Who was The Little Dancer in Edgar Degas’ Famous Painting?

During the years that Impressionism was at the forefront of Parisian artistic expression, Edgar Degas’ work was amongst the best known. He was famous for painting scenes of the ballet, and could frequently be found backstage after performances or watching rehearsals at the Paris Opera, where many young girls went to train in the hopes of becoming revered dancers. Degas was also a sculptor and his famous statue, ‘The Little Fourteen-Year-Old Dancer,’ is known the world over, yet unlike its creator, little is known about the model behind it.

Here, Erin Bienvenu looks at the life of the ‘little dancer’, Marie Geneviève van Goethem.

The Little Fourteen-Year-Old Dancer by Edgar Degas. Source: H. O. Havemeyer Collection, Bequest of Mrs. H. O. Havemeyer, 1929. Available here.

Her name was Marie Geneviève van Goethem and she was born to Belgian parents in Paris on June 7, 1865. Marie had two sisters, the older Antionette and younger Louise-Joséphine. Their mother was a laundress, and their father a tailor, though he disappeared early from his daughters’ lives. Consequently, the van Goethem’s were poor and moved frequently to avoid their debts.

Dancer at the Paris Opera

Desperate for money, Marie’s mother pushed her daughters to become dancers at the Paris Opera, at the time a way many families with young girls earned extra money. But it was a difficult life, the girls, known as ‘Little Rats’ earned little and worked around twelve hours a day, six days a week. Marie walked to and from her classes, her feet often bleeding from the intensive sessions, compounded by the poor nutritional value of the food she ate at home, and the fact that the van Goethem’s did not have running water in their house.

As money was a constant concern for many, the opera also operated a secondary, unofficial trade, which revealed a much darker side to the façade of beautiful dancers- prostitution. Backstage, after performances, the dancers were encouraged to find wealthy male ‘protectors’-their mothers often aiding and encouraging these introductions. Marie’s mother was soon offering up her daughters to these rich, usually older, men. 

Marie and her younger sister were accepted into the school around 1878, at which stage Antionette was already attending classes. Marie made her stage debut, a walk on part, in the ballet La Korrigane, but she never progressed through the levels of the ballet, throughout her time there she remained in the lowest rank.

Model for Degas

To earn some extra income Antionette was also posing for artists, including Edgar Degas, already well known as a painter of ballerinas and it was probably through her sister that Marie met the artist. Soon she was posing for him as well, earning more money than she did at the Paris Opera (four francs as opposed to the two earned from the ballet), and in a less taxing environment. She lived close to his studio and would have walked there for the sessions. Though it was easier work than the ballet sometimes Marie would have to stand for hours in one pose, not moving a muscle. Neither Degas, nor Marie, left any written record of their working relationship, but he did use her as a model for numerous artworks, both paintings and sculptures, the most famous being the ‘Little Dancer.’

‘Little Dancer’ Exhibited

The wax sculpture was dressed in a real tutu, bodice and ballet slippers, and had a wig of real hair, it was exhibited at the Sixth Impressionist Exhibition in 1881. The first and only time Degas put it on public display. It caused a certain amount of controversy. For many it was too lifelike and was criticised for being ugly. One critic described it as displaying “the lowest depths of dance” and another accused it of “bad instincts and vicious tendencies.”

Wax was an unusual choice in sculpture at the time as was Degas decision to dress his piece in real clothes, and display it in a glass case-these unusual aspects added fuel to the critic’s fire. Though at least one believed it to be “the only really modern attempt that I know of in sculpture.”

The reactions to the piece displayed a shocking amount of classism, particularly prominent at the time owing to the popular idea of physiognomy as applied to criminals- the belief that criminals bore similar features, such as large noses and jaws, and were generally believed to be of the lower classes. The idea had recently been in the news thanks to a murder case involving three young men, who were described as ‘bestial,’ a word also applied to the Little Dancer. Similarly, the fact that in Paris dance and prostitution were seen as synonymous led many to believe a ballerina was unworthy of being celebrated in such a way.  In many respects Degas statue was simply too revolutionary for the time.

Later Life

As for Marie, she had begun missing classes at the ballet, and was fined for her absences. It’s not known if she knew about the furore the statue caused, and if she did, how it would have made her feel. She was often seen in the Montmartre Cafés and cabarets, many of which were open all night. They were popular with the bohemian and artistic sets, but were unsuitable for a young girl. Eventually she was dismissed from the ballet for missing too many classes.

The last recorded sighting of Marie comes in 1882, the same year as her dismissal from the opera. Her sister, Antionette had stolen seven hundred francs from a ‘client’ and was attempting to flee to Belgium. She was found waiting at a train station with her mother and Marie, and was arrested. Antionette was sentenced to three months in prison, but afterwards lived a quiet life, passing away at the age of thirty-seven. The youngest of the van Goethem girls, Louise-Joséphine, had a long career at the ballet, becoming an instructor there and passing away in 1945.

Following his death Degas sculpture of Marie was cast in bronze and replicated, it also gained a new appreciation from critics and the general public alike. The Little Dancer can be found in galleries around the world and is much loved.

Marie, however, disappeared from the historical record following her sister’s arrest. Her subsequent life and fate remain unknown. She remains a mystery, a young woman forever immortalised as a fourteen-year-old dancer.

Enjoy that piece? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

References

https://mediatheque.cnd.fr/?Van-Goethem-Charlotte,213

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/degas-and-his-dancers-79455990/

Laurens, Camille (2018), Little Dancer Aged Fourteen: The True Story Behind Degas’s Masterpiece. New York: Other Press

Loyrette, Henri (2016), Degas: A New Vision. Melbourne: National Gallery of Victoria

The Battle of Gettysburg - Part 4: Culp’s Hill, Cemetery Hill, and East Cavalry Field

Culp's Hill is a frequently overlooked area of the Gettysburg battle and played a crucial role in the Union's victory. Situated about three-quarters of a mile south of Gettysburg, it formed the tip of a fishhook-shaped series of hills and ridges that made up the Union lines. The significance of Culp's Hill lay in its strategic location. It guarded the main Union supply line on the Baltimore Pike and protected the rear and right flank of the Union army positioned on Cemetery Ridge.

Here, Lloyd W Klein explains what happened at Culp’s Hill, Cemetery Hill, and East Cavalry Field.

If you missed it, part 1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here, part 2 on day 1 of the battle is here, and part 3 on day 2 of the battle is here.

Scene behind the breastworks on Culp’s Hill, morning of July 3rd 1863. By Edwin Forbes.

Cemetery and Culp’s Hills

The configuration of the Union lines, with Cemetery Hill at its center, provided a strong defensive position known as the "fishhook." This layout allowed the Union forces to benefit from interior lines, making it easier to reinforce and support different sections of the line. Cemetery Hill, situated behind the town, offered a natural defense as attacks could not be launched directly from the streets. To reach Cemetery Hill, attackers had to either capture Culp's Hill on the East or the northern section of Cemetery Ridge on the west. General Lee's strategy relied on attacking the flanks, while the Union's strategy focused on defending these hills to protect the center.

Culp's Hill itself consists of two distinct peaks, an upper hill and a lower hill, separated by a narrow saddle. The higher peak, densely covered in trees, rises to an elevation of 630 feet above sea level, while the lower peak is approximately 100 feet shorter. The eastern slope of Culp's Hill descends towards Rock Creek, while the western slope leads to a saddle with Stevens Knoll. This topography provided natural advantages for defenders, making it challenging for attackers to gain a foothold on the hill.

July 1st

Following the retreat of the Union lines on Seminary Ridge and north of the town, the troops of XI Corps regrouped at Cemetery Hill, where a 2000-man brigade and a battery of 6 guns were positioned to safeguard the withdrawal. Meanwhile, Wadsworth’s division hurried to Culp’s Hill to protect the right flank, and additional reinforcements were on their way. By 4:30 p.m., 500 troops from the 7th Indiana and Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum’s XII Corps had arrived, with Brig. Gen. Thomas Ruger’s 1st Division taking up position behind Cemetery Hill. Brigadier General John W. Geary’s 2nd Division reached Gettysburg at 5 pm, adding 8,000 fresh troops to the Union forces, bringing their total strength to around 20,000 soldiers combined with the XI Corps. The Federals, in addition to the reinforcements, had managed to salvage most of their artillery pieces during the retreat, with almost 40 guns joining Smith’s six guns atop Cemetery Hill.

Ewell's missed opportunity to seize Culp's Hill/Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 is often regarded as a critical moment in the battle. When Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's third division arrived, he was instructed to take the hill if it was not already occupied. However, Johnson hesitated and decided against the attack, sending a small party to scout the area. This party encountered the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, leading to a skirmish that forced them to retreat. By 7 pm, Culp's Hill was well-defended, with the Iron Brigade and other units in position, making it a challenging target for the Confederates.

Pfanz concluded that Ewell had made the best decision, citing the failed probing attack at 7 pm at dusk, but was it as prepared at 5 pm? It was less well-defended; still, who would Ewell have attacked with? After the war, General Gordon wrote in his memoirs that he was ready, but his men had seen significant action.  Gordon’s brigades were scattered and 2 miles from where an attack could be made. Moreover, the 11th Corps troops on Cemetery Hill under Howard were well positioned to defend Culp’s hill, more so than Ewell was positioned to take it.

Ewell did consider taking Culp's Hill, which would have made the Union position on Cemetery Hill untenable Given the discretionary and inherently contradictory order he received from General Lee, General Ewell chose not to attempt the assault. The three main reasons most often given include: 1) the battle fatigue of his men in the late afternoon, as his men had marched a great distance and were exhausted 2) the difficulty of assaulting the hill through the narrow corridors afforded by the streets of Gettysburg immediately to the north, and 3) that after the battle at Barlow’s Knoll and the attacks through the town, there had been enough casualties and mixing of lines to severely weaken command and control. He might also have realized that although he might have been able to take Culps Hill, he couldn’t hold it with a single division after a counterattack from East Cemetery Hill.

And surely that would require a general engagement. It’s possible that Ewell may have felt that it was practicable to take the hill, but did not see how he could do so without bringing on a general engagement. He only had 1 division on hand, it was getting dark, and he wasn't going to receive any backup in any attack. He wanted support and none was available.. However, Jubal Early opposed the idea when it was reported that Union troops (probably Slocum's XII Corps) were approaching the York Pike, and he sent the brigades of John B. Gordon and Brig. Gen. William "Extra Billy" Smith to block that perceived threat.  "Allegheny" Johnson's division of Ewell's Corps was within an hour of arriving on the battlefield and Early urged waiting for Johnson's division to take the hill. After Johnson's division arrived via the Chambersburg Pike, it maneuvered toward the east of town in preparation to take the hill, but a small reconnaissance party sent in advance encountered a picket line of the 7th Indiana Infantry, which opened fire and captured a Confederate officer and soldier. The remainder of the Confederates fled and attempts to seize Culp's Hill on July 1 came to an end.

Although Ewell has been blamed for not aggressively pursuing the Union line on Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, which left the Union on high ground, most military authorities and historians who have looked into the matter have pretty routinely concluded that Culp's Hill would not have been easy to capture on July 1st. Some historians say that it's 20/20 hindsight that Ewell could have easily pushed the Union line from the high ground; others say he was too timid. Stephen W. Sears has suggested that Gen. Meade would have invoked his original plan for a defensive line on Pipe Creek and withdrawn the Army of the Potomac, although that movement would have been a dangerous operation under pressure from Lee.

But, a real conundrum exists in whether or not Lee and Ewell were talking about the same hill. Lee was on Seminary Ridge and may have been looking at East Cemetery Hill while Ewell was at the base of Culp’s Hill. It’s unclear whether Lee & Ewell had a map that showed this.

Lost Cause Reinterpretation? Although the “If practicable order” story is a central part of Gettysburg lore, appearing in many books about the Civil War — it is also greatly negative against Ewell, and perhaps purposely so. The story may have been concocted by Lee’s apologists in a postwar attempt to shift the blame for losing the battle from their hero onto Ewell. In truth, Lee sent no definitive orders directing Ewell to pursue the enemy when the Union lines broke in front of the town, and Ewell was not benumbed by indecision when he defeated them in the town and on Barlow’s Knoll.

It was not until after the war, and Lee’s death, that Lost Cause supporters sought to explain how the infallible general was defeated at Gettysburg. Confederate veterans like John B. Gordon, Isaac Trimble, and Randolph H. McKim insinuated in their postwar writings that it was Ewell’s timidity that had cost Lee the victory. Postwar proponents of the Lost Cause movement, assigned to Ewell's staff during the battle, criticized him bitterly to deflect any blame for losing the battle on Robert E. Lee. Part of their argument was that the Federal soldiers were demoralized by their defeat earlier in the day. McKim’s 1915 article in The Southern Historical Society Papers stated. “Here then we find still another of General Lee’s lieutenants, the gallant and usually energetic Ewell, failing at a critical moment to recognize what ought to be done,” he wrote. “Had the advance on Cemetery Hill been pushed forward promptly that afternoon we now know beyond any possible question that the hill was feebly occupied and could have been easily taken, and Meade would have been forced to retreat.”

Walter H. Taylor, Lee’s former aide, also sided with the anti-Ewell faction in his memoir “Four Years With General Lee.” Taylor wrote that Ewell voiced no objection to the order he brought from Lee to take the high ground “if possible,” and that he returned to Lee under the impression Ewell would attack.

But there is another side to the story. Maj. Campbell Brown, Ewell’s stepson, and aide, observed that the “discovery that this lost us the battle is one of those frequently-recurring but tardy strokes of military genius of which one hears long after the minute circumstances that rendered them at the time impracticable, are forgotten.” And while Taylor’s story became an important part of the controversy, Brown was adamant that he never brought such orders. In an 1885 letter to Gen. Henry Jackson Hunt, the former chief of artillery for the Army of the Potomac, Brown wrote, “I say broadly that Col. Taylor’s account of this battle is utterly worthless — that he carried no such order to Gen. Ewell ... I do not impugn his veracity but his memory has been trusted and has deceived him.”

Major General Isaac Trimble, who was attached on special duty to Ewell’s command during the battle, was among those who tried to dismiss Lee’s warning. Writing for the Southern Historical Society (SHS) years after both Lee and Ewell had died, Trimble recalled his attempt to persuade Ewell to attack:

“The battle was over and we had won it handsomely. General Ewell moved about uneasily, a good deal excited, and seemed to me to be undecided about what to do next. I approached him and said: "Well, General, we have had a grand success; are you not going to follow it up and push our advantage?"

He replied that General Lee had instructed him not to bring on a general engagement without orders and that he would wait for them.

I said, "That hardly applies to the present state of things, as we have fought a hard battle already, and should secure the advantage gained". He made no rejoinder but was far from composure. I was deeply impressed with the conviction that it was a critical moment for us and made a remark to that effect.

