Two Forgotten Aspects of the U.S. Civil War

In the historical novel Rebel Falls, author Tim Wendel focuses on two often forgotten aspects of the US Civil War - how widespread the conflict actually was and the way women played an integral role. He explains more in this piece.

Tim’s book is available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Sarah Emma Edmonds (married name Seelye), a woman who who fought as a man during the US Civil War.

In schools and class textbooks, the Civil War is usually taught as strictly a southern struggle. Certainly, major battles like Vicksburg, Bull Run, the siege of Petersburg and others occurred below the Mason-Dixon line. But we forget that when major conflicts erupt, the struggle and damage can extend well beyond borders and the lines on a map.

Widespread

Few realize that the Civil War nearly ignited an international conflict because of the keen interest of Great Britain and other European powers. In the last months of the war, the South was desperate to ignite an incident that would draw England and other countries into the fray.

The Confederacy sent spies to the northern border with British Canada, from Halifax to Detroit. The most audacious of such plans was to seize the U.S.S. Michigan, the lone Union warship left on the Great Lakes in 1864. (Similar vessels were utilized to blockade the South.)

An unlikely pair – John Yates Beall and Bennet Burley – headed the rebel effort to capture the Michigan. Born in Jefferson County, West Virginia, Beall was a loyal Southerner and had studied law at the University of Virginia. Along the way, he appears to have crossed paths with John Wilkes Booth, who, of course, would later assassinate President Abraham Lincoln.

Burley was Beall’s partner in the so-called Northwest Conspiracy. From Glasgow, Scotland, Burley was a soldier of fortune -- joining the fight for the thrill of it. Unlike Beall, he would survive the war, escaping back to the United Kingdom and become a celebrated foreign correspondent for The Daily Telegraph in London.

(Beall and Burley are mentioned briefly in Doris Kearns Goodwin’s Team of Rivals and Carl Sandburg’s Abraham Lincoln: The War Years.)

And what would have happened if Beall and Burley had seized the iron-hulled Michigan, with its 30-pounder parrot rifle, half-dozen howitzers and additional firepower? They first planned to free Confederate prisoners on Johnson’s Island near Sandusky, Ohio. These POWs included more than 20 rebel generals.

From there, with no opposing warships in the region, it would have been easy to bombard Cleveland, Buffalo, and other targets along the southern shore of Lake Erie. All of this was planned to unfold shortly before the presidential election. Even though Lincoln handily regained office (212-21 in the electoral college), in the weeks before the vote a Republican victory was far from a foregone conclusion. The nation had been at war since spring of 1861, and many were tired of the long struggle. Lincoln and members of his cabinet feared that he might lose to challenger George McClellan due to war fatigue. This result could have led to the formation of a separate nation, the Confederate States of America.

The role of women

Though often overlooked, women played important roles on both sides of the Civil War, especially when it came to espionage. Elizabeth Van Lew was a member of Richmond high society and appeared to be a loyal Confederate. Yet she gathered information from the rebel capital and sent it across the lines to Ulysses Grant and the Union command by using her servants as couriers.

Actress Pauline Cushman was a Union spy and was in uniform by the end of the war. She was buried with full military honors at the Presidio National Cemetery in San Francisco in 1893. “Union Spy,” reads her simple gravestone.

In function and treachery, Rose O’Neal Greenhow was the mirror image of Richmond’s Van Lew. A longtime fixture in Washington, she was a staunch supporter of the Confederacy and stayed in D.C. when the war broke out, sending valuable information to the rebels. Confederate President Jefferson Davis credited information she supplied for the South winning the first Battle of Bull Run.

Then there’s Belle Boyd, nicknamed the “Cleopatra of the Secession.” She was arrested a half-dozen times for sending military secrets to the south. Eventually, Boyd was banished to Canada and became a well-known actress after the war.

While both sides forbade women from serving in the combat units, that didn’t stop many on both sides from joining combat units in disguise. According to the National Archives, for example, Sarah Edmonds Seelye (originally Sarah Emma Edmonds) served two years in the Second Michigan Infantry under the pseudonym Franklin Thompson. She eventually earned a military pension.

When we reach the fringes of public record, novels can sometimes lead us to a better understanding of what happened and what was at stake. When I began Rebel Falls, I decided I wanted my protagonist, the one who would seek to outwit the rebel spies Beall and Burley, to be a woman. This was partly because I needed a strong connection with the Seward Family. During the Civil War, Secretary of State William Seward was the most powerful man in the North after President Lincoln. Seward’s daughter, Fanny, was one of his closest confidants. So how to move inside that family circle? How about with a character named Rory Chase, a childhood friend of Fanny’s?

Rory is a composite of women who knew Fanny in Auburn, New York, where the family home still stands, as well as in Washington, where the Sewards were center stage during the war years.

Here again, the historical record can be a great starting point. After the war, Fanny Seward died of tuberculosis and was buried with other family members at Auburn’s Fort Hill Cemetery. Soon afterward family friend Olive Risley began to accompany Secretary Seward on his travels. To quell gossip (there was a 43-year difference in their ages), the politician eventually adopted her. A statue of Olive Risley Seward was erected near Capitol Hill in Washington in 1971. My goal with Rebel Falls was to have Rory Chase be emblematic of the resourceful, ambitious women who fought and spied for both sides during the Civil War.

Conclusion

Place and participants. Even with a conflict that has been written about as much as the war between the North and South, such important factors and characters can be overlooked. No wonder Ken Burns calls this clash “our most complicated of wars.”

In focusing upon what took place along our northern border and how women played a key role, I’ve not only tried to tell a forgotten story, but deliver a bit more clarity as well. Only by considering more factors of our nation’s history, hearing about all the factors of the Civil War, can we better understand what occurred and determine how best to move forward.

Tim Wendel is the author 16 books, most recently the novel ‘Rebel Falls’ (Three Hills/Cornell University Press):

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How did the US Cope with Empire After the Spanish-American War?

The 1898 Spanish-American War led the loss of the last significant remnants of Spain’s empire, with the transfer of Cuba, cedes Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States. Here, Peter Deane considers the impact of the war and whether America was ready for an empire.

The last stand of the Spanish forces in Cuba. An 1898 depiction by Murat Halstead.

Four years ago we stood on the brink of war without the people knowing it and without preparation or effort at preparation…. I did all that could be done with honor to avert the war, but without avail…. It came. The result was signally favorable to American arms and in the highest degree honorable to the Government. It imposed upon us obligations from which we cannot escape and from which it would be dishonorable to seek escape.

--William McKinley, Second Inaugural Address (1901)

May 1, 1898, Manila Bay

“You may fire when ready, Gridley.” Commodore George Dewey said to firing officer Charles Gridley, quietly. In moments, nothing was quiet as the American fleet’s guns fired to devastating effect. The Spanish fleet was destroyed without a single American death. This would be widely celebrated back home–it was the first American fleet naval battle and had ended victoriously. The United States now had strategic, but by no means complete, control of the Philippines. Dewey ordered his men to seize Cavite, the port for Manila. Dewey had cut the cable from Hong Kong to Manila to isolate further the Spanish garrison in the city of Manila. He sent news of his victory back to Washington, which would take days to arrive formally. He also asked for 5,000 Army troops, enough to defeat the Spanish garrison and occupy the area. Then he settled down to wait. He had no instructions on what to do if he won.

Now what? 

The American Republic ante bellum

The United States in early 1898 was a large, prosperous nation. Its economy was growing rapidly and the nation was confident and optimistic. For the most part it was content to keep to itself. The only “overseas” possession of the U. S. was Alaska, on the same continent. The last foreign war had been fifty years before.

But for several years now, a group of influential men had formed a loose affiliation of those seeking to expand the U. S. beyond its continental boundaries. Their leader came to be Theodore Roosevelt. Manifest Destiny need not stop at the West coast. The U. S. could span the Pacific; trade and greater prosperity would follow. The U. S. could expand into the Caribbean too.

Their first goal was the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. Grover Cleveland, in line with popular opinion, would have none of this and refused to pursue it. He did commit to expansion of the U. S. Navy, such that it became comparable to Germany’s. When Republican William McKinley came to power in 1897, Roosevelt became Assistant Secretary of the Navy. From this position he acted to increase the size and readiness of the Navy. He later drafted secret orders that, in the event of war with Spain, Dewey and the Asiatic Squadron should proceed directly to the Philippines to engage the Spanish fleet. To satisfy the growing and influential expansionist wing of his party, McKinley signed the long-delayed treaty of annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, but the Senate would not consider it—in 1897–and he knew this.

McKinley liked to keep his options open. He has often been seen as unintelligent and indecisive. He listened more than he spoke. But when he decided, he was committed to it. As one aide said, “The President had his way as usual.” This applied in Congress too.

If the U. S. Navy was in fighting shape, the Army was in no state of readiness for war or expansion. (When the war began, Roosevelt would remark, “If the Army were one tenth as ready as the Navy, we would fix that whole business in six weeks.”) The U. S. Army consisted of 25,000 regulars scattered mostly in the interior of the country. With the Indian Wars over, it was underfunded and below what the Army Chief calculated to be the needed number, at least 38,000 regulars.

The War

The Spanish-American War, when it commenced in April 1898, was felt in Congress and by the public to be about the liberation of Cuba from Spanish tyranny. People North and South rallied to the flag; the nation was united behind the liberation of Cuba. McKinley had hoped a foreign war would bind the nation together. The Congress was united behind appropriation for the war. The Army hoped for 60,000 volunteers with two-year enlistments; McKinley called for and received funding for 125,000 plus 62,527 total regulars for the duration of the war. In May, to prepare for any eventuality, he called for and had funded 75,000 more volunteers. Now the U. S. had a Great Power-size army.

The tenfold increase in size overwhelmed the Army. Scandals about the amount and quality of food and supplies blossomed after the War. In April, the Army Chief complained he had not enough munitions “to last an army of 70,000 men in one hour’s serious battle.” The Army had essentially no infrastructure along the Eastern or Gulf coasts. Tampa, Florida was chosen as the staging area. Tens of thousands of new recruits converged there. Roosevelt: “...a welter of confusion…an almost inextricable tangle.” But by Summer they had enough trained and supplied soldiers for the Cuban campaign.

The Army created the Department of the Pacific, in which to put Pacific Ocean possessions. The Army gathered the first of 15,000 (thrice Dewey’s request) troops with much disorganization at the Presidio in San Francisco for transport to the Philippines. Thousands more were to come over the next few years.

Neither the Army nor the Navy had any ships to transport troops overseas. Suitable ships were therefore mostly purchased–103–and a few chartered, in a matter of weeks. These were added to the Navy. Munitions and supplies were shipped as well.

When the first contingent of troops sailed for Manila, they detoured along the way to seize Guam. This was done without casualty. The other Ladrones islands were left to Spain. Then they sailed on.

It was in June that the Hawaiian Islands were annexed. The treaty was suddenly approved–by acclamation. One reason this finally passed is that the Japanese Empire had indicated strong interest in acquiring the Islands, which had a large Japanese population.

Also that Summer, the Russian Empire upgraded its representative from minister to ambassador, the same rank as other Great Powers.

The Fate of the Philippines

In May, Dewey’s fleet in Manila Bay was visited by naval contingents from a number of Great Powers, to congratulate him on his victory. With the status of the Islands unclear and not under American control, others were interested. It was known that the Japanese Empire was interested in acquiring the islands. The German admiral went so far as to indicate that if the U. S. did not want the Philippines for a colony, then Germany would gladly step in. This infuriated Dewey and influenced McKinley toward annexation in his indecision about the future of the islands.

Hawaii, Guam and Puerto Rico were widely seen as strategic necessities. There was no real debate over their future status. McKinley said that the status of the Philippines would be decided by the peace treaty conference, in neutral Paris, France. But peace commissioners rely on their instructions for guidance. At first he issued no clear instructions. But as the months wore on, he sensed that popular opinion favored not only Cuban independence, but also American annexation of the entire Philippines. He instructed his commissioners accordingly and Spain had to acquiesce.

The peace treaty signed late that year aroused tremendous national debate. Was it right or even constitutional for the U. S. to have colonies? Men such as Grover Cleveland, Mark Twain and Charles Francis Adams Jr. opposed annexation. (“Men of a bygone era,” Roosevelt called them.) Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge were among those in favor. The debate, in public society and in Congress, was sometimes acrimonious. A narrow majority of senators approved the treaty in February 1899.

The one group without a voice in this debate were the Filipinos. They for years had staged an insurrection against Spanish rule with the goal of independence. Filipino insurgents and the U. S. Army were allied during the siege of Manila in August, but it quickly became apparent to the Filipinos that the U. S. had no intention of supporting full independence. The insurrection turned against the Americans. This quickly became a full-scale colonial war with upwards of 30,000 American troops involved at any given time at its peak. A total of 125,000 Americans would fight in the war over its course. It lasted officially until July 1902, but some hostilities continued for years after. The American public quickly grew tired of this war, and war in general (the first occasion in what became a pattern of popular response to war) but McKinley had chosen his course of action. However, the U. S. never again waged war for territorial empire.

In December 1898, McKinley issued a proclamation that America’s goal in the Philippines was “benevolent assimilation”. This did nothing to satisfy the insurrectos who wanted no part of it. The policy was sometimes carried out at gunpoint. The American combination of benevolent ideals supported by military force, as a tenet of American foreign policy, appeared for the first time in the Spanish-American and Philippine wars, but not the last. 

The Constitution and the Flag

The Philippines all this time were under military rule, i.e., martial law. Was this constitutional? McKinley felt it was. The Constitution did not apply to a conquered colony, he felt.

