[15] Finally the 1940 directory shows the Atlanta Union station behind the Austell building as well as the Western Union Building where the current Marietta Carrier hotel stands at present.[16]

Atlanta Union Station

The Atlanta Union Station was built in 1930 in Atlanta between Spring Street and Forsyth Street. It succeeded the two previous Union Stations. The previous 1853 Union Station ran from 1853 to 1864 and was ultimately burned by General William Tecumseh Sherman’s forces in the Battle of Atlanta. The second Union Station was built on the same site as the first in 1871 and would operate from 1871 until 1930 when it was torn down for the 3rd Union Station to be built.

The Atlanta Union Station served the Georgia Railroad, Atlantic Coastline, and Louisville and Nashville line. The structure was designed and built by McDonald & Company of Atlanta, Georgia. The station would eventually be razed in the early 1970s. The Union Station can be seen circa 1935 with the Austell building in the background across the Forsyth Street Viaduct.[17] The Atlanta Union Station would stand in operation until 1971 when it was closed and demolished in 1972. The destruction of the 1930 station is shown in multiple archival photos from the Atlanta History Center, displaying the utter loss of architectural history and cultural continuity that are significant to the buildings constructed in the late 19th century and early 20th century.[18]  A 1949 map of downtown Atlanta by the publication Gay Atlanta recirculated by the Atlanta Time Machine shows the block including the Union Station, the Western Union building, the Lucy Wood Cafeteria, and the Atlanta Journal as residing on the block.[19] While there are less sources pertaining to the Lucy Wood Cafeteria, there remains a litany of resources documenting the Atlanta Journal’s tenure at 10 Forsyth Street. A 1950 picture of the block confirms this map’s details, displaying the Western Union building, Lucy Wood Cafeteria, and the Atlanta Journal.[20]

Western Union building

The history of the Western Union building has a brief intersection with Atlanta labor history as, in 1971 the United Telegraph Workers went out on strike against the Western Union Telegraph Company. A 1971 New York Times article details the demands of the workers, saying, “The telegraph workers have asked for a two‐year pact with 16 per cent wage increases each year, Mr. Hageman said. Workers now average $3.37 an hour. The company said its offer included 10 percent increases in each of the two years.”[21] E. L. Hageman, the union president authorized the strike once negotiations with the Western Union Telegraph Company collapsed. A June 1971 photograph shows two AFL-CIO workers participating in the Strike.[22] The AFL-CIO was formed in 1955 when the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations merged. A 1972 Atlanta Constitution article details how the strike left 450 Atlanta workers idle interviewing a soon to be retiring striking employee, James Maxwell who said, “You gotta do it, Itl be better in the end.”[23] The article also describes how the workers were not only picketing for better pay but also for a continued nationwide Western Union office presence of 1300 rather than the proposed cutback to 300 offices that was originally planned before the strike. While the strike was well intentioned in maintaining the livelihoods and economic liberty of Western Union employees in Atlanta and throughout the nation, the writing was on the wall for the telegraph industry. The expansion of the telephone at the expense of the telegraph in addition to the Western Union Telegraph Company’s aggressive diversification ultimately pointed towards the decline of the telegraph industry.[24]

The Atlanta Journal was founded on February 24, 1883, and the Atlanta Constitution was first published on June 16, 1868. Both newspapers bounced around multiple locations around the area ranging from Alabama street, Marietta, and different sides of Forsyth. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution were in direct competition with one another but ultimately in March 1950 became under common ownership. While under common ownership they would still work in competition until they were merged in 2001. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution worked with such journalists as Henry Grady who lobbied for the industrialization of the south during Reconstruction and coined the term “New South” in relation to this industrialization. As well as such figures as Margaret Mitchell, author of Gone with the Wind, and Ralph McGill an early voice for racial tolerance in the south.[25]

10 Forsyth Street

The Atlanta Journal would occupy 10 Forsyth Street from 1949 to 1972. The Atlanta Journal building sat in between the Austell building which was then called the Thrower building at that point, and the Western Union Building. The Atlanta Constitution would soon move into the same building as the Atlanta Journal. While both media companies were under the same ownership, they worked in direct competition. This combination of both companies under the same roof would inevitably lead to the combination of both the Atlanta Journal and Constitution into the AJC of present. When both companies moved to their next location at 72 Marietta Street, the building which had once stood beside the Austell building and housed the historic Atlanta Journal and Constitution would be demolished in 1973 leaving the Western Union or Marietta Carrier Hotel as the only building left standing. [26] The Atlanta Journal demolition can be seen in the archival photo provided in the Central Atlanta Progress, Inc Photographs collection which displays the building being gutted beneath the iconic “Covering Dixie Like the Dew” motto.[27] The only remnant of the days of the Atlanta Journal and Constitution on the block stands in the dilapidated building across the train tracks at 143 Alabama Street which house the Constitution from 1947 to 1953.

The development of the block from reconstruction to the present and the change in buildings serves as a cautionary tale when considering its trajectory from a historical preservation perspective. The only remnants of the history of the block stand in the current Marietta carrier hotel building with a plaque commemorating the Kimball Opera House and a statue of Henry Grady in the middle of Marietta Street. The reality that the Austell building, Atlanta Journal, and Union Station were all demolished in the 1970s follows a broader trend in urban planning which saw the destruction of many historic buildings throughout the nation. While the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 provided the framework to preserve certain buildings, the 1970s saw the destruction of many buildings for new development. The most frustrating aspect of this development on the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block stands in the reality that no new buildings were built after the destruction of the previous historic properties. The area around the railroad tracks is near the Atlanta downtown area known as the Gulch, in which development projects have been planned but have never come to fruition. Jeremiah McWilliams detailed in a 2012 article how revitalizing the area into a transit hub would ultimately be a net positive economically, stating, “The city and state have struggled for years to gain traction on a transit hub envisioned for the area residents known as the “Gulch.” The sunken tract of downtown, spread for acres around CNN Center, is crisscrossed with railroad tracks and parking lots. Late last year, the Georgia Department of Transportation signed a $12.2 million contract for a new master plan with a team of contractors experienced in large-scale developments.”[28] This funding has not made any discernible change on the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block bordering the Gulch.

The economic growth and development that ultimately led to the demolition of many historic Atlanta buildings led to conflict in managing the city’s urban planning. As stated by Michael Elliot, the population of Atlanta grew by over 25% over the 1980s and the office inventory of the central city increased by 50% in the central city. By this point the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block had lost all its historic buildings but the Maritta Carrier Hotel, however this growing opposition to development in the interest of historic preservation follows the larger trend in historical preservation in Atlanta in attempting to conserve what was left from the demolitions of the 1970s.[29]

Rather, Elliot describes how a new mediation process was initiated in attempting to soothe tensions between the forces of economic development and historic preservation. This mediation process required a 9-month negotiation in finding consensus regarding development and preservation of properties but most importantly established a new system for categorizing, designating, and protecting historic properties. Mayor Andrew Young while originally in opposition to historic preservation eventually relented and supported the concept arguing that it was in the public’s interest to preserve certain aspects of the city’s history.[30]

Changes

It is important to consider that while the properties that once stood at the Marietta, Forsyth, Farlie block can be argued to have historic merit especially the first Atlanta based Georgia State Capitol, the trajectory of history and historic identity is infinitely malleable and changing rapidly with each passing generation. The history of the Western Union building, and the Western Union telegraph Company may intersect with both economic and labor history but the nature of its waning importance economically and practically indicates why its story is not preserved or considered significant. Much like the rapid change from horse drawn carriages to automobiles over the course of the early 20thcentury, the decline of the telegraph and the rapid advancement of the telephone warrants that the story of the Western Union Building only exist as a relatively forgotten footnote in Atlanta history. Timothy J Crimmins utilizes the Walter Havinghurst quote, arguing, “The past is not the property of historians, it is a public possession. It belongs to anyone who is aware of it grows by being shared.”[31] This quote allows Crimmins to segway into the realm of public history describing the expansion of the field stemming for the NHPA of 1966 and the growing cooperation between historic preservation and urban planning. This quote also helps to understand that the fields of historic preservation and public history have an inherently more democratic role in establishing what is significant than individual historians. The reality that the story of the Western Union Building is not as prevalent as others shows directly that there is a popular consensus in determining what stands as significant to historic identity and therefore what should be preserved and studied.

Crimmins describes how Atlanta serves as a unique example in attempting to piece together the connection to the past through the present. Specifically, Crimmins says that the changes wrought by economic and technological advancements regarding Atlanta have left much of the heart of Atlanta with little remains in linking the present to the past. Crimmins states that, “The public history issue is one of devising a course of action which would permit citizens to identify the present configuration with that of the nineteenth century.”[32] This problem of reorienting and reconnecting the present area of downtown Atlanta with its historic identity remains a challenge.

In considering the challenges in piecing together historic identity from the remaining built environment of Atlanta, Elizabeth A. Lyon argues that the fields of history and historic preservation must work together in a more efficient manner. Lyons states that, “The problem, however, is not so much the removal of history from historic preservation, as others have observed. The problem is that we often lack the historical information needed to measure and evaluate the historical significance of archeological and structural properties.”[33] This argument points to the heart of the problem, that sometimes changes in the built environment necessitated by technological and economic changes move faster than historic research and preservation. With the example of the Marietta, Forsyth, Farlie block, the most historic property, the Kimball Opera house, and Georgia State Capitol had been razed in 1900, 66 years before the National Historic Preservation Act was passed and 6 years before the Antiquities Act was passed. The Atlanta Union Station, Austell building, and Atlanta Journal were all demolished in the 1970s as well. While it can be difficult to piece together the identity of the past through the present when considering the built environment and the buildings which were demolished along the way, the most important remaining action stands in preserving what is left.