As no movement seemed immediate, I rode off to our left, north of the town, to reconnoiter, and noticed conspicuously the wooded hill northeast of Gettysburg (Culp's), and a half mile distant, and of an elevation to command the country for miles each way, and overlooking Cemetery Hill above the town. Returning to see General Ewell, who was still under much embarrassment, I said, "General, There," pointing to Culp's Hill, "is an eminence of commanding position, and not now occupied, as it ought to be by us or the enemy soon. I advise you to send a brigade and hold it if we are to remain here." He said: "Are you sure it commands the town?" [I replied,] "Certainly it does, as you can see, and it ought to be held by us at once." General Ewell made some impatient reply, and the conversation dropped.”

— Isaac R. Trimble, "The Battle and Campaign of Gettysburg." Southern Historical Society Papers 26 (1898).

Observers at the scene later reported that the "impatient reply" was, "When I need advice from a junior officer I generally ask for it." They also stated that Trimble threw down his sword in disgust and stormed off.

Did this happen as it is stated? No one knows. Trimble was certainly upset that he was without a command on July 1. He would lose a leg and be captured 2 days later as he led a division in Pickett’s Charge, never to return to command. So, he certainly had plenty of scores to settle in 1898, 35 years later. Ewell never wrote or spoke about the matter in the 7 years he survived after the war.

July 2nd

On day 2, Lee’s plan was for Longstreet to attack north along Emmitsburg Turnpike to Cemetery Ridge combined with a simultaneous pincer move on Culp's Hill by  Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson’s division from Richard S. Ewell’s Second Corp. But Longstreet's brigades of McLaw and Hood were delayed and then got tangled up at Little Round Top and Sickles in the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield. The attack ended at the south section of Cemetery Ridge.

An acoustic shadow at Gettysburg on Day 2 occurred when Ewell was supposed to attack Culp’s Hill when Longstreet’s artillery started firing, but he never heard it, allowing Meade to shift some of the forces on Culp’s Hill to his left flank.

Alpheus Williams led the 1st Division. Due to a mix-up in the command structure, General Williams played a prominent role because of a miscommunication between General Meade and Williams’s superior officer. This miscommunication resulted in Williams commanding the XII Corps. Meanwhile, Maj Gen Henry Slocum believed he was in command of the right wing, consisting of the 11th and 12th Corps, and considered Williams as merely the temporary corps commander of the 12th. Slocum held the Union right from Culp's Hill to across the Baltimore Pike. With Longstreet’s attack, Meade ordered relocating XII Corps from Culps Hill. Williams successfully convinced Meade to leave a single brigade on Culps Hill instead of relocating everyone, to defend the entire right flank. This suggestion ultimately saved the position when the Confederate left wing launched an attack that evening. Despite leading two days of intense fighting on the Union's extreme right, Williams did not receive any official credit, as Slocum was late turning in his report, and Meade already submitted his report to the war department.

Maj Gen George Sears Greene At about 6 pm July 2nd, Meade shifted almost the entire XII Corps from the Union right to strengthen the left flank. Culp’s Hill was weakened to defend Cemetery Ridge against Longstreet’s attack on the left. Brig Gen George S Greene was a brigade commander in the division of Maj. Gen. John W. Geary.. His lone brigade of 1,350 New Yorkers (five regiments) was left to defend a one-half-mile line on Culp's Hill when an entire Confederate division attacked. Fortunately, Greene, a civil engineer, had insisted that his troops construct strong field fortifications. These preparations proved decisive and his brigade held off multiple attacks for hours. With the shift of troops, Greene was left with 5 regiments (1350 troops) to defend ½ mile of front against an entire Confederate corps.

Maj Gen George Sears Greene, a 62-year-old with an impressive war record, found himself continually overlooked for promotion due to his age. On the morning of July 2, he insisted that his men entrench on Culp’s Hill. As a former West Point professor of mathematics and engineering, Greene approached the situation with a strategic mindset that differed from his counterparts. General John Geary and General Henry Slocum did not share Greene's belief in the importance of entrenching on Culp’s Hill, but Greene's foresight would prove crucial in the upcoming battle. Neither General John Geary, a former Mayor of San Francisco, nor General Henry Slocum thought it would matter much.Geary’s division covered the lower hill, near Spangler’s Spring, Kane’s brigade to his right; then on the upper hill was Greene’s division, then Candy’s brigade, followed by a portion of Ruger’s division.

As twilight fell, the fighting on the Union left came to a close, but the assault on the Union right flank continued. Gen. Richard Ewell's forces pressed on, with Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's Confederate division launching an attack on Culp’s Hill. Greene's brigade, consisting of around 1,400 New Yorkers, faced off against Johnson's 4,700 Confederates. Greene understood the significance of holding the extreme right flank of the Union army and protecting vital supply lines. Despite being outnumbered, Greene's men were charged with holding the extreme right flank of the Union army and protecting its supply and communication artery, the nearby Baltimore Pike. Greene extended his line to the right to cover part of the lower slope, but his 1,400 men were dangerously overextended since they were only able to form a single battle line, without reserves.

Johnson's Confederate forces encountered fierce resistance as they charged up the slopes of Culp’s Hill. Greene's men had constructed formidable breastworks that halted the Confederate advance. Although Gen. George "Maryland" Steuart's brigade managed to outflank the Federal right flank, Greene's strategic positioning and defensive measures proved effective. The natural obstacles provided by the hill hindered the Confederate forces' progress, showcasing Greene's tactical acumen and the importance of his decision to entrench on Culp’s Hill.

At 7 pm with darkness gathering, Ewell initiated a significant infantry attack. He deployed three brigades, consisting of approximately 4,700 soldiers, from the division led by Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson. These troops crossed Rock Creek and ascended the eastern slope of Culp's Hill. However, Greene's entrenched position played a crucial role in the outcome of the assault. It allowed for reinforcements from the I Corps and XI Corps to come to his aid from the left. Wadsworth dispatched three regiments, while Howard on Cemetery Hill sent four, totaling around 750 men. Greene issued orders to hold the position under any circumstances. Despite four subsequent attacks made in the darkness, the line to his right remained threatened but was bolstered by additional reinforcements. The assaults persisted until 11 pm and resumed the following morning.

On the far right flank of the Union army, Col. David Ireland of the 137th New York faced a formidable attack. Under intense pressure, the New Yorkers were compelled to retreat and occupy a traversing trench engineered by Greene, which faced south. Despite sustaining heavy casualties, they valiantly held their ground and safeguarded the flank. Unbeknownst to Steuart's men, due to the darkness and the heroic defense of Greene's brigade, they failed to realize that they had nearly unrestricted access to the Union army's primary communication line, the Baltimore Pike, which lay only 600 yards ahead. Ireland and his men averted a potential catastrophe.

Adelbert Ames, though not as famous as Chamberlain, who took over his position after his promotion, performed exceptionally well in the difficult circumstances at Gettysburg. During the intense attack led by Ewell on July 1, 1863, Ames, under the command of Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, positioned his division in front of other units of the XI Corps on Barlow's Knoll. This exposed location was quickly overrun, leading to Barlow's capture and injury. Ames then took charge of the division and skillfully orchestrated a retreat through Gettysburg, eventually establishing a defensive position on Cemetery Hill. On July 2, during the second day of battle, Ames's division faced the brunt of the assault on East Cemetery Hill by Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early but managed to hold the crucial position with support from neighboring units. Ames even engaged in hand-to-hand combat at one point. Following the battle, the soldiers of the 20th Maine honored Ames by presenting him with their battle flag as a symbol of their respect.

When the XII Corps returned to the right flank late that night, Confederate forces had taken over parts of the Union defensive line on the southeastern slope of the hill, near Spangler's Spring. Union soldiers, disoriented in the darkness, found enemy troops in the positions they had left. Gen. Williams instructed his men to occupy the open field in front of the woods and await daylight. While Steuart's brigade managed to hold onto the lower heights precariously, Johnson's other two brigades were withdrawn from the hill to wait for daylight as well. Geary's troops came back to reinforce Greene, ensuring the defense of the position.

July 3rd.

The idea that the Copse was the focus was Batchelder’s incorrect and misleading attempt to bring attention to the area on the field where the attack went, not what was the real objective. Lee’s plan for both days 2 & 3 was the union center. That’s why a coordinated attack at Culp’s Hill was so necessary.

As General Lee stated in his official report, "The general plan was unchanged". The commanding position on the battlefield was Cemetery Hill. Piercing the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge was NOT the objective; Zeigler Grove was the large clump of trees in 1863, not the tiny thin saplings of the Copse. Those large trees were used for lumber many years after the battle and before John B. Bachelder's promoting and marking the high-water mark. This combined with a simultaneous pincer move on Culp's Hill by  Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson’s division from Richard S. Ewell’s Second Corp was the real plan.

At dawn, five Union batteries opened fire on Steuart's brigade in the positions they had captured and kept them pinned down for 30 minutes before an attack by two of Geary's brigades. Simultaneously, the Confederates initiated their own attack, resulting in a prolonged engagement that lasted well into the morning, marked by three unsuccessful offensives by Johnson's troops. Despite facing relentless charges from Ewell's entire corps on the night of July 2nd and throughout the following morning of July 3rd, Greene managed to maintain control of the hill, fending off repeated assaults from 4,700 Confederate soldiers and securing the upper summit.

Although Greene's contributions to the Union victory at Gettysburg were significant, his heroism is often overshadowed by other more well-known figures from the battle. As the oldest surviving Union general and West Point graduate, Greene's legacy deserves to be remembered and honored. His monument on Culps Hill serves as a reminder of his bravery and dedication to the Union cause during one of the most critical battles of the Civil War.

In addition to Greene, General John Geary also played a pivotal role in the defense of Culps Hill. His bold counterattack on July 3, 1863, helped drive the Confederates from their positions and protected the Union Army's vital supply line, the Baltimore Pike. Geary's decisive actions at Culps Hill exemplified the courage and determination of Union forces in securing a crucial victory at Gettysburg.

East Cavalry Field

A classic cavalry engagement occurred four miles east of Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 3, 1863. The strategic significance of the vacant field was heightened by the presence of two important roads: the York Pike to the north and the Hanover Road to the south. Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg's Union cavalry, positioned on the Hanover Road, guarded the rear of the Army of the Potomac. Recognizing the threat posed by Confederate control of the Hanover Road and the intersecting Low Dutch Road to the Union's supply line along the Baltimore Pike, Gregg was reinforced by 1,900 Michigan cavalrymen under Brig. Gen. George A. Custer. Together, Gregg and Custer established a defensive line at the intersection, supported by 10 artillery pieces.

Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart led 5,000 Confederate cavalrymen to the northern side of the field. Contrary to previous teaching, there is no concrete evidence suggesting that Stuart and Lee coordinated this assault with Pickett's Charge. Stuart's initial orders were to safeguard the flank of the Army of Northern Virginia, but he later admitted that his true intention was to launch a surprise attack on the enemy's rear. Stuart's charge was met with a countercharge by General Custer, effectively halting the assault. A subsequent charge led by Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton with 2,000 mounted men was also repelled by Custer and the 7th Michigan regiment. Throughout the engagement, Gregg maintained his position. Although not strategically significant, the battle showcased the Union cavalry's growing prowess as a formidable fighting force, reminiscent of their performance at Brandy Station.

Enjoy that piece? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

Further Reading

·       Himmer, Robert, "New Light on Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum's Conduct on the First Day at Gettysburg". Gettysburg Magazine. 43, July 2010.

·       Troy D Harman, “In Defense of Henry Slocum on July 1.”
http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/9/essay3.pdf

·       Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign; a study in command. New York: Scribner's, 1968. 

·       Gottfried, Bradley M. The Maps of Gettysburg: An Atlas of the Gettysburg Campaign, June 3 – June 13, 1863. New York: Savas Beatie, 2007. 

·       Murray, R. L. A Perfect Storm of Lead, George Sears Greene's New York Brigade in Defense of Culp's Hill. Wolcott, NY: Benedum Books, 2000. 

·       Petruzzi, J. David, and Steven Stanley. The Complete Gettysburg Guide. New York: Savas Beatie, 2009. 

·       Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg: Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. 

·       Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/custers-stand-east-cavalry-field

·       John B Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War. Louisiana State University Press, 1993.

Klein, Lloyd W,https://thecivilwarcenter.org/2023/07/04/general-lees-if-practicable-order-to-general-ewell-on-july-1-at-gettysburg/

Reclaiming the “One Nation” Tradition: What are the Lessons from the Past and Policy Options for a Future Conservative Administration?

For several months now, polls have suggested a sweeping victory for the Labour Party at the next British general election; an alarming prospect for the government and one that recently led some Conservatives to openly call for a change of leader in the hope that this will remove the likelihood of electoral armageddon and the end of 14 years of Conservative governance. Here, Vittorio Trevitt considers this in a historical context – and looks at what could happen in the future.

Benjamin Disraeli, circa 1873.

Much of the Conservative administration’s polling plight is arguably the result of the increased levels of poverty and wage stagnation that the party has presided over. Throughout its history, however, and in comparison to the current and more recent Conservative ministries, the Conservative Party has on many occasions upheld a noteworthy tradition that champions a degree of governmental action to lessen inequalities and elevate opportunity. That tradition is the One Nation brand of British Conservatism.

The origins of this tradition can be traced to the one-time Conservative leader Benjamin Disraeli, who spoke of England in a novel he composed, “Sybil,” as being made up “of two nations – one rich, one poor,” and as prime minister introduced a wide range of reforms aimed at bridging that gap. Amongst these included measures to improve the legal status of unions, improvements in living conditions and sanitation in urban areas, food safety standards, and restrictions on the working hours of women and children. The term “One Nation” came to be associated with members of the Conservative Party who believed that Conservatism should reach out to all sections of British society.

The principles of One Nation Conservatism were evident in the social policies of Disraeli’s successors, who utilised the power of the state to mitigate numerous social evils. The 1887 Truck Amendment Act broadened the range of workers protected by legislation ensuring that they be paid in coins rather than in tickets or goods that could only be used at employer-owned shops. The 1889 Cotton Cloth Factories Act regulated the degree of humidity and temperature in such establishments, while the 1890 Housing of the Working Classes Act encouraged local authority public housing schemes. An Education Act of 1891 provided, as noted by one study, “grants for schools willing to abolish fees for children between three and fifteen years of age.” The 1891 Factory and Workshop Act included various provisions aimed at safeguarding labour including an expansion of sanitary regulations, and the following year a Shop Hours Regulation Act sought to limit the weekly working hours of shop assistants under the age of 18 to 74, which included times for meals. In 1897, an important Workmen’s Compensation Act was passed that, while not universal, nevertheless legally obligated employers to pay compensation to workers when accidents occurred.

Early 19th century

The early Twentieth Century also witnessed the passage of much legislation bearing the stamp of One Nation Conservatism. Arthur Balfour’s 1902-1905 administration passed legislation setting up Distress Committees to reduce the hardships suffered by those experiencing unemployment by means of supporting such individuals in finding employment. A 1923 Industrial Insurance Act offered safeguards for millions of policyholders, while the 1925 Merchant Shipping (International Labour Convention) Act provided improved rights for seamen. That same year, a permanent Food Council was set up to prevent food price profiteering, and the Lead Paint (Protection Against Poisoning) Act from the following year sought to protect paint trade workers from lead poisoning. A Mining Act introduced that same year provided for a 5% levy on royalties to help support the installation of pithead baths. For people in rural areas, the 1926 Housing (rural workers') act entitled owners of rural cottages to loans and grants for home improvements, while the 1928 Agricultural Credits Act furnished farmers with a loan system to help them in purchasing their farms.