Other new territories had to be governed as well. Puerto Rico easily accepted American suzerainty. One of the island’s economic mainstays was sugar cane. McKinley felt, logically (if the Constitution does follow the flag) that the tariff walls against Puerto Rican sugar should be lifted. (Never mind that this was a contradiction to his Philippine policies.) America had no tariffs against itself. The sugar lobby disagreed, and in the ensuing debate it would be decided by Congress that the Constitution does not follow the flag. Puerto Rican Sugar duties were reduced by 75%, so McKinley substantially won the immediate question.

In 1901, the Constitutional question would come to the U. S. Supreme Court. The verdict: The Constitution need not follow the flag.

McKinley’s second Annual Message (State of the Union) in December 1898 was to great extent a catalog of American accomplishments–and adaptations to empire and global power. He called for the standing, regular army to be increased to 100,000 regulars “will be none too many to meet the necessities” of the U. S. now. This shocked many, to confront the fact of America’s new role in the world. In early 1899 he called for a mainland-Hawaii-Guam-Manila cable. As usual, on both questions, he got his way.

1900

The Chinese Empire was disintegrating. Great Powers swooped in to claim coastal cities and inland spheres of influence as their own. This process not only made a mockery of China’s territorial integrity but also threatened to shut out American goods from the Chinese market.

In March, Secretary of State John Hay addressed correspondence to each of the relevant powers regarding an “open door” policy towards China. Nations seeking trade and opportunities in China were to be treated equally by all others; Chinese sovereignty was to be respected (at least in name). Some of the responses were vague, but Hay proclaimed the triumph of his policy, and the other powers played along. Thus was born the famous “Open Door” policy.

Even three years before, the U. S. would have had no say in how the Great Powers dealt with China. Now that the U. S. was a Pacific power, it had a seat at the big power table.

The Open Door was severely tested a few months later. During the Boxer Rebellion, the great power (U. S. included) diplomatic enclave in Beijing was besieged. To lift the siege and fight the Boxers, the Eight Power Alliance—all the great powers—was formed and their combined force marched on Beijing. The main force consisted of 18,000 troops under one central command. The U. S. contributed 3,400 troops from the Philippines. All eight nations participated in successfully lifting the siege.

Three years before, the U. S. would again have been a spectator, with no troops to send and no way to send them. Having troops in the nearby Philippines made U. S. participation possible. American unilateral action was not always going to be adequate to address global issues, they learned. So for the first time since George Washington’s Farewell Address, with its warnings against foreign alliances, the U. S. was acting in concert—in an Alliance—with other Great Powers. All saw the U. S. for the power it was. Afterwards, the Open Door survived as the other powers sought reparations from China, but not annexed territory.

McKinley realized the global and political significance of events. He was now responsible for Americans globally. And so he acted by joining the Alliance and committing troops. McKinley considered seeking Congressional approval for this, but was assured by his Secretaries of War and the Navy that this was not necessary, legally or militarily. He had adequate troops in Asia already. This was the first time a President had committed American troops to battle outside the contiguous U. S. without the permission of Congress. Some in Congress objected but it was done. This set the powerful precedent Presidents to come would use.

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What if Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria had not been Assassinated?

Few events in history have had such far-reaching consequences as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria on June 28, 1914, in Sarajevo. This single act of violence set off a chain reaction that led to the First World War, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the world. However, what if Franz Ferdinand had not been assassinated? What alternate course might history have taken? Delving into the speculative realm of "what ifs" we can consider the potential ramifications of a world where the Archduke either was not assassinated or survived the assassination attempt.

Terry Bailey considers this question.

Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

The first and most immediate consequence of Franz Ferdinand's survival would have been the avoidance or delay of the First World War. His assassination served as the catalyst for the conflict, prompting Austria-Hungary to issue an ultimatum to Serbia, which in turn led to a series of alliances being invoked, drawing Europe into a devastating war. Without this trigger, the delicate balance of power that existed among the European nations might have persisted, potentially averting the catastrophic conflict that claimed millions of lives.

With the potential avoidance of the First World War, the geopolitical landscape of Europe would have remained vastly different than we understand it today. The collapse of empires such as the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, Russian, and German would not have occurred in the same manner, altering the course of history for countless nations and peoples. The rise of communism in Russia, the Treaty of Versailles, and the subsequent economic turmoil that paved the way for the Second World War, all these pivotal events might have been drastically different or potentially avoided altogether.

One of the key factors in Franz Ferdinand's assassination was the simmering ethnic tensions within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Archduke, who was heir to the throne, advocated for a federalist solution that would grant greater autonomy to the empire's various ethnic groups. Had he lived, Franz Ferdinand may have pursued these reforms more aggressively, seeking to defuse the ethnic tensions that ultimately led to his assassination. His vision of a more inclusive and decentralized empire could have laid the groundwork for greater stability and harmony within Austria-Hungary.

Diplomacy

Furthermore, Franz Ferdinand was known for his pragmatism and skepticism towards war. Unlike some of his more hawkish counterparts within the Austrian government, he favored diplomatic solutions over military intervention. His survival could have shifted the course of Austrian foreign policy towards a more conciliatory stance, reducing the likelihood of conflicts that could escalate into global wars.

Beyond Europe, the survival of Franz Ferdinand could have had significant implications for the fate of the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East. With Austria-Hungary's focus redirected towards internal reforms and diplomatic solutions, the empire might have been less inclined to support the Central Powers during the First World War. This could have weakened the Ottoman Empire's position and altered the outcome of events such as the Armenian Genocide and the subsequent partitioning of the Middle East by European powers.

Moreover, the survival of Franz Ferdinand could have influenced the trajectory of the United States' involvement in global affairs. Without the impetus of the First World War, the United States might have remained more isolationist, avoiding the entanglements that ultimately drew it into the international arena. The absence of American intervention could have altered the balance of power during the war and shaped the subsequent peace negotiations in unforeseen ways.

Technology and culture

In the realm of technology and culture, the avoidance of a World War could have led to different innovations and artistic movements. The war,  as all wars do, spurred advancements in military technology and medicine, but it also brought about immense human suffering and destruction. In a world where the First World War never occurred, resources that were diverted towards military efforts could have been invested in other areas, potentially accelerating scientific progress for peaceful means, in addition to, cultural developments.

Naturally, it is impossible to predict with certainty how history would have unfolded if Archduke Franz Ferdinand had not been assassinated. The interconnectedness of events and the myriad factors at play make any speculation inherently hypothetical. However, by examining the potential consequences of a non-assassination or his survival, we gain insight into the pivotal role that individuals can play in shaping the course of history and the profound impact that seemingly small events can have on the world stage.

In conclusion, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria set off a chain reaction that led to the First World War and its far-reaching consequences. However, by considering the hypothetical scenario where Franz Ferdinand survived, we glimpse a different path, one where war and upheaval might have been averted, and the course of history irrevocably altered. While we can only speculate on the details of such an alternate reality, the exercise serves as a reminder of the fragility and complexity of human history.

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The Zulu Victory Against the British at the Battle of Isandlwana

It’s been 145 years since Sir Lord Chelmsford’s Army began a three-phase invasion of the South African nation of Zululand in January 1879. Chelmsford and Sir Bartle Frere had instigated the war, and felt that they could bring the Zulu people to capitulation in a short period of time with the goal of bringing another portion of South Africa under British control. What they found, would go down in the annals of military history forever.

Here, Michael Leibrandt explains the story of the Battle of Isandlwana in the Anglo-Zulu War.

The 1879 Battle of Isandhlwana. By Charles Edwin Fripp, 1885.

The Centre Column of the invasion — led by Lord Chelmsford himself — would cross the Buffalo River from Rorke’s Drift and setup camp at the foot of Isandlwana Hill on January 20th. The name Isandlwana is meant to mean abomasum — named as its shape resembles part of the digestive track of the cow. The British would note the sphinx-like shape of the Hill.

Receiving a multitude of intelligence during the overnight hours and feeling that the Zulu Army would not engage the British forces directly, Chelmsford divided his forces. 

Splitting his force, Chelmsford marched out of the camp at 4:00 A.M., and left Lt. Colonel Pulleine with approximately 600 men of the 24th Regiment of Foot, 700 soldiers from the Natal Native Contingent, and 70 members of the Royal Artillery with two cannons.

To reinforce the camp, Chelmsford ordered Colonel Anthony Durnford to march from Rorke’s Drift to reinforce Isandlwana. Not long after 10:00 A.M., Durnford arrived with 250 Natal Native Contingent troops and a rocket battery. To this day, historians are still divided on whether or not this was a deliberate Zulu maneuver to further divide the British troops or transpired out of happenstance. 

While scouting the area around the heights overlooking the nearby Ngwebeni Valley, the British found to their horror the entire Zulu Army hidden in the valley below. Immediately realizing that they had been discovered, the Zulu Army rose up and headed towards Isandlwana. After assembling, the Zulu Impi charged the camp utilizing the “horns of the buffalo” attack that was first employed by King Shaka decades earlier to encircle Isandlwana Hill.

Repelling the attack

Although initially being able to repel the Zulu attack with rank fire, the British and Natal forces were ultimately too extended in front of the camp and vulnerable to the closing Zulu flanks. In less than five hours — almost all of the British and Natal Native Contingent — nearly 1,700 men were wiped out. A few did manage to escape down Fugitives Trail and were able to warn the garrison at Rorke’s Drift before the horns closed to cutoff any retreat.

Colonel Durnford was killed in the dry donga. Zulu accounts indicate that Major Russell’s Rocket Batteries were overwhelmed early in the fight. The Royal Artillery attempted to save the two cannons, but were also overwhelmed. After the Battle, the Zulus disassembled the cannons and one was found on the road back to Ulundi. Colonel Pulleine was killed in the camp.

Lieutenants Melvill and Coghill desperately grabbed the Queen’s Colour and galloped out of the camp at in the latter stages of the battle. They made it to the banks of the Buffalo River before exhaustion overtook them and they were caught and killed. The Queen’s Colour was later found floating in the river.

Eclipse

For some time, historians debated as to whether or not an annual solar eclipse which covered South Africa in the path of totality on January 22nd 1879 actually had an impact. Only the Zulu accounts of the Battle even seem to mention it that day, with other engagements in Zululand on that day do not. The survivors of Rourke’s Drift also did not mention it in their accounts.

The Zulus did mention it in accounts of the Battle, detailing that they took a sudden darkness over the battlefield as a sign from the gods with increased inspiration.

According to Zulu Accounts, one lone soldier made it up the side of Isandlwana Hill and took cover in a cave. He was killed when his ammunition ran out and is depicted in the famous Richard Thomas Moynan painting, The Last of the 24th.

In the late afternoon, Commandant Lonsdale had received permission to return to the camp at Isandlwana to recover in his tent from some heatstroke. Allowing his horse to wander towards Isandlwana, when he roused from his stupor to find the camp in possession of the Zulus and was barely able to spur his horse to escape.

When Chelmsford returned to the camp at dusk, he and the remaining British forces saw a horrific site on the battlefield. In the distance, night sky was lit up with fire burning in the direction of Rourke’s Drift. His troops overheard him say, “But I left 1,000 men to guard the camp.”

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Michael Thomas Leibrandt lives and works in Abington Township, Pennsylvania.

The Polish Army’s World War 2 Bear Soldier

World War 2 has many unpleasant tales, but occasionally a tale isn’t so unpleasant. Here, Lior Bouchnik looks at how a bear came to be part of the Polish Army – and even helped in a major battle.

Wojtek the bear with a Polish soldier during World War II.

It all starts at the opening shot of the Second World War. 1939 - the invasion of Poland by Germany and the USSR and the following annexation left millions of formally Polish citizens under Soviet authority. In 1942, amid the deportation of thousands of Polish civilians, the Ander’s Army was formed, a common name for the Polish armed forces in the east. Ander’s army accompanied the deported Polish citizens to Iran which became a refugee camp that received up to 2,500 people per day, and in total 116,000.

On April 8, 1942, the Polish soldiers stationed in Iran brought with them was the 18-year-old niece of General Bolesław Długoszowski who persuaded her uncle to buy a small Syrian bear cub from a young Iranian boy. The boy claimed that he found the cub after the bear's mother was shot by hunters. The young cub accompanied the soldiers and was given the name Wojtek, an old Slavic name that loosely translates to “happy warrior”. The cub grew into a bear on the campaign and as he grew, he became more than just a mascot to the Polish soldiers. The cub learned to adapt as he lived among them, imitating their actions. Wojtek learned to salute and he even started standing on his hind legs and marching beside them. Wojtek also developed a love for drinking beer and eating cigarettes, but he would only eat lit ones otherwise he would refuse to consume them. He and the soldiers enjoyed wrestling together and on cold nights he would sleep with them.

Battle of Monte Cassino

Wojtek moved with the 22nd Artillery Supply Company all around the Middle East. First, they moved to Iraq then Syria, Palestine, and finally Egypt, and when it came time for his major contribution in the Battle of Monte Cassino, he weighed 90 kilograms (200 pounds). The Polish soldiers of the 2nd Polish Corps were tasked with joining the British 8th Army in the campaign to liberate Italy. By now Wojtek developed a close bond with his human companions, who treated him like a fellow soldier, and when they were told that the designated ship that was supposed to carry them to Italy forbade mascots and pets, they did what they felt was the only natural step. To account for his rations and transportation Wojtek was officially enlisted as a soldier. He was listed among the soldiers with his given name, he had his own serial number and pay book. He lived with the other soldiers in tents or in a special wooden crate, which was transported by truck.