Conclusion

The only remaining building, the Marietta Carrier Hotel currently occupied by Digital Realty may not be on the National Register of Historic Places, but its significance as a grounding point for all the buildings that have been on the same block makes it worthy of local historic preservation. Though the first Atlanta based Georgia State Capitol may have been razed 123 years ago, and all other buildings on the block have been demolished, the history of all the structures of the block can be reoriented through the preservation of the current building. Once again, this topic returns to the introspective nature of historic identity and preservation of this identity through the built environment. While the current state of the block may not seem to have historical significance on a surface level observation, the simple reality that the seat of Georgia’s government was moved to this location from Milledgeville set in motion significant changes that ultimately defined the history of Atlanta. While the structures that made this history cannot be replaced, the importance of reconnecting the present to the past in the Atlanta downtown area is still a worthy aspect of preservation.

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Bibliography

  "Telegraphers Call a Strike at Western Union Tonight." New York Times. May 31, 1971. https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/telegraphers-call-strike-at-western-union-tonight/docview/119326236/se-2.

  1972 September. Central Atlanta Progress. Inc. Photographs. VIS 139.21.01. Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

  Account Book 1885-1889. William B Miles Account Book. MSS236f. Folder 1. Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

AJCN005-041b. Atlanta Journal-Constitution Photographic Archives. Special Collections and Archives. Georgia State University Library, 1950. https://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/digital/collection/ajc/id/14049/ .

 Atlanta Georgia Government. "Georgia State Capitol.” Accessed October 1, 2023. https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-design/urban-design-commission/georgia-state-capitol.

    Atlanta. Map. Atlanta Georgia. Foote and Davies Company. 1919. From Library of Congress. Map Collections. https://www.loc.gov/item/75693190/. (Accessed September 28, 2023).

  Brown-Randolph Co. V Guide Et Al., No.2032. 106 S.E. 161,151 GA 281, Supreme Court of Georgia, 1921.

  City Directory. Atlanta Georgia. 1910.  https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12245934?ssrc=&backlabel=Return.

Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1920, 583-584, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12230775?ssrc=&backlabel=Return

Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1940, 837, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12164878?ssrc=&backlabel=Return

  Cleaton, J. D.. "Forsyth Street Viaduct, 1907." 1907. September 28, 2023. http://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/cdm/ref/collection/guidebook/id/141.

Corson, Pete. “Photos: Former Atlanta Constitution and Journal buildings.” The Atlanta Journal Constitution, June 14, 2018. https://www.ajc.com/news/local/photos-former-atlanta-constitution-and-journal-buildings/ndwtDtspsH27pLQvT3H98L/.

Crimmins, Timothy J. “The Past in the Present: An Agenda for Public History and Historic Preservation.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 63, no. 1 (1979): 53–59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40580077.

  Downs, Billy, Photographer. AFL-CIO United Telegraph Workers on Strike Against Western Union. 1971, Atlanta Journal Constitution. https://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/digital/collection/ajc/id/1270/rec/3.

  Elliott, Michael. “Reconceiving Historic Preservation in the Modern City: Conflict and Consensus Building in Atlanta.” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 16, no. 2 (1999): 149–63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43030496.

“Gay Atlanta Map of Downtown Atlanta.” Atlanta Time Machine. Accessed September 30, 2023. http://atlantatimemachine.com/.

Kimball Opera House. Atlanta History Photograph Collection. VIS 170.2583.001. Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

  Lyon, Elizabeth A. “Cultural and Environmental Resource Management: The Role of History in Historic Preservation.” The Public Historian 4, no. 4 (1982): 69–86. https://doi.org/10.2307/3377048.

  McWilliams, Jeremiah. “Study: ‘Gulch’ impact hefty.” The Atlanta Journal Constitution, Jan 29, 2012. https://www.ajc.com/news/study-gulch-impact-hefty/YNv4JB0YYk77PDSBbvg34L/.

  Miles, Richard. Western Union Strike Idles 450 in Georgia. The Atlanta Constitution. 1972. https://www.newspapers.com/article/118359555/the-atlanta-constitution/.

  Nonnenmacher, Tomas. “History of the U.S. Telegraph Industry”. EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. August 14, 2001. URL http://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-the-u-s-telegraph-industry/

  Perry, Chuck. "Atlanta Journal-Constitution." New Georgia Encyclopedia, last modified Sep 11, 2019. https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/arts-culture/atlanta-journal-constitution/

Reed, Wallace Putnam. History of Atlanta, Georgia, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers. Syracuse, NY: D. Mason & Co. 1889.

  Sanborn Map Company. "Insurance maps, Atlanta, Georgia, 1911 / published by the Sanborn Map Company." 1911. Accessed September 28, 2023. https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_sanb_atlanta-1911#item.

  Union Station. Floyd Jillson Photographs. VIS 71.72.25, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

  Union Station. Kenneth Rogers Photographs. VIS 88.625.05, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

  Unknown. "Austell Building." 1906. September 28, 2023. http://album.atlantahistorycenter.com/cdm/ref/collection/athpc/id/1242.

References

[1] Kimball Opera House, Atlanta History Photograph Collection, VIS 170.2583.001, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[2] Wallace Putnam Reed, History of Atlanta, Georgia, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers, (Syracuse, NY: D. Mason & Co., 1889), 163.

[3] Wallace Putnam Reed, History of Atlanta, Georgia, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers, (Syracuse, NY: D. Mason & Co., 1889), 165.

[4] "Georgia State Capitol”, Atlanta Georgia Government, Accessed October 1, 2023, https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-design/urban-design-commission/georgia-state-capitol.

[5] Account Book 1885-1889, William B Miles Account Book, MSS236f, Folder 1, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[6] Unknown. "Austell Building." 1906. September 28, 2023. http://album.atlantahistorycenter.com/cdm/ref/collection/athpc/id/1242.

[7] Account Book 1885-1889, William B Miles Account Book, MSS236f, Folder 1, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[8] Account Book 1885-1889, William B Miles Account Book, MSS236f, Folder 1, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[9] Cleaton, J. D.. "Forsyth Street Viaduct, 1907." 1907. September 28, 2023. http://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/cdm/ref/collection/guidebook/id/141 .

[10] Sanborn Map Company, "Insurance maps, Atlanta, Georgia, 1911 / published by the Sanborn Map Company", 1911, (Accessed September 28, 2023), https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_sanb_atlanta-1911#item .

[11] Atlanta, Map, Atlanta Georgia, Foote and Davies Company, 1919, From Library of Congress, Map Collections, https://www.loc.gov/item/75693190/. (Accessed September 28, 2023).

[12] Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1910, 64, 116, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12245934?ssrc=&backlabel=Return.

[13] Brown-Randolph Co. V Guide Et Al., No.2032. 106 S.E. 161,151 GA 281, Supreme Court of Georgia, 1921.

[14] Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1920, 583-584, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12230775?ssrc=&backlabel=Return

[15]Atlanta, Map, Atlanta Georgia, Foote and Davies Company, 1919, From Library of Congress, Map Collections, https://www.loc.gov/item/75693190/. (Accessed September 28, 2023).

[16] Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1940, 837, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12164878?ssrc=&backlabel=Return

[17] Union Station, Kenneth Rogers Photographs, VIS 88.625.05, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[18] Union Station, Floyd Jillson Photographs, VIS 71.72.25, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[19] “Gay Atlanta Map of Downtown Atlanta”, Atlanta Time Machine, Accessed September 30, 2023, http://atlantatimemachine.com/ .

[20] AJCN005-041b, Atlanta Journal-Constitution Photographic Archives. Special Collections and Archives, Georgia State University Library, 1950, https://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/digital/collection/ajc/id/14049/ .

[21] "Telegraphers Call a Strike at Western Union Tonight." New York Times, May 31, 1971. https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/telegraphers-call-strike-at-western-union-tonight/docview/119326236/se-2.

[22] Billy Downs, AFL-CIO United Telegraph Workers on Strike Against Western Union, 1971, Atlanta Journal Constitution, https://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/digital/collection/ajc/id/1270/rec/3 .

[23] Richard Miles, Western Union Strike Idles 450 in Georgia, The Atlanta Constitution, 1972, https://www.newspapers.com/article/118359555/the-atlanta-constitution/

[24] Tomas Nonnenmacher, “History of the U.S. Telegraph Industry”. EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. August 14, 2001, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-the-u-s-telegraph-industry/.

[25] Chuck Perry, "Atlanta Journal-Constitution." New Georgia Encyclopedia, last modified Sep 11, 2019. https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/arts-culture/atlanta-journal-constitution/.

[26] Pete Corson, “Photos: Former Atlanta Constitution and Journal buildings”, The Atlanta Journal Constitution, June 14, 2018, https://www.ajc.com/news/local/photos-former-atlanta-constitution-and-journal-buildings/ndwtDtspsH27pLQvT3H98L/.

[27] 1972 September, Central Atlanta Progress, Inc. Photographs, VIS 139.21.01, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[28] Jeremiah McWilliams, “Study: ‘Gulch’ impact hefty”, The Atlanta Journal Constitution, Jan 29, 2012, https://www.ajc.com/news/study-gulch-impact-hefty/YNv4JB0YYk77PDSBbvg34L/.

[29]Michael Elliot, “Reconceiving Historic Preservation in the Modern City: Conflict and Consensus Building in Atlanta.” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 16, no. 2 (1999): 149–63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43030496.

[30]  Michael Elliot, “Reconceiving Historic Preservation in the Modern City: Conflict and Consensus Building in Atlanta.” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 16, no. 2 (1999): 149–63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43030496.

[31]Timothy J Crimmins, “The Past in the Present: An Agenda for Public History and Historic Preservation.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 63, no. 1 (1979): 53–59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40580077.

[32] Timothy J Crimmins, “The Past in the Present: An Agenda for Public History and Historic Preservation.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 63, no. 1 (1979): 53–59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40580077.

[33]Elizabeth A Lyon, “Cultural and Environmental Resource Management: The Role of History in Historic Preservation.” The Public Historian 4, no. 4 (1982): 69–86. https://doi.org/10.2307/3377048.

Can we Still Write ‘Real History’?

History as a discipline is quite subjective. The practitioners of history commit to rigorous and relentless investigation as to how they conceptualize the subject matter of the past. But a historian, like every person, is a product of their experiences, biases, situations, and environment. As each historian approaches a source with a unique set of experiences and skills, they interpret the text differently.

Parthika Sharma and Aarushi Anand explain.

A painting of Marie Antoinette, 1783. By Élisabeth Vigée Le Brun.