This reforming trend would continue throughout the Thirties, in spite of the social and economic turmoil of the Great Depression. New housing laws were passed with the intention of alleviating bad housing, and in 1934 a Milk in School scheme was launched that over 2 million children benefited from. The 1936 Agriculture Act set up an unemployment insurance scheme for agricultural workers, while the 1937 National Health Insurance (Juvenile Contributors and Young Persons) Act allowed for medical treatment to be provided for juveniles the moment they entered insurable employment, instead of waiting until the full health insurance age of 16 to receive such care. Also that year, a Widows’, Orphans’ and Old Age Contributory Pensions (Voluntary Contributions) Act was passed that offered voluntary insurance to those left out of a previous scheme for beneficiaries of such benefits. The 1938 Poor Law Amendment Act provided for the payment of cash allowances to inmates aged 65 and over, while a Blind Persons Actpassed that same year reduced the old age pension eligibility age from 50 to 40 years for blind persons. Other measures included the 1939 Cancer Act, which improved facilities for the treating people with cancer, the 1937 Factory Act (which enhanced workplace safety standards), and the granting of paid holidays to about an additional 1 million workers via the 1938 Holidays with Pay Act.

Post-war period

The values of One-Nation Conservatism were also evident in many of the policies carried out by successive Conservative governments following the end of the Second World War. Although responsible for dubious decisions including the re-introduction of prescription charges (which was legislated for but never implemented under the previous Labour administration) and the 1957 Rent Act (which decontrolled rents throughout much of the private sector), they also carried out notable reforms such as a major housebuilding programme (which produced 300,000 homes per annum), grants to encourage home improvements, and new social entitlements such as a severe disablement occupational allowance for war pensioners and a home confinement grant for new mothers. A Small Farmer Scheme was also set up in 1959 to assist such farmers, with one historian asserting that, while the scheme only received a modest amount of money, the principle was novel “since it offered assistance only to those farmers whose businesses were not economic yet were capable of becoming so.” Edward Heath’s 1970-74 ministry, although maligned with justification for abolishing free milk for primary school children between the ages of 8 and 11, introduced such innovations as rent allowances, an invalidity benefit for those with severe disabilities, and the Family Income Supplement; a top-up benefit for those earning low wages. In addition, the fair rents system that the 1964-70 Labour government introduced for private tenants was extended to those in the public sector.

The 1971 Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act made oil tanker owners liable for any oil pollution they caused, while the Motor Vehicle (Passenger Insurance) Act of that year brought all passengers under liability insurance coverage. The 1971 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, in the words of one study, provided “that in assessing the claim of a widow neither her prospects of remarriage nor her actual remarriage would be taken into account,” while the 1973 Matrimonial Causes Act provided financial support “for parties to marriage and children of family.” A comprehensiveLand Compensation Act was also passed in 1973, designed to offer compensation to individuals whose properties had been negatively impacted by road and redevelopment schemes or had been compulsorily purchased. This included special home loss payments to occupiers in addition to any entitlement to normal market value payment, advance compensation payments of up to 90% of the amount the acquiring authority estimated, a legal bar on the practice whereby compensation was lowered in cases where local councils rehoused persons in a council house and, for the first time, the right of certain business tenants to compensation for removal expenses and trade loss.

Thatcher era

In many respects, the Heath Ministry represented the swansong of One Nation Conservatism, despite having been elected on a platform calling for reduced economic state intervention. The onset of Thatcherism undeniably sounded the death-knell of the Party’s One Nation tradition as a driving force in policy-making. Margaret Thatcher’s rise to the Conservative leadership in 1975 signalled an ideological turn to the Right; one that would find substance in the numerous ministries she led from 1979 onwards. Adhering to the belief that the State should limit its role in social and economic affairs as much as possible, Thatcherism presided over de-industrialisation on a large scale together with curbs on benefit rights. Paradoxically, while average living standards rose, the percentage of Britons living in povertyalso went up. The succeeding New Labour governments, while maintaining Thatcherite economic reforms and presiding over tests for certain benefits, facilitated a steady drop in poverty during most of their time in office; a positive development arguably attributable to new social programmes like pensioner and working family tax credits. Ironically, it was measures such as these that pre-Thatcherite Conservative ministries often rolled out themselves.

To the present

Given the circumstances, it may be time for the Conservative Party to reclaim the “One Nation” mantle and adopt a more activist strategy aimed at making greater use of the state as a force for social change if it hopes to remain in office after 2024.

More can be done to stimulate the social housing sector; a move that a 2023 poll suggested would be very popularamongst Conservative voters. A long-term care insurance system like the one established in Holland under the right-of-centre De Jong cabinet in 1968 (which remains in place to this day) could alleviate the financial burden of households in providing care for elderly relatives. The adequacy of sick pay need addressing, with Britain ranking amongst the lowest in Europe in this category. In addition, income poverty can be tackled by raising the level of unemployment payments, with the UKs replacement rate far below most OECD members like Luxembourg, Iceland and Slovenia. The Conservatives could also improve the family benefits system by introducing new social programmes for families. A Recreational Allowance could assist families with paying for family activities such as going to the cinema, while a Family Holiday Allowance could help pay towards the cost of holiday activities. In education, the Conservative Party could follow the example of Jamaica’s governing centre-right Labour Party, which recently announced the goal of providing free tuition for all public university students; a move that would make Jamaica the first Caribbean nation to do so.

There is, therefore, much in the One Nation tradition that the modern day Conservative Party can learn from, while there exist a number of policy options consistent with that tradition which either the current or a future Conservative administration could introduce. Adopting a more progressive policy agenda would not only be beneficial to the Conservative Party in political terms and in keeping with its historical heritage, but by tackling disadvantage and raising levels of personal health and wellbeing, it would be beneficial to the British people as a whole.

Did you find that piece interesting? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

The Most Infamous Outlaws of the Old West

The Old West is often romanticized in American history, with images of gunslingers and outlaws roaming the frontier in search of adventure and fortune. These individuals played a significant role in shaping the history of the American West, with their actions leaving a lasting impact on the development of the region. 
 
Gunslingers were skilled marksmen who were known for their quick draw and accuracy with a firearm. These individuals were often hired as lawmen or hired guns by towns and ranchers to protect their interests and maintain order in the often lawless frontier towns. Gunslingers were also known for their dueling skills, with many settling disputes through gunfights rather than through the legal system. 

Here, Richard Bluttal considers some of the many outlaws or gunslingers of the old west. 

Charles Boles, otherwise known as "Black Bart".

BILLY THE KID

Billy the Kid, whose real name was William H. Bonney, was a legendary American outlaw and gunfighter who lived during the American Old West era. He was born in New York City in 1859 and moved to New Mexico with his family as a young boy. Billy the Kid became involved in criminal activities at a young age, including cattle rustling and other outlaw behavior.

Billy the Kid gained notoriety for his involvement in the Lincoln County War, a violent conflict in New Mexico in the late 1870s. During the war, Billy the Kid was part of a group known as the Regulators, who clashed with rival factions in the area.

After the Lincoln County War, Billy the Kid continued his life as an outlaw, evading capture by law enforcement. He was eventually captured, tried, and sentenced to hang for his crimes. However, he managed to escape from jail and remained a fugitive until he was tracked down and shot dead by Sheriff Pat Garrett in 1881.

Billy the Kid's life and exploits have been the subject of numerous books, movies, and songs, and he has become a legendary figure in American folklore and the history of the American West. 

BLACK BART 

Black Bart, whose real name was Charles Earl Bowles, was a notorious American outlaw who operated in California and Oregon during the late 19th century. He earned the nickname "Black Bart" for his preference for wearing black clothing and his dark, bushy beard. Born in Norfolk, England in 1829, Bowles immigrated to the United States as a child with his family. He grew up in New York and eventually made his way to California during the Gold Rush of the 1850s. Bowles tried his hand at various jobs, including mining and ranching, but found little success. In the early 1870s, Bowles turned to a life of crime and began robbing stagecoaches in the remote areas of California and Oregon. He adopted the persona of "Black Bart," a mysterious and dashing outlaw who left poems at the scene of his robberies. These poems often mocked the authorities and taunted his pursuers, earning him a reputation as a gentleman bandit. Black Bart was known for his polite and non-violent approach to robbery. He never harmed his victims or used violence during his heists, preferring to rely on intimidation and his reputation as a skilled marksman. Despite his criminal activities, Black Bart was seen as a Robin Hood figure by some, as he targeted wealthy individuals and corporations rather than ordinary citizens. Over the course of his criminal career, Black Bart successfully robbed over 28 stagecoaches, amassing a considerable fortune in gold and cash. However, his luck eventually ran out when he was captured in 1883 after leaving behind a handkerchief with his laundry mark at the scene of a robbery. Black Bart was tried and convicted of robbery, but his polite demeanor and gentlemanly conduct during the trial earned him sympathy from the public and the press. He was sentenced to six years in San Quentin State Prison but was released after serving just four years due to good behavior. After his release from prison, Black Bart disappeared from the public eye and was never heard from again. The details of his later life and death remain shrouded in mystery, adding to the legend of one of the most infamous outlaws of the American West. Black Bart's story continues to captivate historians and enthusiasts of the Old West, cementing his place in American folklore as a daring and enigmatic figure. 

BELLE STARR 

Belle Starr, also known as the "Bandit Queen" or the "Queen of the Outlaws," was a notorious American outlaw who gained notoriety during the late 19th century. Born as Myra Maybelle Shirley in Carthage, Missouri in 1848, Belle Starr was raised in a respectable, middle-class family. However, she was drawn to a life of crime and adventure from a young age, influenced by her father, who was involved in various criminal activities. Belle Starr's criminal career began in her teenage years when she eloped with a man named Jim Reed, who was a known outlaw and Confederate guerrilla fighter. The couple embarked on a life of crime, robbing banks, stagecoaches, and trains across the American South. Belle Starr quickly gained a reputation for her sharpshooting skills, fearless demeanor, and flamboyant style, earning her the nickname "Bandit Queen." After Jim Reed was killed in a gunfight in 1864, Belle Starr married several more outlaws and continued her criminal activities, becoming a prominent figure in the criminal underworld of the Wild West. She was known to associate with notorious outlaws such as Jesse James and the Younger brothers, further solidifying her reputation as a dangerous and influential figure. Belle Starr's outlaw lifestyle was not without its challenges, as she faced numerous run-ins with the law and spent time in jail for her criminal activities. Despite her criminal record, Belle Starr was admired by many for her independent spirit, defiance of societal norms, and her willingness to challenge the status quo. In addition to her criminal exploits, Belle Starr was also known for her unconventional personal life. She had several husbands and lovers throughout her lifetime, including a Cherokee Indian named Sam Starr, with whom she had a son. Belle Starr's relationships were often tumultuous and marked by violence, adding to her enigmatic and mysterious persona. BelleStarr's criminal career came to an end in 1889 when she was shot and killed under mysterious circumstances near her home in Oklahoma. Her murder remains unsolved to this day, adding to the legend and mystique surrounding the "Bandit Queen." Despite her criminal activities and controversial reputation, Belle Starr remains a fascinating and complex figure in American history. She is remembered as a symbol of rebellion, independence, and defiance against societal norms, challenging traditional gender roles and expectations. Belle Starr's legacy continues to captivate historians, writers, and enthusiasts of the Old West.

JESSIE JAMES 

Jesse James was a notorious American outlaw, guerrilla, and folk hero who became a legendary figure in the history of the American West. Born on September 5, 1847, in Clay County, Missouri, Jesse James was raised in a tumultuous and violent environment that would shape his future as a criminal and outlaw. His life story is one of violence, betrayal, and rebellion against authority, making him a complex and controversial figure in American history.

Jesse James was born into a family that was deeply embroiled in the violent politics of the Civil War. His father, Robert James, was a Baptist minister who supported the Confederate cause and joined a pro-Confederate guerrilla band known as Quantrill's Raiders. This group of guerrillas carried out raids and attacks on Union soldiers and sympathizers, engaging in brutal acts of violence and retribution. Jesse James grew up in this environment of lawlessness and chaos, witnessing the horrors of war and the brutality of conflict at a young age.

After the end of the Civil War, Jesse James and his older brother Frank James continued their involvement in criminal activities, robbing banks, trains, and stagecoaches across the Midwest. They formed a gang of outlaws that included members such as Cole Younger, Jim Younger, and Clell Miller, who carried out a series of daring and audacious robberies that captured the imagination of the American public. The James-Younger gang became one of the most notorious criminal organizations of the post-Civil War era, striking fear into the hearts of law enforcement and civilians alike.

Jesse James quickly gained a reputation as a cunning and ruthless outlaw who was able to evade capture and outwit the authorities. He became a folk hero to many Americans, especially in the South, where he was seen as a symbol of resistance against the oppressive forces of Reconstruction and federal authority. Songs, ballads, and dime novels were written about Jesse James, portraying him as a Robin Hood-like figure who robbed from the rich and gave to the poor. This image of Jesse James as a romantic and chivalrous outlaw only added to his mystique and appeal to the public.

However, the reality of Jesse James' life was far more complex and troubled than the myth that surrounded him. He was involved in numerous violent confrontations with law enforcement, leading to the deaths of many innocent bystanders and officers of the law. The Pinkerton Detective Agency, a private detective agency hired by the railroads and banks to capture the James-Younger gang. 

BUTCH CASSIDY AND THE SUNDANCE KID 

They were two of the most infamous outlaws of the American West, known for their daring robberies and their ability to evade capture by law enforcement. Their story has become the stuff of legend, immortalized in books, movies, and television shows. But who were Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, and what is the truth behind the myths that have been perpetuated about them?

Butch Cassidy, whose real name was Robert Leroy Parker, was born in Utah in 1866. He got his nickname "Butch" from his time working as a butcher in his youth. Cassidy was a charismatic and intelligent leader, known for his charm and his ability to recruit and lead a gang of outlaws. He was also a skilled horseman and marksman, which made him a formidable opponent for law enforcement.

The Sundance Kid, whose real name was Harry Alonzo Longabaugh, was born in Pennsylvania in 1867. He earned his nickname from his time spent in the town of Sundance, Wyoming, where he got into trouble with the law. The Sundance Kid was known for his quick wit and his sharpshooting skills, which made him a valuable member of Butch Cassidy's gang.

Together, Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid formed the Wild Bunch, a gang of outlaws that carried out a series of daring bank and train robberies across the American West. Their most famous robbery was the holdup of the Union Pacific Overland Flyer train in 1900, which netted them over $50,000 in cash and valuables. The Wild Bunch became notorious for their brazen crimes and their ability to elude capture by law enforcement.

Despite their criminal activities, Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid were also known for their code of honor and their loyalty to their gang members. They were known to treat civilians with respect during their robberies and were admired by many for their daring escapades. However, their criminal lifestyle eventually caught up with them, and they were forced to flee the United States to escape capture.