In the 1944 Battle of Monte Cassino, Wojtek continued to showcase his learned behavior by helping his unit move heavy ammunition onto trucks. Wojtek helped the soldiers by carrying himself 45 kg (100 Ib) crates of 11 kg (25 Ib) artillery shells that normally required four men. Wojtek helped to speed up the loading process, and the positive effect on the soldier's morale did not go unnoticed. His efforts earned him a promotion to the rank of corporal. Wojtek was later immortalized by the 22nd Artillery Supply Company by becoming their official emblem, showcasing a depiction of a bear carrying an artillery shell.

After the war

 After the war in 1947, Wojtek was given to Edinburgh Zoo where he spent the rest of his life. He was often visited by his former Polish comrades who threw him cigarettes to eat like he used to do in their shared time in the army. Wojtek died on December 2, 1963, aged 21, weighing nearly 500 kg (1,100 pounds) and being over 1.8 m (5 ft 11 in) tall. Wojtek's legacy is one of family. In the war ridden world of the 1940s, Wojtek was much like the Polish soldiers who lost their homes, and what started as a mere amusement to the soldiers became real comradery. The Polish soldiers gave Wojtek a family and he returned the favor in equal measure, by boosting morale, by being one of them. In what must be one of the most unique stories of the war, soldiers found a true comrade who didn’t have a flag or a nation to fight for, just a group of Polish soldiers who became his only family.

Now read about the cat that survived 3 ships sinking during World War 2 here.

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The Battle of Gettysburg - Part 2: July 1, Day 1

The Battle of Gettysburg has been described as a “meeting engagement”, meaning that the battle there was an accident, which was unplanned by the command on either side.  That the largest battle of the war originated from a desire for the acquisition of shoes for the Confederate troops seems preposterous, yet Maj Gen Henry Heth himself reported it that way in his official report on the campaign. But this isn’t the complete story: Lee had ordered his widely scattered army, which spanned from Chambersburg to Harrisburg, to converge at Cashtown & Gettysburg when he was informed by a spy on the evening of June 29th that Hooker had been replaced by Meade and that Meade was moving toward him. Cashtown is located at the eastern base of South Mountain, about 8 miles from Gettysburg, and was selected as being close to his wagon-based supply line.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

If you missed it, part1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here.

John Buford, a Unionist who played a major role on day 1 at the Battle of Gettysburg.

Generals Heth & Pettigrew Move

We don’t know what Lee thought of Hill sending 2 of his 3 divisions into Gettysburg on July 1, a reconnaissance in force; he never said, but it seems inconsistent with his desire to ”not bring on a general engagement” until all of his troops were up. Lee knew he was outnumbered, and what he wanted ideally was to find an isolated Union army group to attack. But neither Buford nor Pettigrew was much surprised to find the other there in force on July 1. After all, they had seen and skirmished on June 30. If this was a meeting engagement from the standpoint of the army commanders, it was only because of a lack of communication with those who were there. Buford clearly understood: he knew the meaning of what he had seen the day before, and had informed his superior, Major General John F. Reynolds.

On the morning of July 1, Heth’s division marched down the Chambersburg Pike. If he and Pettigrew thought there might be Union troops on the road to town, their line of march wasn’t appropriate: there were no cavalry vedettes or other skirmishers in front. The troops were deployed in columns when they should have been deployed in line. While this kept the movement faster initially, it caused Pettigrew to continually redeploy his men into line to fight the Buford’s men on the flanks of his column. The front of the line was Pegram’s artillery, followed by Brig Gens Archer and Davis’ infantry brigades. This was another error since they were not the optimal front line to be deployed in an emergency. Moreover,  Archer’s brigade had sustained heavy casualties at Chancellorsville and was undersized, and Davis was the least experienced brigade in Hill’s Corps.

The first contact was with Union vedettes. Then they reached dismounted cavalry from the brigade commanded by Col William Gamble. At about 7:30 am, 3 miles outside of town near the McPherson barn, the first shots of the battle were fired. The First Shot Marker at the Wisler House is placed on the corner of Chambersburg Pike and Knoxlyn Road. Lt. Marcellus Jones fired the shot with a borrowed Sharps carbine.

Although this has been celebrated as the first shot for decades, it’s not exactly true. A union corporal is known to have been shot and killed in a skirmish earlier that morning. Corporal Cyrus James of the 9th New York Cavalry was killed on vidette duty at daybreak on the Hunterstown Road – east of the town. This is the exact opposite direction of the actual attack. He was killed in a skirmish with the Virginia 14th Cavalry. We know the time of 4:30 am for a fact since his horse dragged his body back into the town, creating a commotion.

John L. Burns, age 69, was the Constable of Gettysburg. After being arrested by General Early in his first pass through town he was released and then arrested by Confederate stragglers. At daybreak on July 1, he stopped the horse dragging Corporal James’s body in the street. Angered at the kerfuffle brewing in his quiet town, he volunteered to General Buford to fight at McPhersons Woods with the Iron Brigade. He received wounds in the arm, leg, and minor chest wounds after falling in with the 24th Michigan. He escaped capture by hiding his weapon and telling the Confederates he had been caught in the crossfire. He later became a national hero.

Buford

General Buford resisted the approach of two Confederate infantry brigades on the Chambersburg Pike until the nearest Union infantry, Reynolds' I Corps, began to arrive. His light cavalry held off more than twice their number of veteran Confederate infantry for 5 hours. In the morning alone, his two dismounted cavalry brigades held off two divisions of Hill’s Corps for 3 hours. Buford’s tactical strategy defined a covering force action, in which space is traded for time. Buford traded 3 ridges for the time for Reynolds and the First Corps to come up.

Having only enough strength to post one man per yard of ground, Buford instructed one of his brigades, under Colonel William Gamble, to dismount to impede the advance of A.P. Hill’s Confederate III Corps along the road from Cashtown. He deployed all 6 guns of Calef's battery (battery A, 2nd US) of Tidball's battalion. The guns were 3" ordinance rifles. Besides being prepared and in excellent defensive position, Buford’s men had weapons that gave his men an advantage: breech-loading carbines, which allowed a 2-3 times faster fire than muzzle-loaded rifles, although sometimes it is incorrectly stated they had multi-shot repeating carbines, they did not, as these only became available that Fall.

Reynolds rode out ahead of the 1st Division, met with Buford about 9 am, and then accompanied some of his soldiers, probably from Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade, into the fighting at Herbst's Woods.

Reynolds

General John Reynolds was the Union commander on the morning of July 1. President Lincoln had offered Reynolds command of the Union Army before Meade, but he had insisted on no political oversight if he accepted the position, which was rejected. Nevertheless, Meade respected and trusted him greatly, making him Left Wing Commander; which as fate would have it, is exactly where General Lee was congregating.

The Pipe Creek Circular was dated July 1, written early that morning well before the battle began. In it, Meade ordered his forces to start pulling back to this line to await Lee’s expected advance once Lee is found and begins his attack. George Meade had no intention of fighting in Pennsylvania on the eve of battle. That much is beyond dispute. On the morning of July 1, Pipe Creek was The Plan rather than a contingency. Meade intended to rest his forces where they were on July 1.

The night before the battle, both Reynolds and General OO Howard had received myriad reports by scouts, residents, and of course Buford the night before. Reynolds informed Meade at around midnight, whose headquarters was in Taneytown MD, of Hill massing apparently at Cashtown. Early in the morning of July 1, they received a response from Meade, giving them orders to advance to Gettysburg, and telling them that Longstreet was located around Chambersburg and Ewell near Carlisle. These were highly accurate intelligence reports, but they seemed to conflict with the Pipe Creek Circular. Whether or not Reynolds ever received that order isn’t known, nor do we understand how either general understood the two orders, one to advance and one to fall back simultaneously. Meade had given Reynolds, the man he had full confidence in, independence to do what he thought warranted. Reynolds commanded the 1st Corps and, as a wing commander, also had operational control of the 11th and 3rd Corps.

Buford is known to have pointed out Cemetery Ridge to Reynolds, the heights at the south part of town, as the best position ultimately for the Union defense. Reynolds ordered him to resist as long as possible to keep the Rebels out of the town. He then sent word to his Corps to hurry.  He sent couriers to Meade and his commanders about what was going on. We do know that the courier he sent to Meade, Captain Weld, did tell Meade that a stout defense was underway.

Reynolds had three options: Deploy into a defensive position near Emmitsburg, occupy the high ground south and southeast of Gettysburg, or occupy the ridges west of the town. Reynolds decided to place his corps on the march and ordered the other two corps to Gettysburg. Another possibility is that Reynolds was organizing a fighting retreat, the correct terminology being covering force action/advance guard operation, consistent with Meade’s Pipe Creek Circular.

Abner Doubleday

After Reynolds’ death, Major General Abner Doubleday, the ranking officer on the field, assumed command of the Union defenses at 10:50 am. Doubleday was at the front as division commander of the second infantry division on the field. For the next 5 hours, he defended the ridges west of Gettysburg as increasing numbers of Confederate soldiers appeared, eventually outnumbering him by about 16,000 to 9,500. The 1st Corps arrived in time to take over the fight from Buford and hold Confederate forces west of Gettysburg until late afternoon.

Reynolds’ death and Doubleday’s decision to make a stand west of Gettysburg scuttled Meade’s plan. It is entirely unknown if Reynolds had told him his orders; if he was aware that he was supposed to fight a covering action, he certainly never tried. If a planned withdrawal was the plan, it wasn’t communicated to Buford nor Doubleday, nor did they have any experience in undertaking this kind of maneuver. Gettysburg might have been simply the product of what transpired on the field and no one actually ordered it.

But where was the plan lost? Did Reynolds not convey to Doubleday the overall plan to move as a covering force action or was Doubleday unable to make this happen, or did he simply change the plan on the fly? We don’t know exactly what Reynolds thought Meade had ordered. Doubleday was quoted after the war as saying, ”It was General Reynolds’s intention to dispute the enemy’s advance, falling back, however, in case of a serious attack, to the ground already chosen at Emmitsburg” That, of course, was precisely what Meade instructed Reynolds to do.  

As infantry reinforcements arrived under Reynolds from the I Corps, Confederate assaults down the Chambersburg Pike were repulsed. The periodic arrival of Hill’s divisions on the Cashtown Pike, and then later on that morning on the more northerly Mummasburg Road required Buford and Doubleday to increasingly extend the Union line as Confederate infantry arrived. As Union troops entered from the south, they had to be routed to the constantly moving front. The roads go through town, so they needed to cross fields to bypass it and get to the place they were needed.

Fighting took place on both the north and south sides of Chambersburg Pike.  The intense fighting occurred on McPherson Ridge. North of the Pike, an unfinished railroad bed created three sections of depressed ground. To the south, fighting centered on Willoughby Run and Herbst or McPherson Woods. The main forces engaged were Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade opposed by brigades of James J Archer and Jefferson R Davis. Three of Cutler's regiments were positioned north of the Pike and two to the south. The Iron Brigade directly opposed Archer. The Union infantry forces were commanded by Maj Gen James J Wadsworth.

For a few hours, Confederate regiments entered the battlefield from the west and northwest, as Union troops arrived from the south and then moved west to the sound of the guns. Because of the roads and distances involved, there was a temporary advantage in number of troops for the Confederates. Fresh troops were sent to battle as they arrived, to face other troops that also just arrived. The arrival of Confederate units was dictated by the position that morning. Hill’s 2nd corps, under Heth and Rodes, were on the western roads, and they arrived in the morning from Chambersburg.

The Railroad Cut

The engagement at the railroad cut, an incomplete railway excavation near the McPherson farmhouse, witnessed a series of brutal assaults and counterattacks. Although lacking actual railroad tracks, the cut provided a deep entrenchment that was utilized by both Union and Confederate forces. The Union Army stationed multiple units near the site to fend off the Confederate attacks, managing to hold their ground until the Confederates, with superior numbers, eventually forced them to retreat.

During a crucial moment around 10 am, the Confederates, overwhelming the Union defenders, flanked their right side and launched an attack. Three regiments strategically positioned themselves at the railroad cut, with one half of the brigade utilizing the cut as a trench while the other half remained at the northern edge. In response, Union forces, led by division commander James Wadsworth, organized a counterattack that exploited the terrain advantage provided by the depression of the cut. This tactic allowed the Union troops to flank the Confederate positions and secure a significant number of Confederate prisoners

A lull in the fighting ensued as both sides awaited reinforcements. Maj Gen OO Howard arrived before his XI Corps did, and assumed command from behind the town of Gettysburg. He communicated with Maj Gen James Slocum of XII Corps and Maj Gen Daniel Sickles of III Corps  to come to the field immediately.

In the afternoon, Ewell’s Corps appeared on Oak Ridge from the north, beginning a massive assault. With Rodes’ division attacking from Oak Hill, the Union lines were under heavy pressure. The CSA 3rd Corps, under Early and Gordon, came from the north and arrived later in the afternoon from Carlisle. This sequence provided a clockwise en echelon pattern that was unintentional but devastating, as the Union Corps were further away in Maryland that morning.

On June 28, Ewell's corps, consisting of three divisions, was strategically positioned at Carlisle and York, Pennsylvania. However, upon receiving orders to concentrate in the Cashtown-Gettysburg area, Rodes made the decision to move his division south from Carlisle, while another division led by Jubal Early marched southwest from York. Simultaneously, Edward Johnson's division was sent back down the Cumberland Valley towards Chambersburg under Ewell's command.