“The study of the past with one eye, so to speak, upon the present is the source of all sins and sophistries in history....”

- Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History

While there is no one right interpretation of historical events, if a source is not handled carefully, historical knowledge instead of getting constituted may get incoherently jumbled. The craft of historians lies in developing a grasp over subjects to abstract information and not everyone can achieve that. So is history real? How do we decide if an account is authentic? The answer lies in evaluating whether historical writing entails a deft handling of sources.

The official report of the Versailles Peace Conference after the First World War was written by the victors and thus it claimed that Germany and her allies planned the war from the outset. The documents published by Weimar Germany in the 1920s on the other hand centered on the aggression of the Serbian government. The arguments stated in either cannot be used as a window to see the past and attribute a single narrative to it. There is a need to interrogate the sources to determine their degree of consistency and inconsistency. Contemporariness of source (primary source) over later written documents (secondary source) neither makes it authentic nor unmediated by filters. They cannot be seen as inherently holding truth; rather, historians must retrieve truth.

Marie Antoinette

For example, the libelles of the 1700s dubbed Queen Marie Antoinette l’Autrichienne- ‘the Austrian bitch’, and portrayed her pornographically wrapped around lavishness, intrigue, infidelity, adultery, and sexually transmitted diseases. A primary source, however, should not be taken at face value. It is important to analyze the socio-political landscape of the French Revolution and the need to blame the monarchy for its downfall. It is important to consider the possibility that the public humiliation of the queen was to demonize the Old Regime and execute her for not fitting 18th-century gender roles. The later accounts like A Day with Marie Antoinette by Hélène Delalex demystifies her, unveiling the woman behind the queen, and the wife and mother behind the sovereign. Thus one needs to subject historical knowledge to debate. A rhetorical reading of the political libelles would enable one to put forth probing questions like "Who is the account directed to?", "what sparked the portrayal?", “what aspects of the record are reticent?” to get a deeper insight.

Through the process of deft source management, the work of Brittany A. McLaren- The Many Faces of Marie Antoinette proves to be objective and informative. The trial of Marie Antoinette, the political pornography of the Enlightenment underground, and Madame Campan's memoirs, Antoinette's First Lady in Waiting, are the three primary texts she examines. She concludes that since each source is skewed by the author's own beliefs, none of them portrays the "true" Marie Antoinette. While Robespierre tried and assassinate Marie Antoinette because she did not conform to 18th-century gender standards, political pornography condemned her to defame the entire Old Regime. Finally, Campan shows her allegiance to the revived Bourbon monarchy by using Marie Antoinette as a foil for herself. Thus, it is less important who Marie Antoinette was, and more important to understand what it is she came to symbolize. By juxtaposing it with other historical information, the actual account of what happened can be determined. 

Thus in the process of subjecting sources to critical analysis, we get to know the reasoning/conceptual framework behind the production of a record. All information of a given historical circumstance must be mobilized to create the setting(socio-ecological political construction) ) and context (space-time) in which the source is generated. This exercise would even involve using our textbook information and gauging vantage viewpoints, for example, women's voices which were previously dismissed.

Ethnocentrism

A great deal of new research is not about looking for sources in variety but approaching well-known content with fresh eyes and questions. Ethnocentrism emerges from a “we-they” view of the world, in which one identifies with a specific group—usually a nation or a religion. This viewpoint is prevalent in the writings of nationalist historians. To give an example, in contemporary politics, historical research is contested as a version of “my religion vs yours.” For example, Indian nationalist writers attempted to portray "Muslim rule" as a dark period, but in doing so, they legitimized the colonial view that the British freed India from this period of darkness.

However, in this type of reading, the past is not studied in itself but to validate a person’s current position. It leads to the bias that one's current way of living should be used to judge the past, which is contrary to the historical perspective because praising modern values while condemning and belittling the rest is not a historical view. The focus shifts to “what was not” there in the past rather than what was. A careful reading of sources would tell us that before engaging with non-Muslim subjects, the dominant emperor would engage with dominant shades of Muslim opinions and practices. Foremost, Islamic emperors, this stride was between Shias and Sunnis.

A historian’s nature of inquiry would depend upon his approach towards the source. According to John Tosh, sources are neither neutral reservoirs of knowledge nor transparent records of the past. They are, rather, small children from the past who do not speak to strangers. Unless we know how to question them and listen, the sources, just like the children, tell nothing. Hence handling sources entails a constant interaction between the historian and her sources to arrive at a complex and richer understanding of the past.

Historian’s role

The past cannot be discovered, but it can be imagined as truthfully as possible. It is quite true that these biases are sometimes unconscious, and it's not always easy to isolate the past from the present, as historical inquiry often stems from present needs. However, it is essential to avoid studying history from these viewpoints; a historical perspective necessitates an understanding of the past without admiring or rejecting it. The purpose of history is to comprehend the past as a whole, not as a less developed predecessor to the present. The emphasis should be on understanding rather than condemning the past.

Even if complete impartiality is impossible to achieve, the historian's role does not have to suffer. They shall employ the concept of 'reciprocal action' on 'the historian and his facts'. The historian's responsibility to his facts involves ensuring that facts are accurate and include all known or knowable facts pertinent to the topic on which he is working and to the interpretation proposed. The historian is to mold his data to his interpretation and his interpretation to his facts without giving one precedence over the other.

What do you think of the authors’ views? Let us know below.

Now read the authors’ article on the 3 key reasons for European Empires here.

Bibliography

●      Jordonova, Ludmilla. (2000). History in Practice, London/New York: Arnold and  Oxford University Press Inc ., pp.27-57, 92-112 and 184-193 (Ch.2, "Mapping the  Discipline of History", Ch.4, "The Status of Historical Knowledge", and Ch.7,  "Historians' Skills").

●      Daniels, R. V. (1981). Studying History: How and Why. Third edition. Englewood  Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, pp.76-97 and 104-110.

●      Tosh, J. (2002). In Pursuit of History. Revised third edition. London, N.Y ., New Delhi:  Longman (Ch.4, "Using the Sources").

●       Reading Games: Strategies for Reading Scholarly Sources; Karen Rosenburg

●      Marvick, Arthur. The nature of history. N.p.: Macmillan, 1985. (Ch.1 “The Past, History, Sources and Myths”

●      .Hobsbawn, Eric. On History. New Press, 1998 (Ch.3 “What Can History Tell Us About Contemporary Society”)

The Story of Napoleonic Duels

In the wake of the much anticipated November 2023 release of Ridley Scott’s Napoleon, this year is the 45th anniversary of Ridley Scott’s debut 1977 film, The Duellists. The Duellists was Scott’s first on-screen project capturing French military life during the Napoleonic Wars.

Michael Thomas Leibrandt looks at The Duellists.

François Fournier-Sarlovèze

The Duellists captures this era perfectly with gorgeous cinematic filming locations in the lush countryside of France as well as placing the viewer directly into French military traditions during the height of Napoleon Bonaparte’s time as Emperor of France.

Ridley Scott’s 45-year film career has been significant. With 41 Academy Award nominations and 9 wins, Scott also has an extensive television career, amassing ten primetime Emmy Awards. Scott’s most notable films include Alien, Thelma & Louise, and Gladiator.

Background

The basis for the film is a 1908 short story by Joseph Conrad entitled The Duel. It is believed that the basis for the Conrad piece was a 1858 account that was published in Harper’s Magazine. It is also very possible that Conrad was inspired by another Harper’s Magazine published account of a true story about a series of Napoleonic-era duels between two real life French officers, Pierre Dupont de l’Étang and François Louis Fournier-Sarlovèze.

Duels of honor date back to the time of antiquity. In France, duels were recorded many, many centuries back. The duel between Fournier-Sarloveze and Dupont de l’Etang lasted thirty years and according to legend ended with a showdown with pistols at the conclusion of which Fournier-Sarloveze had to promise to never again engage his nemesis.

Winner at the 1978 Cannes Film Festival, The Duellists is an epic tale of the military interpretation of upholding one’s honor while navigating the regulations around being a soldier during wartime. 

The story of these two rivals begins at the beginning of Emperor Napoleon’s rise to power around 1800 and extends until after his exile in. The cinematic tale takes the journey of Armand d’Hubert (3rd Hussars) and Gabriel Feraud (7th Hussars) as they endure Emperor Napoleon’s campaigns, military life in the French Army, as well as their contempt for each other.

Contrast

With both characters being different of temperament and background, D’Hubert is of noble birth and Feraud is not, adding to the intrigue of their parallel climb through the ranks of the French Army. During the nearly fifteen-year clash between the two rivals, Feraud and D’Hubert duel in the beautiful countryside of Augsburg, on horseback in the early morning midst of Lubeck, and even a confrontation during the French retreat from Moscow in 1812. As you might predict, it even ends with a climatic showdown.

Ridley Scott’s The Duellists is not only a visual marvel and a historical account of life in the French Hussars during Napoleon’s campaigns but also an exploration into two men’s interpretation of both the military and civilian code of honor.

Whether for its epic storyline, incredible scenery, or perfectly choreographed action scenes, The Duellists is worth seeing.

Especially if you find yourself in anticipation of Scott’s November release of Napoleon.

Now read about the three times Russia was invaded in history here.

Michael Thomas Leibrandt lives and works in Abington, Pennsylvania.

The Similarities Between the World War One and the U.S. Civil War

Picture trenches. Miles of trenches with knee-deep mud. Pulverized trees and rusty barbed wire. These are just a few images that bring World War One or the Great War to mind. Others show endlessly firing machine guns, mowing down soldiers as they charge toward their opponents.

However, the Great War was foreshadowed by the U.S. Civil War. Matt Whittaker explains.

A German trench occupied by British soldiers in World War One at Ovillers-la-Boisselle, July 1916 during the Battle of the Somme. The men came from A Company, 11th Battalion, in the Cheshire Regiment.

Sadly, many of these battles started this way. Troops went “over the top,” using mass infantry tactics, and suffered. An often-cited example is the Battle of the Somme in 1916. Between all the machine gun fire and more, some 19,000 British soldiers died on the first day. Technology simply moved faster than tactics had evolved.