In 1901, Butch Cassidy, the Sundance Kid, and their companion Etta Place fled to South America, where they continued their life of crime. They settled in Argentina and then Bolivia, where they carried out a series of bank robberies and other criminal activities. However, their luck eventually ran out, and in 1908, they were surrounded by Bolivian soldiers during a botched robbery and killed.

Did you find that piece interesting? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

What Happened at the May 1864 Battle of the Wilderness in the US Civil War?

The first battle of the Overland Campaign, known as The Battle of the Wilderness, occurred from May 5-7, 1864. General Grant devised a strategic plan to have all Union armies attack simultaneously, preventing General Lee from transferring troops and resources between theaters as he had done in 1863.He would also have all of the eastern armies move toward Richmond: General Butler from the southeast, and General Sigel from the west. Grant recognized that President Lincoln needed concrete evidence of a victorious war in order to secure re-election, so he assured him that regardless of the battle's outcome, he would not retreat. Although only General Sherman managed to execute a successful simultaneous offensive campaign, it proved sufficient to achieve the desired outcome of Grant's plan.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Major-General Wadsworth fighting in the May 1864 Battle of the Wilderness

Situated south of the Rapidan River in Virginia, The Wilderness encompasses parts of Spotsylvania County and Orange County. Its boundaries extend to Spotsylvania Court House in the south and the Mine Run tributary of the Rapidan River in the west. This densely forested region consists of numerous trees and secondary growths, rendering visibility nearly impossible even to this day. Additionally, the dirt roads within the area were particularly treacherous when wet, making it extremely challenging to coordinate command and control as well as large troop movements.

Grant decided to to establish his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, led by Major General George G. Meade. While Grant focused on overall strategy, Meade assumed responsibility for tactical matters. The battle unfolded just a few miles west of the Chancellorsville battle site,

The Strategy

In the early months of 1864, the Union Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia found themselves in a standoff along the Rapidan River in central Virginia. General Robert E. Lee, commanding the Confederate forces, was well aware of the numerical and technological superiority of the Union army led by General Ulysses S. Grant. In order to mitigate these disadvantages, Lee strategically chose the Wilderness, a densely wooded area, as the battleground. This terrain would limit the effectiveness of Grant's artillery and provide cover for the smaller Confederate force. Lee positioned his troops behind earthworks along the Rapidan River, with the intention of bringing reinforcements from the rear if necessary. Additionally, Lee's cavalry, under the command of Major General J.E.B. Stuart, patrolled the surrounding countryside to gather intelligence on Grant's movements. 

Grant was fully aware of Lee's defensive strategy and his intention to defend Richmond, the Confederate capital. Rather than attempting to outmaneuver Lee, Grant devised a plan to push his army through the challenging forested terrain and into open ground as quickly as possible. His ultimate objective was to capture Richmond and bring an end to the war. Grant understood that time was of the essence and aimed to advance relentlessly until he reached his goal.

Both generals were keenly aware of each other's intentions and strategies. Lee relied on his scouts and cavalry to provide timely information about Grant's movements, while Grant aimed to swiftly maneuver his army towards Richmond. The stage was set for a decisive confrontation between the Union and Confederate forces in the heart of Virginia.

The Union Army commenced its movement from its base in Culpeper County, where it had concluded its operations at Mine Run the previous fall, and proceeded southward towards the fords of the Rapidan River. At daybreak on May 4, Union cavalry successfully crossed Germanna Ford, dispersing Confederate cavalry pickets and facilitating the construction of two pontoon bridges by Union engineers. Subsequently, General Gouverneur K. Warren's Fifth Corps crossed the ford and ventured into the thick woodland. General Lee had anticipated that General Grant would employ the Germanna and Ely Fords. Grant followed this anticipated course of action relying on speed rather than stealth. However, the advance of some Union units was slow, resulting in the creation of gaps. These occurrences provided Lee with an advantageous position at the outset.

Day 1: May 5

Meade, his commander, instructed Warren to strike the Confederates first, but Warren hesitated due to concerns about attacking the impenetrable thickets. He anticipated difficulties in maintaining a battle line and believed that a piecemeal movement would negate his numerical superiority. While Warren and Meade debated the advantages of an attack along the Orange Turnpike, General Richard S. Ewell's Confederate corps halted three miles west of Wilderness Tavern and constructed formidable earthworks on the western edge of Saunders Field. Reluctantly, Warren positioned his corps astride the turnpike.

Saunders Field, a 50-acre clearing near the Orange Turnpike, stood out amidst the forested surroundings. When Ewell encountered the Union Army, his orders were to engage the enemy and impede their progress, but to avoid a full-scale battle until Longstreet's corps arrived the next day. Ewell positioned his corps across the turnpike along the higher, western edge of the field, providing his troops with a clear field of fire.

As Warren emerged from the woods and entered the field, he was met by Ewell's waiting troops who initially held the advantage. Despite heavy casualties, the Federals managed a momentary breakthrough, but Brigadier General John B. Gordon's brigade swiftly sealed the breach. The arrival of the Union Sixth Corps expanded the front, resulting in further casualties.

Soon after, Union Brig. Gen. Samuel Crawford observed another enemy column at the William Chewning farm headed east on the Orange Plank Road toward its intersection with Brock Road. Due to the limited maneuverability in the area, the crossroads of these two main roads became the focal point of the Union's defensive line. The significance of this intersection is depicted in the accompanying photograph. The potential threat posed by the Confederates was grave, as their occupation of this area could have effectively divided Warren's corps on the turnpike from Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's Second Corps, which had moved further south after passing Warren. Recognizing the urgency, Meade promptly dispatched Brig. Gen. George W. Getty's Sixth Corps division to seize control of the crossroads. Around 4:00 p.m., Getty's men launched an attack, forcefully advancing through the dense thickets and engaging in close-range combat against Gen. A.P. Hill's corps. Hancock soon arrived to provide support to Getty's forces, and the battle continued until nightfall.

The conditions under which the soldiers fought were extraordinarily challenging. Visibility was severely limited, with a range of no more than 50 feet. This made it impossible to effectively communicate and issue commands. Both sides struggled to maintain a coherent line, often breaking up into smaller groups. The dense underbrush and thorny briars caused numerous scratches to the soldiers' faces and tore their clothing. The smoke generated by gunpowder further hindered their vision, while fires ignited by exploding shells rapidly spread through the dry woods, transforming the Wilderness into a blazing inferno for all the trapped troops. The unfavorable terrain greatly hindered the progress of the two-day battle, reducing it to a series of brutal skirmishes. Additionally, fires that started in the woods proved to be particularly devastating, claiming the lives of many wounded soldiers who were unable to be rescued.

Day 2: May 6

Hancock’s Federals resumed the offensive the next morning. A.P. Hill’s tired troops were forced back, and the Confederate line seemed on the verge of collapse. At this critical juncture, Brig. Gen. John Gregg's Texas Brigade from Gen. James Longstreet's corps arrived just in the nick of time. Longstreet's timely entrance onto the battlefield prevented a potential disaster and immediately launched an attack on Hancock's corps. Two flank attacks—by Longstreet south of the Plank Road and by Gordon north of the turnpike –carried the line and forced the Union behind breastworks.

Longstreet's arrival after an arduous 28-mile march in a single day proved to be a pivotal moment for the Confederate army. His counterattack played a crucial role in saving the day. The nature of Longstreet's movement involved executing a flank attack on Hancock's left flank, utilizing an unfinished railroad bed located within a densely wooded forest. This strategic maneuver took advantage of the element of surprise, as the railroad bed was not marked on local maps. Longstreet's attack was meticulously planned and well-prepared, showcasing his tactical brilliance. By exploiting an old roadbed constructed for a defunct railroad, his forces were able to stealthily navigate through the heavily wooded area undetected, ultimately launching a powerful flanking assault.

Longstreet's men advanced along the Orange Plank Road, pursuing the Union II Corps. Within a span of two hours, their persistent assault nearly drove the II Corps from the field. Longstreet devised innovative tactics to overcome the challenging terrain, ordering the advance of six brigades using heavy skirmish lines. This approach allowed his troops to maintain a continuous barrage of fire on the enemy while simultaneously making themselves elusive targets. The effectiveness of Longstreet's flanking maneuver was evident in the words of Hancock himself, who, after the war, acknowledged the impact of Longstreet's tactics by stating, "You rolled me up like a wet blanket."

General Longstreet had returned to the ANV after being deployed the previous autumn in the Western Theater. Although he had hoped for an independent command, Despite his hopes for an independent command, his deployment in the Western Theater had not yielded the desired result. While his crucial attack at Chickamauga had showcased his military prowess, his subsequent failure to defeat Burnside at Knoxville and his ongoing disagreements with General Braxton Bragg had cast a shadow over his future prospects. General Lee had proposed that Longstreet join forces with Johnston and Beauregard for a joint offensive into Kentucky. However, Bragg, who had now assumed the role of Davis’s military advisor, swiftly rejected this proposition. Consequently, Longstreet found himself once again serving as a corps commander in Virginia.

As Lee's plan to utilize his 14,000 men as an attacking force had proven successful thus far, the next crucial step was to deliver a decisive attack. Longstreet attempted to identify the optimal location on a reconnaissance mission. However, his efforts were met with a tragic turn of events. The treacherous terrain posed numerous challenges, and it was amidst this difficult backdrop that Longstreet fell victim to friendly fire, sustaining severe wounds to his neck and shoulder. Despite being cautioned against proceeding further, his unwavering determination to strategize the winning attack propelled him forward. Tragically, this ill-fated mission resulted in the immediate death of General Micah Jenkins, who was struck in the head during the same ambush. Its an astounding coincidence that this happened just 4 miles down the road from where Stonewall Jackson was ambushed; this section of Wilderness is dark and silent, as shown in the photo.

Mahone’s 12th Virginia was returning to the Orange Plank Road when a brush fire caused them to take a different route that led them across the road in a different location than other members of their brigade. Longstreet and his staff, unknowingly, passed in the middle of Mahone’s men. In a tragic turn of events, a section of soldiers, either lying prone or kneeling, mistook the approaching figures for the enemy and opened fire. As a result, Jenkins, one of Longstreet's men, was fatally struck in the head, while two others also lost their lives.

In his memoirs, Longstreet describes the bullet as passing through his throat and right shoulder, causing his right arm to immediately go limp at his side. Despite the excruciating pain and the presence of blood in his mouth and throat, Longstreet managed to issue orders and communicate with a whispery voice. The conventional narrative suggests that the bullet entered from the front as Longstreet was riding towards his troops. However, this explanation fails to account for the long-term loss of movement in his arm and his persistent hoarseness. A more plausible explanation lies in the possibility of a nerve injury originating from his back, caused by the soldiers who were either kneeling or lying prone behind him. The bullet then passed through his throat as it exited, providing a more coherent explanation for the observed medical facts.

The coordination of attacks on the Union line along the Brock Road was hindered by Longstreet's inability to command. Despite advising Lee to continue the attack, Lee chose to delay the movement until his forces could be realigned. Unfortunately, this delay provided the Union defenders with ample time to reorganize and strengthen their position. As the Confederates moved forward through the heavy brush, their lack of cohesion became evident, and they encountered obstructions in front of the Union line. It was at this point that Hancock's experienced troops successfully halted the Confederate advance. Although the Confederates briefly gained a foothold and planted their flags on the burning works, the Union troops swiftly counterattacked and reclaimed their position.  According to General Alexander’s memoirs: "I have always believed that, but for Longstreet's fall, the panic which was fairly underway in Hancock's [II] Corps would have been extended & have resulted in Grant's being forced to retreat back across the Rapidan."

On May 6th, AP Hill's corps, which had borne the brunt of the previous day's fighting, was not prepared for a repeat onslaught at dawn. Despite the advice of Generals Heth and Wilcox, Hill believed that Longstreet's presence on the field was necessary before he could continue the engagement. But Longstreet was late; when Hancock launched another attack, only Lt Col William Poague's artillery was holding the line, but it was beginning to falter. However, the entry of a Texas brigade from Longstreet's corps onto the field provided a glimmer of hope.

Knowing that a counterattack would save the day, Lee himself prepared to lead it but was stopped by the Texas men, who shouted “Lee to the rear”.

The potential destruction of AP Hill's corps might have occurred if General Ambrose Burnside had acted more swiftly upon receiving orders to advance. However, once again, Burnside failed to recognize the significance of the situation and did not launch an attack that could have altered the course of the battle.

Brig Gen John B Gordon's prominence within the Confederate command structure was solidified during this particular battle. On May 5, his brigade effectively counterattacked and repelled a Federal advance at Saunders Field. The following day, Gordon executed a highly successful flank attack, resulting in the capture of numerous Union soldiers and two Union generals. Although Gordon had initially proposed this maneuver at dawn, his superiors dismissed his suggestion. Positioned on the left flank of the Confederate line, Gordon's scouts informed him that his brigade extended well beyond the right end of the Union line. To confirm this report, Gordon personally conducted a reconnaissance. Eventually, Lee granted Gordon permission to launch his attack that afternoon. According to Gordon's memoirs, had he been authorized earlier, a flank attack could have enveloped the Union right flank. However, Generals Early and Ewell delayed due to incorrect intelligence suggesting that the Union IX Corps was reinforcing the area, and they were reluctant to engage with an outnumbered force.

The attack by Gordon gave rise to a couple of intriguing anecdotes of the war.  When a staff officer urged Grant to retreat, claiming that Lee would cut him off from the ford, Grant became angry, telling the officer that he was tired of always hearing what Lee was going to do.  He ordered the man to stop thinking about Lee and start thinking about what they were going to do.  It has also been rumored that the tough day of fighting caused Grant to become emotional that evening alone in his tent.

Day 3: May 7

Both opposing forces entrenched and awaited an attack from the other army. Having come close to breaking each other's lines the previous day, both armies seemed satisfied with adopting a defensive stance. Recognizing the futility of further assaults in the Wilderness, Grant issued orders for Meade's army to withdraw under the cover of darkness. Additionally, Grant instructed Union engineers to dismantle the pontoon bridges at Germanna Ford. Despite enduring heavy casualties over the course of two days of intense fighting, Grant made the decision not to launch another attack or retreat. Instead, he opted to swiftly proceed towards Spotsylvania Court House, effectively positioning himself between Richmond and Lee's army.

Implications

The Union army experienced nearly 18,000 casualties in the Wilderness, almost twice as many as Lee’s army. But Grant’s troops were not dispirited. Previous Union commanders, Hooker and Burnside, had chosen to retreat after sustaining significant losses in battles against Lee. Therefore, the continued advancement of Union troops brought a sense of jubilation among the Federal forces.

Who won the battle? This question is essentially unanswerable. Neither side left the battlefield in retreat. Both armies had a very high rate of casualties in just 48 hours (Union 15.0% with 17,666 (2,246 killed) of 118,00 engaged; Confederate 16.7% with 11,033 (1,477 killed) of 66,140 engaged). Tactically, it was probably a draw. Strategically, Grant was able to advance, but Lee had prevented him from reaching Richmond. Indecisive is probably the best descriptor.

Did you find that piece interesting? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

Further Reading

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/wilderness

·       Gordon C Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-6, 1864. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 2004.