In the early afternoon, the Union XI Corps arrived under General Howard, who deployed his men to the right of the already existing line. The Union position was shaped in a semicircle from west to north of the town

Iverson

Brigadier General Alfred Iverson’s brigade fell victim to a well-executed ambush around 2:30 pm, resulting in devastating losses. The lack of skirmishers screening their advance left the Confederates vulnerable to the Union army positioned behind a stone wall at Oak Ridge. The sudden attack caught Iverson’s men off guard, leading to over 900 casualties out of the 1,384 soldiers in his brigade.

The aftermath of the ambush saw the Union forces counterattacking and flanking the Confederate position, leading to further surrenders and retreats. The communication breakdown within the Confederate ranks, exacerbated by the linear landmark of the field, contributed to the disastrous outcome. Iverson’s ineffective leadership, compounded by personal issues such as alcoholism, further worsened the situation, ultimately resulting in his reassignment and leaving a bitter legacy among the survivors of his regiment.

Rodes

When Rodes' division reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on July 1, they could hear the sounds of intense fighting between Harry Heth's division of A.P. Hill's corps and the Union's 1st Corps. Believing that he was positioned on the right flank of the Union forces, Rodes deployed his division on Oak Ridge after marching south. At this critical juncture, Rodes faced a crucial decision. He could either wait for the army to fully concentrate, as per Lee's instructions, or take the initiative and launch an attack.

Despite the significant impact of Rodes' Division on the outcome of the battle, his contributions are often overlooked. The losses suffered by his division, despite being fully engaged only on the first day of the battle, were among the highest of all Confederate divisions. Ramseur was held in reserve. Rodes’s Division suffered the second-highest losses of all Confederate divisions.

Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes played a pivotal role in the initial day of the battle, with his division being a key factor in the success of the Confederate forces. The aggressive attack launched by Rodes' troops on the Union's I Corps resulted in the pushing back of Union forces, compelling them to retreat through Gettysburg and towards Cemetery Hill. Rodes strategically positioned his division at the junction of the Union First and Eleventh Corps, preventing their link-up on Oak Hill and enveloping the Union right flank.

Despite Lee's directive to avoid a general engagement, Rodes, in agreement with Ewell, decided to ignore this order and launch an assault. Following the initial unsuccessful attack, Rodes persisted and led a second assault. These actions resulted in Early's division joining the battle and forced Hill's corps to deploy an additional division. While the Confederate forces did eventually achieve victory, it was not without consequences. The premature commitment of four divisions from Lee's army in a disjointed manner hindered Lee's ability to effectively utilize the full strength of his forces.

After the failure of the first assault, Rodes proceeded with a second attack, which ultimately led to Early's Division entering the fray and the subsequent deployment of another division from Hill's Corps. Although the Confederate forces were successful in the end, the premature involvement of four divisions from Lee's army in a fragmented deployment prevented Lee from fully harnessing the power of his forces.

Howard and Hancock

General Howard arrived 2 hours before his divisions did. Searching for a place to observe the battle, he found Cemetery Hill and recognized it as being the best place to fight a defense, just as Reynolds and Buford had. He tried to find a place to observe in town but could not. When he was informed of Reynold’s death, he became the senior officer on the battlefield. As 11th Corps arrived, starting around 12:30 pm, he gathered them on top of the hill. He observed and was informed of Rodes’s arrival on Oak Ridge and then Ewell’s arrival further west. He rode through the town of Gettysburg with Barlow, then met with General Wadsworth and General Doubleday behind the lines. He then returned to Cemetery Hill.

Operationally, Buford, Reynolds, and Doubleday thought the high ground south of town was a good place for defense and worth fighting for. It’s controversial whether Reynolds made an actual decision when he arrived at the scene and agreed with Buford that this was an excellent place to make a defensive stand. OO Howard suggested that it was his decision, and was credited with delaying the Confederates long enough to ensure the rest of the federal army was concentrated on the heights south of the town. Howard did leave a reserve division and artillery on Cemetery Hill and used this area to collect those retreating from the front line. Others give Hancock credit for that choice. Convinced of the strength of this position, Hancock expressed his belief to Howard, stating, "I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw." With Howard's agreement, Hancock solidified the decision, declaring, "Very well, sir, I select this as the battle-field." Although Howard received Congressional commendation for his actions, Hancock did not receive similar recognition.  It may be that no one actively chose Cemetery Hill at this stage of the conflict, but its obvious merits were plain to all.

When Meade learned of Reynold’s death, he immediately sent for Hancock. Unable to leave his army at that moment and undecided about the course of action regarding Pipe Creek, Meade entrusted Hancock with written orders to assume command, despite his junior rank compared to Howard. Hancock arrived at Cemetery Hill at approximately 4:30 pm. Hancock urged Meade to swiftly bring the entire army to the strategic position on Cemetery Hill. Additionally, Hancock decided to gather the scattered soldiers from various battles around the town and relocate them to the elevated hills south of Gettysburg, with the existing cemetery at its center. Hancock positioned his artillery there, enabling them to target the north over Culps Hill or the west over Cemetery Ridge.

During this critical juncture, Doubleday was in retreat, prompting a meeting between him and Hancock on the field. Recognizing the importance of the situation, Hancock ordered Wadsworth to position his troops at the base of Culp's Hill. This maneuver proved crucial and probably saved the field that day.

Barlow’s Knoll

The arrival of Ewell’s Corps from the north changed the entire dynamic of the battle to that point. To the east, the threat to Doles’ position had been reduced by the appearance of Early’s division. He had arrived at about 3 p.m. but paused for half an hour so that his infantrymen could catch their breath after their hard march to the field. Early then charged out of the northeast, sending the brigades led by Brig. Gens. John B. Gordon, Isaac E. Avery, and Harry T. Hays against the Union line.

Upon the arrival of Gordon's division on the far right, only Barlow's division stood as a barrier against an attack. Recognizing the imminent danger posed by the arrival of Ewell's 3rd Corps from the north, which threatened the Union's right flank, General Francis Barlow decided to advance his division of the 11th Corps to a knoll along the Harrisburg Road. At the time, the area now known as Barlow's Knoll was called Blucher's Knoll.  The Confederate brigades led by Gordon and Doles converged, overpowering Barlow's forces. Outnumbered by Gordon's division, Barlow and his men were unable to maintain their position, which was positioned as a vulnerable salient. Barlow was severely wounded and taken prisoner. Howard’s XI Corps were overwhelmed and forced to fall back As the Union line collapsed, XI Corps retreated back through town and assumed a defensive position on Cemetery Hill.

As Rodes launched a renewed assault from the north and Dorsey Pender attacked from the west, the Union line crumbled. The road system played a significant role in determining the outcome, favoring the Confederates who ultimately emerged victorious as Union troops retreated through the town in a disorganized manner. Subsequently, Union troops hastily withdrew through the town's streets.

Ultimately, of course, the Union lines were overrun as 2 Confederate corps arrived in just a few hours. Doubleday fought an outstanding controlled retreat back to the new lines on Cemetery Ridge. General Howard told Meade that his line had collapsed and it was Doubleday’s fault, because his line faltered first. This incorrect report led to his removal from command and ultimately, in his leaving active service.

Ewell Advances

At about 4:30 p.m., the Confederate superiority in numbers of Ewell’s Corp began to tell, and although Union fire opened gaping holes in their ranks, Hill’s men finally pushed the Federal I Corps off Seminary Ridge. With the Yankees in full retreat, both Rodes and Early called a halt to their pursuit, following the instructions issued by Ewell at the onset of the battle per Lee’s order.

With the collapse of the Union lines on Seminary Ridge and north of the town, the troops of XI Corps fell back on Cemetery Hill, where a 2000-man brigade and a battery of 6 guns were stationed to protect the retreat. Wadsworth’s division raced to Culps Hill to defend the right flank, and other reinforcements were also arriving. 500 troops from the 7th Indiana came forward, and Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum’s XII Corps arrived. The 1stDivision, led by Brig. Gen. Thomas Ruger began filing into position behind Cemetery Hill at about 4:30 p.m. Brigadier General John W. Geary’s 2nd Division reached Gettysburg at 5 pm. These 8,000 fresh troops brought the Union strength to about 20,000 soldiers mixed with the XI Corps. In addition to the reinforcements, the Federals had most of their artillery pieces, which they had salvaged during their retreat. Almost 40 guns had joined Smith’s six guns, and the entire array was emplaced, unlimbered, and ready to fire, atop Cemetery Hill.

Ewell, of course, saw the enemy digging in on Cemetery Hill. Although he no doubt suspected that the Union soldiers would be impossible to dislodge, he knew that sooner or later he would have to charge the heights.

Culp’s Hill & the “If Practicable” Order

Ewell's failure to take Culp's Hill /Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 is often considered one of the great missed opportunities of the battle. Ewell had to decide about whether to make an attack. Rodes’ Division had already incurred heavy casualties and two brigades of Early’s Division had been sent east to block a rumored enemy force on the York Pike, and Maj. Gen. “Allegheny” Johnson’s Division was still marching toward Gettysburg.

Ewell insisted that Lee must approve an attack and Hill had to provide reinforcements. When he asked A.P. Hill for assistance, Hill contended that his divisions were not capable of further offensive action that day, leaving Ewell with only two brigades of Early’s Division for an attack on Cemetery Hill, where the Federals had already established a strong defensive position. James Power Smith, an aide who had spent the afternoon with Lee and had just now come to Gettysburg (without bringing any orders from Lee to Ewell), was dispatched back to Lee with those two requests. Colonel Walter Taylor delivered the message. According to his post-war recollection, Lee was told of Ewell’s movements by Major G. Campbell Brown of Ewell’s staff. He then instructed Brown:

‘To quote Lee’s own words, “General Ewell was…instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army…” ‘

From Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee’s Lieutenant’s: A Study in Command, One volume abridgment by Stephen W Sears, Scribner, New York 1998 p.571.

Smith returned, where he found Ewell and gave him Lee’s instructions. Ewell saw at once that his new orders were paradoxical. He could not drive the enemy from the heights without reinforcements. The force at hand, 4,000 men, was no match for the large group of Federals, backed by cannons, atop Cemetery Hill. To attack would bring disaster to his corps. And even if Ewell mounted the suicidal assault, how could he assure Lee that reopening the battle would not bring on a general engagement? Consequently, Ewell dropped his plan for a direct charge against Cemetery Hill.

What did Lee Expect?

Lee did not directly order Ewell to mount a charge against Cemetery Hill. Had Lee wanted to deny the enemy the heights, he could have given a peremptory order for Maj. Gen. Richard Anderson’s division, just now arriving and ready to fight, ahead to Cemetery Hill. After Barlow was defeated at the base of Culp’s Hill and XI Corps retreated through the town, Ewell was given discretionary orders to take the hill. He did not immediately try, and when later he sent Johnson’s Division, they ran into the Union line digging in.

Ewell felt, correctly by reports of those who were there, that his men were exhausted and disorganized. Most military students of the battle have concluded that Ewell made the right call under the circumstances. He was a professional soldier who had to make a split-second decision in the heat of the moment. The failed probing attack at 7 pm at dusk suggests that any opportunity, if it ever existed, was fleeing. The question will always remain if the Union was as well dug in at 5 pm.

Ewell had at least 6 rational reasons not to make the attack:  a) His men had been through a huge firefight after marching many hours and were fatigued. b) Assaulting the hill through the streets of Gettysburg was not an easy task since the narrow passageways prevented massing the troops for an attack. c) Lee’s ambiguous order resonates through history. Any dispassionate reading of that phrase in the context of battle is more confusing than anything else. And it should be noted that Early himself was reluctant at that moment. d) Ewell requested assistance from AP Hill, who declined due to the condition of his corps, which had taken the brunt of the first day. e) There was intelligence that Union troops were approaching from the east on the Hanover Road. This was the vanguard of the XII Corps under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. If those troops had arrived at the wrong time, Ewell's flank would have been turned. f) This was Ewell’s first Corps command. He was hesitant given these issues. Ewell was never the same after the loss of his leg and marriage.

Ewell did not get that message until after his forces were heavily committed, noting in his report “that by the time this message reached me….It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up.” In fact, at that moment, although victorious, his corps had suffered approximately 3,000 casualties, leaving him with about 8,000 men under arms. The charge into Gettysburg had also left Ewell’s two divisions badly disorganized, and thousands of prisoners had to be rounded up and secured. The third division, under Edward Johnson, was rushing to the scene, but no one knew when it would arrive.

On the hill at that hour and shortly afterward was the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, part of Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth's division, linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge. The XII Corps in George Greene’s brigade of John Geary’s division would soon arrive.

When Ewell’s third division, under Maj. Gen.Edward "Allegheny" Johnson, arrived on the battlefield, Johnson was ordered to take the hill if he had not already done so. Johnson did not take Culp's Hill. He sent a small party to reconnoiter, and they encountered the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, part of Wadsworth's division, which had been in the rear guarding the corps trains and was now linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge. Johnson's party was taken by surprise and almost taken prisoner before fleeing. Culps Hill at 7 pm when the reconnaissance occurred was far from empty. Was it empty at 5 pm? No but less well defended; still, who would Ewell have attacked with? After the war, Gordon said in his memoirs he was ready, but he’d seen significant action. Gordon’s brigades were scattered and 2 miles from where an attack could be made. And the 11th Corps troops on Cemetery Hill under Howard were well positioned to defend Culp’s hill, more so than Ewell was positioned to take it.

Ewell, after assessing the situation and considering various factors such as the approaching darkness, the strength of the Union defenses on Culp's Hill, and the absence of clear orders from Lee to attack, decided against launching an immediate assault. Instead, he chose to consolidate his positions.

Casualties

About one quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one third of Lee's army (27,000) were engaged. Union casualties were almost 9,000; Confederate slightly over 6,000. In itself, Day #1 of Gettysburg would rank among the top 25 battles of the war, even though most of both armies hadn’t even arrived yet.