Yet, some fifty years before the American Civil War provided a glimpse of what would come. In that war, new thinking was required, too.

But in this solely American war, what prompted such a change? There wasn’t just one reason but a combination of technology, tactics, a shift to total war, and perhaps the biggest foretelling – trench warfare.

The American Civil War began after much complex political, economic, and social issues boiled over in April 1861. With the bombing of Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, the war started.

Trench warfare

Though a significant point, trench warfare occurred later in the Civil War. The first similarity was industrialized warfare. America’s industrial industry capacity built up faster than most countries, Britain aside.

How is this important? Such capability allowed rapid technological advancements like railroads, ironclads, and repeating weapons.

Both sides in the war would depend on railroads for supplies and movement. With good rail lines, troops could be moved quicker and in more significant numbers with their stores. The North used its great network to move troops swiftly for battles or offensive build-ups.

In 1914, the French used trains to rush troops to stop the German Army at the Battle of the Marne. Like this, the 1862 First Battle of Bull Run demonstrated what rail lines and a clever commander could do.

Confederate General Beauregard's 20,000 troops faced a Union army of 35,000. Beauregard utilized cavalry to screen a second Union force to his west, allowing trains to hurry 11,000 soldiers east and attack almost immediately. The Union troops, surprised, fled after a sharp battle with these unexpected reinforcements.

Gatling gun

A more ominous omen came with the Gatling gun, a six-barreled hand-cranked precursor to the machine gun like the Maxim or Hotchkiss. Patented in 1862, the Gatling was not a common sight. In 1865, Union commander General Butler purchased twelve to defend positions during the siege of Petersburg.

Any movie aficionado knows that movies about the Great War show troops getting mowed down by machine guns. Like the new Gatling, using the rifled musket and repeating rifles ended the smooth-bore, single-shot musket era. Their greater range or sustained fire proved to be game changers.

The dated tactic of double infantry rows formed up to blast away at their opponents ended. Soldiers got wounded or killed by their foes before being in effective range. Beyond sixty yards, musket balls simply were not accurate. The new Minie ball used with a rifled musket could be effective out to 500 yards, though either side rarely took advantage of this.

Besides rifled muskets, the Civil War pioneered repeating arms like the seven-shot Spencer or fifteen-shot Henry rifle. Soldiers no longer had to halt, pull out powder to pour down the barrel, followed by a slug. The next step meant ramming all down the barrel. The soldier put a percussion cap to ignite the black powder.

At best, a soldier could fire three or four times during the Civil War. During the Great War, the Royal Army trained their regulars to fire a brisk fifteen rounds per minute. Now, that means quite a lot of lead going out. Ouch.

Charges

In another ill-omened battle for the future, repeating arms demonstrated what Great War soldiers would face. At the 1863 Battle of Hoover's Gap in Tennessee, the famed Lightning Brigade squared off against five Confederate brigades.

The Southerners charged against the Brigade’s defenses, only to be cut down by the constant stream of gunfire. They bravely charged into a hail of lead using the same bad tactics. The Confederate colonel leading this attack thought he was outnumbered 5 to 1. A flanking attack on both sides met the same, losing 250 men in the first five minutes. The retreat became a rout, and Chattanooga rejoined the Union.

Beyond all these battles, the nature of this war changed and continued with the Great War. The philosophy of "hard war” was termed. Similar to total war, the concept is the same. In April 1863, President Lincoln decided on total war to shorten the conflict.

Like Imperial Germany decades later, the Confederates reeled under its impact. Lincoln instructed his commanders like Grant and Sherman to “do what was necessary.” Like the Royal Navy’s four-year blockade crippling the German economy, the South’s economy withered.

In a tough march, Sherman’s 1864 March to the Sea campaign cut a sixty-mile-wide path from Atlanta to the sea. He directed his men to burn, loot, destroy whatever they could, and live off the land. Germany, too, by 1918, became an economic mess, suffering from food shortages, astronomical inflation, and political turmoil.

Sadly, total war worked, wreaking havoc on the defeated that would take years to recover.

Trenches

The last Civil War peak into the World War One future was the most terrible – the trenches. The Civil War trench war began at Petersburgh, Virginia, in 1864. Generals Grant and Lee battled constantly around Richmond, the Confederate’s capital.

Despite Grant’s great numbers and big guns, each fight ended in a deadlock. In a switch, Grant made a go for Petersburg – a critical regional supply hub. However, Lee fought the North to a standstill. Let the siege begin!

Most of the fighting around Petersburg ended in stalemates, with no room to maneuver. More than forty miles of trenches appeared, the most of any Civil War campaign. Grant’s best option was to batter his way in to capture this vital hub. Terrible fighting, like the Battle of the Crater, resulted in much death.

Attempting to end the stalemate, the Union detonated explosives under a big trench redoubt, leaving a massive crater and stunning the defenders. Northerners rushed into cavity, attempting to climb into the trenches, followed by the city. The Confederates rallied and bloodily pushed back the invaders, leaving the status quo of back and forth intact.

Like all trenches in World War One, the Petersburg ones became filthy pits filled with muddy water, empty ammunition boxes, and trash. Diseases followed next, making both sides miserable. Eventually, the Union Army forced Lee to give up the city, ending the siege and losing the war. All told, the trench warfare around Petersburg killed or wounded 70,000 men.

The American Civil eerily predicted much of the despair that ensued during the Great War. Whether death tolls from obsolete infantry tactics to the wholesale change to “total war,” few predicted this in their rush to win.

What do you think of the similarities between World War One and the U.S. Civil War? Let us know below.

The Logistical Challenges of the Confederacy in the U.S. Civil War

Much of what happened on Civil War battlefields was determined by the economic and logistical foundations of the societies the armies represented. The military that a country puts on the battlefield is not a generic collection of soldiers but rather a direct reflection of the culture that creates it. War can be compared to an iceberg: the armies and battles are its visible and graphic “tip”, but what actually decides the outcome of the battles are the money and resources available to acquire the weapons and equipment needed to wage war effectively. The procurement and transportation of clothing, food and supplies were the decisive factors, but are typically relegated to footnotes, remaining submerged and invisible.

Here, Lloyd W Klein looks at the logistical challenges in the Confederacy through the Confederate Quartermaster and the Subsistence Corps.

Colonel Abraham Myers.

The Logistics Problems of the Confederacy

The Confederate government faced myriad interconnected problems that hindered its ability to adequately plan for and address the logistical challenges during the American Civil War. The combination of the Union blockade, limited industrial capacity, transportation issues, financial strain, diplomatic challenges, and internal divisions contributed to the Confederate government's difficulties in acquiring and sustaining critical resources during the Civil War. The combination of resource limitations, economic constraints, political factors, and the nature of the conflict itself made it difficult for the Confederate government to plan and address the logistical challenges in a comprehensive manner (see below).

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Origins of the Logistics Issues Faced by the Confederacy

Blockade: The Union Navy imposed a blockade on Southern ports, severely restricting the Confederacy's access to foreign trade and essential supplies. This blockade made it challenging for the Confederacy to import much-needed goods and resources.

Insufficient Industrial Capacity: The Confederate states had a smaller industrial base compared to the more industrialized Northern states. They relied heavily on agriculture, and their limited industrial capacity hindered their ability to produce weapons, ammunition, and other crucial supplies necessary for war.

Poor Rail. Transportation: The war disrupted transportation networks, making it difficult to move resources efficiently within the Confederate states and further complicated efforts to acquire and distribute resources efficiently.

Political Conflict between states and national government: The Confederate states prioritized their individual interests over the collective needs of the Confederacy, leading to internal divisions and challenges in coordinating resource allocation.

The Confederacy had fewer resources and a smaller industrial base compared to the Union. They struggled to match the Union's manufacturing capabilities and lacked the infrastructure to support large-scale production and transportation of weapons and supplies. Moreover, the Confederate government faced economic difficulties throughout the war, including inflation and a strained financial system. These constraints made it challenging to allocate sufficient funds for logistics, transportation infrastructure, and the procurement of necessary resources. The Union blockade severely restricted the Confederacy's ability to import weapons, ammunition, and other supplies from foreign sources. This created a significant reliance on domestic production, which was insufficient to meet the demands of the war.

The Confederate government was structured in its Constitution to be a federation of states without a strong national government, consistent with its founding philosophy based on states’ rights. It was comprised of individual states with varying priorities and interests. Coordination and cooperation among these states in terms of logistics and supply chain management were challenging. Additionally, disagreements and competing interests among political leaders impacted efficient planning and execution of logistics.

Impact of military strategy. The Confederate military leadership, including General Robert E. Lee, opted for offensive strategies and focused on battlefield victories. This emphasis on aggressive tactics sometimes overshadowed the need for comprehensive logistical planning, leading to inadequate preparations for sustaining operations. As an insurgency, a better strategy might have been to defend critical territories and cities, hoping to withstand a Union invasion. But a short war was envisioned and this was not politically a choice Jefferson Davis thought was feasible at the time.

Limited industrial and manufacturing sector. The new Confederate nation possessed insufficient production capacity for the trial ahead. The Confederacy had fewer factories, foundries, and manufacturing facilities compared to the industrialized North. Consequently, the Confederacy struggled to meet the demands for weapons, ammunition, uniforms, and other essential supplies. This scarcity hindered their ability to adequately equip and sustain their troops in the field.

The Confederacy relied heavily on imports to compensate for their domestic manufacturing limitations. However, the Union blockade disrupted their ability to import goods and materials, including weapons and vital supplies. The inability to access foreign sources of production and technology exacerbated the supply shortages faced by the Confederacy.

The limited industrial sector also affected the development of transportation infrastructure. The Confederacy had fewer railways, fewer navigable waterways, and fewer well-maintained roads compared to the Union. The lack of robust transportation systems made it challenging to move goods, weapons, and supplies efficiently to the front lines, resulting in delays and logistical difficulties.

The limited industrial and manufacturing sectors of the Confederacy meant there was a scarcity of raw materials, such as iron, coal, and other critical resources needed for production. This scarcity affected the ability to produce and maintain weapons, ammunition, and other necessary supplies, further straining logistical operations.