·       John B Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904.

·       Stecker, RM BlachleyJD. Arch Otolaryngol Head Neck Surg. 2000;126(3):353-359.https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamaotolaryngology/fullarticle/404442

·       Steere  E The Wilderness Campaign.  Mechanicsburg, Pa Stackpole Books1960;

·       Longstreet  J From Manassas to Appomattox. 2nd ed. New York, NY Da Capo Press Inc, 1992.

·       Sorrel  GM Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer.  New York, NY Konecky & Konecky, 1994.

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/lee-rear

General Benjamin Butler and Runaway Slaves During the US Civil War

In late May 1861, slaves began fleeing to the Union outpost of Fortress Monroe, Virginia. When arriving, they were given sanctuary by the post’s commander, Major General Benjamin Butler. Richard Bluttal explains.

General Benjamin Butler during the US Civil War.

Newly arrived at Fortress Monroe, on May 23, 1861, Butler was confronted by the arrival of three fugitive slaves from the Confederate defensive works project across Hampton Roads. Faced with the looming prospect of being shipped to North Carolina to work on fortifications, Goodheart writes “the three slaves decided to leave the Confederacy and try their luck, just across the water, with the Union.”

As Civil War Emancipation has chronicled, they were they were not the first slaves to seek sanctuary in a Union military post. Soon after Lincoln’s inauguration in early March, slaves in separate incidents had presented themselves at Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor and Fort Pickens near Pensacola, Florida. Consistent with the Fugitive Slave Act the slaves in both instances had been rebuffed and turned over to local authorities. The post commanders at Sumter and Pickens took this action on their own initiative and it was accepted by the Lincoln administration, still hopeful at that point for reconciliation with the slave states.

However, by the end of May the situation was very different. Confederate forces had attacked Fort Sumter on April 12 and forced its surrender. In response, Lincoln called for volunteers to restore federal authority in the South. Lincoln’s actions led four of the remaining eight slaves in the Union to secede, including Virginia. On the same day the three slaves appeared at Fortress Monroe, May 23, the Commonwealth’s voters had ratified secession.

Taking action

In this atmosphere of uncertainty, Benjamin Butler had to decide what action to take. His hand was forced by the arrival of a Confederate officer at Fortress Monroe under flag of truce demanding the slaves return. Adam Goodheart relates the encounter between Butler and the Virginian, Major John Baytop Cary.

Cary got Cary got down to business. “I am informed,” he said, “that three Negroes belonging to Colonel Mallory have escaped within your lines. I am Colonel Mallory’s agent and have charge of his property. What do you mean to do with those Negroes?”“I intend to hold them,” Butler said. “Do you mean, then, to set aside your constitutional obligation to return them?”Even the dour Butler must have found it hard to suppress a smile. This was, of course, a question he had expected. And he had prepared what he thought was a fairly clever answer.“I mean to take Virginia at her word,” he said. “I am under no constitutional obligations to a foreign country, which Virginia now claims to be.”“But you say we cannot secede,” Cary retorted, “and so you cannot consistently detain the Negroes.”“But you say you have seceded,” Butler said, “so you cannot consistently claim them. I shall hold these Negroes as contraband of war, since they are engaged in the construction of your battery and are claimed as your property.”

If anyone was qualified to devise, on short notice, a solid justification to hold slaves who had escaped Confederate custody, it was Benjamin Butler. A crafty litigator and politician from Massachusetts, Butler was a recently commissioned Major General who owed his appointment to Lincoln’s desire to solidify the support of Democrats like him that favored military action against the South. Butler would prove a dismal battlefield commander, but in this incident showed him to be a gifted administrator.

By declaring the three slaves “contraband of war,” Benjamin Butler did not challenge their status as property and by extension call into question of slavery’s legality. At this stage of the conflict, most political leaders in the North were eager to depict the developing conflict merely as a rebellion against legitimate government authority which had nothing to do with slavery. However, officers on the ground like Butler quickly realized the slaves were a significant military asset to the Confederacy, acting not only as laborers, teamsters, and in other support roles for the army, but also by keeping southern agriculture functioning allowing a much larger portion of the white male population to be available for military service than might otherwise have been the case. Hence, as property being used in support of a rebellion against the government, Butler’s “contraband of war” formulation legally justified the seizure of the slaves without immediately undermining their status as property. The Lincoln administration quickly acquiesced to Butler’s policy and Congress gave it the force of law in early August through the Confiscation Act of 1861.

Impact

What neither Butler nor leaders in Washington, D.C., reckoned on was the slaves’ response to his contraband policy. Soon other slaves began seeking sanctuary with Union forces, over 500 at Fortress Monroe alone by June 1861. The northern press soon dubbed these escaped slaves as “contraband,” a name initially resisted by some black leaders and abolitionists, but which even they eventually accepted.

But if the episode at Fortress Monroe demonstrated anything it was the fierce determination of the slaves to be free. A few slaves seeking sanctuary quickly became hundreds and then even more. As Adam Goodheart writes:

Within weeks Within weeks after the first contrabands’ arrival at Fort Monroe, slaves were reported flocking to the Union lines just about anywhere there were Union lines: in Northern Virginia, on the Mississippi, in Florida. It is unclear how many of these escapees knew of Butler’s decision, but probably quite a few did. Edward Pierce, a Union soldier who worked closely with the contrabands, marveled at “the mysterious spiritual telegraph which runs through the slave population,” though he most likely exaggerated just a bit when he continued, “Proclaim an edict of emancipation in the hearing of a single slave on the Potomac, and in a few days it will be known by his brethren on the gulf.”Within little more than a year, the stream of a few hundred contrabands at Fort Monroe became a river of tens — probably even hundreds — of thousands. They “flocked in vast numbers — an army in themselves — to the camps of the Yankees,” a Union chaplain wrote. “The arrival among us of these hordes was like the oncoming of cities.”

Undermining slavery

So the arrival of Union forces in a locality in the South, or even the prospect of their arrival, quickly began to undermine the institution of slavery, as slaves now had a place to escape from slavery with little fear of recapture. Yet without the initiative of the slaves this situation likely would have never arisen. Certainly, the slaves could not gain freedom on their own, but they determinedly pried at the tiniest fissure in the slave system made by the arrival of northern troops and the peculiar institution began to crumble under the weight of countless individual slaves fleeing it.

As Adam Goodheart relates, Lincoln administration policy about the contrabands quickly began to lag behind the reality on the ground. So much so, that the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, which was announced in September 1862, in many ways was merely playing catch up. Goodheart ends his story with an anecdote that captures that situation well. He writes:

On the On the September day of Lincoln’s edict, a Union colonel ran into William Seward, the president’s canny secretary of state, on the street in Washington and took the opportunity to congratulate him on the administration’s epochal act.Seward snorted. “Yes,” he said, “we have let off a puff of wind over an accomplished fact.”“What do you mean, Mr. Seward?” the officer asked.“I mean,” the secretary replied, “that the Emancipation Proclamation was uttered in the first gun fired at Sumter, and we have been the last to hear it.”

Did you find that article of interest? If so, get more by joining us for free - click here.

What if Abraham Lincoln had not been Assassinated?

Few figures loom as large as Abraham Lincoln, the 16th President of the United States. His leadership during the Civil War, his commitment to the abolition of slavery, and his enduring legacy of unity and equality have solidified his place as an icon of American democracy.

What if history had taken a different turn on that fateful April evening in 1865? What if Abraham Lincoln had not been assassinated?

Terry Bailey considers.

An 1860s painting of President Abraham Lincoln. By George Peter Alexander Healy,

To ponder such a scenario is to delve into the realm of historical conjecture. However, by examining the political landscape of the time and Lincoln's own aspirations, it is possible to glean insight into what might have transpired had his life not been cut short by events.

Firstly, it's essential to consider Lincoln's vision for post-Civil War America. He was deeply committed to the principles of reconciliation and reconstruction, aiming to heal the nation's wounds and forge a path towards unity. In the aftermath of the Civil War, Lincoln sought to reintegrate the Southern states into the Union with leniency and compassion, prioritizing national healing over punitive measures.

Had Lincoln survived, it's plausible that his approach to reconstruction would have been markedly different from that of his successor, Andrew Johnson. Lincoln's conciliatory stance toward the South may have led to a smoother and more inclusive reconstruction process, potentially mitigating some of the deep-seated animosities that lingered in the aftermath of the war and potentially still do today.

Moreover, Lincoln's leadership style and political acumen would likely have played a pivotal role in shaping the post-Civil War era. His ability to navigate complex political terrain and build consensus across ideological divides could have paved the way for a more stable and harmonious transition from war to peace.

Race relations

One of the most intriguing questions surrounding a hypothetical continuation of Lincoln's presidency is its impact on the trajectory of race relations in America. As a staunch advocate for the abolition of slavery, Lincoln recognized the need for fundamental changes in the status of African Americans in society. While his Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 marked a significant step forward, Lincoln understood that true equality would require sustained effort and political will.

Had Lincoln lived to see the fruition of reconstruction, it's conceivable that his administration would have prioritized the advancement of civil rights for African Americans. He may have championed policies aimed at ensuring their full participation in the social, economic, and political life of the nation, laying the groundwork for a more equitable society.

Furthermore, Lincoln's continued presence on the national stage could have influenced the course of American politics in subsequent decades. His leadership and moral authority might have shaped the direction of the Republican Party, steering it towards a more progressive stance on issues of racial justice and equality.

Post-war Period

However, it's essential to acknowledge the challenges and obstacles that Lincoln would have faced had he survived. The post-Civil War period was fraught with complexities and tensions, and the path to reconciliation was far from straightforward. Lincoln's ability to navigate these challenges would have been tested, and the outcome remains uncertain.

Moreover, the specter of assassination would have loomed large over Lincoln's presidency, casting a shadow of fear and uncertainty over the nation. The five earlier failed attempts on his life served as a stark reminder of the continued dangers inherent in political leadership, therefore, Lincoln would have to contend with the constant threat of violence.

In considering the hypothetical scenario of Lincoln's continued presidency, it's impossible to predict with certainty the course of history. Countless variables and contingencies would have influenced the trajectory of events, and the outcomes could have been vastly different from those we know today.

However, what remains clear is the enduring legacy of Abraham Lincoln and the profound impact of his presidency on the course of American history. Whether through his leadership during the Civil War, his commitment to the abolition of slavery, or his vision for a more perfect union, Lincoln's contributions to the fabric of American democracy are indelible.

In the final analysis, the question of what if Abraham Lincoln had not been assassinated invites the reflection of not only on the past but also on the present and future of the United States. It prompts the consideration of pivotal moments and decisions that shape the course of history and contemplate the enduring legacy of leadership, courage, and conviction. While it is impossible to ever know with certainty what might have been, it is possible to draw inspiration from Lincoln's example and strive to uphold the values that he held dear: freedom, equality, and the pursuit of a more perfect union.

Did you find that piece interesting? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

The Battle of Gettysburg - Part 3: July 2, Day 2

When the fighting ended on the evening of July 1, Gen. Robert E. Lee was uncertain of the position of the Army of the Potomac. It was ambiguous how far south along Cemetery Ridge the Union line extended. Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton had conducted a reconnaissance on the evening of July 1 to locate artillery positions on the northern part of Seminary Ridge but did not observe infantry positions. Meanwhile, General George Meade arrived at midnight, received reports, and agreed to defend the position the next day rather than retreat.

Here, Lloyd W Klein explains what happened on day 2.

If you missed it, part 1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here, and part 2 on day 1 of the battle is here.

A depiction of Jubal Early's attack on East Cemetery Hill on July 2, 1863. From The Century Magazine, 1884.

The Reconnaissance Mission

In the early hours of July 2nd, General Lee determined that before he could devise a battle strategy for the day, he needed accurate intelligence as to the left flank of the Union line. Longstreet’s Chief Engineer, Maj. John C. Clarke joined Captain Samuel R. Johnston, one of Lee’s aides, on a nighttime mission. They set out at 4 am to locate the Union left. Johnston claimed he took a route very close to Longstreet’s countermarch later that day and made it to the top of Little Round Top (LRT), and saw no Union troops there at all.

Although the exact route taken by Johnston remains a matter of speculation, determining it precisely holds significant importance in comprehending the events that unfolded during the battle on July 2. It is likely that he departed from Lee's headquarters near the Lutheran Theological Seminary and proceeded south along the western slope of Seminary Ridge, eventually entering the Willoughby Run valley. Along this path, he would have passed by the Samuel Pitzer farm and the Pitzer Schoolhouse. Subsequently, he probably turned east, ascending the western slope of Warfield Ridge, near the location where McLaws later positioned his troops that afternoon. Johnston himself mentioned that he continued along the ridge towards the round top, crossing the Emmitsburg road, until he reached the slope of LRT, providing him with a commanding view. This sequence of movements would have placed him on LRT around 5:30 a.m.

Following his reconnaissance, Johnston reported to General Lee that there existed a concealed route that could not be detected from the Union lines. Crucially, he noted that the large hill in the distance, “with a commanding view”, which was LRT, was unoccupied. General Lee formulated his attack plan for July 2 based on the intelligence provided by Johnston's mission.

The problem with his information is that historical records indicate the presence of numerous Union troops on the hill that night. Buford's cavalry and Geary's division were encamped in front of LRT, with two regiments stationed there along with skirmishers. At 7 a.m., Major General David B. Birney of the Third Corps relieved General Geary, who had spent the entire night at that location. It has been estimated that approximately 18,000 Union troops were positioned between the Emmitsburg Road and the Taneytown Road, as well as between LRT and the George Weikert Farm, precisely when Johnston claimed to have been on Little Roundtop. Given these circumstances, it seems highly unlikely that Johnston could have conducted his scouting mission without being detected. Additionally, Captain Lemuel B. Norton, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army of the Potomac, reported the establishment of a signal station on Little Roundtop by 11 P.M. on July 1.

So what could have transpired? One possibility is that Johnston may have been on Big Round Top, as during that period, there was no clear distinction between the two peaks. Another hypothesis put forth by Wittenberg suggests that Johnston might have been disoriented in the darkness and mistakenly believed he was on Bushman's Hill. Others have suggested that he got as far as Houck’s Ridge. Johnston had previously carried out similar successful services at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, so the reason behind the inaccurate information he provided to General Lee before 8 a.m. remains unresolved. Nevertheless, based on this intelligence, General Lee formulated a plan.

Lee’s Plan

Lee initiated preparations assuming that the Union left was positioned on Cemetery Ridge, and he instructed Longstreet to make the necessary arrangements. Lee desired this assault to catch the enemy off guard, so Longstreet was tasked with taking a concealed route along Seminary Ridge, descending to the Emmitsburg Pike without attracting attention, and then launching the attack. However, the First Corps had not yet fully arrived. They had been delayed during their movement behind South Mountain, and to reach the battlefield, they had to pass through Cashtown and cover a distance of 10 miles to Gettysburg. Longstreet insisted on having all his men present for the attack. Unfortunately, when they finally set off, they were led on a roundabout path that exposed their presence, resulting in a significant delay to their assault, which occurred well into the afternoon.