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References

•    James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.

•    Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volume 2. Random House, 1963.

•    Harry W Pfanz, Gettysburg – The First Day. The University of North Carolina, 2010.

·      Harry W Pfanz, Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill. The University of North Carolina, 1993.

•    Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.

•    Stephen Sears, Gettysburg. Mariner Books, 2004.

•    Eric J Wittenberg, The Devils to Pay: John Buford at Gettysburg. Savas-Beattie, 2014.

• Mackowski, Chris, and Kristopher D. White. "Second Guessing Dick Ewell: Why Didn't the Confederate General Take Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863?" Civil War Times, August 2010.

• Petruzzi, J. David, and Steven Stanley. The Complete Gettysburg Guide. New York: Savas Beatie, 2009.

·      https://gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/confederate-headquarters/rodes-division/

·      https://gettysburgcompiler.org/tag/alfred-iverson/  

·      https://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen-richard-ewell-lose-the-battle-of-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/20-fateful-decisions-at-gettysburg/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=hnt-hnn-theme

·      https://thecivilwarcenter.org/2023/07/04/general-lees-if-practicable-order-to-general-ewell-on-july-1-at-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen-richard-ewell-lose-the-battle-of-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/richard-ewell-at-gettysburg/#:~:text=On%20the%20first%20day%20of%20the%20Battle%20of,new%20Federal%20position%20on%20Cemetery%20Hill%20%E2%80%9Cif%20practicable.%E2%80%9D

·      https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/general-ewells-dilemma/

·      https://padresteve.com/2014/06/03/gettysburg-day-one-lees-vague-discretionary-orders-and-lack-of-control/

Captured by the Comanche in the American West in the 1830s: The Story of Cynthia Ann Parker

In the year 1833 the Parker family moved to Texas, the beneficiaries of large acres of free land, given in the hope that they would establish a settlement in country that at the time was still in contestation between the Mexican government and the United States. They built a fort and homes in what was then one of the most sparsely occupied areas in the state, on the edge of Native American territory. At the time Texas was at the edge of America, and skirmishes were frequent, in particular raids from the feared warrior society of the Comanches. The Comanche were struggling not only with white settlers but many other bands of Native American who had been displaced and forced onto the Plains by rapid American expansion. Their way of life was under threat and they retaliated. Despite this the Parkers, unfortunately, overestimated their safety.

Erin Bienvenu explains the story of the capture of Cynthia Ann Parker.

Cynthia Ann Parker and daughter, Topsannah (Prairie Flower). Image taken around 1861.

Fort Parker Massacre

The morning of May 19, 1836 began normally enough for the extended Parker family. They were busy working on their farms and getting their families ready for another day. Cynthia Ann, nearly nine years old, the oldest child of Silas and Lucinda, was with her mother and three siblings. Inexplicably, despite the dangers of the Texas frontier, the large gate of the fort had been left open.

The morning was soon interrupted by a large group of Comanches who appeared bearing a white flag and professing peace. The Parker men suspected their motives but Benjamin Parker, Cynthia Ann’s Uncle, bravely went out to speak with them. He hoped he could give the women and children enough time to hide in the surrounding woods but he was quickly killed and the Comanches descended on the fort and surrounding farms.

At the end of what became known as the Fort Parker Massacre, five men were dead, including Silas, and the Comanche had taken five hostages: Cynthia Ann, her younger brother John, their cousin Rachel Plummer, her son James, and their Aunt Elizabeth Kellogg. For the captives the days and nights that followed were horrific, they were repeatedly beaten, starved, and the older women raped.

Eventually, after several days of hard riding, the captives were separated and sent to different bands. As fertility rates were low amongst the Comanche, due to their nomadic life style which required almost daily riding, captive children were often adopted by families who had lost a child. This is what happened to Cynthia Ann.

Her childhood then began anew as she was immersed in Comanche culture, taught such practicalities as how to sew buckskin and gather firewood, and how to speak the language. She would also have learnt about the tribe’s customs, religious beliefs, and been raised in preparation for marriage and motherhood.

Life with the Comanche

In 1842 John and James were ransomed back to their families and a few years later Cynthia Ann was discovered by Leonard Williams, a Native American agent. She was said to have ‘wept incessantly’ and tried to hide from Williams, though he offered a substantial ransom for her return. However, the Comanche refused to give her up.

In the years that followed more ransoms were offered but all were refused, often by Cynthia Ann herself. She was now married to a warrior who had participated in her capture, Peta Nocona, and they had three children. She also had a new name, Naduah, which meant ‘someone found.’ She was completely integrated into Comanche life and even her brother John could not persuade her to return. She had already been separated from one family, and she would not be taken from another.

Cynthia Ann and her family were constantly on the move, it was a hard life and she was in charge of most of the work. One of her main tasks was to prepare the buffalo hunted by her husband. Not one part of the huge animal was wasted and Cynthia Ann became a skilled tanner. It was dirty, time-consuming work, but she also found joy in the lives of her children - two boys, Quanah and Peanuts (so named because of her fond memories of eating the nuts during her childhood at the Fort) and daughter, Topsannah (Prairie Flower). Her husband was also a skilled warrior and the family was considered to be quite wealthy in Comanche society.

Return to the Parker Family

In 1860 in retaliation for Peta Nocona’s constant raids on white settlements, his tribe were attacked by a group of Texas Rangers led by Captain Lawrence Sullivan Ross.

Cynthia Ann attempted to flee on horseback but was stopped by Ross who, to his great surprise, realised she was a white woman. He declared that Peta Nocona had been killed during the battle and Cynthia Ann had wept over his body, though their son Quanah was to claim his father had died at a later date.

The rangers took Cynthia Ann and her young daughter to Fort Cooper, though she made repeated attempts to escape. Once again, she found herself violently taken from all she knew, her family and her home, forced to assimilate to a culture and language she had largely forgotten. Despite speaking in a mixture of Comanche and Spanish she did recall the massacre at Fort Parker, and her birth name, responding when called ‘Cynthia Ann.’

She was treated as a curiosity by all who saw her and at one stage, under the ‘care’ of her Uncle Isaac was even put on display so that the citizens of Texas could come and stare at her. She tried repeatedly to run away from Isaac’s home. He, and her wider family, could not understand her longing to return to her Comanche life. They expected her to immediately accept the way of life she had left aged nine, to re-adopt their language, dress and religion, but Cynthia Ann would not comply. Consequently, she was treated by her family, and the wider community, as a woman who did not know her right mind.

Eventually she was sent to live with her brother Silas Jr, but her situation did not improve. Around this time a photograph was taken of Cynthia Ann, in which she is nursing Topsannah with her hair cut short, a symbol of Comanche mourning. She was grieving not only her husband, but her two sons, who she believed were lost on the prairie. When Silas joined the Confederate army Cynthia Ann was sent to live with a different set of relatives, this time her sister, Orlena. Here, life was a little better. There were more sympathetic people to speak with and she earned a reputation as a hard worker and expert tanner. She remained, however, largely unhappy and would frequently lament the loss of her sons, often cutting herself in the traditional Comanche way of expressing grief. The Parker’s promised her that when the Civil War ended, they would take her to find her sons, but as time wore on, she began to realise their promises were empty.

Then in about 1864 Topsannah died from pneumonia and a grief-stricken Cynthia Ann lost all hope. It is believed she died of complications probably bought on by self-starvation around 1870.

Conclusion

Cynthia Ann left no written account of her life, or her feelings about her experiences, what little we do know about her was told through the eyes of those that briefly encountered her, but who often had their own agendas when it came to telling her story. Her son Quanah, regarded as the last of the great Comanche Chiefs, remembered her as “a good woman” who he “always cherished.” Hers was a life between two worlds and, as it was for many people in the early history of the American West, one marked by frontier violence and tragic misunderstanding.

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References

https://archive.org/details/rachelplummernar00park/page/16/mode/2up?q=cyntha

https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4492&context=etd

https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth85556/m1/2/zoom/?q=cynthia%20ann%20parker&resolution=2.565054159331353&lat=3373.065552681177&lon=3245.6007365528353

https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth583180/m1/14/zoom/?q=%22cynthia%20ann%20parker%22~1&resolution=2.1904496702355107&lat=3009.330046382758&lon=3003.1985262518583

Exley, Jo Ella Powell (2001), Frontier Blood: The Saga of the Parker Family. Texas A&M University Press

Frankel, Glenn (2013), The Searchers: The Making of an American Legend. New York: Bloomsbury

Gwynne, S.C. (2011), Empire of the Summer Moon: Quanah Parker and the Rise and Fall of the Comanche Tribe. London: Constable

Michno, Gregory & Susan (2007), A Fate Worse Than Death: Indian Captives in the West, 1830-1835. Idaho: Caxton Press

Myron Taylor: A Man on a Mission

Thomas Carlyle once opined that “the history of the world is but the biography of great men.”  And that is certainly true in the case of Myron C. Taylor, whose consequential life helps explain a great deal about the 20th Century.

Taylor was born in 1874, and grew up in the small, upstate town of Lyons (in Wayne County), just south of Lake Ontario. Taylor went to the Cornell Law School in Ithaca, graduating with a Bachelor of Laws degree in 1894.  Returning to Lyons, he established a small law practice, but shortly transitioned to helping his father’s tannery business.  That quickly led to bigger things.

Taylor soon became America’s leading industrialist: first as the “czar” of the textile industry; and later, in the 1920s and 30s, as CEO of U.S. Steel.  Thereafter, he became a key diplomatic participant in some of the most important geopolitical events of the World War II era.  Taylor is little remembered today, however, because of his intense personal dislike for self-promotion and publicity; for much of his business career, the national media called him “the man nobody knows.”

C. Evan Stewart explains.

Myron Taylor in the Vatican. Image provided by the author.

Ambassador Extraordinary

Having literally saved U.S. Steel from ruin during the depths of the Depression and then restoring it to its position as the country’s most important corporation, Taylor stepped down as CEO in April of 1938; he hoped to enter a “sabbatical period of life” with his wife, Anabel.  But his friend, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, asked him to take on an assignment: could Taylor help solve the crisis of Jews who were attempting to flee persecution in Nazi Germany.  Taylor’s efforts actually led to a deal with Hitler and Germany, whereby 150,000 “able-bodied” Jews were to be permitted to emigrate, with their dependents to follow later.  Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles told the president it was “better than we hoped for.”  Unfortunately, with the Nazi invasion of Poland (which led to World War II), that deal came to naught.

Then, right before Christmas 1939, FDR called on Taylor again, asking him to be the president’s personal representative to Pope Pius XII (with the rank of “Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary”). This very controversial appointment, which FDR undertook for multiple reasons (e.g., domestic politics; his wanting a third term; trying to influence Church policy (and its internal politics) in the United States; getting international-diplomatic information at the Vatican; influencing the Vatican on geopolitical issues; etc.), led to what was widely known as the “Taylor Mission.”  And in fulfilling that Mission over the next eleven years, Taylor was at the heart many of the era’s critical matters, including: (i) efforts to keep Italy, Spain, and Portugal out of the war on the Axis side; (ii) ensuring that Lend-Lease aid got to the Soviet Union in 1941, which at that point was about to be overrun by the German army; (iii) bringing the first documented proof of the Holocaust to the Vatican in September of 1942; (iv) ensuring that the Church would support the Allies’ policy of unconditional surrender (and later, not break with that policy); (v) helping to broker Italy’s surrender and Mussolini’s departure; (vi) blocking German attempts to have the Vatican broker a peace; (vii) helping to godfather the Bretton Woods agreement and the United Nations; (viii) almost single-handedly helping Italy recover from the war; and (ix) under President Truman, engaging in an effort to have all the world’s religions unite against atheistic communism (i.e., the Soviet Union).

Lend-Lease to Russia

To cover all the foregoing (and more), readers will have to pick up Myron Taylor: The Man Nobody Knows (Twelve Tables Press).  For the remainder of this article, the focus will be on Taylor’s critical role in ensuring Lend-Lease aid got to Russia in 1941.

On March 11, 1941, FDR signed the controversial Lend-Lease legislation. Premised on the president’s campaign pledge in 1940 for America to be the “great arsenal of democracy,” it was understood - by Congress and the American public - to apply only to providing assistance to Great Britain, then isolated and under the German attacks known as the “Blitz.”

On June 24, 1941, the geopolitical world was up-ended when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union.  The German army’s advance through Russian territory was swift; FDR and his top advisors feared that the if the USSR were to be overrun and conquered, then stopping the Nazi regime when (not if) the United States became a belligerent might well provide impossible. (Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, told FDR that Russia might not last three months.)  The president was determined to provide substantial military assistance to Joseph Stalin, but there was a very significant roadblock.

In 1937, the Vatican had issued the Encyclical Divini Redemptoris - issued by Pope Pius XI (but authored by his Secretary of State, who would succeed him as Pope Pius XII).  That Encyclical condemned in no uncertain terms the Soviet Union and expressly forbade all Catholics from having anything to do with supporting that nation-state. Given the 1937 Encyclical and the strong isolationistic sentiments of many American Catholics, FDR feared that the political backlash would prove too great if he tried to extend Lend-Lease aid to Russia.  (For example, the Bishop of Buffalo had publicly stated that Catholics would be justified in not serving in the U.S. military if the country were allied with the Soviet Union.)  In the words of Robert Sherwood (an FDR speechwriter and later biographer), “[a]s a measure for coping with serious Catholic opposition to aid for the Soviet Union, Roosevelt decided to send Myron C. Taylor … on another mission to Rome.”