The Confederacy's industrial base was heavily agricultural, with limited diversification into other industries. This lack of diversification made it difficult to develop a robust manufacturing sector capable of meeting the varied demands of the war effort. The limited range of industrial capabilities constrained their ability to produce a wide array of equipment and supplies needed for the military.

Overall, the limited industrial and manufacturing sectors of the Confederacy had a profound impact on logistical operations. Supplying and equipping Confederate forces during the war was a serious problem for the entire 4 years but became worse as time wore on and critical ports and geographic areas came under Union control.

Scarcities of various essential war resources. The Confederacy struggled to produce enough firearms and ammunition to adequately equip its troops. Rifles, muskets, and other weapons were in high demand, but the limited manufacturing capabilities meant that many soldiers had to rely on outdated or inferior weapons. Ammunition shortages also occurred, limiting the firepower of Confederate forces.

The production of uniforms and clothing was insufficient to meet the needs of the Confederate Army. Soldiers often faced shortages of proper uniforms, resulting in a mix of civilian clothing, captured Union uniforms, and makeshift garments. This not only affected morale but also impacted the identification of friendly troops on the battlefield.

Adequate footwear was scarce among Confederate soldiers. Leather shortages and limited production capabilities led to soldiers marching and fighting with inadequate or worn-out shoes. This created significant discomfort, increased the risk of foot-related health issues, and impacted mobility on the battlefield.

The production of blankets and tents fell short of demand. Confederate soldiers often lacked sufficient protection from the elements, especially during harsh winter conditions. This further contributed to the hardships endured by troops in the field.

The Confederacy faced difficulties in procuring and producing medical supplies needed to treat wounded soldiers and to treat communicable diseases. Scarcities included items such as bandages, medicines, surgical instruments, and anesthetics. Medical personnel often had to improvise and rely on limited resources, resulting in compromised healthcare for the wounded.

The limited industrial capacity of the Confederacy affected the production of essential machinery and equipment needed for various sectors, such as manufacturing, mining, and transportation. This hindered the development and expansion of critical industries and further impacted the overall war effort.

The Sustainment Bureaucracy

Expecting only a brief war and anticipating merely a perfunctory Northern response, secessionist leaders had quietly planned to construct a sufficient military force for that limited mission. After preparing a political ideology that succeeded in establish secession, they planned for a single battle that would decide the question. They had amassed abundant weapons through subterfuge and capturing supplies at federal forts to last them for a year or two. In retrospect, it is apparent that the Confederate leaders had not expected to fight a long war and had not made contingency plans until secession actually forced a serious consideration.  The creation of military sustainment departments began on February 26, 1861, even before the authorization of an army on March 6 (1,2). A Bureau of Ordnance was created on April.27. The leaders of the Quartermaster, Subsistence and Ordinance Departments, Colonel Abraham Myers, Lieutenant-Colonel Lucius Northrop, and Major Josiah Gorgas had considerable influence on logistics organizations and operations for the Confederate armies. These three men were charged with the responsibility of harnessing the Southern economy to support the armies.

The Confederacy was a newly formed nation with a limited institutional framework and experience in managing large-scale logistics and warfare. The absence of a well-established bureaucracy and logistics system further hampered their ability to plan and execute effective supply chains. After Manassas, it became clear that food, additional armaments and clothes would be needed to carry on the war effort.  Financial means and mechanisms for their procurement became critical facets of war planning. As the duration of the war lengthened, inherent weaknesses in the Confederate economy began to show. The political and military leaders expected their land mass to be their defense, never thinking that the Union could build bridges and roads and repair railroads as fast as its cavalry could burn them. They expected cotton to be their financial strength, but never considered where armaments and supplies would come from or paid for, and never planned on the expense of a naval presence to counter a blockade of its ports.

The Quartermaster Department

The Confederate Congress created the position of Quartermaster-General on February 26, 1861. The Secretary of War was allowed to appoint one colonel and six majors to serve as Quartermasters (3, 4).  Abraham Myers served as the first Quartermaster General for the Confederate States of America during the Civil War. Myers was responsible for managing and supplying the Confederate Army with various provisions, including food, clothing, and equipment. The role of the Quartermaster General was crucial in maintaining the logistics and efficiency of the Confederate military operations. Myers played a significant part in ensuring that the Confederate forces were adequately equipped and provisioned throughout the war.

The Confederate Quartermaster Department was responsible for procuring, transporting, and distributing essential supplies to the troops, including food, clothing, equipment, and ammunition.

Overseeing the supply of an army is a complicated job: besides weapons and armaments procurement, the responsibilities also included uniforms, horses, wagons, and railroad cars; and finding the money and resources to acquire these supplies.  It also entails transportation of the materials to the location of the army, constructing supply depots near enough the front to be effective but not where it could be captured, and coordinating production with need. The quartermaster department is responsible for creating a supply network for the army; in particular, the procurement, maintenance, and transportation of military materiel, facilities, and personnel. It is the functional bridge between economics and tactical operations. To operate optimally, the logistical network must connect the combat forces with the strengths and capabilities of the society it defends. It does not simply create itself and it is not merely an administrative task; it is an enterprise in itself that requires using technological and economic resources to overcome an enemy and sustains the military forces by supporting its warfighting readiness (5).

Myers had a very difficult if not impossible situation to accomplish these goals. The Confederacy faced severe resource limitations, including shortages of essential supplies such as food, clothing, and equipment. Additionally, the Union blockade hindered the Confederacy's ability to import necessary goods from overseas.

His pre-war experience in southern forts and his contacts in those positions were especially valuable in getting started. Myers sent agents into the domestic market, contracting with local manufacturers and paying competitive rates. The department bought cotton, woolen cloth, and leather goods.  He also established shops for making clothing, shoes, tents, wagons, and other equipment, and purchased livestock at market prices for as long as possible.  During the first few months the South had sufficient supplies to cobble together a supply chain (6,7).

But the South lacked the manufacturing infrastructure required to produce and build the required huge quantities of food, equipment, shoes, and clothing.  Settling in for what would be a long war they had not planned for, the supply deficits developed into a crisis as the financial weakness of the country led to runaway inflation. The CSA government had to create a supply chain that would bring its armies the supplies needed to allow it to continue the war. Creating a new country with a new financial system, revamping its rail system, and developing its industrial capacity would have posed inconceivable and perhaps impossible problems for a state government dominated system in peacetime. Trying to accomplish these tasks while being invaded by a much larger, more resource rich country bordering its most critical strategic areas was likely beyond anyone’s capacity.

Myers was a highly experienced quartermaster officer who was widely admired for competence, integrity and efficiency (8). Myers' efforts to fulfill the needs of the armies brought praise from some and condemnation from others. He immediately began advertising for tents and other camp equipment from southern vendors (9).  As president of the military board, Myers helped design the first Confederate Army uniform. (10) Blankets, shoes and wool remained scarce. Quartermaster depots were created around the South in large cities (11). Supplying uniforms in bulk in 1861 was a huge problem (12). He estimated in 1861 that he needed 1,600,000 pairs of shoes for the first year, but he could only locate 300,000 (13). He also estimated that he would need hundreds of thousands of blankets, socks, and shirts, and almost no industry was present in the South to procure them. They would have to be imported from Europe and brought through the blockade.

It was not enough to purchase these items; they had to be transported to the armies. He devised a system of supply depots; Richmond and Nashville would be the main depots for the two armies, with multiple satellite storage areas closer to the front (14). The railroads were the primary means of transporting these items, as there was minimal merchant marine activity with the blockade and overland wagon routes were slow and subject to military attack.

Despite a very large service, he was restricted by a lack of funds, inflation, and poor railroads, over which he had no control. His department was criticized among its generals because the South could not obtain supplies to outfit the Army. His inability to provide shoes and uniforms was an especially serious problem.  He set goals and controls on southern manufacturing throughout the war. By commandeering more than half the South's produced goods for the military, the quartermaster general, in a counterintuitive drift toward socialism, appropriated hundreds of mills and controlled the flow of southern factory commodities, especially salt (15).

Some criticisms of Myers and the Confederate quartermaster department include inefficiency, inadequate coordination, and difficulties in providing timely and sufficient supplies to the army. These issues were partially attributed to the limited resources and the overall logistical challenges faced by the Confederacy. The CSA lacked nearly all manufactured products and had little capacity to make them. The Quartermaster Department proved to be unable to properly equip and clothe the Confederate soldiers. Myers consistently failed to anticipate the operational requirements of the army (16). As a result, Lee was often at a logistical disadvantage. The significant constraints and limitations that Myers and the Confederate quartermaster department operated under made the task of supplying the Confederate army extremely challenging. Despite these challenges, Myers and his department managed to provide some level of support to the Confederate forces throughout the conflict. Overall, assessing Myers' performance as a quartermaster general requires considering the extraordinary circumstances of the Confederacy during the war.

Subsistence Department

Lt Col Isaac M. St. John Northrop served as the Commissary General and Subsistence Director of the Confederate States Army. He was responsible for procurement and transportation of food to soldiers in the field. Northrop's tenure as Subsistence Director was marked by significant challenges due to resource shortages, logistical difficulties, and the impact of the Union blockade on the Confederate food supply. These challenges resulted in widespread food shortages and inadequate rations for Confederate soldiers throughout the war.

Critics of Northrop argue that he was inefficient, lacked effective management skills, and failed to adequately address the logistical and supply issues facing the Confederate army. There were allegations of corruption, favoritism, and mismanagement within the commissary department, which contributed to the inadequate provisioning of soldiers. Moreover, Northrop had a frustrating tendency to deny support by creating unnecessary administrative hurdles and red tape (17).

His performance in a capacity for which he was completely unprepared was abysmal.  The supply of food, shoes, clothing, and other materials has been termed inexcusably inadequate (18) Confederate soldiers were frequently obliged to make do inadequate rations, and to forage amongst their own countrymen. While the stuff of legend and a sign of intrepidness, it’s no way to fight a war – on one’s own territory. It is incomprehensible that commissaries in Vicksburg and Virginia were unable to stockpile provisions in military zones located in friendly territory (19).