The Myth of the Sunrise Attack

July 2, 1863, was the true High Water Mark of the Confederacy. The narrative that Longstreet could have launched an attack that morning, altering the course of history, was a notion perpetuated by Jubal Early in the post-war era. General Pendleton's insistence on this theory only added to the tension between him and Longstreet.

Glenn Tucker's thorough examination in the 1960s discredited the myth of the sunrise attack, further supported by Longstreet's memoirs. The reality was that only a fraction of Longstreet's forces were in position at 7 am, with the majority still miles away. The impracticality of organizing such an attack, coupled with the overwhelming Union presence, makes it clear that Longstreet's alleged failure to act at that specific time did not determine the outcome of the battle or the war. Only McLaws, the artillery, and a part of Hood’s division were even up at 7 am, about 10,000 men, and that was after an all-night march. Had they attacked, they might have been met by 60,000 Union troops. The rest of the Corps were at Chambersburg and south of Cashtown. He moved up as quickly as possible, but most of his men were miles from Seminary Ridge at 7 am.

Even an 11 am start was not feasible due to various delays faced by his corps reaching the battlefield, resulting in a later arrival time. Alexander and his artillery didn’t even arrive until 9 am. Lee's vision of simultaneous flank offensives was hindered by Longstreet's need to wait for Law's brigade to arrive; the delay in Law's arrival further postponed the attack, with three brigades still in march columns when Longstreet finally began his movement at noon. Witness reports of Lee's frustration at 11 am that the attack had not started highlight the challenges faced in coordinating the attack, with delays caused by traffic jams. But Longstreet's attack was delayed because he first had to wait for his final brigade (Evander M. Law's & Hood's division) to arrive, and then he was forced to march on a long, circuitous route that could not be seen by Union Army Signal Corps observers on LRT. Longstreet received permission from Lee to wait for Law's brigade to reach the field before advancing. Law marched his men quickly, covering 28 miles in 11 hours, but did not arrive until noon. Three of Longstreet's brigades were still in march columns when he set off. In retrospect, Lee & Longstreet should have kept these men closer to the front, not at the tail end of the order of march.

Longstreet intended to place his men across from the Emmitsburg Pike facing east, toward the enemy lines directly facing them. Lee's strategic vision called for a different approach - he wanted the troops to face north and advance towards Cemetery Ridge and Hill. This shift in direction was crucial, as Lee aimed for a concentrated attack on the Union center on both Day 2 and Day 3 of the battle.

As Longstreet's men approached the area near Blackhorse Tavern, the presence of Union signalmen on LRT posed a risk of detection. In response, the decision was made to countermarch back to the starting point, to keep the lines in the correct order for the attack. This resulted in a delay of at least one hour, and Longstreet did not reach the appropriate zone until 4 pm.  Whether the countermarch was necessary or not is a matter of contention. However, the countermarch took longer than expected, and by the time Longstreet's troops were ready to launch their attack, valuable time had been lost. The delay allowed the Union Army to reinforce their position, and for additional troops to march toward the battlefield.

Maj Gen Daniel Sickles and III Corps

At this moment, arguably the most crucial hour of the entire war, an unauthorized troop movement changed the course of the battle and history. Ordered to hold the line on the ground between LRT and Cemetery Ridge, Maj Gen Sickles instead, on his own initiative, decided that this was a poor position for his III Corps, and instead moved them forward (west) about a half mile to the Sherfy Peach Orchard, on the Emmitsburg Pike. The consequences of this unauthorized movement reverberate through the ages

Sickles perceived, correctly, that the ground in his front was about 10 to 15 feet higher than the ground he was supposed to defend. He believed therefore that his line was in a vulnerable position for enemy artillery to destroy him. A very similar situation had happened at Chancellorsville when he was ordered by General Hooker to give up Hazel Crest, which then became the key to Confederate artillery destroying the army on day 2 of that battle. Sickles hadn’t forgotten that experience, so he asked Meade for permission to move up at least twice. Meade thought that the area was not in a good position and was in a no-man’s land. Famously when General Meade saw this right before the battle opened, he told Sickles that he was out of position and knew a disaster was in store. Hancock made a similar famous observation.

General Sickles decided at 11 AM to not defend the line General Meade assigned him between   Top and Cemetery Ridge but rather to advance to the Peach Orchard. This unauthorized move must count as one of the most fateful decisions of the entire war. Certainly, it led to the destruction of his III Corps, and it threatened the entire left flank of the Union defense, but paradoxically, it might have saved the battle. By leaving uncovered both of his flanks, leaving   (LRT) Top uncovered, and not telling anyone what he was up to, he put Meade at a serious disadvantage.

The decision to defend the Sherfy Peach Orchard, adjacent to the Emmitsburg Pike, rather than the assigned position on the descending limb of LRT attached to Cemetery Ridge, not only resulted in a vulnerable and easily attacked position but also left the flanks exposed. The left flank, consisting of LRT, Devil’s Den, and the Wheatfield, had to be hastily covered as troops entered the battle. As units arrived on the field, they were immediately dispatched to critical locations to save Sickles' III Corps and the entire front. The success of Day 2 of Gettysburg relied heavily on the bravery and valor displayed by numerous men and their regiments, who are now remembered as heroes. It is important to acknowledge that Sickles' unconventional decision does not absolve him of the fact that he acted without proper knowledge, displayed insubordination, endangered the Union line, and caused the loss of many lives. However, it should also be noted that he was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions and was regarded as a great hero during his time.

Longstreet Attacks

At 4 pm, Longstreet finally prepared to launch his attack, only to realize that circumstances had changed in the interim. His original battle plan involved a left wheel followed by an en echelon attack. However, it became immediately apparent that this plan was no longer feasible due to the III Corps' position at the eastern edge of the Emmitsburg Pike, specifically at the Peach Orchard. Upon seeing Sickles' chosen position, it became clear that Lee's intended plan was no longer viable. Attacking northwards while the Peach Orchard remained under Union control was no longer an option. Instead, Longstreet's attack had to be redirected eastward, crossing the turnpike and landing further south than initially intended by Lee. The original objective of attacking the Union center had now shifted to targeting its left flank.

Hood repeatedly questioned Longstreet about whether the attack should be called off or if the plan needed to be altered due to the changed position of the Union line. Despite these inquiries, Longstreet insisted on proceeding with the attack as ordered. When told to attack as ordered, he reportedly told the colonel of a TX regiment something along the lines of "When we get under fire, I will have a digression." We don’t know if he said this, but the digression is often assumed to be the attack on LRT. His pep talk to the troops before the attack stepped off included a reference to taking those heights, also widely assumed to refer to LRT.

The assault on LRT occurred due to General Law's movement eastward, leading his 15th and 47th Alabama regiments to pursue US Sharpshooters up Big Round Top. As the Sharpshooters retreated down the slope, the Alabama regiments found themselves without a clear target, prompting them to be directed northward until they eventually reached LRT.

Following this, a crucial period unfolded where the fate of the battle, and potentially the entire war, teetered on the edge for several hours. Major General John Bell Hood launched an attack on LRT and Devil's Den, while Major General Lafayette McLaws attacked the Wheatfield and the Peach Orchard. Although neither side emerged victorious, the Union III Corps suffered significant losses.

The echelon attack strategy employed that day is often misconstrued, necessitating clarification on which plan is being referenced: the original strategy where McLaws' division would have taken the lead, or the revised plan and actual sequence of events after Union troops were spotted on Sickles' advanced line, resulting in Hood's division leading the charge. Under the initial plan, McLaws would have advanced alongside the Emmitsburg Road towards a Union flank presumed to be further north, with Hood's division providing support, likely by advancing to his rear or right rear. The ultimate goal was for the attack, with support from AP Hill’s Corps, to culminate on Cemetery Ridge and potentially Cemetery Hill.

Under the original plan, McLaws would have advanced astride the Emmitsburg Road, across the Peach Orchard, toward a Union flank believed to be located further north.  Hood's division would have supported McLaws.  Exactly how is unclear, but probably advancing to his rear or right rear.  At some point, McLaws would have probably shifted entirely east of the road, because continuing to advance astride it would have missed most of the Union position.  With support from AP Hill’s Corps, the idea was that ultimately the attack would end up on Cemetery Ridge and hopefully Cemetery Hill.

In the actual unfolding of events, Hood's division took the lead, but it underwent significant revisions on the spot. The plan was for the division to advance "up the Emmitsburg Road," but not directly on it. It's important to note that this was not meant to be an en echelon attack, where units are arranged diagonally. Instead, the division would advance in a column formation, with two brigades side by side in the first line (Law and Robertson), followed by Benning and Anderson in the same manner. The en echelon aspect would come later, but it never actually materialized. The plan was for Robertson to align his left flank with the Emmitsburg Road and his right flank with Law's position. However, Law veered to the east, making it impossible for Robertson to maintain both alignments. He chose to hold on to Law's left flank instead. As a result, Lee's original concept of advancing "up the Emmitsburg Road" was abandoned once the Peach Orchard and the Wheatfield turned into deadly battlegrounds.

The phrase "en echelon attack" often carries a sense of awe, as if it is an unstoppable and overwhelming force. An en echelon formation is a diagonal arrangement of units, with each unit positioned at an oblique angle to a specific direction. The name of this formation comes from the French word "échelon," which means a rung of a ladder, describing the ladder-like shape when viewed from above or below. This formation is favored due to the enhanced visibility it provides to each unit.

However, as the events of July 2 demonstrated, an en echelon attack can also become disjointed and ineffective. By launching attacks in a sequential manner, the initial attack draws the enemy's attention, potentially leaving subsequent parts of the formation under-defended. Timing is crucial, and any delay at the start can significantly impact the later stages. On the second day of the battle, Hood and McLaws deviated from their intended northward direction and instead moved east, as the enemy had shifted in that direction. This created a weak point at the top of the formation. Despite this setback, the attack almost succeeded due to Sickles' exposed position, but the change in direction ultimately diminished the impact of the latter stages, falling short of Lee's expectations.

Unlike Hood's division, McLaws division did attack en echelon in two lines, with Kershaw and Barksdale in the front line, followed by Semmes and Wofford in the second line. While Barksdale attempted to drive north along the road into Humphreys' left flank, most of McLaws' efforts were directed east, towards Wheatfield Road and Plum Run Swale. Wofford's brigade, for instance, ended up moving down Wheatfield Road instead of supporting Barksdale.

The idea of Hood turning right to flank the Union left was not a straightforward option due to various factors. No suitable roads were running east/west for Hood to take his division on a flanking attack. Additionally, the presence of the Union VI Corps in the area would have made any movement slow and risky. Lee already had an extended front line, making it challenging to shift the whole army to support Hood's potential maneuver. Without proper intelligence on the terrain and Federal positions, Hood's division would have been vulnerable without infantry or artillery support. The lack of such information is directly attributable to the reality that Stuart was nowhere to be seen. Finally, once Anderson's division is committed. any movement in that direction would have been too small to make a difference.

Laws made a tactical decision of immense consequence. Hood organized his division into two lines, with Jerome B. Robertson’s Brigade and Evander M. Law’s Brigade forming the first attacking line, followed by George T. Anderson’s Brigade and Henry L. Benning’s Brigade in support. Law’s Brigade held a significant position as the right brigade not only in Hood’s Division but also in the entire Army of Northern Virginia. As Law’s Brigade advanced, it faced artillery fire from Captain James Smith’s battery near Devil’s Den.

Law had several options to consider as his brigade moved forward: continue moving eastward; incline his entire brigade toward Devil’s Den; or send part of his brigade to attack Smith’s guns and continue forward with the remainder of his force. Law decided to direct the right two regiments, the 44th Alabama and the 48th Alabama, to flank left and attack north towards the Union battery. The 15th Alabama, which had been in the center, now found itself on the far right of the brigade, moving towards the valley between Big Round Top and LRT, with the 47th Alabama on its left. This decision led to unexpected fighting near LRT and Devil’s Den, deviating from Lee’s original plan, with Benning’s Brigade ultimately ending up in Devil’s Den instead of advancing north on Emmitsburg Road.

The Defense of LRT

There was a scarcity of Union troops along LRT during that period. Conversely, there was a significant presence of Union troops and artillery positioned on Houck's Ridge. The left flank of the Union forces was not situated on LRT by 4 pm, but rather at Devil's Den. The outcome of Day 2 at Gettysburg hinged upon the valor and bravery displayed by numerous men, who are now revered as heroes alongside their regiments. Additionally, credit must be attributed to Meade for effectively mobilizing over 20,000 reinforcements to secure the salient that had not been part of his initial plan.

The chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren was considered the "Savior of Little Round Top" for his quick reaction to get troops to the summit before the approaching Confederates arrived on the afternoon of July 2.  His statue on what is now known as Warren Rock immortalizes the moment that he saw the long line of Rebel soldiers approaching from the south. It depicts the moment when he looked out with binoculars, saw the Rebels moving his way, and realized that he needed to get troops and batteries up there as soon as he could. General Warren recognized that LRT dominated the Union position and had been left undefended, and the tactical importance of the hill. He urgently sought Union troops to occupy it before the Confederates could,  but where would these troops come from? A New Yorker who had taught mathematics at West Point, he had no time to get authorization: he immediately, on his own initiative, constructed a defense of the Union left flank.

Warren encountered Strong Vincent's brigade nearby and asked for immediate assistance. Vincent, without consulting his superior officers, decided, "I will take the responsibility to take my brigade there." Vincent ordered one of his regiments to face southwards, positioned on the left flank of the brigade, while he handled the right flank, facing west. The regiment he so ordered was the 20th Maine and its commander was Colonel Joshua Chamberlain, who would become one of the greatest heroes of the war and governor of Maine. Vincent made it clear to Chamberlain that he was the far left flank regiment of the entire Union line, and that he must hold it no matter what. Vincent went back to his right flank, where the 16th Michigan was beginning to falter; at that moment he was mortally wounded. He would receive a battlefield promotion to general from Meade; that portion of LRT is called Vincent’s Spur.

Colonel Strong Vincent's brigade was discovered by a staff officer nearby. Recognizing the strategic advantage of his brigade's position, Vincent took it upon himself to deploy them where they would be most effective. Disregarding the need for approval from his superiors, he made the decision independently. Pvt. Oliver Willcox Norton, Vincent's brigade standard bearer and bugler, together with Vincent, made a reconnaissance of the Confederate forces as the brigade was moving into position, "While our line was forming on the hill at Gettysburg I came out with him in full view of the rebel lines. They opened two batteries on us instantly, firing at the colors. Colonel Vincent looked to see what was drawing the fire and yelled at me, "Down with the flag, Norton! Damn it, go behind the rocks with it."

Standing atop a large boulder, he brandished a riding crop and shouted for his troops to hold their ground. Tragically, he was struck by a bullet and fell. However, the resolute efforts of his brigades and the individual regiments within it, such as the 20th Maine, the 44th New York, the 83rd Pennsylvania, and the 16th Michigan Infantry, ultimately secured the position. Vincent was transported from the hill to a nearby farm, where he succumbed to his injuries five days later. Vincent received a promotion to brigadier general by General Meade before he died. LRT could not have been held without his leadership.