Myron Taylor shares a letter from FDR with the Pope. Image provided by the author.

Threading the Needle

Before his trip, Taylor, together with two Church officials in the United States and Sumner Welles, devised a strategy to thread the needle of the 1937 Encyclical: that any U.S. aid would not constitute supporting communism, but would instead be directed at alleviating the suffering of the Russian people, for whom the Pope and the Church always had special affection.  But that nuanced approach to the problem got off to a rocky start at Taylor’s first meeting with the Pope on September 9, 1941.  FDR had asked Taylor to present a hand-written letter to the Pope, a document which went to great lengths to assure him that “the churches in Russia are open” and that “freedom of religion” was a likely outcome of the Nazi’s invasion.  The Pope and his advisors were incredulous; at least seven Vatican memoranda were prepared in response to FDR’s letter, many of them questioning the president’s mental state and his grasp on reality.

Notwithstanding FDR’s blunder, Taylor, over a number of days and multiple sessions with the Pope and his advisors, was able to get the Vatican to agree to the concept of delinking the Russian people from the Soviet Union; but this message could not be seen as being issued from or dictated by the Pope or the Vatican.  Instead, guidance would be sent to the Apostolic Delegate in Washington to have the message delivered by a high-ranking member of the Church in America.

Once Taylor returned to America, in consultation with the Apostolic Delegate and other Church officials, it was decided to effectuate the Vatican’s hidden-hand strategy by having an outspoken isolationistic Church leader - Archbishop McNicholas of Cincinnati - deliver the message.  With time of the essence - not only were German troops closing in on Moscow, but a second Lend-Lease appropriations bill was pending in Congress and over 90% of available Lend-Lease funds had already been allocated - McNicholas was summoned to Washington and given his marching orders.

On October 30, 1941, McNicholas published a pastoral letter (which received broad national coverage and was printed in toto in the Congressional Record) explicitly endorsing the need for America to help the “persecuted people of Russia, deprived of freedom and put in bondage.”  That same day, FDR cabled Stalin that he had approved $1 billion of war materials to be shipped to the USSR.  But the president waited a week for the McNicholas letter to sink in and take effect in the American body politic (and Congress).  As Sherwood wrote: “It is an indication of Roosevelt’s concern for public opinion that he did not formerly include the Soviet Union among the recipients of Lend Lease until November 7.”

In the words of the leading historian on the decision to aid the USSR in 1941, because of “Myron Taylor’s special mission to the Vatican” - which had secured the Church’s overt approval of such aid, “[s]o perished the great dread of the President that the encyclical of Pius XI would provide a sanction for equating aid to Russia with aid to communism and thereby permit his opponents to insist with telling force that his program was in conflict with the doctrines of the Church.”  Ultimately, eleven billion dollars in aid was sent to the Soviet Union to help them repulse the Nazis.  And at the Tehran Conference, Stalin toasted that, without the U.S.’s war materials, the USSR would have been overrun.  In reflecting upon Taylor’s contribution to this historic result (which was “given no great amount of publicity”), Sherwood wrote: “Taylor was one who truly deserved the somewhat archaic title of ‘Ambassador Extraordinary.’”

The Taylor Archives

Myron C. Taylor donated his papers to his alma mater, Cornell University, and I drew upon these papers (in the University’s Olin Library) for this article.  Other archival sources with important Taylor documents include the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library in Hyde Park, New York; the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library to Independence, Missouri; the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.; and the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland; in addition, the Baker Library at Harvard University (papers of Thomas Lamont) and the Oral History Project at Columbia University (including oral histories of Frances Perkins, George Rublee, etc.) contain many valuable materials on Taylor’s life and career.  The Vatican has made many, but not all, archival materials covering the World War II era available for scholars.

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What If Leon Trotsky had not been Assassinated?

Throughout history, certain moments stand out as pivotal turning points, altering the course of nations and shaping the destiny of millions. One such moment occurred on August 20, 1940, when an ice pick-wielding assassin attacked, Lev Davidovich Bronstein, better known as Leon Trotsky, the fiery revolutionary and one of architects of the Bolshevik Revolution. Trotsky died of his injuries the next day August 21, 1940.

However, what if fate had taken a different path? What if Trotsky had not met his untimely demise in Mexico City? The ripple effects of such a scenario would have undoubtedly reshaped the landscape of the 20th century, altering the trajectory of communism, world politics, and the course of countless lives.

Terry Bailey considers this alternative history.

Trotsky in Mexico, January 1937 with his wife Natalia Sedova. The artist Frida Kahlo is behind them.

The Rise of Trotsky

To understand the profound impact of Trotsky's hypothetical survival, we must first delve into his revolutionary legacy. A brilliant orator, strategist, and ideologue, Trotsky played a pivotal role in the overthrow of the Russian Tsarist regime in 1917. Alongside Vladimir Lenin, he galvanized the masses, leading the Bolsheviks to victory and laying the groundwork for the world's first communist state.

Had Trotsky survived the assassination attempt, he would have remained a formidable force within the Soviet Union. His intellectual prowess and unwavering commitment to Marxist principles would have posed a significant challenge to Joseph Stalin's consolidation of power. Unlike Stalin, whose brutal tactics and cult of personality alienated many within the party, Trotsky garnered widespread respect and admiration among the rank-and-file Bolsheviks. With his continued presence, the internal power struggle within the Communist Party would have taken a drastically different turn.

The Trotskyist Vision

Trotsky's vision of communism differed fundamentally from Stalin's authoritarian regime. While Stalin advocated for "socialism in one country," prioritizing the consolidation of power within the Soviet Union, Trotsky championed the concept of "permanent revolution." He believed that true socialism could only be achieved through the international spread of proletarian uprisings, challenging the global capitalist order and ushering in a new era of worldwide socialism.

Had Trotsky maintained his influence within the Soviet leadership, his emphasis on internationalism would have profoundly shaped Soviet foreign policy. Rather than pursuing a policy of isolationism and realpolitik, as Stalin did, Trotsky would have actively supported revolutionary movements abroad. This stance would have likely intensified tensions with capitalist powers, particularly the United States, leading to a more confrontational Cold War dynamic.

The Fate of Communism

One cannot ignore the impact Trotsky's survival would have had on the global communist movement. In the aftermath of Stalin's purges and the rise of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, many disillusioned leftists looked to Trotskyism as a beacon of hope for a more democratic form of socialism. With Trotsky at the helm, the Fourth International would have emerged as a formidable challenger to both capitalist imperialism and Stalinist dogma.

Moreover, Trotsky's continued influence could have averted some of the excesses and atrocities committed in the name of communism. His commitment to democratic centralism and workers' democracy stood in stark contrast to Stalin's autocratic rule. By promoting a more decentralized and participatory form of governance, Trotsky may have prevented the worst abuses of state power, preserving the integrity of the socialist project.

The Legacy of Trotsky

In exploring the counterfactual scenario of Trotsky's survival, we are confronted with a multitude of possibilities and uncertainties. Would he have succeeded in his quest to overthrow Stalin and establish a more democratic socialist order? Or would he have met the same fate as countless other dissenters crushed by the machinery of the Soviet state?

Regardless of the outcome, one thing remains clear: Trotsky's legacy endures as a testament to the power of revolutionary ideals and the enduring struggle for social justice. His writings continue to inspire generations of activists and intellectuals, offering insights into the nature of power, oppression, and resistance. While his physical presence may have been extinguished on that fateful day in 1940, his spirit lives on in the ongoing quest for a world free from exploitation and inequality.

Conclusion

In contemplating the hypothetical scenario of Trotsky's survival, we are compelled to confront the complexities and contradictions of history. The assassination of one man irrevocably altered the course of world events, unleashing a chain reaction of consequences that continue to reverberate to this day. Yet, amidst the uncertainty and speculation, one thing remains certain: the enduring legacy of Leon Trotsky serves as a reminder of the transformative power of revolutionary thought and the indomitable spirit of those who dare to challenge the status quo. As we reflect on the road not taken, we are reminded of the countless possibilities that lie ahead, waiting to be shaped by the actions and aspirations of those who refuse to accept the world as it is and strive to create a better one in its place.

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The Battle of Gettysburg - Part I: General Lee’s Advance to Pennsylvania

In late May 1863, the Confederacy was facing a challenging situation. Despite General Robert E Lee's success in defeating the Union forces in almost every major battle, the war's progress remained stagnant along the Rappahannock River. The Confederacy had not made significant gains despite the intense fighting. On the other hand, the Western Theater had experienced substantial territorial losses, particularly in Louisiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee. The fall of Vicksburg and western Mississippi seemed imminent. It was evident that a dramatic shift was necessary to alter the course of the war while maintaining the people's confidence in the government and military. The war had already surpassed the South's expectations in terms of duration, and resources were depleting rapidly.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Confederate troops battling Union forces in the first day at the Battle of Gettysburg. On the left background is the Railroad Cut; on the right is the Lutheran Seminary. In the background is Gettysburg.

The Rationale

Recognizing the urgency of the situation, President Davis invited General Lee to Richmond for a three-day meeting with his cabinet on May 26. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss their plans and devise a strategy to turn the tide of the war. It is crucial to understand the significance of the Battle of Gettysburg within the broader context of the war. It was seen as a final attempt to secure victory on the battlefield. General Lee aimed to provoke a large-scale battle that could potentially be decisive. The intention was to divert attention from the Western Theater and instigate a battle in the East that could alter the war's trajectory. Building on his previous victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, Lee proposed taking the war into Northern territory. While General Grant was closing in on Vicksburg, there were discussions about detaching General Longstreet's corps and sending them to assist General Pemberton. However, it was increasingly apparent that Vicksburg was already lost. Lee suggested the alternative: retain Longstreet in his army and launch an invasion of Pennsylvania, hoping to achieve a breakthrough.

There were two main objectives in mind for this operation. Firstly, it aimed to remove the war from central Virginia during the summer months. Additionally, the hope was to secure a victory in a battle north of the Mason-Dixon Line, which would potentially lead to the recognition of the Confederacy by France and Britain. Another crucial objective was to provide the Army of Northern Virginia with essential resources such as food, forage, horses, and other supplies from the fertile farmlands of Pennsylvania. This was necessary as the Quartermaster and Subsistence Departments were struggling to meet the increasing demand due to the blockade's significant impact. Alongside these objectives, there were several other goals to be achieved. These included diverting the Union Army of the Potomac away from the Rappahannock River line, disrupting any offensive plans General Joseph Hooker may have had, driving Union occupation forces out of Winchester and the lower Shenandoah Valley, drawing Union forces away from other theaters, and ultimately dealing a decisive blow to Northern morale.

Lee's unwavering confidence in his army led him to believe that if he could secure advantageous terrain, the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) would triumph over the Army of the Potomac (AoP). This perception fueled his hope that such a victory would compel the war-weary North to seek peace, potentially serving as a decisive military maneuver to showcase the Southern will for independence to Great Britain and France.

However, Lee's strategic approach was marred by a series of misconceptions regarding the state of morale in the North, which ultimately shaped his flawed strategy and resulted in miscalculations. One of these misinterpretations was his misunderstanding of Northern sentiment, as he mistakenly believed that the general public in the North was fatigued by the ongoing conflict. Consequently, he failed to grasp the unwavering determination of the Lincoln Administration to persevere in the face of adversity. This misjudgment of the North's resolve played a significant role in shaping Lee's flawed assumptions and strategic decisions.

Reorganization

Following Chancellorsville and the mortal wounding of Stonewall Jackson, General Lee undertook a significant reorganization of his forces. To strengthen his army, Lee decided to create three Corps instead of the previous two. As part of this restructuring, he promoted AP Hill to command the newly formed 3rd Corps, while Richard Ewell assumed leadership of the 2nd Corps. James Longstreet remained in charge of the 1st Corps.

Before the Battle of Gettysburg, Lee's army had suffered significant losses in terms of both brigade and regimental commanders. Out of the 28 brigades that participated in the Chancellorsville campaign, a staggering nine of them lost their commanders during the battle. Furthermore, three of these brigades experienced the loss of multiple commanders. Additionally, the ANV lost 64 out of its 130 regimental commanders. Consequently, many of Lee's brigades entered the Gettysburg campaign with inexperienced unit commanders, which would have a noticeable impact on the outcome of the battle.

As part of the reorganization efforts, Lee made a crucial decision to disband the army's reserve artillery and redistribute its batteries to the infantry corps. This adjustment allowed each corps to have five artillery battalions at its disposal, granting them the flexibility to assign these battalions to the infantry divisions or retain them under the command of the corps. Although this change in the command structure may have appeared insignificant at first glance, it would prove to have significant implications on July 3rd, during the Battle of Gettysburg.

Was the ANV Designed for a Northern Invasion?

Lee's Army was not designed to leave the confines of Virginia due to several factors. Firstly, Lee had limited intelligence operations compared to his Union counterparts. Instead of having a dedicated intelligence service like the Bureau of Military Intelligence, Lee relied on three main sources for information: the civilians of Virginia, Stuart's Cavalry, and his staff. However, when Lee moved north, he left behind his most valuable intelligence source - the civilians of Virginia. These civilians not only provided crucial information but also aided in the communication and navigation of local roads and geography. This decision may have been influenced by the fact that Lee heavily relied on his cavalry for intelligence and did not trust information from other sources. This deficit in intelligence gathering put Lee at a significant disadvantage. The CSA had very few covert operatives in the north. Lee primarily used individual undercover agents to provide intelligence, usually assigned to one of his subordinate generals, most famously Henry Harrison. Lee depended strongly on his cavalry and never trusted actual intelligence from other sources.