Ordinance

In contrast, Josiah Gorgas served with distinction as the Chief of Ordnance for the Confederate States Army. He was responsible for overseeing the procurement, production, and distribution of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies for the Confederate forces. Gorgas is generally regarded as a highly competent and effective ordnance officer. Under his leadership, the Confederate Ordnance Department faced numerous challenges, including limited resources, inadequate industrial infrastructure, and the Union blockade. Despite these challenges, Gorgas worked to establish and expand Confederate arms factories, streamline production processes, and improve the efficiency of supply chains.

His primary function was to create an armaments supply system: the acquisition and distribution of armaments and ammunition in the Confederate army. The new country possessed almost no industry capable of providing arms and ammunition: ante bellum ordnance-making factories were mostly located in the North. Furthermore, existing supplies of weapons had been seized by Confederate state militias, and their state governments resisted sharing them. Gorgas recognized that only a limited amount of money was available to spend on arms and ammunition.

The limited production capacity due to the absence of manufacturing industries constrained the ability to mass-produce firearms. The scarcity of raw materials, particularly iron and steel, also posed a significant challenge for firearm production. The Confederacy lacked the technological expertise and infrastructure necessary for the efficient production of advanced firearms. They lagged behind the North in terms of machinery, precision manufacturing techniques, and skilled labor. This limited their ability to produce modern and sophisticated firearms.

Consequently, the Confederacy relied on imports to supplement their domestic firearm production. The Confederacy faced difficulties in accessing these resources from abroad due to the Union blockade. As the war progressed, the Union blockade efficacy increased, disrupting the ability to import finished firearms or components from abroad.

To compensate for these limitations, the Confederacy resorted to various measures. They converted existing weapons, such as hunting rifles or smoothbore muskets, into serviceable firearms. They also sought to repair and reuse captured Union weapons. Additionally, they established government-owned and private armories to manufacture firearms, although these facilities were often limited in output and faced resource shortages.

Gorgas implemented measures to increase domestic production of firearms, ammunition, and artillery, making the Confederacy less reliant on imported arms. He also made efforts to repair and refurbish captured Union weapons to supplement Confederate armament. Gorgas emphasized the importance of quality control and strived to ensure that Confederate forces were supplied with functional and reliable weapons.

Gorgas constructed systems to scavenge arms from battlefields, import arms and essential manufacturing supplies from Europe, and build an industrial complex to manufacture what the army required. He was responsible for ensuring that artillery tubes and rifles were delivered through the blockade. He established armories to store the materials so when needed, they could be transported easily to the front lines (20,21). Gorgas created a system that supplied all the powder and artillery for the Confederacy, despite labor shortages. (22) Although the Confederate armies often lacked basic food and clothing, they were rarely without necessary ammunition.

Faced with the problem that the Confederacy had few facilities for weapons manufacture and no plants to produce gunpowder, Gorgas demonstrated brilliant administrative skill in building these capabilities. Gorgas, as Chief of Ordnance for the Confederate States Army, implemented several measures regarding weapon procurement during the American Civil War. Gorgas recognized the need to increase weapon production to meet the demands of the war. He established new armories and expanded existing ones to boost manufacturing capacity. He sought assistance from private companies to fulfill the Confederacy's weapon needs. He entered into contracts with private arms manufacturers to produce firearms, artillery, and other military equipment. He recognized the necessity of captured Union weapons and directed efforts to refurbish and reuse them. This practice helped supplement the Confederate Army's weapon inventory. Since the Confederacy had limited domestic manufacturing capabilities, Gorgas focused on importing weapons from abroad. He coordinated efforts to procure arms from Europe, primarily from countries such as Britain and France.

Gorgas and his team faced immense logistical challenges in transporting weapons.
Gorgas prioritized the allocation of available resources to meet the most pressing weapon needs. He assessed the demands of various theaters of war and distributed weapons accordingly, based on strategic requirements. He relied heavily on the existing railway networks to transport weapons and ammunition. Railways were crucial in moving large quantities of arms from manufacturing centers to distribution points closer to the front lines.

Other methods of transporting arms were necessary given the state of the railroads in the South. When feasible, Gorgas utilized rivers for transportation. Riverboats and steamers were employed to move weapons and supplies along navigable waterways, providing an alternative to overland transportation. Overland transportation via wagon trains played a significant role in moving weapons and supplies to the front lines. Wagons, pulled by horses or mules, were used to transport arms overland from distribution depots to the troops in the field.

By 1863, the South had several factories producing modern weapons. Despite the inferior southern rail system and southern governors who hoarded supplies in their own states, Gorgas almost single-handedly assured that the troops on the front line had sufficient weapons and ammunition to carry on. Gorgas performed an outstanding service in developing businesses to produce weaponry and transporting it to the front. Rifles and ammunition continued to be in abundance even when supplies of food and other materials had vanished (23,24).

Logistics Network

The procurement and transport of military materiel into the Confederacy was a dismal logistical failure. At first, it was borderline in its efficacy; but as ports were closed, key mining and farming territories lost, and supply depots captured, the network became increasingly unable to supply the needs of its armies in the field.

Cost of Supply

The Confederate government faced severe financial constraints throughout the war. The limited funds available hindered the procurement and distribution of supplies, and often resulted in inadequate provisioning for the troops.

Inefficiencies and corruption. The Confederate quartermaster department encountered issues with inefficiencies, mismanagement, and corruption. Supply routes were not always optimized, and there were instances of fraud and misappropriation of resources, leading to further logistical challenges. Perhaps even more problematic than limited resources was the “pervasive ineffectiveness that characterized every aspect of Confederate administrative life, especially its logistical and supply arrangements” (25).

Inflationary spiral. Understanding the problems that confronted these officers requires a comprehension of the costs of Confederate supply and how the Confederate inflationary spiral altered the war. As a comparison, the US dollar has experienced on average a 2.18% inflation rate per year since 1860. Hence, $1 in 1860 is roughly equivalent to $32.43 in 2023 dollars. (26). The inflationary spiral of the Confederate dollar during the four years of the war increased its costs exponentially: every 6 months, the value of the Confederate dollar decreased in value so much that costs were almost incomparable to the previous time frame. The total expenditures of the CSA government, nearly all of which were for the War Department, increased from $70 million in November 1861 to $329 million in August 1862. That is a dizzying figure to contemplate in retrospect, and impossible to imagine what it was like for Myers, whose job it was to administrate and develop budgets for his department a year in advance.  One example is that the $199 million allocated for the war budget for 1862 had run out by September (27). It’s impossible to operate a functional war machine with inflation at that unsustainable rate. 

A significant escalation of the problem can be ascribed to a single event of marked importance. On April 29, 1862, Commander David Farragut captured the South’s largest port city, New Orleans. (28)  The fall of New Orleans was a powerful financial disadvantage. For a nation composed of rebellious states to wage war, it must have capital with which to pay for war supplies: weapons, armaments, horses, food, clothing, soldiers’ salaries, etc.

Impact on Subsistence Administration. The resulting budgetary pressure had consequences all along the administrative path. In 1862, Myers saw his estimated budget cut from roughly $27 million/month to $19 million.  He informed the cabinet that at that time, the current actual expenditure was $24.5 million/month, and with inflation would clearly become much higher. Myers lobbied the Congress for more appropriations to keep the war effort on track. The CSA Congress then passed a supplementary expenditure of $127 million to pay for just the 3 months of December 1862 to February 1863 (29).

In response to these absurd cost rises, even more Treasury notes were issued on March 3,1863. In total over $517 million in notes were issued that year alone, reflecting the tripling of costs in just one year.  These would further worsen the inflationary spiral.

Centralization of Manufacturing

With the onset of the war, the Confederate War Department centralized control over the nation’s industries. This was surprising given that the CSA was designed as a state-controlled government with limited federal powers. The Quartermaster and Ordnance Bureaus organized the production and distribution of war materiel.  In time, many of the Confederacy’s large-scale manufacturers – textile mills, foundries, and machine shops – worked under contract with the Ordnance and Quartermaster Bureaus. The salt industry was entirely operated by the CSA government in what has been termed “salt socialism” (30). A government formed on the principles of state primacy and not a central government was finding it necessary to institute federal control of industry.

Moreover, by 1862 shortages of supplies and equipment, in addition to inflated prices in the domestic markets, led to the conferring of impressment powers on Myers in addition to the Commissary Department (31). While this somewhat alleviated the supply issues, it became demoralizing for the public.  The central government was now empowered to seize the products of its citizens and pay them what it could, not what it was worth.

Cost of Transportation. The transportation of supplies at a cost-efficient price was one of the Confederacies biggest difficulties. The southern railroad system failed to transmit sufficient supplies to the armies, and many supplies were kept in storage because they couldn’t get to the soldiers. By February 1862, horses and men were not receiving sufficient rations. The Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac RR was not carrying food and forage because the prices able to be charged for these items were small and there was no centralized control. Eastern North Carolina had abundant stores of corn, bacon and grain but the route necessary to carry these items to the front was byzantine: The Wilmington and Weldon RR was a single-track road, connecting with the Richmond line, but this connection was in terrible condition and there was no cooperation between the lines. In a confederation system without centralized government authority, private ownership of railroads continued to run on profit not patriotism. Despite these inefficiencies, Myers opposed central government control or the building of its own trains, believing that would only increase the inefficiencies. Later in 1863, he worked with Secretary of War Seddon and President Davis to put pressure on the rail owners to expedite shipments despite lower profit margins (32).

And in 1862, the level of rail efficiency was at its peak: it declined from there. As the war continued, the rail system became even less adequate. The tracks began to deteriorate. The metal composition of the Southern rails was of relatively soft iron, frequently fractured or wear after continued use, requiring high maintenance. In the mid- 19thcentury, Northern foundries began to produce more durable iron products such as steel but the southern foundries did not switch to the more difficult to manufacture material. Steel must be smelted from iron ore, in which impurities (e.g., carbon, nitrogen silicon) are removed and alloying elements (e.g., manganese, nickel, chromium) are added. Consequently, the infrastructure of southern track crumbled throughout the war, with limited resources for their repair. Myers complained that the locomotives were breaking down and had no replacement parts. (33)

Conclusion

The skills of a society to identify, purchase and convey the goods and supplies necessary to maintain an army in working order is a window into the health of that society and transcends mere administrative planning.  How the needs of the Confederate armies in the field were determined, acquired, transported and distributed is a central but often overlooked piece of the Civil War narrative. How they fared is a vital part of the story of the Confederacy.