Vincent's 20th Maine regiment, under the command of Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, gained significant renown for their defense of LRT. Upon their arrival in the late afternoon of July 2, Chamberlain's regiment was directed by Colonel Vincent to secure the far left position of the Union lines and to hold it at any cost. Recognizing the crucial importance of this position, Vincent emphasized its significance to Chamberlain while he attended to the right flank of the brigade. Chamberlain's regiment stood as the final line of defense on the left flank, understanding that if they were to falter, the entire Union position could collapse.

The 15th Regiment Alabama Infantry, commanded by Col. William C. Oates, charged up the hill multiple times attempting to flank the Union position. The line of the 20th Maine was doubled back upon itself, with a squad well off to the left. Despite multiple casualties and ammunition almost gone, Chamberlain recognized the dire circumstance and ordered his left wing to initiate a bayonet charge. The resulting action, with the left wing wheeling to make the charging line swing like a hinge, created a simultaneous frontal assault and flanking maneuver. Chamberlain's decisive action against Oates' Alabama brigade, risking their lives in a suicidal bayonet charge when they were nearly overwhelmed, successfully safeguarded the flank of the army on LRT.  101 of the Confederate soldiers were captured and the charge saved the flank. Chamberlain sustained one slight wound in the battle when a shot hit his sword scabbard and bruised his thigh. After initiating the maneuver, a Confederate officer wielding a revolver fired, narrowly missing his face. Chamberlain put his saber at the officer's throat and accepted the man's surrender. He received the Medal of Honor for this action.

Warren encountered Patrick “Paddy” O’Rorke, a former student and fellow New Yorker. Despite being ordered to follow his brigade commander, Steven Weed.. Warren knew O’Rorke from West Point, having been his Mathematics instructor.  Warren rode up to O’Rorke and ordered him to reinforce Little Round Top; “Never mind (your Brigade Orders), Paddy. Bring them up on the double-quick and don’t stop for aligning. I’ll take the responsibility.”

O’Rorke did not hesitate.  Warren’s aide was George Washington Roebling, who would later build the Brooklyn Bridge.  He guided O’Rorke and his men to the correct position on the hill. Reaching the top, O’Rorke saw the line of 16th Michigan holding tentatively. O’Rorke drew his sword shouting: “Down this way, boys!” The 140th “advanced, following their Colonel.  Despite a devastating volley in which men fell the men exhausted from their march nevertheless moved up. O’Rorke retrieved the regimental flag and urged his men forward.   Then a bullet hit him in the neck and he fell mortally wounded. This courageous action led to O’Rorke being killed, but he is remembered as one of the bravest American military figures, with his likeness being the focal point of the 140th NY monument on LRT today.

Weed then followed, and brought up his artillery commanded by Lt Charles Hazlett. Both were killed in a memorable moment, and the rock they were killed on remains a huge attraction.

General Sykes in his report on the action stated: “Vincent, Weed, and Hazlett, chiefs lamented throughout the corps and army, sealed with their lives the spot intrusted to their keeping, and on which so much depended.... General Weed and Colonel Vincent, officers of rare promise, gave their lives to their country.”

The Attack Continues

The unsuccessful assault by the Third Corps division of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson against the Union center on Cemetery Ridge was the final chapter. Anderson's brigades attacked en echelon, or at least, most of them.  But unlike Hood and McLaws, Anderson's division had no support line.  It had not been intended to make a main effort.  Instead, its brigades were to advance in sequence, as McLaws moved north into its sector.  It would have supported what was already a success. Instead, with Hood's and McLaws' attacks going elsewhere, Anderson was essentially forced to make a primary effort, which his deployment was not suited to.  With no secondary lines, his brigades couldn't exploit any success they might attain.  Once they encountered resistance, they had to withdraw.

The fighting continued into the looming dusk. The sun was sinking, and with it, Confederate hopes of a breakthrough. Intense fighting raged on Culps Hill, Devil’s Den, the Wheatfield, and Cemetery Ridge. The killing fields were covered with soldiers, and horses, and burned and destroyed farms and artillery. The “lines” at this point were hypothetical in some places, as the enemy approached at unexpected angles and from above and below. The scenes were those of almost complete chaos. The bodies of the dead were everywhere.

Devil’s Den:

Devil's Den, located at the extreme left of the III Corps salient under Birney's Division, holds significant geological importance as it is a southern extension of Houck's Ridge and is characterized by its massive boulders. This area proved to be a strategic position for Confederate sharpshooters who took cover behind these boulders and engaged in long-range firing. The Union left flank faced a threat from two regiments of Law's brigade, followed by an attack from Benning and Anderson's brigades of Hood's Division, which exploited a gap in the defense. Despite reinforcements, the Confederate forces outnumbered the Union by a ratio of 5000 to 2500, resulting in a forced retreat. The casualties suffered by both sides amounted to approximately one-third of their respective forces.

Wheatfield:

The Wheatfield was a triangular-shaped field situated at the base of LRT. It was a crucial battleground with road connections spanning the entire fighting zone. Combatants from both sides entered this 20-acre field and launched attacks, only to face unexpected counterattacks from various angles. Owned by John Rose, the Wheatfield was bordered by Rose Woods to the west and Stony Hill, a slight elevation. Houck's Ridge lay to the southeast, while Devil's Den stood to the south. Although elements of the III Corps primarily defended this area, General Meade recognized the vulnerability of Sickles' salient and ordered Caldwell's division from the II Corps, under the command of Hancock, to assist. Notably, the leadership of Samuel Zook, Patrick Kelly (the Irish Brigade), and Edward Cross, who led three brigades, emerged as heroes. The Confederate brigades of Semmes, Anderson, and Kershaw confronted a total of six Federal brigades, resulting in casualties amounting to approximately 30% of all engaged forces.

Colonel Regis de Trobriand, commanding the 38th NY, played a pivotal role in the Wheatfield. His brigade displayed unwavering determination against the relentless assaults launched by Hood's division, particularly the Georgia brigade led by Brigadier General George T. Anderson and the South Carolina brigade commanded by Brigadier General Joseph B. Kershaw. Despite facing overwhelming odds, de Trobriand's brigade valiantly held their ground until they were relieved by units from Major General John C. Caldwell's division of the II Corps. But there was a terrible price—every third man in Trobriand's brigade was a casualty. Despite a personal commendation by his commander, General Birney, he was not promoted for two more years, nor given a medal, likely because he was French, older, and not from West Point. He had a distinguished military career after the war and was an artist and author.

Col. Edward E Cross, 2nd Corps, 1st Division brigade commander.  Positioned on the left of the division's battle line as it entered the Wheatfield, Cross led his brigade with valor and determination. During the fighting, Cross was mortally wounded while at the left of his line near the Rose Woods. He died the next day at a field hospital.  He normally wore a red bandana into battle but having had a premonition of his death wore a black one this day instead which he was wearing when he was cut down leading his brigade into the Wheatfield leading Caldwell's division to support the advanced position of the under attack 3rd Corps. Hancock told him he would be promoted to Brigadier General after that battle, which is when he announced his premonition. 

Samuel Zook: On July 2, 1863, the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell's division, including Zook's brigade, was sent to reinforce the crumbling III Corps line that was being assaulted by the Confederate corps of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet. Zook was directed by one of the III Corps staff officers toward the Wheatfield to reinforce the brigade of Col. Régis de Trobriand and to fill a gap near Stony Hill. Zook, on horseback, led his men up the hill, which attracted the attention of men from the advancing 3rd and 7th South Carolina Infantry regiments, of Joseph B. Kershaw's brigade. He was struck by rifle fire in the shoulder, chest, and abdomen, and taken behind the lines for medical treatment at a toll house on the Baltimore Pike. He died from his wounds on July 3.

Cemetery Ridge:

At the top of the “ladder” was Richard Anderson's division of AP Hill's 3rd Corps, which along with Confederate brigades under Cadmus Wilcox, David Lang, and Ambrose Wright made a final attempt at Cemetery Ridge. The brigades of Carnot Posey and William Mahone did not attack, for reasons that remain obscure and controversial.

The Wilcox and Lang attacks drove Humphrey’s line, at the left of the Sickles salient, back toward Cemetery Ridge. Fighting an intense retreat, Humphreys’ resistance gave Meade and Hancock a chance to find reinforcements for the onslaught that was gathering, which was Lee’s idea all along. They had to bring XII Corps from Culps Hill, as we discussed previously.

William Colvill. During the intense fighting in the Wheatfield, AP Hill’s Corps made a move towards the Union center. He deployed the 3rd Brigade of the 3rd Division, led by Col. George Willard, to counter the advance of Confederate Brigadier General William Barksdale's Brigade. Meanwhile, as Hancock searched for reinforcements, he spotted Wilcox's brigade positioned near the base of the ridge, targeting a gap in the Union line. With time being of the essence, Hancock made a crucial decision to call upon the 1st Minnesota, Harrow's Brigade, of the 2nd Division of the II Corps, to confront Wilcox's division. Despite being vastly outnumbered, Hancock ordered the 1st Minnesota Volunteer Infantry Regiment to engage in a desperate bayonet charge against the much larger Confederate brigade four times its size. 

Colonel Colville had been arrested on the way to the Gettysburg battlefield for allowing his men to ford a river on logs chasing the Confederate army into Maryland. His regiment arrived in Gettysburg on the morning of July 2 after traveling 14 miles every day for 11 days, finally resting on Cemetery Ridge.

Pointing towards a Confederate flag flying over the advancing enemy line, Hancock urged Col. William Colvill to lead his men in capturing the colors. He shouted to Col. William Colvill, "Advance, Colonel, and take those colors!" The 262 Minnesotans bravely charged the Alabama brigade with fixed bayonets, managing to halt their progress at Plum Run but suffering devastating losses in the process, with 215 casualties (82%), including 40 fatalities or severe injuries. Col. Colville, who had been detained on his way to the Gettysburg battlefield for allowing his troops to cross a river on logs while pursuing the Confederate forces into Maryland, eventually arrived at Gettysburg on July 2 after an arduous journey. The 1st Minnesota became an iconic regiment that survived more casualties percentage-wise than any other during any other single battle. Due to heroic action there, Colvilll was severely wounded, requiring a cane for the rest of his life.

Despite claims that Wright's brigade "pierced the Union line", the best it seems to have done was attain a brief lodgment on its right wing, which it could neither hold nor exploit, and had to relinquish.  The Union veterans of the action disputed even this interpretation. The only reason that part of Wright's Brigade managed to pass towards the top of Cemetery Ridge was that the 22nd Georgia (and part of the 3rd Georgia) struck a hole in Gibbon's line that had been created when part of Hall's Brigade was sent south to stabilize the line as the Third Corps retreated. On his left where he smacked into the face of the Philadelphia Brigade, Wright was stopped cold and never made it closer than 30 yards from the stone wall. Posey and Mahone would have been facing two of Hays' brigades and numerous guns on Cemetery Hill. They would have been running a gauntlet to approach the Union line. They may have seen something like what Pettigrew and Trimble faced on the afternoon of July 3.

Freeman McGilvery. McGilvery identified a vulnerable and unguarded gap in the Union's defensive line situated at the southern part of Cemetery Ridge, just north of LRT. In response to this critical finding, McGilvery skillfully assembled a makeshift artillery line by gathering cannons from different commands to fortify the gap. Although lacking infantry support initially, McGilvery's strategically positioned "Plum Run line" of fieldpieces played a crucial role in thwarting the Confederate forces' final push towards the heart of the Union's position.

Summary

As the battle neared its end, Longstreet's assault had been stopped despite the possibility of breakthroughs in different areas. The question arises: would the addition of more troops have changed the outcome? If Anderson had followed orders and deployed all five brigades instead of just three, in a coordinated and echelon formation, could Cemetery Ridge have been breached? The absence of 3,000 men between Posey and Mahone, as well as the lack of support from Wofford's Georgia Brigade for Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade, impeded the success of the attack. If Anderson's forces had been at full strength with all five brigades engaged, there might have been a chance to secure a foothold on a portion of Cemetery Ridge. However, similar to Pickett's Charge the next day, the lack of reinforcements to maintain the breakthrough would have posed a significant challenge against the inevitable counterattack. There were no reserves or supports prepared to exploit any breakthrough, and the dwindling daylight further complicated the situation.

Most importantly, by 6 pm, the tide had turned. The Union had gained the numerical advantage, with more reinforcements heading towards Cemetery Ridge. The presence of additional Union divisions, fresh brigades, and elements of other corps nearby solidified the Union's position. The remnants of Robinson's and Doubleday's Divisions (including Stannard's fresh brigade) and elements of the Sixth and Twelfth Corps were nearby. Despite the temporary advantage that Lee's forces had initially held, the overwhelming strength of the Union forces, combined with the fading daylight, worked against any potential breakthroughs. The brief advantage that fate had bestowed upon Lee was now gone.

Enjoy that piece? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

Further Reading

·       Harry W Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day. University of North Carolina Press, 1987.

·       Glenn Tucker, High Tide at Gettysburg. Bobbs-Merrill, 1958.

Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg. MacMillan Publishing Company. 1968.

·       Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.

·       James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. 2nd edition, Lippincott, 1912. Accessed at: http://www.wtj.com/archives/longstreet/

·       Richard Moe, The Last Full Measure: The Life and Death of the First Minnesota Volunteers. HarperCollins Publishers, 1994.

·       https://aoh.com/2019/03/25/patrick-ororke-a-forgotten-hero-of-gettysburg/

·       https://killedatgettysburg.org/patrick-ororke-140th-new-york/

·       Schmidt, Jim. "The Medical Department: A Thorn in the Lion of the Union", Civil War News, October 2000.

·       https://www.civilwarmed.org/chamberlain/

·       https://www.historynet.com/20-fateful-decisions-at-gettysburg/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=hnt-hnn-theme

·       James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.

·       Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volumes 1-3. Random House, 1963.

·       Stephen W Sears, Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004.

·       Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler, A Field Guide to Gettysburg, Second Edition: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People. University of North Carolina Press, 2017.

·       J David Petruzzi, The Complete Gettysburg Guide. SavasBeattie, 2009.

Philadelphia’s Civil War Hero

George E. Stephens was a Civil War hero from Philadelphia. He was outraged at not initially being able to fight as he was an African America, so took other roles until free African Americans could join the war.

The 54th Massachusetts Infantry Regimentat the Second Battle of Fort Wagner in July 1863. By Kurz & Allison.

When It came to the cause of freedom, George E. Stephens was the first to step up.

It’s been 160 years since the last of George E. Stephens correspondence letters were sent to the New York Weekly Anglo-African, and 35 years since the Civil War movie Glory hit movie theaters around the country. The film depicts the formation of the 54th Massachusetts who bravery led the attack on the Confederate defenses at Fort Wagner in Charleston Harbor in July of 1863.

He is even loosely based on a character in the 1989 film.

Stephens was born in Philadelphia in 1832, the son of William Stephens, worked who would eventually become a lay preacher in the First African Baptist Church, which became extremely active in the abolitionist movement and ultimately in the Underground Railroad.

Although we don’t know much about Stephens’ education, it is probable that he received an education through the Quakers and possibly the Pennsylvania Abolition Society.