Lee may have overlooked the political landscape of the areas he intended to invade. While there were a significant number of KGC operatives and Copperheads in Baltimore, western Maryland, and southern Pennsylvania, these regions were predominantly pro-Union. This meant that Lee would face strong opposition and limited support from the local population in these areas. Overlooking this factor could have further contributed to the challenges Lee encountered when attempting to expand his operations beyond Virginia.

Another limitation was that his staff was too small to plan and coordinate a foray into enemy territory. Lee had a very small staff to manage his corps movements, so when he needed them to regroup, it took several days.  These 6 men comprised all of Lee’s staff

·      Chief of Staff, Inspector General: Col. Robert H. Chilton

·      Chief of Artillery: Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton

·      Aide de Camp, Asst. Adjutant General: Lt. Col. Walter H. Taylor

·      Aide de Camp, Asst. Military Secretary: Maj. Charles Marshall

·      Aide de camp, Asst. Inspector General: Maj. Charles S. Venable

·      Engineer Officer: Capt. Samuel R. Johnston

This would repeatedly be a limitation: his command and control at critical moments was inadequate, and he lacked sufficient staff to maintain communications with corps leaders.

Lee faced significant logistical challenges during the Pennsylvania Campaign due to his lack of adequate supply support. Unlike the Union forces, who had the advantage of utilizing railroads and rivers for transportation, Lee had to rely on a primitive system. With no railroads or rivers available to him, Lee's only option was to transport his supplies over land using horse and mule-drawn wagons. This resulted in a lengthy and vulnerable supply line, which posed a major hindrance to his operations.

One of the key issues that Lee encountered was the dependency on a long supply line that relied on horse and mule-drawn wagons. This meant that his forces had to cover a significant distance to transport essential provisions and equipment. The reliance on such a method of transportation not only slowed down the movement of supplies but also made them susceptible to attacks and disruptions along the way.

Lee's forces suffered from a shortage of long-range artillery ammunition, which severely limited their ability to sustain multiple attacks during the campaign. This deficiency became evident during Pickett's charge, where the lack of sufficient ammunition hindered their offensive capabilities. Lee also lacked the availability of pontoons over the Potomac River, which provided a crucial emergency crossing point. This would become evident in his retreat after the battle.

Lee’s heavy reliance on horse and mule-drawn wagons led to a lengthy and vulnerable supply line, insufficient long-range artillery ammunition, challenges in transporting captured goods, and limited emergency crossing options. These logistical challenges significantly impacted Lee's ability to sustain his offensive campaign and ultimately contributed to his setbacks in the Pennsylvania Campaign.

Lee faced significant logistical challenges in transporting supplies to Gettysburg and Harrisburg. The route spanned 125 miles from Winchester, and even more to Harrisburg, requiring wagons pulled by either four horses or six mules. These wagons had a carrying capacity of 2000-2500 pounds but moved at a slow pace of about 3 miles per hour, which could be further reduced by unfavorable road conditions. The animals themselves had substantial needs, with mules requiring 9 pounds of grain, 10 pounds of fodder, and 12 gallons of water daily, while horses needed 14 pounds of grain, 14 pounds of fodder, and 10 gallons of water. Additionally, the animals required horseshoes, which required manpower to apply. The waste disposal issue was also daunting, with each animal producing 10 pounds of manure and 2 gallons of urine daily. Failing to properly care for the animals would result in decreased efficiency, as they would move more slowly and carry less until they eventually broke down, rendering the army immobile. The sheer size of Lee's trains, stretching for dozens of miles, further complicated matters as infantry and artillery had to share the same roads as the wagons, leading to traffic congestion and delays. The meticulous administration of the order of march was necessary to prevent pile-ups at crossroads, requiring significant labor. Overall, these logistical challenges posed a nightmare for Lee, impacting the timing of Longstreet's arrival on the field, the availability of weapons and armaments, the organization of the three corps in battle, and the retreat after the battle.

General Lee relied on an incomplete map during the Battle of Gettysburg, as he did not possess a detailed map of the town itself. The map he had was a product of the efforts of Jedediah Hotchkiss, a topographical engineer, who had been tasked with creating a small-scale map of the region encompassing northern Virginia, central Maryland, and south-central Pennsylvania. Due to the vast scope of the project and limited time, Hotchkiss had to rely on Pennsylvania county maps to complete the map. He meticulously penciled a grid on a heavy watercolor paper and transcribed the map onto this grid, resulting in a visually appealing yet incomplete representation of the area.

The map used by General Lee was crafted on cream-colored paper and featured red pencil lines to denote roadways, blue markings for rivers and streams, and black ink for the names of towns, mills, blacksmith shops, and major topographical features. The attention to detail extended to including the names of every rural resident in impeccable handwriting. However, despite its aesthetic appeal, the map lacked crucial information such as mild declivities, small hillocks, woods, road surfaces, and fording sites. Additionally, it failed to depict the now-famous landmarks of the battle, including Seminary Ridge, Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill, and Little Round Top.

The absence of comprehensive maps placed the ANV at a significant disadvantage, particularly when a thorough understanding of the local geography was crucial. These omissions had consequences during the battle. On July 1, two regiments from Confederate Brigadier General Joseph R. Davis's brigade were lost when his soldiers unexpectedly jumped into an unmapped twenty-foot-deep railroad cut and were subsequently captured by Colonel Rufus R. Dawes's 6th Wisconsin Regiment. On July 2, as Lee strategized to encircle Meade's left flank, his engineer, Captain Samuel R. Johnston, claimed to have ridden to Little Round Top and found it unoccupied. However, the area was teeming with Union troops. Likely, Johnston had mistakenly identified Warfield Ridge or Houck's Ridge as being vacant. Furthermore, when Johnston was tasked with guiding Hood's and McLaws's divisions to the southern end of the battlefield in preparation for an early afternoon assault on the Union left, he had to retrace his steps and march in the opposite direction due to his lack of a map and his misunderstanding of the area's topographical features. Lastly, the map itself did not accurately depict the Round Tops, nor did it adequately represent the undulating and wooded regions east of the Emmitsburg Road, including the terrain surrounding Weikert's and Trestle's farms, Rose's Woods, the Wheat Field, and the valley between Houck's Ridge and Little Round Top.

The Invasion Begins

On June 3rd, the ANV initiated their departure from Fredericksburg, marking the beginning of their movement. The initial phase of their march led them to Culpeper Court House, to advance further to the Shenandoah Valley while being shielded by the cavalry division under the command of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart. However, the Union cavalry, led by Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton detected Stuart's concentration. Believing that Stuart was planning a raid towards Washington from his right flank, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, the commander of the AoP, instructed Pleasonton to cross the Rappahannock River and eliminate the Confederate cavalry.

The Battle of Brandy Station

Taking place on the 9th of June, 1863, the Battle of Brandy Station emerged as the largest cavalry engagement of the Civil War. In a surprise attack at dawn, Pleasonton launched columns across the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford and Kelly's Ford. Following the successful crossing at Beverly Ford, the Union troopers launched an assault on Stuart's camp near a rail station known as Brandy Station on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. The Confederate forces swiftly regrouped, and the Union troops encountered fierce resistance at St. James Church and the Richard Cunningham farm. Simultaneously, the Union cavalry divided, with one division advancing towards Brandy Station and the other heading to Stevensburg. The arrival of Union cavalry at Brandy Station posed a threat to Stuart's rear position, prompting him to skillfully maneuver his brigades. The ensuing clash between the two sides occurred in mounted combat on a lengthy, undulating ridge named Fleetwood Hill, situated near the station. Meanwhile, Pleasonton's forces at Stevensburg faced obstacles from Confederate horsemen and were unable to penetrate Stuart's defenses. After enduring fourteen hours of intense fighting, Pleasonton ultimately withdrew from the field.

The Union suffered a total of 907 casualties, including 69 killed, 352 wounded, and 486 missing or captured, out of approximately 11,000 troops. The Confederates had 523 casualties out of about 9,500 troops. Consequently, the battle can be considered inconclusive. Union forces withdrew without discovering Lee's infantry camped near Culpeper, which was the mission assigned to Stuart. Nevertheless, Hooker deduced that if Stuart had ventured that far north, Lee must be planning a further northward movement into Maryland. Consequently, Hooker promptly initiated the movement of the AoP across the Potomac River, well before Stuart commenced his ride around the Union Army. Therefore, many argue that it was a strategic victory for the Union. Stuart, however, contended that the battle constituted a tactical victory for the Confederates since they had fewer casualties, held the field at the end of the day, and successfully repelled Pleasonton's attack. Nevertheless, General Stuart suffered a significant blow to his reputation in the Court of Public Opinion. He fell victim to two surprise attacks, which the cavalry was expected to prevent. The Southern press generally expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome, and subordinate officers criticized Pleasonton for not aggressively defeating Stuart. Although Hooker had ordered Pleasonton to "disperse and destroy" the Confederate cavalry near Culpeper, Pleasonton justified his actions by claiming that he had only been instructed to conduct a "reconnaissance in force toward Culpeper." Consequently, Pleasonton did not gain much reputationally from this battle. It is worth noting that this battle marked the end of the Confederate cavalry's dominance in the Eastern theater of the war. From this point onward, the Federal cavalry grew stronger and more confident. Therefore, from this perspective, it can be considered a limited operational victory for the Union.

The Early Stages of the Campaign

To maintain the illusion that he was still at Marye's Heights in Fredericksburg, Lee had to ensure that Hooker remained unaware of his northward movement. To achieve this, Lee left AP Hill behind and protect Richmond, effectively holding back Sedgwick and the VI Corps. Although Hooker was aware that Lee was on the move, he lacked precise information regarding its route and destination.

Lee's strategic position was precarious, as his forces were dangerously spread out. On June 12th, the Confederate army extended over a vast expanse of 70 land miles, with no direct roads connecting its wings. If Hooker had been privy to Lee's position on that day, the Confederate general would have been highly vulnerable. However, Stuart, the Confederate cavalry commander, skillfully concealed this vulnerability. A series of battles with Union cavalry prevented them from ascertaining the location and strength of Lee's army, thus obscuring its direction and ultimate objective:

Battle of Winchester (Second Battle of Winchester) (June 13–15, 1863): This battle occurred in Winchester, Virginia, which was a strategic town in the Shenandoah Valley. Confederate General Richard Ewell's forces defeated Union General Robert Milroy's garrison, securing control of the area.

Battle of Aldie (June 17, 1863): The Battle of Aldie was part of the wider cavalry engagements known as the Battle of Middleburg, which occurred as part of the Gettysburg campaign. Union and Confederate cavalry clashed in fierce fighting as they vied for control of key positions.

Battle of Middleburg (June 17–19, 1863): The Battle of Middleburg took place near the town of Middleburg, Virginia. It involved both mounted and dismounted actions between Union and Confederate cavalry forces.

Although the movement north is often portrayed as a display of Lee’s cunning while Hooker was deceived, both sides were screened from the other. Both sides were effectively screened from each other. Moreover, it was widely known that Lee intended to invade, prompting Hooker to make numerous attempts to locate the ANV. Maj Gen Sharpe of the BMI had early on suggested that Lee would move in a northwesterly direction, a prediction that proved to be accurate. In light of this information, Hooker dispatched several cavalry patrols in search of Lee. On June 5, Brig Gen John Buford reported Confederate cavalry presence in Culpepper, which led to Sharpe's one error in intelligence assessment, suggesting that the northward movement might only be a cavalry raid. Despite the efforts of brigades led by Gregg, Munford, and Duffie to locate Lee, the Rebel cavalry remained elusive. It is important to acknowledge that Hooker did what he could, but his cavalry ultimately failed to outmaneuver Stuart. With this phase of the campaign concluded Lee was now prepared to cross the Potomac River and proceed into Maryland.

JEB Stuart gets lost

One of the most controversial aspects of the Gettysburg Campaign was Jeb Stuart’s absence after crossing the Potomac until July 2nd. His absence had significant consequences, as it left Lee without crucial cavalry reconnaissance and intelligence. The lack of information regarding the Union Army's strength, positions, and intentions greatly impacted Lee's decision-making process and contributed to the uncertainties he faced in the initial stages of the battle. Many historians speculate that if Stuart had effectively screened the front of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee would not have been caught off guard by the proximity of the AoP, and the Battle of Gettysburg might have unfolded differently. Stuart's desire to redeem himself after the surprise attack at Brandy Station and his eagerness to outmaneuver the Union army led him to attempt to circumnavigate the enemy once again. However, his plans were hindered by encounters with Union troops, forcing him to deviate from his intended path and ultimately leaving him unable to effectively screen General Ewell's right flank.

The orders given by Lee to Stuart on June 22 have sparked controversy ever since. Stuart, upon separating from the main force on June 23, was granted permission by Lee to ride around the Union army unhindered, cross the Potomac River, and provide cover for the right flank of Ewell's Corps as it marched north. However, Stuart's movement on June 25 was met with opposition from the Union 2nd Corps near Haymarket, Virginia, preventing him from advancing northward. Despite this setback, Stuart decided to press on. His original intention was to circumvent the Union army by starting from its rear, but to his surprise, the Union army shifted northward, turning his position into its eastern flank. Encountering more Union troops near Fairfax Court House, Stuart was forced to move further eastward and could not turn north until reaching Rowser's Ford on the Potomac River. As a result, Stuart found himself positioned to the east of the Union army, unable to effectively screen Ewell's right flank.