What do you think of the Confederacy’s logistical challenges during the U.S. Civil War? Let us know below.

Now, read Lloyd’s article on the Battle of Fort Sumter and the beginning of the U.S. Civil War here.

References

1.     Woodruff JD. The Impact of Logistics on General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. Accessed at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1083715.pdf 6/23/23.

2.     Goff, Richard D. Confederate Supply. Pranava Books.1969, pages 6-7.

3.     Wilson HS. Confederate Industry: Manufacturers and Quartermasters in the Civil War. University Press of Mississippi, 2002, pages 15-25. https://epdf.pub/confederate-industry-manufacturers-and-quartermasters-in-the-civil-war.html  

4.     The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Vol. I, 495. (Hereafter: OR). https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/001/0495

5.     Wissler, John E. Logistics: The Lifeblood of Military Power. Heritage.org. https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2019-essays/logistics-the-lifeblood-military-power

6.     Goff op cit pages 15-

7.     The Twiggs-Myers Family. Fix Bayonets Blog. (hereafter: Fix) https://fixbayonetsusmc.blog/2019/03/29/the-twiggs-myers-family-part-iii/

8.     Goff op cit pages 33-35.

9.     Goff op cit pages 15-16.

10.  Goff op cit page 16

11.  Goff op cit page 16

12.  Goff op cit page 33

13.  Goff op cit page 34

14.  Goff op cit page 35

15.  Lonn, Ella. Salt as a Factor in the Confederacy. New York, W. Neale, 1933 and

Davis, William C. Look Away: A History of Confederate States of America. The Free Press, New York, 2002, Chapter 10.

16.  Wilson op cit page 4

17.  Vandiver F. Ploughshares into Swords: Josiah Gorgas and Confederate Ordnance. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1952, 165.

18.  Wiley, Bell I. (1968). The Road to Appomattox. New York City: Atheneum Books. 31.

19.  Hess, Earl J. Civil War Supply and Strategy. Louisiana State University Press, 2020. Page 84

20.  McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom.  Oxford University Press, 2003. page 318.

21.  Klein LW. How the Confederacy got their Weapons – Fueling the Confederate War Machine. The Civil War Center. Accessed 6/23/23. https://thecivilwarcenter.wpcomstaging.com/2022/06/06/how-the-confederacy-got-their-weapons-fueling-the-confederate-war-machine/

22.  Goff op cit 246

23.  Klein LW. How did the Confederacy Fund its War Effort in the U.S. Civil War? History is Now Magazine.http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2023/6/5/how-did-the-confederacy-fund-its-war-effort-in-the-us-civil-war Accessed 6/23/23.

24.  Josiah Gorgas. https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/us-history-biographies/josiah-gorgas  Accessed 6/23/23.

25.  Hess op cit 361.

26.  Consumer Price Index Calculator. https://www.in2013dollars.com/

27.  Goff op cit page 90

28.  Ferguson, Niall. The Ascent Of Money. A Financial History of the World. 10th Anniversary Edition. Penguin, New York, 2009. And Edwin C Bearrs. The Seizure of the Forts and Public Property in Louisiana.  Louisiana History (2:401‑409, Autumn 1961) 

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/America/United_States/Louisiana/_Texts/LH/2/4/Seizure_of_the_Forts*.html

29.  Goff op cit pages 90-91 & 47-49

30.  Davis op cit chapter 10

31.  Goff op cit pages 41-2

32.  Goff op cit pages 107 & 40

33.  Davis op cit 307

A Great Boat Tragedy in New York: General Slocum Disaster

As soon as the fire became visible beyond the ship, bystanders from nearby boats and on shore rushed to aid the stricken steamer. One rescuer story that got extensive newspaper coverage was that of teenager Mary McCann, a recent immigrant from Ireland who was recuperating from an illness at the isolation hospital on North Brother Island. Mary ran to the shore and swam out time after time to pull as many children as she could to safety. Reports of the number she saved range from six to twenty depending on the newspaper account.

Here, Richard Bluttal looks at the June 1904 General Slocum disaster in New York City in which over 1,000 people died.

A picture of the General Slocum.

The New York Times wrote about the staff at the North Brother Island hospital, who immediately rushed to aid the beached ship. They not only pulled people from the water using ladders and human chains, but also resuscitated victims and provided medical care. The New-York Tribune described a story similar to Mary’s, in which a hospital employee named Pauline Puetz swam out multiple times to pull victims ashore, even rescuing a child who had been caught in the ship’s paddlewheel.

The New York Evening World wrote about 12-year-old Louise Galing, who jumped into the water with the toddler she was babysitting and managed to keep ahold of the child until they were pulled from the water. The World also recounted that when young Ida Wousky would have fainted, 13-year-old John Tishner kicked his friend in the shins to wake her up. John then managed to find a life preserver and put it on Ida, pushing her into the water when she wouldn’t jump. He held onto her by her n hair until they were rescued by a boat. 

It was, by all accounts, a glorious Wednesday morning on June 15, 1904, and the men of Kleindeutschland—Little Germany, on Manhattan’s Lower East Side–were on their way to work. Just after 9 o’clock, a group from St. Mark’s Evangelical Lutheran Church on 6th Street, mostly women and children, boarded the General Slocum for their annual end-of-school outing. Bounding aboard what was billed as the “largest and most splendid excursion steamer in New York,” the children, dressed in their Sunday school outfits, shouted and waved flags as the adults followed, carrying picnic baskets for what was to be a long day away.

A German band played on deck while the children romped and the adults sang along, waiting to depart. Just before 10 o’clock, the lines were cast off, a bell rang in the engine room, and a deck hand reported to Captain William Van Schaick that nearly a thousand tickets had been collected at the plank. That number didn’t include the 300 children under the age of 10, who didn’t require tickets. Including crew and catering staff, there were about 1,350 aboard the General Slocum as it steamed up the East River at 15 knots toward Long Island Sound, headed for Locust Grove, a picnic ground on Long Island’s North Shore, about two hours away. The Slocum headed out from its berth at 3rd Street on the East River at about 9:30 am with a band playing and the passengers joyously celebrating the smooth ride and beautiful weather. The excursion vessel had been chartered to take the group—almost all of them women and children—from Manhattan to picnic grounds on Long Island.

The Fire

As the ship reached 97th Street, some of the crew on the lower deck saw puffs of smoke rising through the wooden floorboards and ran below to the second cabin. But the men had never conducted any fire drills, and when they turned the ship’s fire hoses onto the flames, the rotten hoses burst. Rushing back above deck, they told Captain Van Schaick that they had encountered a “blaze that could not be conquered.” It was “like trying to put out hell itself.”  A fire began in the forward cabin, the steamboat General Slocum caught fire in the East River of New York City, including many children. In the course of 20 minutes an estimated 1,021 people died, mostly women and children.

In the neighborhood of Little Germany families were decimated, many losing a mother and two or more children. In some cases entire families were killed. At the Lutheran Cemetery in Middle Village, Queens, over 900 victims were buried, including 61 in a mass grave for the unidentified.

Addressing the disaster

Onlookers in Manhattan, seeing the flames, shouted for the captain to dock immediately. Instead, Van Schaick, fearing the steering gear would break down in the strong currents and leave the Slocum helpless in midriver, plowed full speed ahead. He aimed for a pier at 134th Street, but a tugboat captain warned him off, fearing the burning ship would ignite lumber stored there. Van Shaick made a run for North Brother Island, a mile away, hoping to beach the Slocum sideways so everyone would have a chance to get off. The ship’s speed, coupled with a fresh north wind, fanned the flames. Mothers began screaming for their children as passengers panicked on deck. As fire enveloped the Slocum, hundreds of passengers hurled themselves overboard, even though many could not swim.

The crew distributed life jackets, but they too were rotten. Boats sped to the scene and pulled a few passengers to safety, but mostly they encountered children’s corpses bobbing in the currents along the tidal strait known as Hell Gate. One newspaper described it as “a spectacle of horror beyond words to express—a great vessel all in flames, sweeping forward in the sunlight, within sight of the crowded city, while her helpless, screaming hundreds were roasted alive or swallowed up in waves.”  Although the captain was ultimately responsible for the safety of passengers, the owners had made no effort to maintain or replace the ship's safety equipment. The main deck was equipped with a standpipe connected to a steam pump, but the fire hose attached to the forward end of the standpipe, a 100 ft (30 m) length of "cheap unlined linen", had been allowed to rot and burst in several places. When the crew tried to put out the fire; they were unable to attach a rubber hose because the coupling of the linen hose remained attached to the standpipe. The ship was also equipped with hand pumps and buckets, but they were not used during the disaster; the crew gave up firefighting efforts after failing to attach the rubber hose.   The crew had not practiced a fire drill that year, and the lifeboats were tied up and inaccessible. (Some claim they were wired and painted in place.) 

Survivors reported that the life preservers were useless and fell apart in their hands, while desperate mothers placed life jackets on their children and tossed them into the water, only to watch in horror as their children sank instead of floating. Most of those on board were women and children who, like most Americans of the time, could not swim; victims found that their heavy wool clothing absorbed water and weighed them down in the river.

Passengers trampled children in their rush to the Slocum‘s stern. One man, engulfed in flames, leaped over the port side and shrieked as the giant paddle wheel swallowed him. Others blindly followed him to a similar fate. A 12 year-old boy shimmied up the ship’s flagstaff at the bow and hung there until the heat became too great and he dropped into the flames. Hundreds massed together, only to bake to death. The middle deck soon gave way with a terrific crash, and passengers along the outside rails were jolted overboard. Women and children dropped into the choppy waters in clusters. In the mayhem, a woman gave birth—and when she hurled herself overboard, her newborn in her arms, they both perished.

The captain beached the burning vessel on North Brother Island, but the stern of the ship, where most of the passengers had been forced by the fire, was left in ten to thirty feet  of water. Though there were life preservers  and lifeboats aboard, poor maintenance and neglect had made many of them useless. 