Honoring African American Mathematician Benjamin Banneker, he joined a group of fifteen to form The Banneker Institute (a literary society.) Ironically, he was nearly enslaved between 1857–1858 around where the 54th Massachusetts would make their galant charge on Fort Wagner in 1863.

During the Civil War, he initially signed on as a cook and began sending war correspondences to the New York Weekly Anglo-African. 

Stephens was a driving force in enlisting men to join the 54th in Philadelphia and would himself signup with the regiment in April 1863 as a Sergeant.

During the brave attack on Fort Wagner on July 18, 1863 the 54th Massachusetts emerged after 7:30 P.M. and advanced up the sandy beach. By the time that the regiment’s charge arrived at the parapet of Wagner, they had withstood immense casualties. Among the 272 men killed from the regiment was commander Colonel Shaw, whose sword was taken from his body after the battle. 

Fellow Sergeant William H. Carney, upon seeing that the United States flag was faltering and about to drift into the sand, grabbed it and moved forward despite being wounded. After being pulled to safety, he refused to let go of the colours saying that he had not let them touch the ground.

Stephens was at the center of the 54th’s advance on Fort Wagner. He was wounded but managed to survive and escape without being captured.

After the Civil War, he spent time as a cabinet maker and upholsterer and also as a sailor and also educated newly freed slaves.

Stephens died in Brooklyn, New York in April 1888.

In 1997, editor Donald Yacovone released “A Voice of Thunder: The Civil War Letters of George E. Stephens.”

Did you find that piece interesting? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

Michael Thomas Leibrandt lives and works in Abington Township, Pennsylvania.

How effective was the 1815 Congress of Vienna?

The Congress of Vienna took place in 1814-15 in the light of the ending of the Napoleonic Wars. It had the aim of creating a revised European political order in the post-war period. Here, Bilal Junejo considers how effective the Congress was.

Klemens von Metternich. 1815 portrait by Thomas Lawrence.

Whenever it is the effectiveness of something which has to be determined, it invariably helps to be clear at the outset about the criteria in light of which such determination is to be made. In the case of the Congress of Vienna, how effective was it in doing what? What was it supposed to do when it convened? And what did it then go on to actually do? Was it able, by dint of the settlement which it drew up on 9 June 1815, to accomplish all that it had set out to? Or did subsequent events prove by their very occurrence that the Treaty of Vienna had been “ineffective” (because it could do nothing to forestall them)? To learn the answers, we must begin our analysis by examining the principal characteristics of a peace conference in the abstract — before turning to consider the extent to which those characteristics may be said to have been borne by the Congress of Vienna.

Ordinarily, a peace conference opens in the wake of an armistice. That is because the foremost purpose of such a conference is to determine what the postwar settlement will look like, and there is no point in discussing such a settlement until hostilities have at least provisionally ceased, for any such discussion presupposes knowledge of the international environment in which any settlement drawn up will have to operate, and no ascertainment of that environment can take place until fighting has stopped, not least because the lineaments of that environment will themselves be determined by the timing of the truce. What necessitates such a conference, though, is not the nature of the losing side’s surrender (which may be conditional or unconditional), but the fact that the winning side comprises not one participant but several. The victors’ initial lack of consensus as to the principal characteristics of the postwar settlement, coupled with the inability of each of them to settle things unilaterally in their own favor, makes them hold a conference in the hope of finding (some) common ground. As it is a peace conference, any acceptable settlement (for what is not acceptable will not be workable either) in which its deliberations eventuate has to ensure, if the conference itself is to be called “effective”, three things at all costs — the minimization of the losing side’s ability (and, if the victors are sufficiently wise, incentive) to resume hostilities; the material satisfaction of each victor in proportion to their losses during the war; and finally, if the first two requirements have been fulfilled, an overall arrangement of affairs that is calculated to maximize the life of the new peace. Given how the views of each victor are bound to be colored by considerations of their national security, none of the three things mentioned above can ever admit of an easy solution; but what occasionally complicates matters for everyone is the awkward situation where some members of the winning side turn out to have been able to have accomplished all or most of their wartime goals before the armistice was concluded, whilst the rest expect to be able to accomplish theirs as a direct result of the postwar settlement. The former, whom one might call the possessive, will consequently find their bargaining power at the conference to be much greater than that of the latter, whom one might call the acquisitive. Under such circumstances, the acquisitive will normally make their gains only if they first accord recognition to the wartime gains of the possessive. However, it should also be remembered that the possessive will have, in spite of their superior bargaining position, a vested interest in satisfying as many demands of the acquisitive as they possibly can, since any alienation of the latter will only result in potential allies for the side that has lost the war, presaging a regrouping of forces and a consequent undermining of the new settlement even before it officially comes into being.

Effectiveness

Having ascertained the raison d’être of a peace conference, as well as the three cumulative requirements for making it “effective”, it should not be too difficult now for us to determine just how well the Congress of Vienna’s chosen means conduced to its own ends. Beginning with the first requirement, namely minimizing the losing side’s ability and incentive to resume hostilities, the Congress performed quite well. Unlike most peace conferences, it had the advantage of having opened (in September 1814) only after a proper treaty of peace (as opposed to a mere armistice) had been concluded with the loser (on 30 May). The Treaty of Paris had confirmed not only the Allies’ recognition of the return of legitimate (i.e. internationally acceptable) Bourbon rule to France, but also the terms upon which France (or at least her new, de facto representatives) had agreed that she should thenceforth peacefully coexist with the rest of Europe. The early advent of this congenial development ensured that the Congress, when it subsequently convened, would remain conscious of the need to draw up no settlement of which the provisions in relation to France would be such as to humiliate the French people, subvert the Bourbons’ shaky hold, incite the return of Bonapartism, and plunge Europe into war anew. And given the decision to exile Napoleon to an island as close to France as Elba, it is likely that nobody foresaw the One Hundred Days in May 1814, as nobody could have known then how quickly the Bourbons, notwithstanding the Charter of Ghent, would resume their traditional misrule (ranging from economic inefficiency to humiliating political opponents) after returning to power (Roberts, 2015: 726-8). But that misrule had nothing to do with the Congress. It could, of course, be argued that since the Bourbons owed their return to Allied military support, the Congress could have ordered them to govern less provocatively than they were doing, but that begs the question of how exactly it was supposed to have realized the provocation prior to Napoleon’s smoothest of returns to power in March 1815. As late as February, Lord Castlereagh’s deputy at the Foreign Office was telling Campbell (the British commissioner guarding Napoleon on Elba) when he met him in Florence that “[w]hen you return to Elba, you may tell Bonaparte that he is quite forgotten in Europe: no one thinks of him now (Roberts, 2015: 730).” This cannot be dismissed as mere hyperbole to dampen Napoleon’s spirits, for the aforementioned proximity of Elba to France and the Allies’ indifference to both that and Bourbon misrule (in spite of Allied forces still being present upon French soil) strongly suggest that such a view was genuinely held at the ongoing Congress. But because Napoleon was soon defeated at Waterloo and exiled to faraway St Helena, the Congress never had to atone for its indifference to Bourbon misgovernment. The Second Treaty of Paris (20 November 1815) — which established a Quadruple Alliance of Great Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia to function principally as a system of collective security for nipping any kind of French aggression in the bud — declared that France was to return to her pre-Revolutionary borders, pay an indemnity of 700 million francs, and have the greater part of her territory occupied by Allied forces for five years. But the French people, notwithstanding the Bourbons’ return, complied; and by 1818, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, reparations had been settled, the occupation was ended after only three years, and the Quadruple Alliance became the Quintuple with the addition of France, which finally restored her to full great power status in Europe. The speed with which France was able to regain equality of status in Europe after 1815 shows how the Congress of Vienna, supplemented by the Second Treaty of Paris, had left her neither desirous of overturning the new settlement nor in a position to do so even if she wanted to.

Material satisfaction

Vis-à-vis the second requirement — the victors’ material satisfaction — the Congress also did well. Indeed, it must have done so, if “it is possible to say [that the Vienna settlement] contained in none of its provisions the seeds of a future war between the great powers, and must thus be rated a better peace than either Utrecht or Versailles (Seaman, 2003: 8).” A complete list of the powers’ individual territorial gains is not necessary, for all that concerns us is the realization that because no power felt cheated or resentful, the third requirement — ensuring the peace’s longevity — may be considered in conjunction with the second, as any durable postwar peace presupposes the victors’ general satisfaction. It should be remembered that since the Congress had opened only after the Bourbons’ restoration, its task was not to achieve peace, but to ensure that it would continue. But because that peace was going to be principally between hereditary autocrats, the lack of domestic accountability had to be compensated for by an international equilibrium of forces, which necessitated not only the erosion of revolutionary ideas, but also the remedying of those weaknesses in the Continental structure which had tempted and enabled French aggression in the first place. Unsurprisingly, the best antidote to revolution was perceived to lie in the concept of legitimacy, which meant that the established monarchies of Europe alone had the right to rule over their respective people(s) merelybecause they were established. It was a return to the status quo ante, as

“After the two World Wars of the twentieth century there was no question of recreating the situation that had existed before the outbreak of hostilities; the statesmen of 1814, on the other hand, were definitely seeking some sort of return to the eighteenth-century system. It was not merely that their pride had been bruised by the impact of Napoleon's armies; the whole basis of the ancien régime had been challenged by the extension of revolutionary principles in the lands adjoining France, and for the Allies the purpose of victory was to restore the political and social framework that had been so roughly shaken since 1789 (Wood, 1964: 6).”

Weak Legitimacy?

The weakness inherent in choosing legitimacy as the basis of the Vienna settlement was that it was based upon the memory of the French Revolution and Napoleon (Kissinger, 1994: 88). Inevitably, as that memory faded with the passage of time, respect for legitimacy (which had only grown as a result of that memory) would diminish, and conflict erupt anew. But in 1815, there existed no other belief upon which to base a consensus. For the settlement to work, every power had not only to make the territorial gains for which she had fought the protracted Napoleonic Wars (and which would constitute her price for acceding to the settlement), but also to rest assured that those gains would not be subsequently snatched from her by a jealous rival. After decades of war, the decision to uphold legitimacy would mean that the incentive for one autocrat not to encroach upon the territory of another could easily lie in the understanding that the latter would reciprocate such forbearance in kind. Indeed, Russia, Prussia, and Austria went a step further, and developed between themselves what would come to be known as the Holy Alliance, which obliged its members to assist one another in the suppression of insurrectionary activity in each other’s dominions. But if legitimacy could keep the powers from exploiting their respective geopolitical opportunities merely for the sake of reciprocity, it did not eliminate the existence of those opportunities. They would be exploited as soon as anyone felt strong enough to do so (as eventually happened in the Crimean War). The principal achievement of the Treaty of Vienna — or rather of its foremost defender, Metternich, who remained Austrian foreign minister until 1848 — was to keep Prussia and Russia, the foremost Continental powers, convinced for over thirty years that their best interests lay in peace rather than war. It helped, of course, that these countries were autocracies, where Metternich only had to convince the monarch and no one else. But throughout his tenure, Metternich’s task had been to keep them from acting, rather than from reacting. One wonders, therefore, whether even Metternich, had he remained in office, would have been able to stave off conflict after the advent of the ‘illegitimate’ and provocatively domineering Napoleon III in 1852. It was Metternich’s luck that no meaningful challenge to the peace arose until after 1848 — and his accomplishment that he kept both Prussia and Russia from challenging it throughout his time in office. Navarino had not challenged the peace because Russia had fought it in concert with the ‘legitimate’ Bourbons and London — and against a non-Christian power, assisting whom was in no way stipulated by the Holy Alliance. Consequently,

“After the Congress of Vienna, Europe experienced the longest period of peace it had ever known. No war at all took place among the Great Powers for forty years, and after the Crimean War in 1854, no general war for another sixty (Kissinger, 1994: 79).”

Good luck

It was the spirit of Vienna’s good luck that it did not die (in 1856) until the rejuvenation of France under Napoleon III (which was shortly eclipsed by German unification under Bismarck) had taken place, restoring something of a military balance on the Continent to counter the end of legitimacy (which was crucial in postponing the outbreak of a general war until 1914). It had taken the combined forces of Great Britain, France, and eventually Piedmont-Sardinia (plus the decisive ultimatum from Austria) to bring Russia to the negotiating table in 1856!

But for the forty years that it lasted, the post-1815 peace also owed something to the Continental restructuring that had taken place at Vienna, and which the precepts of legitimacy subsequently preserved from unilateral change. In the first place, British determination to prevent the recrudescence of Continental subservience to one state had resulted in the creation of a united kingdom of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg to keep the Low Countries’ ports, which were perilously close to Dover, from falling into a Continental power’s hands. Catholic Belgium was united with Protestant Holland not from lack of foresight, but because it was impossible then to confirm future French docility (Seaman, 2003: 4) — not least because Napoleon had yet to be defeated when the Treaty of Vienna was signed on 9 June. Even after Belgium’s secession from the union in 1830, Great Britain was able to have Belgian sovereignty guaranteed by all the great powers under Article 7 of the Treaty of London of 1839 — with the result that thenceforth, until 1914, she could remain comfortably aloof from all disputes in western Europe (particularly at the time of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870), resulting in their automatic reduction to manageable proportions and preventing the outbreak of a Continental conflagration.

German Confederation & Russia

Another (Austro-) British achievement was the establishment of the German Confederation. An association of thirty-nine German states (including parts of both Prussia and Austria) in the center of Europe with no central administration but under the nominal presidency of Vienna would prove to be too strong to be attacked by a neighboring power, but too weak to attack anyone itself (Kissinger, 1994: 81). Checking both French and Russian expansion, as well as maintaining an equilibrium between Prussia and Austria in central Europe, the Confederation promised to be the cornerstone of the Continental equilibrium for which Lord Castlereagh had been straining every nerve.

The cause of peace was also helped by appeasement of the foremost Continental power in 1815 — Russia (Kissinger, 1994: 140). By acknowledging Russian suzerainty over Poland — which the Tsar had captured from Napoleon in the war’s final stages, making Russia a possessive power in the Polish context — the Allies, and especially acquisitive Austria, won Russia’s crucial support for legitimate rule across the Continent. It was the Congress of Vienna because, among the great powers, Austria’s desire for one had been the greatest (Roberts, 2015: 726). Her military weakness meant that her European wishes could only be fulfilled if they also became international decisions. Winning indispensable Russian support at that decisive hour preserved the peace for nearly forty years.

Conclusion

To conclude, the Congress of Vienna was considerably effective because it ushered in an unprecedentedly long era of (general) peace. But because that peace had been inspired by a common fear, it was bound to be lost once that fear had evaporated. Even so, legitimacy’s survival until 1856 allowed the Continent to regain something of a military balance — which helped to postpone the next European war until 1914.

Did you find that piece interesting? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

Bibliography

Kissinger, H. (1994) Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.

Roberts, A. (2015) Napoleon the Great. Penguin Books.

Seaman, L. (2003) From Vienna to Versailles. Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Wood, A. (1964) Europe 1815-1945. Longmans, Green and Co Ltd.