Stuart had taken his three most capable cavalry brigades, leaving the remaining two brigades without strong leadership. Approximately 5000 cavalry troops were left behind with Lee, and the commander of this force was aware that Hooker had crossed the Potomac River between June 25 and 27. However, this crucial information was not relayed to Generals Longstreet and Lee, leaving them without reliable reconnaissance. Stuart did send a dispatch to General Lee on June 27, informing him of Hooker's crossing, but it never reached him. A copy of the dispatch did reach Richmond, but no one there took the initiative to confirm this information with the Commanding General.

Lee specifically instructed Stuart to move northward, protect the Confederate army's right flank, and maintain communication with Lee's forces. It was crucial for Stuart to keep the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) informed about the movements and activities of the Union Army, as well as act as a screen to prevent the Union forces from gathering intelligence on Lee's army. Lee emphasized the importance of timely and accurate information, and he also wanted Stuart to leave enough cavalry behind to cover the mountain passes in the army's rear and protect Ewell's advance with the rest of his force. However, beyond these instructions, Stuart had considerable discretion in how he accomplished these objectives.

Stuart's interpretation of the orders differed from Lee's intentions due to his ambitions and the allure of bypassing the AoP. Instead of maintaining close contact with Lee's army, Stuart embarked on an extensive raid around the Union forces. Lee had specifically directed Stuart to safeguard the mountain passes with a portion of his force while the ANV was still positioned south of the Potomac River. Subsequently, Stuart was supposed to cross the river with the remaining troops and protect the right flank of Ewell's Second Corps. However, Stuart opted for an alternative route, choosing to lead his three best brigades between the AoP and Washington. He proceeded northward through Rockville to Westminster and eventually into Pennsylvania, to seize supplies and cause disruption near the enemy capital. Instead of taking a more direct path north near the Blue Ridge Mountains, Stuart decided to reach Ewell's flank by taking his three best brigades, namely those commanded by Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton, Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, and Col. John R. Chambliss (who replaced the injured Brig. Gen. W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee), between the Union army and Washington. This strategic choice was made in the hopes of capturing supplies along the way and creating chaos near the enemy capital.

Furthermore, despite Stuart's direct orders for Brigadier General Beverly Robertson to join Lee's forces when General Hooker advanced, Robertson displayed a lackadaisical approach to his duties. Instead, Robertson focused on guarding the mountain gaps and the baggage train, ultimately failing to arrive at the battle. The brigades that Stuart left behind included Imboden's Valley brigade, which was temporarily attached to the army and more accustomed to partisan activities, as well as the two "regular" brigades of Robertson and Jones. Robertson was regarded as the outcast of the ANV's cavalry command, having previously been dismissed, while Jones, although competent, earned the nickname "Grumble" due to his difficult nature. Lee did not place as much trust in these brigades or their commanders compared to Stuart and the three brigades he chose to accompany him.

Stuart and his three brigades at 1 a.m. on June 25. Unfortunately for Stuart's plan, the Union army's movement to defend Washington and Baltimore was underway, so his proposed route was blocked by columns of Federal infantry, forcing him to veer farther to the east than either he or General Lee had anticipated. This prevented Stuart from linking up with Ewell as ordered and deprived Lee of the use of his prime cavalry force, the "eyes, and ears" of the army while advancing into unfamiliar enemy territory.

Stuart's decision to seize a wagon train at Rockville, Maryland on June 28, 1863, was motivated by various factors. Stuart believed that capturing the wagon train would provide the Confederate army with valuable supplies and provisions, such as food, ammunition, and other resources necessary for their operations. Additionally, Stuart may have seen this as an opportunity to disrupt the Union's supply lines, causing panic and confusion among their forces. By inflicting damage and depriving the enemy of vital supplies, Stuart aimed to weaken the Union's logistical capabilities and potentially hinder their ability to respond effectively. Moreover, capturing such a significant wagon train could have boosted Confederate morale and showcased Stuart's cavalry as a formidable force. It could have been a way for Stuart to demonstrate his effectiveness as a commander and restore his reputation, which had been tarnished by earlier criticisms in southern newspapers. However, it is important to note that Stuart's decision to prioritize capturing the wagon train over gathering critical intelligence on the Union army's movements further delayed his reunion with General Robert E. Lee's forces. Although this train would have posed a logistical hindrance to Stuart's advance, he interpreted Lee's orders as emphasizing the importance of acquiring supplies. This interpretation aligns with Lee's campaign objectives and goals, justifying Stuart's actions.

Part of the reason for Stuart’s tardiness was that he was caught up in the rear and flank of the Union army.  From the time he crossed the Potomac to arriving at Gettysburg required nearly 8 days of non-stop marching for over 200 miles and fighting nearly every day.  Stuart engaged in 4 skirmishes and 3 actual battles trying to make his way to find Ewell. Skirmishes included Thoroughfare Gap June 25, Fairfax Courthouse June 27, Rockville June 28, and Westminster June 29; Battles at Hanover June 30, Hunterstown July 2, and Carlisle July 2. Few accounts of Stuart’s ride note that he faced genuine challenges and required astute tactics to ensure the preservation of his command.

On June 30, General Jubal Early, who would later blame other Confederate generals for the loss at Gettysburg, including Stuart, heard the sounds of battle at Hanover. Despite being aware that Stuart was supposed to be locating him, Early made no effort to ascertain the identity of the combatants. Remarkably, Early was within a mere 5 miles of the battle, and had he made contact, Stuart could have arrived at Gettysburg on July 1.

The Plan of Invasion

The ANV traversed the Blue Ridge Mountains and advanced north through the Shenandoah Valley, capturing the Union garrison at Winchester, in the Second Battle of Winchester, June 13–15, 1863. After crossing the Potomac at Falling Waters, Lee made the strategic decision to divide his forces during their march northward to maintain secrecy regarding their exact location and to sow confusion among the occupied areas. Lee aimed to demonstrate to the people of the North that he held the advantage in the conflict. Additionally, the division of forces was necessary for the procurement of supplies and helped to prevent traffic congestion. It also hinted at Lee's intention to engage in open battle rather than launching a direct assault on a fort or initiating a siege of a city. However, the chosen western route seems indirect if Lee's ultimate goal was to target Baltimore, Washington, or Philadelphia. It is often suggested that Harrisburg was his intended objective, but if so, he was planning on its capture with just one corps. Ewell had swiftly advanced northward towards Harrisburg, while Longstreet remained concealed behind South Mountain until their exit at Cashtown.

However, the AoP was in pursuit and had reached Frederick, Maryland, before Lee realized his opponent had crossed the Potomac. General Hooker had to anticipate a potential attack on Washington or Baltimore. He took measures to defend these crucial locations by mobilizing as many troops as possible. In the absence of concrete information, Hooker made the prudent decision to concentrate his forces and secure the roads leading to the capital to thwart any potential assault. Given the circumstances, Hooker's decision to remain centrally located was the correct course of action.

Meade takes over

After Chancellorsville, calls for Hooker to be replaced were widespread. With Lee on the move, somewhere, and realizing that a major battle was soon to take place, a decision had to be made by Lincoln and Stanton. Darius Couch, as second in command, would have been the obvious choice to replace Hooker, and Lincoln offered him the position. Couch instead resigned his post to create the Department of the Susquehanna, where he brilliantly held off General Gordon with the militia at Sporting Hill on June 30. He recommended Meade instead.

Following Couch's refusal, President Lincoln held a private meeting with Major General John Reynolds on June 2, during which he reportedly inquired about Reynolds' willingness to assume command of the Army of the Potomac. Reynolds, however, expressed his readiness to accept the position only if he could operate independently and free from the political influences that had plagued previous commanders. Understandably, Lincoln could not agree to such a condition, leading to an impasse in their discussion.

The lack of confidence in General Hooker expressed by his senior officers, as well as by General-in-chief Henry Halleck, further exacerbated the situation. Hooker suggested the evacuation of Harper's Ferry and the consolidation of his forces, but his demand to regain control of the garrison or else resign provided Secretary of War Stanton and President Lincoln with the perfect opportunity to accept his resignation. In a moment of impulse, Hooker tendered his resignation, which was promptly accepted. Subsequently, when General Meade assumed command, he immediately made the same request and was granted the authority over the garrison.

Stanton dispatched a civilian engineer, Herman Haupt, his chief of railroads, to oversee the management of the railroads, including the civilian lines. This individual possessed extensive knowledge of the area and coincidentally owned a house in Gettysburg.. On June 30, he informed General Halleck that the Confederates were planning to gather near that vicinity. On July 1, he strategically utilized a single-track line and organized the operation of 5 or 6 10-car trains, one after another, to swiftly transport goods from Baltimore to Westminster. He also instructed Meade's quartermasters to have troops prepared to unload the cargo upon arrival and promptly send the trains back. To ensure effective communication in the absence of functioning telegraph lines, he established a communication line resembling a pony express system that followed the tracks. By July 3, this well-coordinated operation had successfully transported 1500 tons of cargo to the battlefield and returned 2000 wounded soldiers to hospitals in Baltimore. Notably, when President Lincoln delivered his address in November, he traveled by train from Baltimore to Gettysburg on the same line.

Henry Thomas Harrison

On the evening of June 28th, Lee was informed by a spy that Hooker had been replaced by Meade and that Meade was moving toward him. The spy, a diminutive actor who worked with General Longstreet, was known to provide highly accurate information. General Lee had to swiftly adapt his strategies. Recognizing that Meade was a cautious and meticulous commander who was unlikely to make any major errors, Lee needed to devise a more careful plan. The immediate priority was to ensure the concentration of his widely dispersed army, which extended from Chambersburg to Harrisburg. The initial step in this process was to gather his army in a centralized location. Consequently, Lee directed his troops to converge around the crossroads towns of Cashtown and Gettysburg.

Pipe Creek Circular

Meanwhile, Meade decided that his best course of action was to stop looking for Lee and instead let Lee look for him. On June 30, Meade relocated his headquarters to Taneytown, MD, and issued two orders. The first order, known as the Pipe Creek Circular, outlined the construction of a defensive perimeter, while the second order directed a general advance toward Gettysburg starting on July 1. Gettysburg was located between 5 to 25 miles away from each of Meade's seven infantry corps. The Pipe Creek Line served as a defensive barrier to protect against potential attacks on Baltimore and Washington D.C. It also acted as a reserve line in case a retreat from Gettysburg became necessary for the Union forces.

The Pipe Creek Line was positioned just north of Westminster, Maryland, and held strategic importance for the AoP.: the Western Maryland Railroad had its terminus in Westminster, making it the primary supply line for the army in the region, including Gettysburg. Safeguarding this crucial supply route was of utmost importance. The Pipe Creek Line followed Parr Ridge, a significant ridge that stretched from Manchester in the east to Middleburg in the west, running on an east/west axis. Except for some lower ground near Middleburg, the entire position was situated on high ground that was easily defensible. It was believed that this strong position would be nearly impregnable unless Lee could successfully flank it.

The Day Before. Brig Gen John Buford arrived in Gettysburg on the morning of June 30, accompanied by 2 cavalry brigades and approximately 3000 soldiers. Upon his arrival, he was informed by residents that Confederate soldiers were in the vicinity. One of AP Hill's brigades, led by Brig Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew, ventured towards Gettysburg. According to the memoirs of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, Pettigrew's division commander, Pettigrew was sent to search for supplies, particularly shoes, in the town. With a brigade of 2700 men, Pettigrew conducted a scouting movement. During this movement, he encountered a physician named Dr John O'Neal, who was on a house call. After inspecting O'Neal's medical equipment, Pettigrew inquired about the presence of Union troops, to which O'Neal responded negatively. However, as they approached the town, Pettigrew spotted what he believed to be Union cavalry in the distance. He did not bring on an engagement, as he had been ordered, and returned to Generals Heth and Hill to report.

Confederate Response: When Pettigrew told Hill and Heth about what he had seen, neither general believed that there was a substantial Federal force in or near the town, suspecting that it had been only Pennsylvania militia. It is perplexing to consider why neither General Heth nor General Hill placed trust in Pettigrew's observations. One possible explanation is that both Heth and Hill were relatively new to their positions and had reputations for impulsive decision-making. In terms of practical experience, Heth did not possess significantly more than Pettigrew.

Furthermore, Pettigrew's background as a non-West Pointer from a wealthy family, coupled with his lack of military experience before the war, may have contributed to the skepticism towards his report. Additionally, the fact that Pettigrew's men were freshly outfitted with new uniforms and rifles, and his staff consisted of fellow aristocrats, may have given the impression that they were inexperienced and unfamiliar with the realities of battle. Consequently, Hill may have discounted Pettigrew's interpretation due to these factors, leading to a failure to take his report seriously.

Union Response: In contradistinction, Buford had also spotted Pettigrew’s men. He recognized that he was facing a sizeable force of rebels because they had moved without vedettes as a screen. Buford's identification of a significant enemy presence in the area was taken seriously by his superior, Gen Reynolds. Buford was the ideal individual in the ideal location at the opportune moment. He had attended West Point, was acquainted with many of the generals as school friends, had served in the US First Dragoons, had commanded infantry, and had recently led his cavalry division at Brandy Station and Upperville. His military expertise was highly regarded; Buford and Reynolds had trust and confidence in each other, and their shared experiences at Second Manassas had demonstrated the consequences of disregarding accurate reports from a subordinate. Therefore, when Buford requested close support, Reynolds promptly initiated the advance. The outcome of battles hinges on such intricate details; these specifics determine the victor and the vanquished.

Recognizing that the Confederate movement was originating from the northwest, Buford strategically positioned his men along the roads in this vicinity. Anticipating that any engagement involving his division would serve as a delaying tactic, he dismounted his troopers and stationed them on the low ridges to the north and northwest of the town, aiming to buy time for the army to arrive and secure the advantageous positions to defend McPherson and Seminary Ridges.

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