Unlike the Titanic which sank eight years later, where the crew was organized and disciplined in evacuating the ship, most of the Slocum crew of thirty six men pushed passengers out of the way and abandoned ship. The crew had never been trained in a fire drill and the few lifeboats on board were never lowered – they were wired down.

The panicked passengers were left to fend for themselves. The life preservers were strapped to the ceiling of the ship’s deck and were out of reach of many of the women and children. Those who could grab a life preserver had a nasty surprise waiting for them.

The Slocum and its life preservers had “passed inspection” only weeks before, without ever actually being checked. In reality the life preservers were rotten – filled with dried, pulverized cork.

When some passengers tried putting them on, they disintegrated in their hands. Others  who managed to jump into the water wearing the “good” life preservers, sank like a boulder was weighted around them.

Not only was the pulverized cork filling of the life preservers waterlogged without an iota of buoyancy, it seems some of the life preservers had metal weights added to them to bring their weight specifications up to standards. Fire hoses of the cheapest kind were also rotten from age and neglect, ruptured when activated and were rendered useless.

Women who strapped life preservers onto their children and tossed their small, loved ones overboard, watched in horror as they disappeared without ever coming back to the surface.

Weighed down by their heavy clothing and struggling against a strong tide, 400-600 passengers drowned after the ship was beached. Though estimates vary, a government report commission  into the disaster reported 955 passenger deaths—or about 70 percent.

Van Shaick was believed to be the last person off the Slocum when he jumped into the water and swam for shore, blinded and crippled. He would face criminal charges for his ship’s unpreparedness and be sentenced to 10 years in prison; he served four when he was pardoned by President William Howard Taft on Christmas Day, 1912.

Aftermath

 Within an hour, 150 bodies were stretched out on blankets covering the lawn and sands of North Brother Island. Most of them were women. One was still clutching her lifeless baby, who was “tenderly taken out of her arms and laid on the grass beside her.” Rescued orphans of 3, 4 and 5 years old milled about the beach, dazed. Hours would pass before they could leave the island, many taken to Bellevue Hospital to treat wounds and await the arrival of grief-stricken relatives.

At Riverside Hospital on North Brother Island, where patients with typhoid and other contagious diseases had been quarantined, staff spotted the burning vessel approaching and quickly prepared the hospital’s engines and hoses to pump water, hoping to douse the flames. The island’s fire whistle blew and dozens of rescuers moved to the shore. Captain Van Schaick, his feet blistering from the heat below, managed to ground the Slocum sideways about 25 feet from shore. Rescuers swam to the ship and pulled survivors to safety. Nurses threw debris for passengers to cling to while others tossed ropes and life preservers. Some nurses dove into the water themselves and pulled badly burned passengers to safety. Still, the heat from the flames made it impossible to get close enough as the Slocum became engulfed from stem to stem.

Since there was no manifest of passengers the final death toll will never be exact, but it was probably more than 1021.  The official police report put the number at 1031 and The Brooklyn Eagle newspaper listed 1204 as dead or missing.

In the neighborhood of Little Germany families were decimated, many losing a mother and two or more children. In some cases entire families were killed. At the Lutheran Cemetery in Middle Village, Queens, over 900 victims were buried, including 61 in a mass grave for the unidentified.

The owners of the General Slocum, The Knickerbocker Steamboat Company escaped jail time for negligence. Knickerbocker President Frank Barnaby was indignant at people wanting to sue him or his company. Knickerbocker filed suit that a limit be fixed to their liability claimed by the plaintiffs as the number of suits grew for loss, damage and injury.The liability limit they wanted was not to exceed the value of the boat. That is the value of the boat after the fire and beaching and termination of the excursion should not exceed the sum of  for all the victims collectively — $5,000. That would amount to less than $5 paid per fatality and injured.

The owners then had the gall to claim that under maritime law that sum should be subject to the fees of the salvage and wreckage services performed. Essentially, they were claiming they should be limited to the current value of their wrecked boat which would be close to nothing. Sure enough, besides a fine they had to pay, Knickerbocker ended up paying nothing to the survivors or the victims’ families.

Ship safety inspectors Henry Lundberg and John Fleming who had passed the General Slocum despite numerous violations were indicted. Lundberg was tried three separate times for manslaughter but was never convicted.

Eight people were indicted by a federal grand jury after the disaster: the captain, two inspectors, and the president, secretary, treasurer, and commodore of the Knickerbocker Steamship Company.

Most boatmen felt that Van Schaick "was unjustly made a scapegoat for the resulting tragedy, instead of the owners of the steamer or the effectiveness of the life saving and fire fighting equipment then required — and the inspections of it by government inspectors". He was the only person convicted. He was found guilty on one of three charges: criminal negligence, for failing to maintain proper fire drills and fire extinguishers. The jury could not reach a verdict on the other two counts of manslaughter. He was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. He spent three years and six months at Sing Sing prison before he was paroled. President Theodore Roosevelt declined to pardon Van Schaick. Van Schaick was finally released when the federal parole board under the William Howard Taft administration voted to free him on August 26, 1911. He was pardoned by President Taft on December 19, 1912; the pardon became effective on Christmas Day. After his death in 1927, Schaick was buried in Oakwood Cemetery (Troy, New York).

The neighborhood of Little Germany, which had been in decline for some time before the disaster as residents moved uptown,  almost disappeared afterward. With the trauma and arguments that followed the tragedy and the loss of many prominent settlers, most of the Lutheran Germans remaining in the Lower East Side eventually moved uptown. The church whose congregation chartered the ship for the fateful voyage was converted to a synagogue in 1940 after the area was settled by Jewish residents.

What do you think of the General Slocum Disaster? Let us know below.

Now read Richard’s article on the role of baseball in the US Civil War here.

A Brief History of Russian Museums - From Stalin to Putin

Russia has a very rich cultural history, and its museums have played an important role in the country. Here, Tim Brinkhof considers how Russia’s museums helped bring down one dictatorship only to build up another.

Soviet troops by the portico of the Hermitage Museum in Saint Petersburg (then Leningrad) during the Siege of Leningrad in 1943.

One of the most shocking museum exhibits to ever take place in Russia was about…underwear. “Memory of the Body: Underwear of the Soviet Era” opened at the City History Museum in St. Petersburg in 2000, offering an intimate look at life under communism by way of bras and boxers. Protests from embarrassed officials reinforced the curators’ message: that socialist prudishness survived the fall of the USSR itself.

There is more to museum exhibits than meets the eye. This is true everywhere, but especially in countries obsessed with (or haunted by) their own history. They not only preserve cultural memories from the past, but also reveal how that culture wishes to be perceived in the present. A change in exhibits, writes German historian Karl Schlögel in his newly translated book The Soviet Century: Archaeology of a Lost World, means “an alteration has taken place, a revision, a revaluation or a change in perspective.” Numerous revaluations happened inside Russia’s museums over the past century, and – when viewed in succession – they mirror the transformations of Russian society at large.

Bolsheviks

When the Bolsheviks took charge in 1917, they didn’t know what do with museums. According to his wife, Vladimir Lenin “was no great lover” of them, seeing them for what they arguably were at that point: trophy rooms of the fallen elite. Instead of disbanding museums, however, the revolutionaries opted to organize exhibits of their own.

For better or worse, Russia’s museum culture was reimagined along socialist lines. For better, because the Communist Party took collections from Saint Petersburg and Moscow and redistributed them across the countryside in an effort to decentralize cultural goods. (“This,” Schlögel writes, “is how masterpieces by Boris Kustodiev or Kazimir Malevich can still be found in remote locations where no one would ever expect to find them.”) For worse, because museums became places not of learning, but indoctrination. There were exhibits about atheism, railways, the Great Patriotic War, but not the Terror or the Holodomor. These topics were removed from museums, just as they were removed from schools.

Where Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Joseph Stalin permitted criticism of Stalinism in particular, Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika policies of the mid-1980s normalized criticism of the Soviet system in general. A “Ten Years Khrushchev” exhibit in Moscow’s Komsomol'skiy Prospekt confronted visitors with their own, uncensored past, from daily life inside the kommunalka or communal apartments, to the return of inmates from Stalin’s gulags. Many exhibits from this period featured objects from mass graves which were, at long last, allowed to be opened up.

Post-Soviet era

Of all chapters in the history of Russian museums, the one situated between the USSR’s collapse and the country’s return to contentious order under the Russian Federation is the foggiest. Dwindling political and financial security led to a boom in antiques smuggling, just as it had in 1917. Many museums were closed, while others issued massive layoffs. As Christianity returned to Russia, so did calls to convert locations like Petersburg’s St. Isaac’s Cathedral (turned into a museum by Bolsheviks) back into churches. On the other side of the spectrum was the progressive “Memory of the Body” exhibit, which had visitors giggling at how uncomfortable and unsexy their state-issued undergarments used to be.

Museums in Vladimir Putin’s Russia heavily resemble their Soviet counterparts. Not just in their choice of subject – exhibits applaud military campaigns in Afghanistan and Chechnya while museums dedicated to LGBTQ history are closed – but also in their approach. Rather than letting visitors loose and allowing them to draw their own conclusions from the exhibits, as they are in western countries, Russian museums have – as Schlögel’s puts it – “an order of their own, much like that of old-time school textbooks, so that whoever follows the narrative line cannot really go astray. They follow the red threat and at the end of the trail, having successfully negotiated all the vicissitudes and dangers, arrive at an end point, which is indispensable in any historical narrative.”

Under the Communist Party, this narrative was Marxism: the preordained process of dialectic materialism that guided humanity from prehistory to feudalism to capitalism and finally, following the USSR’s example, towards communism. Under Putin, Marxism has been replaced by a new narrative of Russian exceptionalism, in which the proudly illiberal country – a civilization onto its own – is destined to become the world’s one and only superpower. It is, as historian Ian Garner shows in his new book Z Generation: Into the Heart of Russia's Fascist Youth, a narrative full of inconsistences and contradictions, but which – thanks to state-owned television, social media, and museums – is accepted by a frightening number of Russian citizens.

What do you think of Russian museum culture? Let us know below.